More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (Full Version)

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ronmexico111 -> More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/17/2019 9:37:11 AM)

Was just reading this article on Warfaresims.com http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=4884 and I just wanted some clarification. When firing a CEC-capable weapon does the unit actually firing the weapon have to also be painting the target with it's radar? I hate to say it but I'm confused on this issue here.




Dimitris -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/17/2019 11:44:42 AM)

If the weapon to be fired can link up to another suitable platform that is radar-tracking the target then no, it doesn't have to. In that case it can "blind-fire".




morphin -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/17/2019 6:18:57 PM)

in this article it says:

"Note that CEC-capable weapons can still be launched and mid-guided by a suitable outside datalink-parent platform, as before."

My Question:
Which are suitabel outside datalink-parent platforms? Which property on the database viewer i must search for?

Thank's
Andy




ronmexico111 -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/17/2019 6:23:24 PM)

Ok, thank you Dimitris for the clarification.




trujillocorreo -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/17/2019 6:24:30 PM)

Reading the article, indicates that the IRST that equips the SU-27-30-35 has no ability to guide ARH missiles:

quote:

"For example, to Su-27 detecting a target on its IRST can use that information to manouver against the target and maybe launch an infrared missile like the R-73/74, but it can not longer blind-fire an ARH weapon like the R-77 or PL-12: It must now first gain a solid onboard radar track on the target. "


Well this is not entirely true, the IRST-OLS that equips the SU-27-30-35 presents the data acquired in the hud as a radar contact, which allows to guide ARH missiles in passive mode without turning on the radar. For this thread there is an interesting discussion on the subject:

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/printable.asp?m=3735320

Manufacturer:
[image]http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_mDvQ8xYRdSI/StWc0w6EH4I/AAAAAAAAAgY/R9HGZDBaHgA/s1600/14.10.2009+11-43-43_0028.jpg[/image]




Dimitris -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/18/2019 4:35:57 AM)

That thread indicates that other IRSTs may provide the same capability. Is there a characteristic that is common among these systems? We'd really prefer to avoid peppering the source code with "Sim City" hacks [:)]




shania -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/21/2019 8:19:06 PM)

Q is not if missile can be fired. But what information missile got at launch and if aircraft can support it...

Unsupported missile has poor chance to successfully intercept target even if it has perfect information about its target at launch, especially if target is changing vector.

If only info fighter has is azimuth and range, no velocity or even vector. Where will missile fly? Directly at target?




AKar -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 6:09:32 AM)

Yes, this specific topic is somewhat complex and can be broken up into multiple parts...

1. Pre-launch targeting;
2. post-launch mid-course updates;
3. a case of losing mid-course updates before weapon is active.

These may not always be 1-to-1 related to each other. Using AMRAAM as an example, but the same discussion would apply to any similar weapon. When an active radar guided missile (such as AMRAAM) is given its pre-launch targeting information, whether a radar tracking is required or not is not particularly a weapon limitation but that of launch platform interfacing the weapon. To my knowledge, most circa 2000 era users of AMRAAM do require an active radar track (such as STT or TWS designation) of target to give the missile its initial targeting information. The exception is a 'maddog' launch, in which the missile is fired without any targeting information whatsoever, goes immediately active and guides into first target the active seeker acquires. I understand that most A-to-A ARH missiles are capable of being launched this way.

I don't know the details of platform-to-AMRAAM interface communications, however, I would believe there are no fundamental technical reasons to not be able to target a missile to a target designated by other on-board sensors or fusion of sensors, or even one datalinked to a launch platform. I'd expect several up-to-date, circa 2020 era launch platforms to be able to do at least the former. I'd also expect similar capability from modern-day Russian (or other) platforms.

Now, after the launch, it is by default the launch platform that must provide the missile its mid-course updates of the target's changes. This will almost certainly make the launch platform somewhat vulnerable to detection in comparison to a case where it would remain with its radar completely silent. What makes an interesting aspect is what happens should the launch platform not give the missile any post-launch updates. To my knowledge, at least the major variants of AMRAAM should not go blind in a same way a SARH missile would, but should be capable of continuing with the last known target information. Noteworthy thing is that there reportedly are (were?) variants of AMRAAM that lack the mid-course update capability entirely; I don't see why the variants having such capability would be any dumber should they not receive the mid-course data (well, I can think of one reason, but anyway). Obviously, left alone the missile is less likely to readily acquire the target by the time it goes active, depending on the maneuvering of the intended target.

It would be interesting to find some details of the platform-to-weapon communications interfacing, but it is unlikely there are too much material in the public. Because the launch platforms in general do require radar tracking specifically, I suspect the AMRAAM cannot be targeted in "a target position only" way, or in bearing only (except for 'maddog') but at least an artificial estimate of target's position by the calculated time of impact is probably needed. I'd guess the target's speed is the key ingredient that is missing from a generic, 'raw' IRST targeting information.




morphin -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 8:47:09 AM)

AKar: Thank's. Very interesting.

I think it is worth to tunning the current implemenation.

Andy




shania -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 4:16:48 PM)


quote:

Noteworthy thing is that there reportedly are (were?) variants of AMRAAM that lack the mid-course update capability entirely; I don't see why the variants having such capability would be any dumber should they not receive the mid-course data (well, I can think of one reason, but anyway).


I think this is related to Tornado and its fire control system and not missile itself.
Article from 2002:

quote:

In the live firing test, carried out within the past 12 months, Amraam was fired "blind" - without radar guidance - by pointing the aircraft at a target and launching a missile. An RAF officer said: "The Tornado F3 radar is unable to communicate with Amraam before or after firing. The missile is programmed to follow its host radar guidance system to its target. When that guidance is lacking, the missile reverts to a simple 'seek and destroy' mode: the first target that it sees is the one it goes for. The Amraam detected the Tornado aircraft that was escorting the firing aircraft and tried to intercept and destroy that aircraft."

It was only the airborne positions of the aircraft in the test that prevented an accident, the officer said.

He added: "This is a blatantly irresponsible way to try to engage an enemy. Following this operational practice could lead to friendly fighters - or even civilian aircraft - getting shot down."

A spokesman for the MoD said: "The Amraam missile is not part of the RAF's inventory at the moment." Tornado F3 aircraft regularly patrol the no-fly zone over southern Iraq and are a key weapon in the defence of British mainland airspace. The aircraft is expected to be replaced by the Eurofighter, which can use Amraam, in a few years.


And around Turkis shotdown of Su-24 in syria, they were some rumors(and dont has reliable source for this) AWACS can pass targeting data to F-16 a it could fire passively.


Another thing in this game is, how easy is for pilot (at last i have this impression)is to spot (even burnt out and passive) incoming missile by Mk1 Eyeball. So its hard to manage surprise attacks even with 5gen aircraft... (thats what we heard from every red flag) I think it should take some time (even with wing man radio warning) be harder to find it, measure distance, know its attacking him and do evasive action. There should be some kind of OODA loop for defensive actions.




AKar -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 5:34:59 PM)

quote:

I think this is related to Tornado and its fire control system and not missile itself.


Hmm, I don't know. What your article mentions ("The Tornado F3 radar is unable to communicate with Amraam before or after firing. The missile is programmed to follow its host radar guidance system to its target. When that guidance is lacking, the missile reverts to a simple 'seek and destroy' mode: the first target that it sees is the one it goes for. The Amraam detected the Tornado aircraft that was escorting the firing aircraft and tried to intercept and destroy that aircraft.") describes a 'maddog' launch to the letter. This is can be done even in more capable launch platforms: point and shoot firing the AMRAAM locks it up to the first target it detects, going immediately active. This is sometimes called the dogfight mode of the missile.

I need to search for the quote I was after when mentioning the missiles lacking mid-course update capability...I think it was about something else than this. I believe the missile behaves differently when fired with the host platform 'being able to communicate with it before the launch, but still not after', instead of not being able to, or choosing not to, communicate it any targeting information whatsoever before launch.

That said, I cannot absolutely positively ascertain (even if I think so) that any variant of the missile would not go 'pitbull' immediately if the mid-course radar guidance was lost after the launch, or at the launch, instead resuming inertial track as per the latest target information and respecting the calculated time-to-active count.

quote:

And around Turkis shotdown of Su-24 in syria, they were some rumors(and dont has reliable source for this) AWACS can pass targeting data to F-16 a it could fire passively.


Even if they didn't receive targeting information, they'd still be able to sneak in to a range from which to fire passively without any off-board sensors for targeting solutions. Note that getting within around 10 nm without emitting lets one fire ARH missiles 'maddog' or to lock on some IR missiles as well, while still remaining fairly difficult to spot visually if lacking any alarm. They would not need any sophisticated datalinked targeting to pull that one off.




Scorpion86 -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 5:56:44 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: shania

And around Turkis shotdown of Su-24 in syria, they were some rumors(and dont has reliable source for this) AWACS can pass targeting data to F-16 a it could fire passively.



Well, I don't know about Turkish F-16s, but MLU-ed F-16s have Link-16 datalinks. Could that be used to feed radar tracks to the AMRAAM?




AKar -> RE: More realistic restrictions on remote-cued AAW engagements: Small change, big ramifications (2/22/2019 7:21:33 PM)

No, I don't think the AIM-120 is a LINK 16 node. Not counting in the very latest variants, of which I don't know.

LINK 16 is a kind of umbrella term anyway, representing a fairly unimpressive datalink by the terms of capabilities and performance as introduced. I'd think it is a kind like Internet Protocol, getting better by the capabilities of the related subsystems as they develop further and mature, building on the very foundation given by the basic interconnecting system. This gives that a platform being LINK 16 compatible gives away very little of its actual networking capabilities via that very link.




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