Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT.

Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (Full Version)

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Mike Scholl -> Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/6/2003 9:55:27 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT [B]Mike, Japan had the wherewithall and shipping to land at least 4 Divisions on the Northeast coast of India in the spring of 42. Certainly at the expense of any further movement in the south Pacific, but nonetheless it was quite capable of doing so if it so chose (ie; the IJA and IJA agreed). This would not of course be enough to conquer India, but along with the 15th army pushing overland from Burma, it would be sufficient to secure Calcutta and the Bangledesh region. I agree that this wouldnt neccessarily provolk of general upriseing since too many minority sects owed their power to the Brit Raj, but localized revolts or at least ambivilence could be expected. In the spring of 42 there was some reason to believe that Asians would be better off as part of an Asian Empire, and Japan had some altruistic motives, however I agree these expectations were pretty much spent within a year. BTW, Japan waited until 44 for the Imphal raid because they chose to. Burma was the planed extent of their advance. [/B][/QUOTE] The KEY word in my statement was "supported" Divisions. I imagine that if the Japanese had really tried, and pulled units from other efforts, they might have been able to scrape up 4-5 Divisions and enough shipping to pitch them ashore in India by say June of '42. But NOT to support them in the long campaign needed to battle the British in India. Japan invaded the Phillippines from bases in nearby places like Formosa where pre-war preparations could be made. For Malaya the base was Indo-China. Both were "limited" campaigns in the sense that their enemies had nowhere to run and almost no ability to reinforce and re-supply in a major way. Even then, Yamashita had to run a "bluff" in Singapore because he was virtually out of ammunition. India is a large place, with significant arsenals and manufacturing capacity and a large garrison. It can be easily reinforced by the British from the mass of units in the Mid-East Theatre. An attempt to conquer it by the Japanese would call for a very extended and well supplied and supported campaign. But their nearest Major Logistical base in the spring/summer of '42 is Japan itself. Everything else is either newly conquered or has been emptied of supply in conquering the rest. Look at the effort the Allies used to land 5 divisions on D-Day. Mounted from a base less than 100 miles away, that had been built up for over a year to support the Campaign! Japan just doesn't have the "poop" to make a serious invasion of India. Hell, the Army and Navy had to "steal" a half million tons of shipping from the civilian economy just to mount the original campaign. And Japan, like Britian, is an island that imports a huge percentage of it's needs from overseas. They were short of shipping from day one, and it only got worse as the "robbed Peter to pay Paul" throughout the war. These large and far-flung invasions gamers talk about are pipe-dreams. That was the point I was making.

wpurdom -> India invasion (6/6/2003 10:51:13 PM)
It seems to me that Mike's comment are mostly accurate. I suppose there is a remote possibility that the Indian Army might have simply evaporated in a manner as bad as or worse than the Burnese army did, but on the whole the performance of the Indian Army in WWII, even leaving out the better and longer trained divisions, makes it likely they would have performed at least as well as the untrained Phillipine Army formations. But if the logistical problems are real, it would be interesting to see how a straight military model of the campaign would work on the existing model.

TIMJOT -> Re: Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/6/2003 11:34:17 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl [B]The KEY word in my statement was "supported" Divisions. I imagine that if the Japanese had really tried, and pulled units from other efforts, they might have been able to scrape up 4-5 Divisions and enough shipping to pitch them ashore in India by say June of '42. But NOT to support them in the long campaign needed to battle the British in India. Japan invaded the Phillippines from bases in nearby places like Formosa where pre-war preparations could be made. For Malaya the base was Indo-China. Both were "limited" campaigns in the sense that their enemies had nowhere to run and almost no ability to reinforce and re-supply in a major way. Even then, Yamashita had to run a "bluff" in Singapore because he was virtually out of ammunition. India is a large place, with significant arsenals and manufacturing capacity and a large garrison. It can be easily reinforced by the British from the mass of units in the Mid-East Theatre. An attempt to conquer it by the Japanese would call for a very extended and well supplied and supported campaign. But their nearest Major Logistical base in the spring/summer of '42 is Japan itself. Everything else is either newly conquered or has been emptied of supply in conquering the rest. Look at the effort the Allies used to land 5 divisions on D-Day. Mounted from a base less than 100 miles away, that had been built up for over a year to support the Campaign! Japan just doesn't have the "poop" to make a serious invasion of India. Hell, the Army and Navy had to "steal" a half million tons of shipping from the civilian economy just to mount the original campaign. And Japan, like Britian, is an island that imports a huge percentage of it's needs from overseas. They were short of shipping from day one, and it only got worse as the "robbed Peter to pay Paul" throughout the war. These large and far-flung invasions gamers talk about are pipe-dreams. That was the point I was making. [/B][/QUOTE] Mike, First I am thinking more like April/May, The troops were already on hand. The 16th Army barely broke a sweat in the Java campaign along with the South Area Armies reserves not (notabley 21st Division ) commited and the shipping is already concentrated in SE Asia. Logistically the Bay of Bengal is no further than New Guinea and the Solomons, where the Japanese were able to maintain a 1/2 dozen or so divisions. Re: India, yes its a big place, but you are incorrect in stateing that it had a significant manufacturing base. In fact it had almost nil. The by product of British colonial system in which the minions provided soley the raw materials for Britains industrial/manufacturing base. Did you know that even the simple spinning wheel was outlawed in India for this very reason? Arsenals? Hardly most had been striped and sent to the Mideast by spring 42 and what was left was in the NW frontier, the traditional base of the British Raj. True they had plenty of men, but due to the massive expansion the Indian Army was being force to recruit from the so called non-martial or effeminent races. There was insufficent weapons to arm them and woefully insufficient in officers and Noncoms to train them. The dregs that were being sent to Singapore and then to Burma were little more than peasants with uniionforms. As for massive reinforceing from the Mideast, well in the spring of 42 Rommel is pushing the Brits out of Libya and driving on Suez. Its hard to see any significant reinforcements comming from there. Again to make clear I am suggesting secureing just the region of Bangledesh and Calcutta , not ALL of India, which I agree is completely beyond Japans capability.

Raverdave -> Re: Re: Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/7/2003 9:49:30 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT [B] As for massive reinforceing from the Mideast, well in the spring of 42 Rommel is pushing the Brits out of Libya and driving on Suez. Its hard to see any significant reinforcements comming from there. [/B][/QUOTE] Indeed this is true....and infact it was Churhills worst nightmare, having to choose between India and the Middle east ,I doubt that the british would have made more than a token effort in India. They had already shown that they were willing to sacrifice Austalia to save India and would have also sacrificed India to save the middle east.

gus -> the INA and Indian Independence. (6/7/2003 10:45:32 AM)
The INA and the role of Subhas Chandra Bose in WWII is an interesting subject but is not as irrelevant as some may think. Certainly from a pure military perspective the INA was not a force to be reckoned with, but the propaganda/political value of such an organization could have been quite powerful if the Japanese had taken advantage of it. Historically the INA was composed of ex POWS who were captured by the Axis in North Africa and South East Asia. While certainly they were not equivalent to front line Allied/Japanese soldiers they were soldiers non-the-less and could have been used for rear echelon duty thereby freeing up Japanese front line units that otherwise would have been required to do these tasks. So by that reasoning alone they should be included in the game similar to how Naval Garrison units are included in UV. But this is neither here nor there as the real strength of the INA was as a political tool and this opportunity was totally squandered by both the Indians and the Japanese. While the British in India certainly feared the Japanese Army after the Malaysian and Burma campaigns they were equally concerned about the possibility of a revolt within the Indian Army, which is not out of the realm of possibility as the start of Indian Independence Movement is universally recognized as the revolt of the Indian Army in 1857. If the Japanese had marched into North East India in 1942 and had brought in the INA with them for propaganda purposes it may have been enough to spark a revolution in India. While it is true that the Japanese were ill prepared to fight a European style war on the plains of Imphal, or anywhere else in India for that matter, their chances of spurring the Indians into open revolt were much higher in 1942 than in 1944 when the outcome of the war was no longer in question. The IJA also had a psychological and combat experience edge over the British in 1942 having convincingly defeated them in Malaysia and Burma that same year, by 1943 any advantage had been lost. So what I would suggest for WitP is an option 'Possible Indian Revolt' just as we have for 'Japanese sub doctrine' etc. in UV, if you want to play with it turn it on if not turn it off. The presence of Japanese troops in India accompanied by the units of the INA before the end of 1942 should trigger the game engine to check whether or not a revolt has occurred and if so it's extent. The chance for an open revolt should be quite small probably 100:1 odds of it occurring but the check should be made on every turn that IJA and INA troops are in India. So it the Japanese player maintains his position in India for 3 months or so it is highly likely that a revolt will occur. The extent of the revolution if it occurs could be anything ranging from increased insurgency, to outright war between India & Britain and the subsequent loss of resources/production, bases, etc... Note: if you doubt the respect to which Bose was held in India during the WWII era, remember that his 100th brithday was celebrated nationwide in India in 1997 although he died in 1945. snf he is considered one of the true heros of their independence movement. -g

Mike Scholl -> Re: Re: Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/7/2003 7:51:08 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT [B]Mike, First I am thinking more like April/May, The troops were already on hand. The 16th Army barely broke a sweat in the Java campaign along with the South Area Armies reserves not (notabley 21st Division ) commited and the shipping is already concentrated in SE Asia. Logistically the Bay of Bengal is no further than New Guinea and the Solomons, where the Japanese were able to maintain a 1/2 dozen or so divisions. Re: India, yes its a big place, but you are incorrect in stateing that it had a significant manufacturing base. In fact it had almost nil. The by product of British colonial system in which the minions provided soley the raw materials for Britains industrial/manufacturing base. Did you know that even the simple spinning wheel was outlawed in India for this very reason? Arsenals? Hardly most had been striped and sent to the Mideast by spring 42 and what was left was in the NW frontier, the traditional base of the British Raj. True they had plenty of men, but due to the massive expansion the Indian Army was being force to recruit from the so called non-martial or effeminent races. There was insufficent weapons to arm them and woefully insufficient in officers and Noncoms to train them. The dregs that were being sent to Singapore and then to Burma were little more than peasants with uniionforms. As for massive reinforceing from the Mideast, well in the spring of 42 Rommel is pushing the Brits out of Libya and driving on Suez. Its hard to see any significant reinforcements comming from there. Again to make clear I am suggesting secureing just the region of Bangledesh and Calcutta , not ALL of India, which I agree is completely beyond Japans capability. [/B][/QUOTE] "Amatures debate tactics..., Professionals study logistics." OK. So the second the 16th army finishes the conquest of the East Indies, you pull out all the troops and stick them on trans- ports again. To them you add the Theatre Reserve, and maybe a Division or two from Malaya. That puts more men "afloat" than at any time so far in the war, but let's say you found enough shipping somewhere. And you've taken another couple hundred thousand tons of shipping out of the civilian economy in Japan and loaded them with the munitions, rations, and POL to supply this Army for a while. And a good size chunk of the Navy needs to come along to protect this massive commitment of effort, and their supporting oilers. First of all, you've totally stripped the Dutch East Indies of a garrison---and they (and their oil) were the biggest prize of your opening offensives. You've made a "Midway-sized" commitment from your dwindling National Oil Reserve at the same time you abandon the very area you hope to replenish it from. And at the same time I imagine you are trying to move the bases of your land-based aircraft forward into Burma to support this army---and while the planes can fly, their support crews, munitions, and tanker loads of avgas have to come by ship (The Burma RR hasn't been built yet) And for all this effort, and major dislocation of the National Economy, you put 100,000 troops with a couple weeks of supply ashore in the Ganges Delta. Now you're right, the 200,000 troops the British had in Egypt have their own concerns with Rommel---but the British had over a half a million troops in their Middle East Theatre (which ran from the Turkish-Persian border all the way down to East Africa), so if your Japanese can totally abandon the East Indies they finished overrunning only a week before, then it wouldn't seem unrealistic for the British to scrape up 100-150,000 of their troops from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and East Africa to be sent to reinforce the Indian Garrisons. And India DOES have arsenals. They were turning out "India Pattern" Brown Bess Musket during the Napoleonic period. I own a Mark III Enfield Rifle built in the Bangalore Arsenal in 1943. So the Japanese are going to face an extended Campaign in India, which will require constant re-supply. And with India on the scales, the British would almost certainly send Tanks---which the Japanese proved throughout the war to be less than well- equipped to deal with. And for this you get the "CHANCE" that India "MIGHT" revolt----a revolt that would require Japanese assistance and troops to continue. Realistically, I don't see that such a campaign is even possible. But even if it were, I don't see how the cost and effort could possibly be justified by the potential gain. The Japanese were anything but altruistic in their plans of conquest. They already couldn't conquer or occupy China---what good do another 500 million revolting Asians do them? And a fair-sized percentage of those revolters would be anti-Japanese given the usual conduct of their troops. Yes, it would embarress the British---but it wouldn't save the Empire from the Wrath of the Americans.

TIMJOT -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/11/2003 7:14:31 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl "Amatures debate tactics..., Professionals study logistics." -------------------------------------------- Logistics is useless without good strategy, which is useless without good tactics. They are not mutually excusive. True proffessionals study are three. (quote) --------------------------------------------- OK. So the second the 16th army finishes the conquest of the East Indies, you pull out all the troops and stick them on trans- ports again. To them you add the Theatre Reserve, and maybe a Division or two from Malaya. That puts more men "afloat" than at any time so far in the war, but let's say you found enough shipping somewhere. And you've taken another couple hundred thousand tons of shipping out of the civilian economy in Japan and loaded them with the munitions, rations, and POL to supply this Army for a while. And a good size chunk of the Navy needs to come along to protect this massive commitment of effort, and their supporting oilers. -------------------------------------------- Really? Lets see 3 Divisions for Malaya, two more for the PI and an equivilent of 1 more for Guam, Wake, and Mindanao. That Makes 6 Divisions that were more or less transported simutaneously. You would be takeing no more shipping away economy than was historically for the entire Centrifugal Offensive or the later SOPAC campaign. A good chunk of the Navy was already in the Indian ocean at the time. It would have been better for them do something actually consequential than the historically inconsequential raid. (quote) ------------------------------------------- First of all, you've totally stripped the Dutch East Indies of a garrison---and they (and their oil) were the biggest prize of your opening offensives. You've made a "Midway-sized" commitment from your dwindling National Oil Reserve at the same time you abandon the very area you hope to replenish it from. And at the same time I imagine you are trying to move the bases of your land-based aircraft forward into Burma to support this army---and while the planes can fly, their support crews, munitions, and tanker loads of avgas have to come by ship (The Burma RR hasn't been built yet) ------------------------------------------- First of all you make a lot of assumptions, Who said anything about stripping the DEI? FYI, the Japanes did not generally use front line troops for garrison duty. they used 2nd tier Square divisions and indep. reservist Bgds. for that purpose. Historically the 16th Armies Divisions did not stay in Java. The 2nd and 38th Divisions were sent to South Pac and the 48th was sent to Timore. The 25th Army's 18th Div. 56 Div. were immediately sent to Burma on completion of the Malaya Campaign. The 38th Div. went immediately to Sumatra after the capture of HK and the 48th went to Java after secureing Manila. Useing Divisions successively from one operation to the next was standard IJA procedure. Logistically the 16th Army had enough supplies in train for a projected 3 months campaign Java, that actually lasted less than a week. So enough supplies were undoubtedly available for at least an initial assault. The Burma campaign would require little more than was historically alocated to that operation. (quote) ------------------------------------------ And for all this effort, and major dislocation of the National Economy, you put 100,000 troops with a couple weeks of supply ashore in the Ganges Delta. ----------------------------------------- Who said anything about 100,000 troops? I projected 3-4 divisions landing in the area of Calcutta, supported by the 3 divisions overland from Burma. (quote) ----------------------------------------- Now you're right, the 200,000 troops the British had in Egypt have their own concerns with Rommel---but the British had over a half a million troops in their Middle East Theatre (which ran from the Turkish-Persian border all the way down to East Africa), so if your Japanese can totally abandon the East Indies they finished overrunning only a week before, then it wouldn't seem unrealistic for the British to scrape up 100-150,000 of their troops from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and East Africa to be sent to reinforce the Indian Garrisons. And India DOES have arsenals. They were turning out "India Pattern" Brown Bess Musket during the Napoleonic period. I own a Mark III Enfield Rifle built in the Bangalore Arsenal in 1943. ---------------------------------------- A half a million troops? I dont know where you are getting your numbers, but you should go back and recheck them. They had no where near that much. The reality is that in the spring of 42 the 6th and 7th Aussie Divisions were in the process of returning home and was replaced in Palestine by the 9th Aussie which was also designated to eventually return home. Hell would freeze over before any of those divisions would be allowed to be sent to India. It took major arm twisting and a lot of bribery for PM Curtain to acquiese to the 7th Aussie temporarily disembarking at Ceylon, dureing the crisis of March/April 42. True in Iraq you had the 6,7,8,10th Indian divisions, but they were there for a reason. To keep the pro-axis Iraqis inline and act as a bulwork against the Axis was driving toward the Caucuses. Besides these were so called all Indian Divisions were considered 2nd tier. They were not even considered in the crisis of spring 42. In Africa you had the East and West African Divisions that can not be considered more than garrsion or LOC levelstroops and for that reason were never used in front line combat operations as far as I know.. Eventually they were sent to rear areas Madagascar, Ceylon and LOCs in Burma. Historically the only division that was able to be spared from the Mideast during the hieght of the crisis was the 70th Brit division from Cyprus and even this was done with much agony and sole searching because the Brits fully expected the Germans to land there. Regarding arsemals, A few India Army light arsenals hardly translates into a military industrial complex. To state that the India army was anything less than uterly depependent of the Brits for munitions and equipement is an overstatement. (quote) -------------------------------------------- So the Japanese are going to face an extended Campaign in India, which will require constant re-supply. And with India on the scales, the British would almost certainly send Tanks---which the Japanese proved throughout the war to be less than well- equipped to deal with. And for this you get the "CHANCE" that India "MIGHT" revolt----a revolt that would require Japanese assistance and troops to continue. ------------------------------------------- Show when in 1942 the Brits could spare any tanks. It was all they could do to make up the losses against Rommel even with US help. Besides we are not talking of the central plains of India, we are talking NE India, where the terrain and lack of infrastructure is not exactly conducesive to large scale tank warefare. (quote) ----------------------------------------- Realistically, I don't see that such a campaign is even possible. But even if it were, I don't see how the cost and effort could possibly be justified by the potential gain. The Japanese were anything but altruistic in their plans of conquest. They already couldn't conquer or occupy China---what good do another 500 million revolting Asians do them? And a fair-sized percentage of those revolters would be anti-Japanese given the usual conduct of their troops. Yes, it would embarress the British---but it wouldn't save the Empire from the Wrath of the Americans. ----------------------------------------------- First no one said the Japanese were altruistic, I said there was some thought or at least some hope among Asians, that they would be in the spring of 1942. Second a India revolt would not be the goal it would be an added plus but certainly not the reason to invade India. The reason for doing it at all is to deny the Allies the NE India Airfields. Without which there can be no "HUMP" flights. No hump flights no Chang. No Chang no KMT. No KMT no organized nationalist front. No organized nationalist front and you get the good possibilty of a negotiated face saving settlements among the various warlords that be. Resulting most likely in a status quo agreement with Japan in conrol of the coastal regions and the warlords in control of the interior. The reason you invade India is to end the war in China.

Yamamoto -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. (6/11/2003 8:40:53 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT The reason for doing it at all is to deny the Allies the NE India Airfields. Without which there can be no "HUMP" flights. No hump flights no Chang. No Chang no KMT. No KMT no organized nationalist front. No organized nationalist front and you get the good possibilty of a negotiated face saving settlements among the various warlords that be. Resulting most likely in a status quo agreement with Japan in conrol of the coastal regions and the warlords in control of the interior. The reason you invade India is to end the war in China. [/B][/QUOTE] And then the warlords have to spend the rest of their time fighting the communists as China goes into full scale civil war. So the plan is Invade India--> force India into revolt --> closes airfields--> forces negotiated truce with China--> China goes into full scale civil war---> Japan wins on auto-victory conditions (since the only reason they ended up in WW2 was because of their China policy). Sounds simple... on paper. Yamamoto

HMSWarspite -> (6/15/2003 6:45:54 PM)
All very interesting, but I feel we are lacking a few sources - please justify thoughts related to the likelihood of Indian revolt. Unless I am mistaken, there was a little unrest at the time of the retreat from Burma in 1942, but I am not aware of any widespread issues. - please justify the lack of reliabilty of the Indian Army. I am not aware of any significant units that were considered unreliable. - IIRC, most of the Indian political movements threw in their lot with the British, on condition that independance got a serious debate after the war (might be wrong here, I have no sources on this!) - The idea that a few Japanese divisions around Calcutta would achieve much other than (further) loss of face, and suck in resorces from else where is IMHO slightly improbable. IF Japan managed to put an invasion together in say June-July 1942, it would probably have delayed Alamein (by diverting the build up of 8th Army), but would not have affected Torch, and Rommel was in no position to take the offensive, so Libya stagnates, but Africa still falls by the end of 1943. Conversely, the US camapign in the South Pacific gets easier if anything, and Allied strategy is simplified by reducing or even removing the threat to Australia. However the above is my speculation, and I have no historical justification for most of it. Probably the biggest question on all of this is 'does Stalingrad still happen' I cannot see anything the Jn could do to affect this, and thus the main direction of the war is not changed. The biggest effect of the INA is the POSSIBILITY that it might be a useful threat, so I think it should be moddeled as a random event. IJA has a chance of one or more units forming x months after any Indian unit surrenders. Variable size, quality etc. Keep the Allies guessing. I guess you would then need a (small) chance of Indian unrest as well. In reality, there are many more features I would like in before this one (aircrew retire after x missions, number retiring successfully determine repl pilots skill, for one!)

Snigbert -> (6/16/2003 9:11:24 PM)
[B]Indeed this is true....and infact it was Churhills worst nightmare, having to choose between India and the Middle east ,I doubt that the british would have made more than a token effort in India. [/B] I have to disagree with that, you have to remember that a large part of Britain's involvement in the Middle East was to protect the supply route (Suez Canal) from India which acted as a large part of their economy and resource base. They also had the oil from Egypt, but that could be acquired from other holdings like Iraq/Kuwait, Africa, etc. So I think the reason for a strong Middle Eastern defense was partly justified as a defense of India, which if attacked directly by the Japanese would have taken a higher priority. [B]- please justify thoughts related to the likelihood of Indian revolt. Unless I am mistaken, there was a little unrest at the time of the retreat from Burma in 1942, but I am not aware of any widespread issues.[/B] Since the passive resistance movement for Independence under Ghandi succeeded only a few years after the war ended ('47 or '48) one would assume that the seeds of discontent were already planted well before the war started. It would be interesting to see what percentage of pre-war India supported England and what percent opposed them. [B]- The idea that a few Japanese divisions around Calcutta would achieve much other than (further) loss of face, and suck in resorces from else where is IMHO slightly improbable. [/B] I disagree, I think it would have been a positive step towards Japan's objective throughout the war...which was to achieve a significant enough victory to get Britain/USA to agree to an honorable peace. It also could have disrupted supply to China and reduced the immediate threat of a British offensive into Burma. Does anyone think that Japan might have had an easier time if they attacked Ceylon and occupied only the island (which also had strong anti-Britain sentiments). It would have taken less troops to invade/hold, could be used as an air base to interdict shipping around India...it would still have been very difficult to supply but any invasion of India would have been. Also, what about an overland invasion of India to cut out the sealift requirements? The Japanese could have used slave laborers to construct a highway and bridges to support their supply lines and take a sizeable piece of Northeastern India.

mogami -> Indian Armed Forces (6/16/2003 10:10:54 PM)
Hi, It is not so well known that the Indian Armed Forces were the largest all volunteer force to fight in WW2. Nearly 20 million volunteers fought with the Indian Army, the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy. Now they were all volunteers that says something about India's being ready to revolt.

HMSWarspite -> (6/17/2003 3:48:32 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Snigbert [B]- Since the passive resistance movement for Independence under Ghandi succeeded only a few years after the war ended ('47 or '48) one would assume that the seeds of discontent were already planted well before the war started. It would be interesting to see what percentage of pre-war India supported England and what percent opposed them.[/B][/QUOTE] The independance of India was not brought about solely by Gandhi or anyone else (Gandhi's major activities were pre-war in the 30's). UK Policy post war was to withdraw as soon as possible (too soon some would say, and the cause of the Hindu/Muslim unrest, and 00000's of deaths). India had intellectuals campaigning for an end of colonial rule. I am less certain of support in the bulk population during the war (hence my request for sources). Even the majority of the intellectuals were not in a rush to swap one ruler for another! [QUOTE][B] The idea that a few Japanese divisions around Calcutta would achieve much other than (further) loss of face, and suck in resorces from else where is IMHO slightly improbable. I disagree, I think it would have been a positive step towards Japan's objective throughout the war...which was to achieve a significant enough victory to get Britain/USA to agree to an honorable peace. It also could have disrupted supply to China and reduced the immediate threat of a British offensive into Burma.[/B][/QUOTE] Capturing part of India (or Ceylon) only annoys UK, but does not really affect the ability to wage war. As I said, insome ways it can simplify strategy. And what threat of an immediate attack into Burma? No threat at all until 1943, and no credible threat til 1944. [QUOTE][B]Does anyone think that Japan might have had an easier time if they attacked Ceylon and occupied only the island (which also had strong anti-Britain sentiments). It would have taken less troops to invade/hold, could be used as an air base to interdict shipping around India...it would still have been very difficult to supply but any invasion of India would have been. Also, what about an overland invasion of India to cut out the sealift requirements? The Japanese could have used slave laborers to construct a highway and bridges to support their supply lines and take a sizeable piece of Northeastern India. [/B][/QUOTE] Have you ANY idea how big India is? It is slightly more than 1/3 the size of the US NOW (excluding Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc). Calcutta to Ceylon is over 1000miles, there is nearly 5000miles of coast. The only shipping Ceylon would interdict would be that in to the southern ports. Capturing Ceylon or part of India would force the Eastern Fleet back to East Africa, and cause a scare, but in reality would just be another China - a vast area JN couldn't hope to control. Finally, the overland invasion is through horrendous country up near Imphal and Kohima. And that's after marching the length of Burma. The JNese had to build the Burma RR to supply Burma, then extend it to India? I am not saying it can't be done, but I think it is a resource drain that the JN couldn't cope with, and the UK could, since it doesn't hurt it's essential war fighting ability much. Finally, why do you think UK would accept a peace with JN separately to the US (NO CHANCE, FDR might sign a separate peace with GE), and why would UK accept peace from Jn in 1942 when all offers from GE in 1940 were rebuffed (MUCH worse situation than any loss of part of India). I don't see US accepting peace even if all of India falls!

Snigbert -> (6/18/2003 12:17:03 AM)
[B]Capturing part of India (or Ceylon) only annoys UK, but does not really affect the ability to wage war. [/B] No, the Japanese had no real hope of seriously hampering the UK's war making ability, but clearly the Japanese knew when they started the war that they were getting in deep... and that they would need to achieve victories that would convince the enemies to stop fighting if Japan wanted to come out of the war with any semblance of victory rather than militarily overwhelming the US/UK. Capturing a key region of India would have been a slap in the face to British prestige, especially coming shortly after Hong Kong and Singapore. The idea of this was causing Churchill considerable heartburn which even caused him to request the Australians defend India instead of their home country (which the Australians didnt take kindly to) so obviously the threat of Japanese controlling part of India was a major concern to the British. Would they have been forced to surrender if part of India was captured? No, absolutely not. But that's what the Japanese were probably hoping for...just as Hitler hoped to shatter the US/UK alliance at the Battle of the Bulge. Political influences on military decisions aren't the wisest way to go, but it happened. I think this should be represented in game terms by placing very high victory point values on objectives in India, enough so that if Japan controls them for a considerable length of time it could result in a Japanese point victory. [B]And what threat of an immediate attack into Burma? No threat at all until 1943, and no credible threat til 1944.[/B] Historically this was a low priority, back-water theatre to the US which was the reason the offensive was delayed. If the Allied player decides that this is where he is going to launch his main offensive through, you have an entirely different situation. The Japanese are forced to garrison this area early in the game because you dont have the benefit of playing an opponent who will do things historically. If the Japanese launched a campaign through the area first and nullified the threat on that front, it would be a great advantage to them until the British built up a sufficient force to recapture the region. [B]Have you ANY idea how big India is? It is slightly more than 1/3 the size of the US NOW (excluding Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc). Calcutta to Ceylon is over 1000miles, there is nearly 5000miles of coast. The only shipping Ceylon would interdict would be that in to the southern ports. Capturing Ceylon or part of India would force the Eastern Fleet back to East Africa, and cause a scare, but in reality would just be another China - a vast area JN couldn't hope to control. [/B] I do have an idea of how big India is, but the Japanese LBA also have very long range for the very purpose of interdicting shipping over large areas. The most important advantage of capturing Ceylon would be interdicting shipping between Northeastern India and the rest of the world because it would have to travel through the Indian Ocean past Ceylon to reach that area, and if Ceylon, Malaysia and Burma and that small island group between India and Malaysia the Japanese occupied historically were all loaded with LBA, which were set on Naval attack, any British naval actions in the Indian Ocean east of Ceylon would be compromised. I think that turning the Eastern Indian Ocean into a Japanese lake would be a huge military victory. The main difficulty would of course be, trying to capture Ceylon. The Japanese entertained plans to capture Ceylon and Madagascar historically. I think they wanted to establish a presence in Madagascar which they could use for liasons with the Germans (U boats). [B]Finally, why do you think UK would accept a peace with JN separately to the US (NO CHANCE, FDR might sign a separate peace with GE), and why would UK accept peace from Jn in 1942 when all offers from GE in 1940 were rebuffed (MUCH worse situation than any loss of part of India). I don't see US accepting peace even if all of India falls![/B] I dont see the US accepting peace under those circumstances either, but as I said above, the Japanese have no hope of rendering their opponents militarily impotent. The Midway campaign, for example, was designed to win another major naval victory and threaten the security of Hawaii, which they hoped would make America back out of the war. They didn't think that winning at Midway would de-fang the US... I think in the game if the Japanese pull off a huge, high prestige victory (like capturing India, Hawaii, Australia) they should be rewarded with Victory points.

mdiehl -> (6/18/2003 12:21:26 AM)
I think in a game if the Japanese are [I]capable[/I] of projecting enough force to capture India, Hawaii, or Australia, the game is not worth purchasing.

Snigbert -> (6/18/2003 12:42:43 AM)
[B]I think in a game if the Japanese are capable of projecting enough force to capture India, Hawaii, or Australia, the game is not worth purchasing.[/B] You didn't buy UV either though, did you? I somehow doubt WitP will meet your standards well enough that you will purchase it. If you look hard enough you can find faults in any game. Except maybe Chess, but they've had a few thousand years to fine tune the rules :)

mdiehl -> (6/18/2003 12:50:12 AM)
You're sounding like another fellow around here when you presume to have a clue about my motives or what I will or will not purchase or the reasons for same. I'll explain this once. I'm a middle aged middle class established guy with a family, and money to spend on games. Even those in the $100 plus dollar price point area. That said, I feel NO compulsion to part with my money to buy a game on speculation, particularly when one sees results turned in routinely by games like UV. In my view, the assertion that "no game is perfect" is both a red herring and an excuse for sloppy research. No game is perfect, but some come darned close. The good ones rise to the top as simulations. The merely fun ones can become classics, but as I've played fun goofball computer games before (PW, Panzer General series), I've "been there and done that," and feel no need to repeat the experience. 'nuff said. Back to issues of substance rather than responding to smarmy assertions from strangers who presume to know what I will or will not do.

Snigbert -> (6/18/2003 1:08:36 AM)
.[B]You're sounding like another fellow around here when you presume to have a clue about my motives or what I will or will not purchase or the reasons for same.[/B] Sorry if I sounded smarmy, I didnt mean to sound like I was passing judgement on you or even cared whether or not you bought the game. I have heard your reasoning before for what you will or wont buy, and having played the Alpha of War in the Pacific, I dont think that the game will rise to the standard that is required for you to buy it. That's all I meant. I previously held the opinion (which I stated to you before) that if you didn't buy UV, you shouldn't be criticizing it. However, I've changed my mind about that...I realized it was just a knee jerk reaction because UV and WitP are both games that I have dedicated a lot of time and energy to trying to help make as correct as possible and having someone criticize them without trying them out seemed like making an assessment of a car's handling without having driven it. Now I realize (having put emotions behind me) that someone can decide whether or not to buy a car based on a thorough knowledge of cars and knowing what features he does and does not want. So, having an idea of the level of details and things you would likely criticize in a similar game, I just dont think that the decisions 2by3 has made regarding playability and historical accuracy in WitP will result in a game that you will find acceptable. I think it's a great game, but it isn't going to make everyone happy. If I offended you, my apologies. I hgpe I am wrong and you do buy and enjoy WitP.

HMSWarspite -> (6/18/2003 3:24:13 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Snigbert [B]... I think in the game if the Japanese pull off a huge, high prestige victory (like capturing India, Hawaii, Australia) they should be rewarded with Victory points. [/B][/QUOTE] No contest, I totally agree with you. (Although I hope it wont be happening too often even against the AI). However, this thread started with a slightly surreal view by someone (not you) that India was ripe for rebellion, and Jn could really have got somewhere by invading. THAT is what I was arguing against/

Snigbert -> (6/18/2003 7:56:55 PM)
[B]However, this thread started with a slightly surreal view by someone (not you) that India was ripe for rebellion, and Jn could really have got somewhere by invading. THAT is what I was arguing against[/B] I agree that India isn't a ripe apple ready to be plucked away from the British empire by the first greedy hand that makes a snatch at it. I think a major Japanese offensive in India would have been a failure, it's proportions limited only by the amount of troops the Japanese committed.

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