RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (Full Version)

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/16/2020 6:06:02 PM)

Japan Naval Landing

The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF), (Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai) were naval infantry units of the Imperial Japanese Navy and were a part of the Imperial Japanese Navy Land Forces. They saw extensive service in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific theatre of World War II.
Starting in the Meiji Era the navy began to raise units unofficially known as Special Naval Landing Forces. These forces were raised from kaiheidan at — and took their names from — the four main naval districts/bases in Japan: Kure, Maizuru (deactivated following the Washington naval treaty, reactivated in 1939), Sasebo, and Yokosuka. In 1927 some of these SNLF units were unified under command of the Shanghai Naval Landing Force and saw action in China from 1932 in the January 28 Incident. Afterwards the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force was officially formed in October 1932, signifying the first official SNLF unit. Official SNLF units from naval bases were authorized in 1936. SNLF units would once again see action at the Battle of Shanghai and countless other battles and cleanup operations throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The strengths of each SNLF ranged from the 200 to over 3000 personnel. Almost all units were a single battalion with a varying number of companies.
The SNLF was not a marine force, but was instead sailors who had basic infantry training. In 1941, the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF were converted to parachute units. The SNLF paratroopers were successfully used during the attack on Celebes and the Battle of Manado. Aside from the paratroopers, there were also planned elite units to conduct reconnaissance and raid operations.
Like all landing forces they often experienced heavy casualties when faced with determined resistance, such as at the Battle of Milne Bay. This was due to their poor training and unwillingness to surrender, and when completely out of ammunition, they may even resort to hand-to-hand fighting with their swords and bayonets. After the failure to capture Milne Bay the Special Naval Landing Forces became a defensive force and very few units were raised. Naval Guard Units became much more common Imperial Japanese Navy infantry units in the Pacific.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/17/2020 6:04:34 PM)

Japan Naval Guard

As the war progressed, and the Japanese Navy became more involved in the seizure and defense of Pacific islands, other naval land organizations came into existence. Examples of these are: the Base Force (Tokubetsu Konkyochitai), the Guard Force (Keibitai), the Pioneers (Setsueitai) and the Naval Civil Engineering and Construction Units (Kaigun Kenchiku Shisetsu Butai). Special naval landing forces, or similar organizations, were occupying a number of outlying bases, because the Army was been reluctant to take over the defenses of these outposts. Since Japan has lost the initiative in the Pacific, these forces have been given defensive missions, and the Japanese Navy has changed their organization accordingly. Under Allied pressure Japan saw that it was necessary to increase the defenses of some islands by reinforcing the special naval landing force, or by combining two or more special naval landing forces into a new organization known as a Combined Special Naval Landing Force. In New Georgia the Kure 6th, the Yokosuka 7th, and portions of the Maizuru 4th were combined into the 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force. In the Gilberts a special naval landing force was combined with a guard or base force to form a Special Defense Force.
The Base force or special base Force (Tokubetsu Konkyochitai) is a unit the Naval Command echelon for the defense forces of a prescribed area. In addition to headquarters personnel, the base force has certain heavy coast artillery and also heavy and medium antiaircraft artillery. It seems there was no fixed organization, and the size of the base force depending upon the importance and extent of the area to be defended. The following units may be found attached to base forces: Aircraft, small naval surface units (patrol boats), one or more special naval landing forces, one or more guard forces, pioneer units, and Navy civil engineering and construction units.
The Guard force (Keibitai) was a unit used for the defense of small installations. It is composed of naval personnel, and has light and medium antiaircraft and heavy infantry weapons. its size, armament, and organization vary, and several guard forces may be attached to a base force.
The function of Pioneers (Setsueitai) unit was the construction of airfields, fortifications, barracks, etc. It were commanded by a naval officer, usually of the rank of captain or commander, with attached officers and civilians with engineering experience. There had 2 types of organization, of 800 and 1,300 men respectively, depending on the size of the job. The unit contained from 1/4 to 1/3 Japanese, and the balance or Koreans or Fomosans. The 15th Pioneers was such a unit.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/18/2020 6:19:15 PM)

Japan Firts Line

The rationale behind most of the rules for the Japanese should be based over his incredible courage in the face his willingness to die rather than be taken alive. The Japanese was been raised in a highly regimented society with little regard for the individual, with an iron discipline enforced in the military, and the Bushido, the code of the Samurai. Bushido stressed unquestioning bravery and loyalty, the unimportance of the individual, that failure in battle demanded death, and that capture by the enemy was unthinkable. Together all these produced what some have called the best infantry in history. The Japanese First Line infantry is an example of all this.
The Japanese First Line infantry can be considered as combat engineers in Western armies. It is an elite unit of the Japanese Imperial Army, similar to the Japan Naval Landing infantry of the Imperial Naval Army.
. In theory, Japanese tactical doctrine advocated infiltration, night attacks, speed and surprise at all times, the maximum use of deception, bold outflanking movements, attacks on the enemy's rear and the deployment of snipers behind enemy lines.
Even when Japanese tactics were appropriate (or at least adequate), the advantages of careful reconnaissance and surprise were often thrown away by poor fire discipline or, far worse, by unnecessary noise. Resorting to noisy ruses to generate enemy "jitter" fire, and so reveal dispositions, denies an opponent sleep, generally demoralizes him or causes casualties from "friendly fire" and is a valuable technique and by no means unique to the Japan Army, but the Japanese tended to persist with such ploys long after their enemy was wise to them—with predictable results. Moreover, the Japanese were also indifferent to (and careless in) the need to remain stealthy when preparing to attack; they would blow bugles, shout, sing, chant, chatter, throw firecrackers or taunt their foes, especially at night.
The lack of personal initiative in Japanese soldiers of all ranks was the product of a very rigid social order in which education (increasingly militarized over preceding decades) taught the individual to "obey without question" almost as a religious directive, while bushido's "obedience" ethic also fostered the concept of paternalistic government rendering the individual dependent on the state-and thus conveniently subservient, readily obedient, apt to shirk responsibility and lacking in initiative. These traits were then reinforced by the brutality to which recruits and even veteran soldiers were subjected by their superiors (horses and weapons got better treatment) in order to keep everyone in their respective places within the military hierarchy.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/19/2020 6:18:36 PM)

Japan Marine Paratroopers

Japanese parachute units, small in number and involved in no strategic assaults, are rarely mentioned in the battle histories of the Pacific War. Only six airborne "operations" were carried out by Japanese forces during the Second World War. Formal organization did not commence until 1940 and by the time war broke out in late 1941, there were an estimated 14700 Japanese soldiers trained as paratroops.
The first unit activated was a contingent of the Yokosuka of the Imperial Japanese Navy which had undergone recent intensive but short training. Shortly thereafter a second parachute unit, known as the 1st Raiding Flying Brigade (Teishin Hikodan) of the Japanese Army Air Force, was activated. The brigade was composed of a reinforced battalion of infantry, supported by an air regiment of heavy bombers. At the beginning of 1944, the Japanese Army airborne units consisted of a raiding brigade, two independent raiding regiments, and a couple of raiding flying regiments. In the latter part of the year, the Japanese high command raised two raiding groups (a command roughly equivalent to a division in strength) and created an official Table of Organization (T/O). These parent units were known as the 1st and 2nd Raiding Group (Teishin Shudan). Both units had two parachute regiments, although each "regiment" was undersized. Two glider infantry regiments were also seemingly created, each with a manpower of approximately 880 officers and men. The 1st Raiding Group, under the nominal control of the 4th Army and commanded by Major-General Tsukada Rikichi, was sent to the Philippines and fought against the American 6th Army on Luzon as ground troops.
The organization of a Japanese Army Raiding Group shows a relatively small unit that was extremely light in firepower. A Raiding Group had a total manpower of only 5575 officers and men, including flight crews. The Raiding Group HQ and Signals unit had a personnel roster of 220 and 140 men respectively. The main combat component of a raiding group was its Raiding Brigade, with 1475 officers and men organized into an HQ and two Raiding Regiments, each composed of an HQ and signal units, a Heavy Weapons Company and three Rifle companies. Each rifle company had a HQ section of 15 officers and men, a MG platoon of 20 men, and three rifle platoons of 40 men each. Each Raiding Group was also allotted two "Glider Infantry" regiments. Each regiment had two rifle companies of three rifle platoons and a MG platoon, backed up by a combat engineer company, an AT Gun company (with six 47mm AT guns) and a Cannon Company (equipped with four 75mm Infantry guns). Auxiliary units of the Raiding Group also included a machine-cannon unit for base defense, and a "Raiding Engineer" unit of about 250 men.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/20/2020 6:32:02 PM)

Japan Imperial Guard

In Japan the Imperial Guard is the name of two separate organizations dedicated to the protection of the Emperor of Japan and the Imperial Family, palaces and other imperial properties. The Imperial Guard of the Imperial Japanese Army became the foundation of the Imperial Japanese Army. Later, the Guards Cavalry Regiment, Guards Field Artillery Regiment, Guards Engineer Battalion, Guards Transport Battalion, plus other Guards service units were added to the Imperial Guard Division.
In September 1939, the division was split into the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades. The 1st Guards Brigade, which contained the 1st and 2nd Guards Infantry Regiments, the cavalry regiment, and half of the support units, was transferred to South China. Here it became known as the Mixed Guards Brigade. In October 1940, it joined other Japanese units occupying French Indo-China. In April 1941 the Mixed Guards Brigade returned to Tokyo but it did not rejoin the Imperial Guards Division.
The 2nd Guards Brigade, which contained 3rd and 4th Guards Regiments, also went to China. In 1940, it went to Shanghai before being posted to Hainan Island. In June 1941, the 5th Guards Infantry Regiment joined the 2nd Guards Brigade becoming the Imperial Guard Division again. It later saw action in the Battles of Malaya and Singapore with Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Army.
In May 1943, all designated Imperial Guard units were renamed again. The Mixed Guards Brigade in Tokyo became the 1st Guards Division (which now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 6th Guard Regiments) and the Imperial Guard Division became the 2nd Guards Division. The 3rd Guards Division, which never left Japan, was formed in 1944. It consisted of the 8th, 9th and 10th Guards Regiments.
In comparison to the two regular divisions, 5th and 18th, which received intense physical and military training before the campaign that brought them to peak effectiveness, the Imperial Guard did not go through the same tough school. The Guard selected its rank and file based on their height, not experience or ability. This made a Guard unit much taller than the average Japanese battalion, but height is not an indicator of physical strength or fitness — and in the nutritional background of the 1930s, possibly even indicates less stamina than a man of average stature. Guards units in other armies did get first pick of the recruiting pool and often better equipment. This was not true in Japan, and the Guard was no better off than line units in terms of its gear. The Guard selected its officers from families close to the Emperor by birth or social standing.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/21/2020 6:23:06 PM)

Japan Marine Gliders

Perhaps the least remembered of the airborne units in World War II is the parachute infantry of Japan. Roughly 3000 volunteers from the 12th and 18th Infantry divisions were trained at Shimonoseki; another 3000 passed through the process at Shizouka, and about 1200 drawn from the troops stationed in Canton received instruction at Hiroshima. Later, another 2000 from the 9th and 11th Infantry divisions would be trained at Himeji. Paratroop training was concentrated at a single base, while jump/combat training of naval personnel was centered on Hainan island.
It was not until late 1941, as plans were maturing for the initial operations, that Japanese parachute units were activated; and then they were designated only for the southern operations against the Netherlands East Indies. The units were typically organized into four companies plus an HQ. The first three companies were organized with four rifle platoons and a MG platoon, while the fourth company included a "heavy weapons" platoon. The weapons platoon typically consisted of four 3" Naval guns, two 75mm Field guns, and two 70mm Infantry guns. Depending on the mission, the naval guns could be replaced with light AA guns. For the 1942 parachute operations, the heavier weapons were not airdropped but transported by other means. Two glider infantry regiments were also seemingly created, each with a manpower of approximately 880 officers and men.
Air transport for the group was provided by an integral Flying Brigade that consisted of two flying regiments (Teishin Hikosentai). Their primary mission was to provide transport for the airborne formations; when not engaged in this, they were at the disposal of the Army Air Force. The organization was similar to that of the normal Japanese air regiments. Each consisted of a headquarters unit and three squadrons, roughly 500 officers and ranks, all under the command of an Air Force lieutenant-colonel or major. Approximate strength was 35 aircraft, usually Topsys, but some converted Sallys were also in service.
There were other raiding units within the Japanese command structure in Manchuria. Many of the Japanese divisions of the Kwantung Army established elite Raiding Battalions so as to have a special unit capability. While most of these raiding battalions of the Kwantung Army were not trained as paratroopers, jump training was occurring in Manchuria in at least two locations, and there are confirmed reports of paratroop training centers being established in North China near Shanghai, Waichang, Nanking and Hsiang Fan. The Russians were to find out the hard way just how elite these raiding battalions were during their August 1945 invasion.
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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/22/2020 6:30:41 PM)

Japan Second Line

The Japanese approach to infantry training had severe weaknesses, especially at the lower echelons. However, these weaknesses were neither readily apparent nor especially important in the jungle fighting in Southeast Asia in 1941, where small unit operations were the only operations that mattered. The Japanese had several clear training strengths that they were able to capitalize on in the early part of World War II in the Pacific. First, despite Japan’s relatively small population, the Imperial Japan Army was better configured than any of the other major combatant nations to rapidly expand into a much larger, but still reasonably well trained force. The Japanese conscription and reserve system obviated the need for the regular establishment to set up large training camps for newly inducted soldiers. Instead, the Imperial Japan Army was able to efficiently double in size, then double again, virtually overnight. There was naturally a point where this seemingly endless well of trained soldiers would run dry, but that was several years into the future in 1941--a future that was not supposed to include further armed conflict.
The "7" morale factor of Japanese Elite squads (Marine Paratroopers, Naval Landing, First Line), suggests the question of why "7" is not more appropriate than "6" for the Second-Line squads. However, the wide gulf in training, competence, leadership, weapons, physical fitness and diet (combat troops naturally got priority in receiving rations and anti-malarial drugs) did have an effect on morale even among the Japanese that were not elite troops. There is little need to dwell at length on the stoicism of their soldiers.
The fanatical resistance and resilience under fire displayed by the Japanese stemmed from a number of factors. In the first place, the bushido spirit demanded that suffering and hardship be borne bravely without complaint, imposing a form of self-discipline. Secondly, many Japanese believed through persistent indoctrination that the greatest personal fulfillment attainable was to die a hero's death in battle and thus be assured a place in Heaven, linked to the old ethos that death was nothing to fear and preferable to dishonor. Thirdly, the brutal discipline of Japanese military life made retreat (let alone surrender) a crime under the Military Penal Code, and demanded suicide even from Japanese POWs who subsequently escaped and regained their own lines. Fourth, the fact that the Japanese would often kill their own comrades if they attempted surrender was a powerful disincentive to be rational and quit. And, fifth, Japanese education and propaganda (the two were almost synonymous) convinced most soldiers that their foes were racial inferiors-or at least barbarians-and should be resisted "tooth and nail". Lastly, regional recruiting fostered strong regimental loyalty and unit cohesion.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/23/2020 6:36:04 PM)

Japan Conscripts

Those Japanese soldiers possessing any acceptable firearms could count themselves lucky, for the 1-2-4-4 MMCs represent the dregs of the manpower available (Conscripts Squads): "pressed" civilians (including females) like the Okinawan Boeitai Home Guard, rear area troops, shipwrecked personnel, and hospital patients in varying states of physical integrity summarily turfed out of their beds, all sent into action with little if any training and brandishing whatever "weapons" were at hand. The Japanese were, naturally, aware of their deficient infantry firepower.
The Japanese assigned one or more depot divisions to each divisional district. These were training formations whose function resembled that of British regiments in a number of respects. In peacetime, the depot divisions trained each years' class of conscripts. If war suddenly broke out, the bulk of the depot division was used as cadre and filled out with reservists to create a field division, usually bearing the same number as the depot division, which could quickly be committed to combat. The remainder of the depot division was then rebuilt with other reservists or conscripts. During a more prolonged war, when a new division needed to be raised, a small nucleus of cadre was drawn from a depot division and filled out with reservists and conscripts to create a new field division with its own number. This new division was billeted in its own wartime barracks while undergoing as much training as the situation permitted before being committed to combat. Depot divisions were also responsible for providing replacements to field divisions, usually those that were earlier raised from the same divisional district.
The inadequate training was also a Japanese feature. Pre-war conscripts normally served for two years (later three), but the deteriorating war situation shortened this training period, after 1942, to three months or less before men left for the front. Even in 1941-42, some formations were raw; the 65th Brigade on Bataan had received less than a month's training, and the Imperial Guards Division in Malaya, while expert at ceremonial drill, had last seen action in 1905. In Malaya, complaints were made about poor map-reading, inadequate standards of patrolling and bad artillery-infantry cooperation, together with abysmal leadership and a lack of fighting spirit among both officers and men. All this is a far cry from the stereotyped view of the Japanese soldier as a highly trained warrior.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/24/2020 6:49:12 PM)

Japan Naval Base

The Combined Special Naval Landing Force, combined several Special Naval Landing Force units into a brigade sized unit with greater firepower. There were around five of these when the war ended.
The Base Force or Konkyo-chitai and The Special Base Force or Tokubetsu-konkyo-chitai provided a variety of services both administrative and tactical in areas outside Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa. The Japanese raised around fifty of these units which ranged in size from 250 to 1500 men depending on location and function. The Base Force could also include afloat units.
Defense Units or Bōbi-tai: units of from 250 to 2000 men organized for defense of naval installations and areas of strategic importance within Japan. Some Defense Units included artillery emplacements and some controlled the minefields in Japanese waters.
Guard Units or Keibi-tai: 100 to 1500 men units responsible for ground defense of Imperial Japanese Navy facilities. They were frequently assigned to Base Forces and Special Base Forces. The Japanese raised around one hundred of these units. Many of these units played a notable part in the defense of Japanese held islands during the later stages of the war, such as the Iwo Jima Keibi-tai consisting of 1000 men led by Captain Samaji Inouye.
Anti-Aircraft Defense Units or Bōkū-tai: Anti-aircraft artillery units of 200–350 men. There were three types which differed based on the number and kind of anti-aircraft weapons assigned. The Japanese formed over two hundred of these units which were primarily located in areas outside Japan, Formosa, and Korea. They were usually assigned to Base Forces, Special Base Forces, Special Naval Landing Forces, and Guard Forces.
Construction Battalions or Setsuei-tai built and repaired naval facilities of all kinds, including airstrips, barracks, ammunition bunkers, and fuel depots on remote islands as well as Japan's major naval bases. Most personnel were civilian employees and unarmed. The units also included naval engineers overseeing the operations and sailors guarding the unit, both being lightly armed for defense. The Construction Battalions often made use of local labor whose service was compulsory.
The Communications Units or Tsūshin-tai of 100–2,000 men were stationed ashore to provide communications between Japan's widespread naval installations and to and from the fleets and ships at sea.
The Tokkeitai Navy military police units carried out ordinary military police functions in naval installations and occupied territories; they also worked with the Imperial Japanese Army's Kempeitai military police, the Keishi-chō civil police and Tokkō secret units on matters concerning security, intelligence collection, and counter intelligence.
Anti Aircraft Artillery Batteries or Koshaho Chutai were units of forty or fifty men organized for the air defense of important installations and were subordinate to Air Defense Sectors which in turn were subordinate to Defense Units. These batteries were separate from the previously mentioned Bobitai. Several hundred of them were in existence at the end of the war.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/25/2020 6:25:24 PM)

Japan Takasago Giyutai

The Imperial Japanese Army was interested in the use of aborigines in special forces operations, as they were viewed as being more physically capable of operating in the tropical and sub-tropical regions in Southeast Asia than ethnic Japanese, and, coming from a hunter-gatherer culture, would be able to operate with minimal logistics support. The Japanese military recruited many young men from friendly tribes into service shortly before the start of World War II.
When Japanese military victims mounted after the Allied start theirs offensives in all fronts, Japan start to thought to recruit Southeast Asians in theirs occupation areas as the replacements. On April 22, 1943, the 7th Japanese Army HQ in Saigon proclaimed that they give a chance for Indonesian youths to join with theirs army as ‘Heiho’. ‘Sendenbu’ (Japan propaganda service) propagandize that ‘Heiho’ would became a chance for Indonesian youths to serve theirs homeland and nation. Those volunteers were called as ‘Heiho’ (auxiliary soldiers). However, ‘Heiho’ wasn’t an individual unit, it was only a commonly name for Southeast Asian volunteers that served in Japan army. They were incorporated into Japanese unit as individual rather than taking the risk of setting-up this kind of a motivated military structure with its more independent character.
Many Indonesian youths listed as volunteers. The total number was confidential and training was under the direction of officers from the Nakano School, which specialized in insurgency and guerrilla warfare. After receive theirs training for some months, thousands of ‘Heihos’ were send to frontline to fight the Allied. Initially assigned to transport and supply units, as the war condition progressively deteriorated for Imperial Japanese forces, the volunteers were sent to front line as combat troops. They were involved in many battlefields, like Burma, Rabaul, Morotai, Balikpapan, etc. According some Japanese sources, ‘Heihos’ usually have more better training and weaponry than theirs PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, or Defenders of the Motherland) counterpart and fought fanatically like theirs own troops.
Units consisting entirely of "Takasago Volunteers" served with distinction in the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Solomon Islands and New Guinea, where they fought against American and Australian forces even before Taiwanese volunteers were recruited into service. Towards the end of the war, 15 officers and 45 enlisted members of the Takasago Volunteers were organized into the Kaoru Special Attack Corps for a suicide mission similar to that of the Giretsu Kuteitai, and attacked a United States Army Air Forces landing strip on Leyte. The Takasago Volunteers were well known for their jungle survival ability.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/26/2020 6:37:37 PM)

Squads Japan Imperial Army

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/27/2020 7:05:27 PM)

Japan Scouts

Reconnaissance regiment (Sōsaku-rentai or Sōsaku-tai), was the type of unit derived from Cavalry regiment, tasked with combat scouting. These regiments were attached to the large number of the Japanese divisions. Reconnaissance regiments were a small-scale units, comprising about 500 men in total. Therefore, they did not have battalions in structure, and were usually commanded by Major instead of Colonel as was typical for infantry regiment. About one platoon was normally attached to each battalion wing for duty as messengers and orderlies. The remainder was divided for battalion flank protection with the bulk on the decisive flank. As the strength of the division cavalry regiment was light, the combat value was not as great as might be expected.
The Japanese military commanders were frequently challenged with situations requiring reconnaissance, rapid messages transfer and using the advantages of the maneuver warfare. Such tasks in Japanese army were regularly performed by cavalry regiments. Although in Japan was observed a long retention of cavalry regiments and battalions, in 1937-1938 the initial batch of seven Sōsaku-tai (reconnaissance regiments) was introduced into the army of Japan. These were renamed as Sōsaku-rentai during the great army reorganization leading to Pacific War. Since 1940, the existing cavalry regiments were also reorganized into the reconnaissance regiments. Some cavalry regiments were retained. Most notably, Imperial Guard division have kept cavalry regiment while also including reconnaissance regiment. In Imperial Guard division cavalry regiment did include an armoured car company.
While the Reconnaissance regiment was envisioned as combination of the Armoured fighting vehicles and Motorized infantry, initial vehicles available for the army was very sparse. It happened because Type 92 Heavy Armoured Car tankette, Type 94 tankette and Type 97 Te-Ke tankette earmarked for reconnaissance, were also overloaded with attack role, and absorbed into the tank regiments. Also, while initial concept was what Reconnaissance regiment must be a self-sufficient fighting force, in practice the mechanized forces were predominantly used to reinforce under-powered infantry units.
As Nanshin-ron strategy was adopted for the Pacific War, the reconnaissance regiments were initially very successful during Japanese conquest of Burma, but later the operations have become increasingly focused on smaller islands. Because the performance limitations of light armoured fighting vehicles were obvious at this point, the reconnaissance regiments were frequently left behind on mainland while infantry forces have headed to outlying islands.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/28/2020 6:45:39 PM)

Japanese Snipers

The Japanese devised tactics that would provide maximum advantage for their smaller army. They used night attacks whenever possible in order to minimize casualties, and performed the maximum use of deception, speed, surprise and infiltration to put and keep the enemy off balance. In theory, each Japanese squad contained two or three snipers—and even LMG were used for sniping, some being equipped with scopes for that purpose. Japanese tactical doctrine advocated the deployment of snipers behind enemy lines.
It's known the historical Japanese enthusiasm for deploying snipers (or, more accurately, "sharpshooters" as improvised snipers, for the vast majority were neither trained nor equipped to be true snipers and were merely infantrymen who had infiltrated into or stayed behind in good firing positions to cause trouble). The common "sharpshooter" was often more a nuisance than a danger, as shown by one Japanese soldier at the siege of Kohima in Burma who missed a British battalion CO sitting on a tree-stump in broad daylight from 100 yards, only to be shot with threes round by a British soldier even though his target was hidden up a tree. The real Japanese sniper was better camouflaged, had a telescopic sight on his rifle (which clarified rather than magnified targets by clearing away haze and other distractions to make objects stand out better), concentrated rations and perhaps even binoculars. This far more formidable individual was much harder to deal with; on Okinawa one sniper killed or wounded 22 Americans before being eliminated, and another, in Burma, shot eight officers over a three-week period and eventually escaped despite vigorous countermeasures. The sniper or sharpshooter was a particularly economical and effective ploy for tying down and eroding the strength of enemy units, as demonstrated to perfection on Bataan in 1942, although the placement of snipers there was found to be "repetitious" and thus enabled the Allies to conduct successful sniper-hunts (even dynamite was used to fell the trees concealing them). In Burma too, massed "snipers" were encountered, and in February 1945 over 100 were eliminated in one area between the Welaung and Meiktila roads alone. The Japanese would often time their artillery fire to land while enemy shells were passing overhead to give the impression that the Allies were themselves victims of "friendly" fire and they often handled guns like snipers.

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asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/29/2020 6:47:16 PM)

Japan Spotters

Indirect fire was effectively carried out by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War. After World War I , the evolution of the artillery itself and the development of combat doctrine and tactics Became standard. Indirect fire was performed by the following teams: Observation group (Forward Observer: FO); Fire Direction Center (FDC); Gun line (battery). Only the observation team was directly looking at the target, and no enemy was visible in the shooting command post or battery.
The observation team needed to observe the target. Target coordinates, altitude, enemy size, etc. were sent to the shooting command center as a "shooting request". Based on the data from the observation team, the specifications ware calculated and the guns ware ordered. The battery was to open fire by adjusting the elevation and depression angles of the gun, the left and right turning angles, ammunition, etc. based on the commanded specifications. The observation team was to observe the impact and was to sent a correction request.
Shot observation (Shadankansoku) was to observe how the position of the shell fired from the gun settled, or the position where the tow burst broke with the target, and its effectiveness. Shooting observation was the basis of shooting , and its correctness was to affect the effectiveness of shooting. Particularly important consideration was given to artillery when performing indirect or long-range fire. Therefore, in the case of artillery fire and anti-aircraft fire, it was supposed that a specially equipped personnel and specially trained personnel or units will be provided.
In the case of the Imperial Japanese Army , observation platoons and observation teams was to carry out ground observations of artillery shells, and was to may request the cooperation of the Artillery Information Team. For observation, the Japanese set up an observatory and use binoculars , 6 meters observation mirror, gun mirror, ground leveling machine and other observation tools to make observations as accurate as possible. It was possible to measure the position of the shot more accurately by simultaneously observing from two or more observing stations and calculating by the intersection method ( triangulation). The observatory was advantageously shielded from enemy "eyes" and enemy bullets and as high as possible. Therefore, it was often done remotely from the gunfire line. The main observation elements was the direction, the perspective and burst height. Communication equipment was also important for prompt feedback of observation results.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/48DEE287EB5545EA91BE2727090CBFE4.jpg[/image]



CHINCHIN -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/29/2020 6:58:03 PM)

How would you see that these observer units had the "super spotter" feature? This characteristic gives an 83% chance of discovering enemies.



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/30/2020 7:00:59 PM)

Japan Heroes

Hiroshi Funasaka (1920-2006), Imperial Japan Army. The final rank was Sergeant. In March 1941, he joined the Utsunomiya 36th unit and was assigned to the 219th unit of Qi Haru Hara across Manchuria. Hiroshi was in charge of the Grenadier Squad Commander who led 15 men during the Battle of Angaur. In 1944, his Regiment arrived on Angaur Island on April 28. In the Battle on Angaur Island, Palau, he fought like a hero both on the beach and later in the island's cave complexes.
Yasuyo Yamazaki (1891-1943) Imperial Japan Army. The final rank was Army Colonel. During the Pacific War he commanded the Battle of Atts. On May 29, 1943, Captain Yamazaki ordered the survivors of the garrison to gather in front of the headquarters and made the final assault on the US military base near Mt. Gyuushi near Asahi Bay. Yamazaki was in front of the attacking team followed by about 300 soldiers with full wounds. Breaking through the patrol line of the United States Army he on up the slope of the mountain and violent in the United States Army encampment hand-to-hand combat was deployed. The attacking force was destroyed, Yamazaki was killed in the battle, and the Ats Island garrison was shattered.
Toichi Wakabayashi (1912-1943), an Army soldier who changed from a soldier to an officer. Known as the hero of the Hong Kong Cheats. The final rank was Army Captain. After participating in the operation of the Chinese continent, he participated in the Kowloon Peninsula Hong Kong capture operation and the Guadalcanal Island operation as the 38th division infantry 228th regiment 10th company commander, where was ordered to protect Mt.Miharuyama and, after a heroic fight, died on January 14, 1943.
Hirō "Hiroo" Onoda (19 March 1922 – 16 January 2014) was an Imperial Japanese Army intelligence officer and was a Japanese holdout who did not surrender at the war's end in August 1945. After the war ended Onoda spent 29 years hiding out in the Philippines until his former commander traveled from Japan to formally relieve him from duty by order of Emperor Shōwa in 1974. He held the rank of second lieutenant in the Imperial Japanese Army. He was the penultimate Japanese soldier to surrender.
Shōichi Yokoi (March 31, 1915 – September 22, 1997) was a sergeant in the Imperial Japanese Army, and was among the last three Japanese holdouts to be found after the end of hostilities in 1945. He was discovered in the jungles of Guam on 24 January 1972, almost 28 years after U.S. forces had regained control of the island in 1944.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/5755A2D7AA2E4BB18160BA213423ABE8.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/30/2020 7:25:29 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: CHINCHIN

How would you see that these observer units had the "super spotter" feature? This characteristic gives an 83% chance of discovering enemies.


Very good idea Chinchin.

I understand that you propose to activate the cell corresponding to the column "Super Spotter (1-5)" in the case of Spotters (of all nations).

If we agree, I can change the Units matrix in the new version of the Core of Heores and Leaders mod.

What do you think?



CHINCHIN -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/30/2020 7:49:42 PM)

Yes that's what I mean. I think it is a logical characteristic for this class of units, and it would give them one more utility.



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/30/2020 8:26:22 PM)

Chinchin, I agree. I'm going to change the drive array by adding this capacity to the Spotters.

Thank you very much for your proposal.



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (10/31/2020 6:41:05 PM)

Japan Crew

Japanese tank troops were highly trained in night fighting, and in fighting under extremes of weather. They was obsessed with the value of the attack, and crews will not hesitate to leave their tanks to fight on foot when pressed or in coming up against manned obstacles. Japanese tank training stresses the need for: rapid decisions; rapid mobility; rapid concentration of fire; concealment of intentions; and supply and repair. Frequent was practiced in maneuvers over varied ground; in developing close cooperation within the tank between driver and gunner; and in bringing accurate fire to bear in the shortest possible time. In combat training successive stages were the advance, deployment, attack, mopping-up, and pursuit.
As a result of experiences in the Manchurian Incident, the war in China, and the clash with the Russians at Changkufeng, the Japanese Army was acquired a lively appreciation of the value of mechanization. Much thought was given to the proper use of this new weapon in the light of the experiences. A distinguishing feature was the early modification, extension, and detailed expatiation on the paragraphs devoted to the use of tanks and mechanized units in combat regulations. However, the new changes in regulations, while gave additional space to mechanization, tried the subject with broad generalities which leave considerable doubt as to whether the Japanese had resolved worked out many of the practical details of such highly involved questions as infantry-tank-artillery liaison, control by higher commanders, and logistics of mechanized forces.
The reliance on cooperation with the infantry may could explain the large number of "Independent" armored units, which could be attached to other formations as and when required. The lack, or failure, to identify artillery, infantry, etc., with the Tank Group also may be explained by this policy, and this formation may, in fact, be more of the Army Tank Brigade type than of the armored division. This view again is borne out to some extent by Japanese teaching, and it is thought that the Tank Group may be employed in conjunction with infantry formations, working in close cooperation with infantry divisions, rather than fulfilling the role of an armored division, which would be to destroy enemy armored formations.
US Army analysts expected that teh Japanese tanks reasonably may be expected to employ armor at least as a spearhead to infantry enveloping attacks. Should the nature of the ground permit, the Japanese had, in the tank, an ideal weapon for exploiting their favorite maneuver of a wide and rapid encircling movement which cuts the enemy's lines of communication and generally disorganizes his rear areas.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/1F3709870E8A4C8DBE09C513F3AE0B8F.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/1/2020 5:38:04 PM)

Heroes and Leaders Ranks

[image]local://upfiles/56084/21855F316F944BACA9EE267994323009.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/2/2020 4:56:03 PM)

Japan Leaders

Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1891–1945) General. Commander of the Japanese garrison of Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi refused to permit banzai charges. The United States Marine Corps had expected to capture Iwo Jima in five days, but Kuribayashi and his men held out for 36 days. It is believed that Kuribayashi was killed in action in the final assault, but his body was never identified by the United States military.

Keiji Shibazaki (1894–1943) Rear Admiral. Commander of the Japanese garrison on the island of Betio of the Tarawa atoll. He was a veteran of amphibious landings in China. He arrived on Betio in Tarawa in September 1943 to take command of the Japanese garrison, including 1,122 Imperial Marines forming the 3rd Special Base Force and 1,497 sailors forming the 7th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force. Shibazaki was killed in action on the first day of the Battle of Tarawa.

Yida Yasuda (1898-1943) Navy Colonel. He took over as commander of the 5th Special Land Squadron of Yokosuka Guardian. In 1942, when the US-Australia Allied Forces landing on Guadalcanal, Yasuda, Commander of 292nd Yokogo Special, 110th Sasebo Guardian Fifth Special Land Squadron, and fought against the Allies for about 50 days. His troops were almost wiped out, and the battle is described in the history of American warfare as the world's number one fierce battle.

Ōnishi Takijirō (1891-1945) Admiral. Founder of the Kamikaze units. In the fall of 1941, Ōnishi was jointly responsible for planning the attack on Pearl Harbor. He commanded the air strike on Clark Air Base during the Battle of the Philippines.

Yusaku Shimada (1912-1988) Lieutenant Colonel. Commander of Shimada tank corps. Fought in the Battle of the Slim River, with the tanks of the 4th company. Commander of 9th tank Regiment in 1942. In March 1945, he became the 18th tank Regiment commander.

Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885–1946) General. Led Japanese forces during the invasion of Malaya and Battle of Singapore, with his accomplishment of conquering Malaya and Singapore in 70 days earning him the sobriquet "The Tiger of Malaya". Yamashita was assigned to defend the Philippines and was able to hold on to part of Luzon until after the formal Surrender of Japan.

Masao Maruyama (1889–1957) Lieutenant General. Maruyama and his 2nd Division were deployed to Guadalcanal from September and October, 1942 in response to the Allied landings on the island. During the Guadalcanal campaign, Maruyama led troops during the October 1942 Matanikau action and the subsequent Battle for Henderson Field, in which Maruyama's troops were decisively defeated.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/F97797F2CF524D87B39CDBAB1E0BFDEF.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/3/2020 5:44:55 PM)

Japan Leaders

Yoshitsugu Saitō (1890–1944), Lieutenant General. He commanded Japanese forces during the Battle of Saipan and killed himself during the battle. In spite of Nagumo's objections, Saito organized a final suicidal banzai charge.
Harukichi Hyakutake (1888–1947) General. In May 1942 Hyakutake was assigned command of the 17th Army, at Rabaul. His command was involved in the New Guinea, Guadalcanal, and Solomon Islands campaigns. Hyakutake directed Japanese army units in the Solomons, primarily on Bougainville.
Kiyotake Kawaguchi (1892–1961) General. In 1940, he was appointed commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade. Kawaguchi's reinforced brigade made landings in British Borneo in December 1941 and January 1942: at Miri, Kuching, Brunei, Jesselton, Beaufort, Labuan Island and Sandakan. Kawaguchi and his Brigade were landed on Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings. In Battle of Edson's Ridge on September 1942, Kawaguchi's forces were defeated with heavy losses.
Tomitarō Horii (1890–1942) Lieutenant General. He commanded the Japanese force that had been given the task of capturing Port Moresby. Horii was appointed commander of the Nankai-Detachment of the 55th Division, part of the South Seas Force. Horii led this organization in the Japanese invasion and subsequent capture of Guam during December 8–10, 1941. In November 1942, in the retreat from Oivi–Gorari, Horii drowned while attempting to canoe down the Kumusi River to reach Japanese forces defending Buna–Gona.
Minoru Sasaki (1893–1961), Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army. He led the Japanese forces during the Battle of New Georgia from June 1943 to August 1943. After fighting an effective, his forces retreated to Kolombangara, only to be bypassed and left to starve. He and his surviving forces managed to successfully escape by barge to Choiseul and Bougainville and then to Rabaul. In the Battle of New Georgia his outnumbered forces stood off nearly four Allied divisions and successfully evacuated 9,400 men to fight again.
Hidemitsu Nakano (1890–1982) General. He briefly served as commander of the 29th Infantry Brigade. In November 1941, Nakano was given command of the 51st Division. The division subsequently took part in the Salamaua–Lae campaign and other combat operations throughout 1943–45. Nakano made a fighting retreat from Salamaua, and lost half him men retreating through the Finisterre Mountains towards Madang.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/EC0536971A2F42078620F1587F0DB671.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/4/2020 6:11:32 PM)

Japan Leaders

Toyoaki Horiuchi (1900–1948) Captain. Leader the paratroopers at Tateyama, Chiba. On 1940, the paratroopers were divided into the first special troop, headed by him numbering 750. He jumped on 11 January 1942 from a height of 150 metres, and his troop successfully performed an airborne operation at Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia.

Seizō Yasunori (?-1945) Sub Lieutenant. Leader of the Navy's Kamikaze Corps 7th Showa Special Attack Squadron. On May 11, 1945, Yasunori dropped a 550-lb bomb and then crashed his A6M Zero into the aft portion of the flight deck of the USS Bunker Hill. It was the most devastating suicide attack in the Pacific War.

Mitsuru Ushijima (1887–1945) General. Commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade in northern China. Later he was Commandant of the 32nd Army, charged with the defense of the Ryukyu Islands, which fought in the Battle of Okinawa during the final stages of the war.

Masao Watanabe (1888–1950) Lieutenant General. Commander of the 56th Division, was sent to Burma in March 1942 and participating in the Battle of Toungoo. His Division defeated the Chinese 6th Corps in the Karen Hills area battles of Mawchi on April 1942, Bawlake, Taunggyi and Loikaw, and defeated the Chinese 65th Corps to take the city of Lashio on the Burma Road. The fall of Lashio cut off much of the local Chinese Army from China and compelled the Allies to evacuate Burma.

Tokutarō Sakurai (1897–1980) Major General. He commanding Japanese ground forces in Burma. In 1942 was commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment. He was the main Japanese commander at the Battle of the Admin Box in February 1944. In April 1945, he was appointed commander of the 212th Division, one of the new divisions raised to contest Operation Coronet, the projected American invasion of Japan.

Shojiro Lida (1888–1980) General. Commander of Imperial Guard until 1941. In December 1941, He took command of the Fifteenth Army, and his forces easily overcame Thai resistance. On January 1942, Lida's divisions crossed into Burma and outmaneuvered British forces. On 8 March, Lida took Rangoon, cutting the Burma Road and isolating China. By May, British and Chinese forces in Burma had been driven back to India and China.

Masatane Kanda (1890–1983) Lieutenant General. Commander of the 45th Infantry Regiment. In 1941, he was commander of the 6th Division, assigned to China, and fought at the Third Battle of Changsha. He took command of the 17th Army in 1945 during the end period of the Bougainville campaign.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/A543F0EF6FBD4D68A9F79AC40BF7A29D.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/5/2020 6:17:38 PM)

Japan Leaders

Hideyoshi Obata (1890–1944) Major General. He was commander of the 5th Air Group in Taiwan at the start of the Pacific War. In 1942 his command was assigned to the Burma front. In May 1943, he became commander in chief of the 3rd Air Army. On February 1944, Obata was assigned command of the Thirty-First Army, with the 29th Division and 53rd Division in charge of the defense of the Mariana Islands. At the Battle of Guam he ordered an all-out attack in July 1944 and was lose more than 80% of his men.

Otozo Yamada (1881–1965) General. In 1937 Yamada was commander of the 12th Division, based in Manchukuo, an elite unit, with a disproportionately large amount of firepower and heavy equipment. In 1944, was reassigned in July back to Manchukuo as the final commander of the Kwantung Army. Yamada attempted to organize large numbers of poorly-trained conscripts and volunteers into eight new infantry divisions and seven new infantry brigades, and to withdraw from border areas to protect the strategic core of the nation.

Masakazu Kawabe (1886–1965) General. In China, he was involved in the Battle of Xuzhou, Northern and Eastern Honan, Battle of Wuhan, Canton Operation, Battle of Nanchang, Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang, Battle of Changsha, and the 1939-40 Winter Offensive. He returned to China as commander in chief of the 12th Division in March 1940, serving under the Kwantung Army. Kawabe became Commander in Chief of the Central District Army on 1 December 1944, he also became Commander in Chief of the 15th Area Army from its formation on 1 February 1945 to 7 April 1945.

Sakae Oba (1914 - 1992) Captain. In March 1943, promoted to Captain. In February 1944, he became the commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment, and the regiment moved to Saipan Island. Even after the 43rd division was crushed, the Oba Corps was turned into a guerrilla based on Mount Tapocho and will continue fighting until the end of the war.

Kiyonao Ichiki (1892–1942) Colonel. He commanded the 28th Infantry Regiment "Ichiki Detachment" in Battle of the Tenaru. The regiment was disastrously defeated by the 1st Marine Regiment and of the 917 soldiers of Ichiki's 1st echelon, only 128 survived. Ichiki was either killed during the final stages of the battle.

Hiromichi Yahara (1902–1981) Colonel of the 32nd Japanese Army at Okinawa. Yahara recommended holding back Japanese forces for as long as possible and using them in a defensive posture, rather than an aggressive one. Yahara's method, was to fight from caves as long as possible and then, once the caves were lost, to "retreat and defend"—time after time—until there was no longer any room to retreat to.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/3D1F6FB6EE024537A802767EDB00F1A4.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/6/2020 6:04:18 PM)

Japan Leaders

Nomasu Nakaguma (?-1942) Colonel. He commanded the 2nd Infantry Division's 4th Infantry Regiment during the Guadalcanal campaign. His regiment suffered heavy losses during the Matanikau actions and the Japanese defeat in the Battle for Henderson Field in October 1942, and further losses during the Matanikau Offensive in November 1942. Nakaguma was killed by artillery fire on or around November 7, 1942

Shigetoshi Miyazaki (?-1942) Captain. From 9 December 1941, he commanded the Japanese occupation of the Gilbert Islands, on Makin. On August 7, the Americans invaded Guadalcanal and Miyazaki had to cope with the marines. Fighting as an infantryman, Miyazaki was gunned down by US marines.

Kiyoshi Inagaki (1915-1941) Navy Sergeant. In November 1941, he attacked of dawn on Pearl Harbor in midget submarine HA.19 was part of the Kido Butai, carried by the Type C cruiser submarine I-24. Acompanied him the Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki. Could not fire one of her torpedoes and, after stranding the submarine, he drowned.

Teruo Nakamura (1919–1979) Taiwanese-Japanese soldier. He was enlisted into a Takasago Volunteer Unit. In November 1943 was stationed in Morotai Island in Indonesia shortly before the island was overrun by the Allies in September 1944 in the Battle of Morotai. Did not surrender until 1974.

Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) Indian nationalist what did want rid India of British rule. Bose was able to reorganize the fledgling Indian National Army and organised massive support among the expatriate Indian population in south-east Asia. His troops were under the Azad Hind Government, and his special forces, the Bahadur Group, were involved in operations behind enemy lines during the Japanese thrust towards Imphal and Kohima.

Baron Takeichi Nishi (1902–1945) Colonel. Nishi was assigned the regimental commander of the 26th Tank Regiment, based in Mudanjiang, in northern Manchukuo on defensive duties. In 1944, the Regiment was reassigned to the defense of Iwo Jima under the Ogasawara Corps (109th Division). Was killed in action during the defense of the island.

Prince Kanin Haruhito (1902–1988) Colonel. Commander of the 5th Tank Regiment. He was placed in command of the 4th Armored Division and three independent infantry regiments assigned to combat outside of Tokyo.

[image]local://upfiles/56084/A8F83D9EFFBD41439A9F927DD2EC39A2.jpg[/image]



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/7/2020 6:10:41 PM)

Japan AVAILABILITY OF INFANTRY

[image]local://upfiles/56084/12FCF7A71C804B75AFD3BBA45BE5A8BC.jpg[/image]



GiveWarAchance -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/25/2020 5:25:31 AM)

asl3d, I am looking around to figure out stuff. The internet here is really slow here so I can't load the threads to see the pictures without long waits.
I want to download the pack for your Stalingrad battles. Is that the Heroes and Leaders mod? Does it package the Normandy USA stuff together with the Stalingrad mod stuff?
I also wonder about 'chinchin' (egad!! this name is very odd if you know Japanese language), is he also making new unit cards? I saw one of his thread and it has really nice pictures from what I could see.



asl3d -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/25/2020 7:58:05 PM)

Hello GiveWarAchance,

Exact. It is precisely this thread where you can download everything you need to play Barrikady, Omaha, American Eagles, and Carentan. Remember that you also have to copy the rest of the files contained in this package onto your hard drive, because it contains the latest versions of the Heroeas and Leaders mod files.
´
Regarding friend Chinchin, I confirm that he is converting the units into a "silhouette" format, which I am creating, converting them into the classic "cardboard token" format.



GiveWarAchance -> RE: Core of Heroes and Leaders mod (11/26/2020 12:05:21 AM)

Okay I got the Heroes mod 364 MB so I should be good to go. I like how you packaged everything up nice and simple to use. There must be a lot of content with all that for us to enjoy. Seriously that is amazing work on your part and you deserve credit for it. Maybe a rich player can buy you a luxury home or a Bugatti.

Thanks for clarifying about Chin's (I can't type the full name cause it feels like I am insulting him) token format. That's good you have a loyal partner kind of like Robin is to Batman. I will be more like the Penguin. That's actually a cool idea to make a cardboard effect to go with the dice and board of the game.

Cheers



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