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InfiniteMonkey -> RE: Will there be a War in the Pacific 3 someday? (12/26/2017 5:00:09 AM)
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Aurorus already responded, but I was writing a response myself and decided to go ahead and post it.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
Aside from all the perks that the Japanese automatically get such as (in the "Historical" Scenario):
1) sinking or damaging double or thereabouts the number of ships which their PH raid actually inflicted
I've probably run the first turn a hundred times just with stock orders. I've seen results that exceeded historical results in less than 10% of attacks. In other words, roughly 80% of attacks using stock orders sink less than 2 battle ships. I just ran 5 trials of the first turn to evaluate PH attacks. NO cherry picking, just opened the Scenario 1 file and hit run.
Japanese losses
Historical: lost 29 planes. Range of IJN CV losses for 5 trials was 38 to 49 aircraft lost in attack. 33 to 66% greater plane losses.
Allied Day 1 losses between PH and Force Z:
Historical: 4 lost (POW, Repulse, Arizona, Oklahoma), 2 so severely damaged they would not return til 1944 (WV, California). 188 aircraft lost.
Aircraft losses at PH ranged from 51 to 73 a/c in the five trials.
Trial 1: no losses. Greatest ship sunk was a DM. However, PoW was at 95 float. BB Pennsylvania has 51 Sys dmg, Nevada has 60 Eng damage. Nothing else red.
Trial 2: POW & Repulse lost. Tennessee has 51 float damage, Maryland has 54 float damage. Nothing else red.
Trial 3: AZ lost. WV 64 Flt/51 Sys. POW 53 Flt, PA 56 Eng. Nothing else red.
Trial 4: POW and Repulse lost. Nothing red.
Trial 5: POW and Repulse lost. California has 59 Sys damage. Nothing else red.
In every trial Japanese losses exceeded historical and Allied losses were less than historical in both planes and ships. As I said, I've run hundreds of Turn 1, Scenario 1 and at one point recorded the results of over 40 attacks as I tried different settings. In roughly 40 trials, I sank 3 BB's once. I sank 2 BB's three times. In no case did I see results similar to the ones we saw in the historical attack. In EVERY case, the results were skewed to the AFB, not the JFB.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
2) hanging Force Z out to dry
Most PBEM games have a house rule that allows AFB to save Force Z, even though it was sunk historically. It was sunk historically, but it is a sign of JFB bias in the game design that Force Z has a chance to be sunk in game? Note in the trials shown above, they are sunk roughly 70% of the time (I'm counting the trial where float is 96 as sunk).
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
3) damaging Singapore (starts with the damage) with the same bombers that attack Force Z
They are not the same bombers…. Did you even look at the Japanese side? The IJN has 99 bombers at Saigon on 12/7/1941. 54 of them are assigned to night bomb Singapore. The rest are set to naval Attack. I can see that Singapore has 50 port damage, but what is your point? My guess is that this is intended to simulate the period where Singapore was not building defenses because the threat was not taken seriously.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
4) giving the IJA enough supply to immediately launch one or more offensives in China in spite of the fact that it was stalemated and had been for 3 years (frankly there ought to be more a bigger difference between motorized supply such as the US enjoyed and the horse/mule drawn supply train of the IJA)
a) IJA had trucks. A typical flat land division had 3 transport companies each with 38 2-ton trucks. (114 trucks per division) Their supply train was not on par with American Divisions, but they were on par or superior to the Chinese they faced. Additionally, the presence of absence of trucks was related to the area it was deployed. They had Jungle and Mountainous divisions that skipped the trucks and used horses, carts, etc. You might want to pick up a copy of the two Rikugun books on Amazon. It details the support groups that a division possesed
b) IJA used rail for transport of men and supplies in China. (See Rikugun)
c) IJA managed to push into China to capture B-29 bases when they had to.
d) Japan was under international pressure to scale back it's moves in China following the Rape of Nanking in late 1937. Once war was enjoined, those concerns were no longer relevant.
e) I am not knowledgeable enough on China to debate it. You are probably somewhat right on this one. However, I'm not sure of that.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
5) giving the IJN enough fuel to sortie all its BBs repeatedly when in reality sortie them once expended a whole years worth of fuel (speaking of BBs - other than the 4 Kongos the rest of the battlefleet was pretty much a joke throughout the Japanese Navy and its record in combat pretty much justifies that)
2 Nagato class BB, 5560 tons fuel oil each
2 Ise class BB, 5113 tons fuel oil each
2 Fuso class BB, 5100 tons fuel oil each
4 Kongo class BB, 6330 tons fuel oil each
Total for all BB for one load of fuel: approximately 60000 tons fuel oil.
Navy petroleum product reserves on 1 December 1941 were 1,435,000 tons of crude oil; 3,634,000 tons of of bunker fuel; 473,000 tons of aviation gasoline; 27,000 tons of isooctane; 6400 tons of aircraft lubricants; 13,600 tons of ordinary lubricants; and 921,000 tons of petroleum derivatives already loaded on ships or distributed to overseas bases.
From <http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/i/Oil.htm>
They clearly had bunker fuel to sortie them, the problem was that the more they sortie them, the more other things like the economy suffer.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
6) doubling of the IJNs ability to launch an airstrike from its aircraft carriers - doctrine AND carrier construction limited IJN carriers from launching all of their strike a/c in a single raid - two smaller raids are easier to fight off than one huge raid)
7) giving the IJN 1944 style USN fleet defense from the start when they didn't adopt the ring defense until 1944 and never developed a CIC/Fighter Direction Center at all.
See Aurorus reply. I had something written, but… he said it better.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
8) the knowledge that most Allied submarines will be all but impotent until at Jan 1943
Funny, AFB's use the same knowledge to hide their subs with those torps until the dud rate improves. I don’t see you railing about the AFB's using the info to their advantage. Now that I think of it, how do I take advantage of that as a JFB? I still escort my task forces , I move what I need to move in the ships I need to move them in, etc. I've read far too much about the dismal performance of US torpedoes to suggest that they should have their dud rate reduced. If it were up to me, the dud rate would not go down until a certain number of torpedos had been duds on attacks. We all possess knowledge that gives us an advantage over the men whose decisions we second guess. This is not the first, last or worst of them.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
9) the removal of the SBD4 from the Allied OB (approx 900 airframes between Oct 42 and April 43 (there were essentially no SBDs in the Atlantic Fleet until Oct 1942 when Torch was launched) - since the SBD4 was all identical to the SBD3 the actual a/c is not important, rather the difference is in the overall replacement rate from the beginning of the war.
Not having been a part of the research team for the scenario, it is hard for me to comment. They reviewed production and set the replacement rate numbers as they did. If it is wrong I cannot help you there much. There are mistakes and omissions of lots of things in the game - and the idea that the errors are always in favor of the Japanese is simply false.
quote:
ORIGINAL: spence
After all it's only a game. All that would be OK with me as well as allowing the Japanese Player to do whatever is desired within the constraints of production correcting operational deficiencies except that the Allied Player (which was far more adaptable to change than the hidebound IJA/IJN Supreme Command) is stuck making no adjustments whatever to the changed Japanese operational doctrine/tactics.
Japan had one war to fight. The Americans and the British had two. They decided to put Germany first. If you want to take from the ETO and put it into the PTO, then you need to account for that - more British withdrawals, later Soviet Activation, Soviet OOB changes, Soviet collapse, easier Japanese/German cooperation, etc.
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