Is China going to be a pushover?

Is China going to be a pushover? (Full Version)

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Dawy -> Is China going to be a pushover? (6/3/2003 7:12:48 AM)
Hi, Does anyone know how is China going to be modelled into this game? I really do hope it's going to be far more realistic this time, unlike PACWAR where you could overrun it in a dozen or so turns. I would gather that to model a more accurate China, she's going to need a far bigger order of battle than in PACWAR and terrain/logistics is going to need to a great overhaul?

Fred98 -> (6/3/2003 7:32:02 AM)
My view is that it needs to absorb the Japanese resources. It needs to make the Japanese player think twice about where to place troops. Historically it was a thorn in the side and was the reason for the attack on Pearl Harbour.

Mike_B20 -> (6/3/2003 7:41:03 AM)
I played a great board game once called 'World in Flames'. In that game, early on Japan was deemed to be in a limited war with China. If Japan upped the ante and escalated to total war, Chinese soldiers started coming out of the woodwork. In fact, so many Chinese were mobilized, there was a very real possibility of Japan being driven out of China.

mogami -> China (6/3/2003 8:33:07 AM)
Hi, While we are still in Alpha and no long term testing has been done. My impression is "God help the Japanese" if the China ever gets supplied. There is a mass of Chinese units. However they really can't move due to supply limits. China is not going to be a push over. (but it might take the Allies a few years to move enough supply)

Mike Scholl -> One other point... (6/3/2003 10:31:38 AM)
By 1941 the Japanese had pushed the Chinese out of all the "easy parts" of China. From then on, the terrain was going to be as big a problem as the Chinese---and the support infra- structure for continued advance didn't exist. Bad road net, not much rail. Kind of like a conquering army that swept across Kansas and eastern Colorado suddenly coming to Denver and the Rocky Mountains---it's not going to be easy from here on.

Yamamoto -> (6/4/2003 2:03:20 AM)
Will the nationalists and the communists both be in the game? If so, I assume they wil be fighting each other. Yamamoto

mdiehl -> (6/4/2003 2:07:09 AM)
Except that the communists and nationalists really did not fight all that much. They were much more preoccupied with building their own political infrastructures in Japanese-occupied areas, expecting the real clash of ideologies to occur when the Japanese left.

Capt. Harlock -> (6/4/2003 2:08:16 AM)
Fighting each other? Not while there are significant Japanese forces in China. The saying "I and my brother against my cousin, but I, my brother, and my cousin against the outsider" applies to China as well as the Middle East.

gus -> (6/4/2003 2:17:46 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Capt. Harlock [B]Fighting each other? Not while there are significant Japanese forces in China. The saying "I and my brother against my cousin, but I, my brother, and my cousin against the outsider" applies to China as well as the Middle East. [/B][/QUOTE] Sorry to disagree with you but I believe you are only partially correct. According to Edgar Snow, 'Red Star Over China', in 1937 at the start of The Great Patriotic/Anti-Japanese War the Nationalistist and Communists set aside their differences but it did not last. By the end of 1940 all practical cooperation between these two factions ceased with Chiang Kai Shek's 'unprovoked' attack on the Communist's 4th Army. While it never became an all out war they spent as much time fighting each other for local control of the populace as they did the Japanese for the remainder of the war. According to Barbara W. Tuchman & John K. Fairbanks in 'Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45' Stillwell believed that the majority of Allied military aid given to the Nationalists was actually used to fight the Communists from 1941 thru 1945. Tuchman & Fairbanks back up this belief as well. I can't offhand remember the source but I read somewhere that there were instances where local Japanese commanders would pay the Nationalists to fight the Communists as it reduced guerrilla activity in their area. This was by no means done on a grand scale but it does illustrate that in some instances the Communists were regarded as a greater threat than the Japanese by the Nationalists. If I can remember where I read this I will provide the link in a later post, for now treat this last blurb as you would any other uncited reference ;) IMO this theater is going to be very difficult to model well in a game such as WitP as the objectives of the parties involved are not as black and white as they are in most wargames. Historically the Chinese were incapable of driving the Japanese out and were simply biding their time waiting for the Japanese to be defeated then resume their civil war. The Japanese officers and soldiers in China were content to rest on their laurels as by 1938 they had accomplished most of their original aims in China with the primary exception being pacification of the conquered territory. Their failure to accomplish the latter tempered any desire they had to renew offensive operations in China. How all of this will be incorporated into WitP is anyone's guess. I have confidence that the developers will arrive at a workable solution but I don't envy them in this task. -g

mdiehl -> (6/4/2003 9:56:16 PM)
One way to accomplish this is to have readiness penalties for Japanese units in China and make units there eat supply at prodigious rates if they attempt to do anything. These two effects would serve as a proxy for insurgent activities in conquered (but largely unpacified) areas, and counterinsurgent efforts to reduce said activities.

Feinder -> (6/5/2003 2:15:30 AM)
I do not know if WitP will be modeling it this way, but I think there was a fairly useful (and potentially usable) solution Victory Game's(?) board game "Pacific War, The Struggle Against Japan 1941-1945". There were several major HQ units, and player would assign "command points" to each HQ unit for the coming month. The scope of the HQ units were such that each side had about 12 major HQs, to assign CPs to, that filtered down to their subordinate HQs. In the case of Chines HQs, their was a divisor of about 1/3, that essentially meant that if you sent 300 CPs to SWPAC, you got 300 CPs, but if you sent 300 CPs to the Chinese HQ, you only got 100 CPs of effort (I'm oversimplifying, but you get the gist). If you really did want to launch a major offensive in China, you were welcome to, but in order to truely muster a large force, you were going to have to do so at great expense to your other theathers. In that respect, the Chinese theater was generally reagared as "not worth the effort" by both sides. Logistically, the Japanese were required to keep so many divisions of troops and numbers of planes near the Russian border (tensions there also). They also needed to keep a presense in China, because if he left it undefended the Allied player would be tempted to mobilize the Chinese masses. As the war dragged on, Japan would be tempted to pull the experienced divisions in China, and transfer them to Burma or elsewhere (and replace green divisions for garrison duty in China). Regarding issues between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese, the simple rule was that they could not stack or participate in any attack together (seemed to work well enough). One caveate' on that is that, you could make in WitP such that the Communist troops could be "activated" by BOTH sides (at great expense), by the Japanese -and- the Allies (but again, with no cooperation with a Nationalist unit). -F-

gus -> (6/5/2003 3:16:59 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]One way to accomplish this is to have readiness penalties for Japanese units in China and make units there eat supply at prodigious rates if they attempt to do anything. These two effects would serve as a proxy for insurgent activities in conquered (but largely unpacified) areas, and counterinsurgent efforts to reduce said activities. [/B][/QUOTE] Hey mdiehl, I don't think supply by itself can address all of the issues in the Chinese theater. If one side gains a stratgic advantage in another theater it would be possible to shunt reinforcement and supply to China and upset the delicate balance of power that existed historically. By super supplying this theater it would be possible for one side to launch a sustained strategic offensive which IMO should be a herculean task on a good day for either side, easier for the Japanese and virtually impossible for the Chinese. So what I am thinking is that Japanese behavior in the China theater should determine the level of cooperation that exists between the Nationalists and the Communists and the amount of guerrilla activity (GA) as well. The rates of supply usage and attrition for the Chinese would vary inversly with the level of cooperation, i.e when they get along 90% of supply gets through and attrition levels are reduced when they are at each other's throats only 10% of supply makes it through and attrition levels are ver high. GA would vary directly with cooperation, as it increases Japanese resource collection and production is reduced and Japanese attrition in theater is increased. For example in the historical stalemate situation Chinese cooperation was minimal and this should be reflected in a high supply rate loss as well as higher attrition rates among Chinese units. GA should be low as well to reflect adequate garrisoning by Japanese forces and Chinese preoccupation with their internal political struggle. Under these circumstances the Chinese would be hard pressed to mount an offensive and GA would have very little impact on Japanese resource collection and production. There are three other possiblities for the Chinese theater; 1) Japanese offensive 2) Chinese offensive 3) Reduction of Japanese garrison in China These are not mutually exclusive, i.e they can all occur simulataneously. Chinese cooperation should increase whenever the Japanese are conducting offensive operations in theater and should be dependent on its scope and duration. In other words cooperation should increase more dramatically if three divisions of Japanese troops are involved instead of a single regiment. Likewise an offensive that lasts a month should raise cooperation more than one that lasts a week, everything else being equal. Once the offensive is halted cooperation level should gradually return to normal. This would reflect the Chinese setting aside their differences to oppose a common threat as they did in the 1937-1940 timeframe. A Chinese offensive should do the opposite lowering cooperation levels over time and should be dependent on scope and duration as well. Once the offensive is halted cooperation level should gradually return to normal. This would reflect that one or both Chinese factions becoming more concerned about losing their political advantage over the other instead of fighting the Japanese. Reduction of Japanese garrison in China should raise cooperation levels over time proportional to the force level reduction of the garrison. This would reflect the inability of the remaining garrison to deal effectivley with the insurgents and as Chinese combat units recieved more supply their readiness and therefore their ability to conduct offensive operation would increase while this situation lasted. What I hope this would accomplish is to restrict offensive ops to a very limited scope in this theater, very small steps not a blitzkrieg. It would not prohibit either side from launching a major offensive in China but it would force the player to really plan ahead to make sure it was worth the cost. It would also give the players more latitude to determine their own fate (or more likely hang themselves :) ) especially for the Japanese. -g -g

mdiehl -> (6/5/2003 3:39:16 AM)
[QUOTE]For example in the historical stalemate situation Chinese cooperation was minimal and this should be reflected in a high supply rate loss as well as higher attrition rates among Chinese units. [/QUOTE] Perhaps I was not clear. I had it in mind that Japanese units would have exceedingly high supply costs and readiness penalties, not the Chinese ones. Basically, as long as the Japanese remain dormant, their readiness stays constant at some level around 75% (talking in PW terms) and they consume supply at the usual rate. The moment the Japanese units in China begin to twitch, their supply demands increase and their readiness drops as they have to suppress insurgency in the areas already in their control. If the Jpn player wants to dedicated ALL of the IJA transport capacity to supplying China, he should be able to move a few divisions around ... at the expense of supplying any IJA divisions elsewhere. In effect, he has to pretend that it's 1938 and that there really isn't a war going on elsewhere to demand time/resources/personnel.

gus -> (6/5/2003 5:08:06 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]Perhaps I was not clear. [/B][/QUOTE] Hey mdiehl, No, you were quite clear in your post and I agree in principal with your solution. I just think it may not be enough to prevent abuse of this theater in game terms. -g

Dawy -> (6/5/2003 8:01:35 AM)
Hmmmm, yep looks like it will be interesting how the Matrix team will handle this. I wonder if the troops in China will be locked in China HQ like in PACWAR where you had to wait till a certain date in order to send them to other theatres?

gus -> (6/5/2003 8:18:18 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dawy [B]I wonder if the troops in China will be locked in China HQ like in PACWAR where you had to wait till a certain date in order to send them to other theatres? [/B][/QUOTE] Hey Dawy, I would hope not as I thought that PacWar system was too restrictive. The Japanese player should have the right to wage the war as they see fit just as long as there are appropriately severe consequences for 'stirring the pot' in China, Manchukuo and Korea I will be satisfied. -g

Bulldog61 -> (6/7/2003 11:33:55 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by gus [B]Hey Dawy, I would hope not as I thought that PacWar system was too restrictive. The Japanese player should have the right to wage the war as they see fit just as long as there are appropriately severe consequences for 'stirring the pot' in China, Manchukuo and Korea I will be satisfied. -g [/B][/QUOTE] Currently in the Alpha it apprears that it would be possible to withdraw/reassign a division however it will be expensive to do so. Additionally, China appears that it could soak up reinforcements, not be the source of them. There are lots of Chinesse!

Snigbert -> (6/8/2003 9:49:02 AM)
Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communists will both be included. China isn't going to be a pushover. We're only in Alpha, but the sheer weight of forces the Chinese have is intimidating. It seems rather like a stalemate situation in China, unless herculean efforts are made by one side or the other (at the cost of other theatres.)

Blackhorse -> (6/19/2003 11:09:33 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Snigbert [B]Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communists will both be included. China isn't going to be a pushover. We're only in Alpha, but the sheer weight of forces the Chinese have is intimidating. It seems rather like a stalemate situation in China, unless herculean efforts are made by one side or the other (at the cost of other theatres.) [/B][/QUOTE] Great . . . and I hope the game models the difficulty Japan had in occupying China, and does not allow the Japanese player to simply pile all of his divisions into the front line, and leave his rear undefended. IRL, even a greatly-depleted Japanese Army could whip Chinese formations in regular combat -- as Chiang Kai Shek and Chennault discovered to their dismay when they attempted the Bomber Offensive from Chinese bases in 1944. The tremendous difficulty for the Japanese was to pacify what they conquered -- simply garrisoning the cities, railroad lines and navigatable rivers stretched the Japanese Army in China to its limit. In WitP I hope the game has Chinese "guerilla" units (Communists and Nationalists) springing up in unoccupied or weakly garrisoned cities / key locations behind Japanese lines. I very much like the concept of having Chinese offensive capability tied to outside supplies -- while the Burma Road and the Hump only provided a tiny fraction of the Nationalists' supplies, Chiang was constantly threatening to withdraw from the war unless the flow was maintained / increased. Besides, it provides a good reason for the Japanese to try to cut the Burma Road, and for the Allies to defend it.

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