Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (Full Version)

All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> Command: Modern Operations series



Message

AdmiralSteve -> Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (10/25/2016 5:49:43 AM)

I'm knee deep designing a Cold War scenario in which Soviet boomers are encroaching the East Coast of the US, approximately 600-700 NM from the coast and in international waters. I'm curious on real world doctrine and RoE for the era (1967) on how close subs with ICBM's (SS-N-5 Stark with a 750 NM range) would be allowed to approach before being considered hostile and engaged.

Thanks,
Steve



SeaQueen -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (10/25/2016 5:26:50 PM)

The essence of deterrence is the ability to hold targets at risk, so it probably wouldn't matter how close they came, they wouldn't necessarily be considered hostile.

Submarines, being more survivable than land based missiles and bombers, are often considered to be a "second strike," weapon. They prevent one side from attacking another by insuring that if they do attack, there will always be enough weapons remaining to deal a devastating counter strike. If you attacked the Russian submarines before they came close enough to attack targets on land with their missiles, that might be considered preparation for an American first strike because they'd be eliminating the Soviet's ability to respond. That forces a first strike by the Soviets because they can't sit around and wait for their ability to counter strike to be eliminated. Therefore, you'd never attack the SSBNs just because they were in range of their targets.

More likely they'd keep an eye on them somehow and monitor them for signs that they might be preparing to launch. They'd only attack if it looked like a nuclear attack was imminent. That's the whole purpose of "track and trail," like you read about in Cold War histories. You wanted to secretly know where the SSBNs were at all times, so that in the event of signs of an imminent launch, you could destroy them quickly without seeming threatening.

The situation is always unstable, hence the need to play it cool on both sides. Both sides specifically did not want to be the first to start shooting because the first shot, even if it was conventional, could be perceived as the preparation for all-out nuclear war (something to be avoided). That's why deterrence works. Winning means shooting never happens.

What I would do to make a complicated Cold War scenario, is have some very small probability (like... 1 in 10 for "fun's" sake) of changing the side postures to "hostile." Most of the time they'd merely be "unfriendly." Victory would consist of your side's defended aim points remaining intact. Most of the time nothing happens, but you still have to find all the enemy SSBNs because in the event that something actually does occur, you need to be able to destroy them quickly before they launch and limit the damage.

quote:

ORIGINAL: AdmSteebe

I'm knee deep designing a Cold War scenario in which Soviet boomers are encroaching the East Coast of the US, approximately 600-700 NM from the coast and in international waters. I'm curious on real world doctrine and RoE for the era (1967) on how close subs with ICBM's (SS-N-5 Stark with a 750 NM range) would be allowed to approach before being considered hostile and engaged.

Thanks,
Steve




RafaleKiwi -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/2/2016 10:16:19 AM)

Hi I totally agree with SeaQueen's synopsis, but would like to add the time period would be likely also have a very significant bearing on the interpretation ROEs and any likely reaction of a skipper of an attack sub trailing any boomers and more specifically the posture of the boomer at the time.

I've recently completed reading two very interesting books about, or feature, the loss of K-129 in March 1968. The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea by Dr JP Craven and Red Star Rogue by Kenneth Sewell.

Naturally around the period of loss of K-129 there were suspicions of the sinking attributed to USN action by Soviet Admiralty, and it has been suggested that USS Scorpion was sunk as retaliation in May 1968. It is claimed that in August 1968 the wreck of K-129 was located by USS Halibut and the missile hatches were discovered open as if to prepare to launch a first strike of it's SS-N-5 SLBMs which gives raise to the Rogue Submarine theory and it's subsequent effect on international relations between the superpowers.

Bearing in mind also that communications to a submerged vessel is not instantaneous, especially a SSN or SSBN that can remain submerged indefinitely and intelligence and orders may be days old. The Sub needs to receive an ELF signal to be notified to come to PD to receive a more detailed message that will needed to be received and then decoded. The Captain of the vessel can't radio for orders and wait for confirmation due to time constraints, they have to make that snap decision with what information they have. If they see a threat and believe there is a lunch imminent, they need to act to prevent that on their own initiative.

The point I want to make is that is a USN sub or MPA observed a Soviet SSBN or SSB in a possible lunch posture with missile hatches open within range of CONUS in a heightened period of tension would be far more likely to engage than if it was not on the surface or at launch depth with SLBM hatches closed.






SeaQueen -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/2/2016 3:42:28 PM)

quote:

The point I want to make is that is a USN sub or MPA observed a Soviet SSBN or SSB in a possible lunch posture with missile hatches open within range of CONUS in a heightened period of tension would be far more likely to engage than if it was not on the surface or at launch depth with SLBM hatches closed.


The difficult part here is that unless they're sufficiently shallow to have enough light to use the periscope, you have to rely on an uncertain instrument (passive sonar) to determine if the launch hatches are opened. Even then, there's other explanations besides preparing to go to war for opening launch hatches. Those include drills and test launches, to mechanical failures. There'd need to be more information than that before you could attack them.

It's actually a pretty tough problem; "At what point are you sure that SSBNs are going to launch?" The worst case scenario is that the enemy has already launched their first strike and you're merely attempting to mitigate the problem my eliminating their second strike while you scramble your bombers and launch your land based weapons. There's no sense in leaving land based missiles in their silos waiting to get hit. That's actually a real possibility. SSBNs, being a deterrent force, probably wouldn't be asked to launch unless their home was already toast.







Nangleator -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/2/2016 7:45:25 PM)

The story of your mission could follow a "Hunt for Red October" basis, where Soviet boomers alone were given orders to approach and attack at a given time, to ensure simultaneous delivery. A rogue element in the navy, of course.

Perhaps some sabotage of the ELF transmitting stations would be necessary? (How many does a superpower have?)

In a "Failsafe" type reaction, the civilian leaders of the Soviet Union warn America of the approaching threat, and perhaps deadline. They may even offer the services of a few Soviet attack subs, which might be a third 'nation' in the game.

The result is, the U.S. commander knows boomers are coming. Knows a launch will happen after they all reach max range for their targets. A few Russian attack boats, some hostile, some hostile only to the boomers, can complicate things, as an option.



SeaQueen -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/3/2016 5:17:48 PM)

I think the whole "rogue element" thing is overplayed. While it remains the topic of cheesy military techno-thrillers, the truth is that it is an excuse to start shooting when the author cannot think of a rational basis to motivate conflict. In this sense, to me, it represents intellectual sloppiness. It's a way of avoiding the very hard work of trying to understand the conditions under which a conflict might occur, what the goals of such a conflict might be. It's also frequently unrealistic. A good scenario, to me, doesn't depend on rogue elements, but instead depends on a deep understanding of the geopolitics and ways the military might attempt to achieve political goals.



Randomizer -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/3/2016 6:17:23 PM)

100% agreement with SeaQueen in post #5. The loose-cannon PLARB commander is a pretty lame narrative device even given the entirely circumstantial and highly suspect account provided in the supposedly non-fiction book Red Star Rogue.

Long ago (it seems) I had uploaded to the Community Scenario Pack an anti-PLARB scenario: (by way of shameless plug find the revised and updated version here Those Who Hunt Goblins) that takes place during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the crisis trigger event is a US-Soviet confrontation in the Med that spins out of control. This was actually one of the few times when US strategic forces went to DEFCON-3 and USN nuc boats were active in the mid-Atlantic tracking the Project-667 (Yankee) boats operating there. If you research the Incident at Sea series of treaties there is a reasonably rich source of possible confrontation triggers that owe nothing whatsoever to the tired and contrived mutinous-missile boat trope. One good source for US/USSR incidents is "The Cold War at Sea" by David Winkler.

Evidence suggests that the Red Banner Fleet was never happy with the forward deployed PLARBs, preferring under-ice or bastion operations for the missile boats where they could be protected. That said, a nuclear deterant that cannot reach it's target is worse than useless so the Golfs and Hotels needed to be able to cover the CONUS and this meant patrolling uncomfortably close to the eastern and western seaboards.

As late as 1986, Yankee PLARBs were on patrol comparatively near Bermuda (and K-219 would be lost there)

-C



AdmiralSteve -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (11/5/2016 11:56:31 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SeaQueen

A good scenario, to me, doesn't depend on rogue elements, but instead depends on a deep understanding of the geopolitics and ways the military might attempt to achieve political goals.


Which can be difficult to model in a game like CMANO unless through constant briefings in a realistic timeline of events and may add considerable amounts of time to playing the scenario.

Not that playing CMANO a considerable amount of time is bad.[:D]

I think to pull something like that off could require about a 7-14 day game time and a setup to the scenario such as the K-219 accident off of Bermuda. Possibly a very skittish ex-USN Admiral as President of the US, a willing Congress with an itchy trigger finger and the American public stockpiling a 5 year supply of canned food in their bunkers.
But that's only the lead and isn't really playable so possibly sending a few Yankee class SSBN's to the eastern and western shores of the US would cause anyone to be nervous and suspicious and would be the beginning of the scenario. A USN diesel sub tracking a Yankee 1000NM from Washington DC would trigger further diplomatic events (again not really playable in CMANO) and becomes a sticking point for me and I've come to the conclusion that I'd have to tone down the scenario and make it a single USN platform vs. a single USSR platform which probably has done a thousand times over.
So my final question becomes this. How would a designer model diplomatic events in the the scenario and then what forms of reactions to those events could be put into it? For example my thoughts had been;

1)A Soviet Yankee that approaches 1000NM from the eastern shores of the US could trigger a response of a couple of frigates and its Seaprites keeping tabs on the Yankee class.
2)At 750nm the frigates are joined by a wing of P-3's from Florida. Some kind of message could pop-up describing some sort of political action and strife taking place.
3)North east of Bermuda, the P-3 locates a Soviet sub tender that could possibly re-arm Soviet subs at sea. This too could trigger a further American response and saber ratteling but at this point the scenario begins to merge into multiple platforms over millions of miles of ocean and becomes quite a handful for the player and becomes my "designer roadblock."

I feel that just keeping tabs on the submarines becomes rather boring but as a surface sailor, I never had the pleasure of being 500 feet below the surface with a Soviet SSBN a mile away.
Is tracking one or several subs with a dozen surface vessels, helos and fixed wing aircraft without firing a shot going to fun for a lot of players?
Thanks everyone for your input.
Steve



AlphaSierra -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (7/1/2017 10:40:39 AM)

There are no diplomats on the bridge of a ship. Modeling diplomatic events is not a function of CMANO. Crews do what they are ordered.

A well designed scenario has no "diplomatic" events, triggers or actions, only missions and results.

While it is admirable that some think the NAVY needs a reason to attack, more likely they just need orders.




kevinkins -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (7/1/2017 3:32:26 PM)

Umm ... I think military officers (US anyway) are adept at geopolitics and consider it all the time in ambiguous situations like a meeting engagement. There are no "diplomatic" triggers in the sim. But I have found that players like to have a plausible reason to fight. This context can be delivered via the briefings (which is standard) or through operationally related triggers. The model proposed above is not wrong per se. But it hand cuffs a designer's ability to create cool scenarios apart from simple shooting gallerys.

Kevin



mikmykWS -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (7/1/2017 3:45:23 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: AlphaSierra

There are no diplomats on the bridge of a ship. Modeling diplomatic events is not a function of CMANO. Crews do what they are ordered.

A well designed scenario has no "diplomatic" events, triggers or actions, only missions and results.

While it is admirable that some think the NAVY needs a reason to attack, more likely they just need orders.




Depends on how you use the sim.

Its possible through special actions. lua and the event editor to let the player make a political decision that more or less triggers a bunch of supporting game behaviors that support the decision and scrubs those that do not. This pushes up slightly into operational sim territory who's success depends on the effort and brains of the designer.

Its also possible to not use them at all and just play the sim very tactically and just follow orders.

Different strokes for different folks.

Mike



Gunner98 -> RE: Very Deep Doctrine/RoE Question (7/1/2017 7:25:13 PM)

quote:

A well designed scenario has no "diplomatic" events, triggers or actions, only missions and results.


Not many comments on this forum that I disagree with completely - but this is one of them.

War is diplomacy by another means - an old German fella came up with that one. Points given or taken away, for doing things in COMMAND are often politically motivated - collateral damage for instance, hitting certain targets.

I'll leave it at that.

B



Page: [1]

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
2.6875