US87891 -> RE: Type 1 medium tank and Sherman (7/7/2017 2:08:26 PM)
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Yes, things are weighted towards the more vulnerable areas because they are larger and weaker. Given this games mathematical calculation methods, this has the virtue of consistency, ease of application, and rational relation to objective outcome. In terms of first principles, this is as valid today as it was in War-2. Troops were trained to fire at the more vulnerable areas of vehicles. Engagement ranges and impact zones depended on the type and caliber of weapon available. According to doctrine, high velocity, largish caliber weapons ‘could’ engage target fronts, but the preferential target was always the sides. Alternatively, as expressed by the famous centurian at Ilipa with respect to elephants, you sneak around back and jam your pilum up its a$$. US field manuals taught this explicitly, as did the Soviet training schedules. The Russians widely distributed a series of booklets, Partisan’s Companions, containing diagrams and photos of every German vehicle, describing where the weak points were and how to disable it with every conceivable weapon from AT guns, rifle caliber bullets, bottles of gasoline, to rocks! Synopsis of data from US Army post war analyses. Avg gunfire range; Italy-350y, West Europe-800y, Africa-900y, Avg-800y Avg hollow charge range; UK-35y, US-55y, Avg-50y Distribution of (immobilization) hits: Artillery; turret-31% (57% top, 36% sides), upper side-52%, lower side-17% Hollow charge; turret-44% (72% sides, 26% rear), upper side-48%, lower side-8% Direct fire; front-37%, side*-60%, rear-3% (* document note: average 30% per side surface) Distribution of tank casualties: Direct fire-54%, mines-20%, non-weapon-13%, hollow charge-7.5%, artillery/mortar and misc.-6% Causes of vehicles destroyed verses vehicles disabled: Destroyed: Direct fire-51%, artillery/mortar-20%, hollow charge-14%, mines-9%, other-6% Disabled: Direct fire-28%, artillery/mortar-62%, hollow charge-6%, mines-13%, other-2% *document summary – The incompleteness of the Allies’ historical records of armored units in World War II obviated any attempt to separate tank casualties from gunfire into categories, e.g., “tank”, “antitank”, or “artillery”. Coox, Naisawald, “Survey of Allied Tank Casualties of WW-II”, Johns Hopkins, Operations Research Office, Ft. McNair, Washington DC (ORO-T-117); under contract to Dept of the Army, 1951 FM-17 series, Armored Force Field Manual, War Dept., Washington DC Êîìïàíüîíû ïàðòèçàíàì (Partisan’s Companions), GRU, Moskow (many from 1941-1945). Matt
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