Rating the Combatants

Rating the Combatants (Full Version)

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LTCMTS -> Rating the Combatants (6/22/2003 9:31:36 PM)
With apologies to Mr. Iverson, but at the request of Dagfin: Ratings are based on the following: Size of defense budget provided for operations & maintenance (overall, per capita per soldier and per capita per recruit/conscript) Training facilities, opportunities, restrictions and constraints Training equipment, systems, doctrine and organization Individual and collective training Training cycles Experience and training of training cadre Personnel management systems (methods of induction, transfer within force and maintenance of organizational strength, rotation policies, initial enlistment/conscription commitment and retention) Unit cohesion (percentage of professional cadre, retention of officers, NCOs and junior EM, frequency of conscript/recruit classes, training responsibilities of cadre within units) AC/RC integration (percentage of reservists integrated into an organization, commitment to RC equipment, training and personnel, RC organization, training and service commitments) Many of these factors can be determined objectively and some cannot. Some armies have more informatioon than others available. Skill is only one factor in readiness along with morale and equipment (EOH and ER). I do not insist I am totally correct or that my subjectives ratings are better than anyone else's. These are just the factors I would use in determining the INITIAL skill level of various NATO ground forces. On the RDA itself, there is nothing wrong with the individual conscript, the professional cadre or the training doctrine. The skill level is for battalion through division organizations. Such organizations perform most effectively when trained as a unit. In 1988-1991, even the Jutland Division was manned at only 20% of its wartime strength. Nine months AD from its conscripts and the lowest percentage of professional cadre along with the lowest level of funding, the availability of training opportunities, both individually and collectively, for the reservists, the lack of manuever and training areas for even battalion level exercises are major detractors. In a mobilization with immediate deployment into combat, these detractors would mean significant mission failures and major levels of casualties even during successful ops. If mobilized and then given time before commitment to combat, some of the detractors could be eliminated. Combat experience, other than an immediate collapse, would also increase, if painfully, the skill level. There is nothing wrong with relying on reservists, if the appropriate steps in funding, professional cadre, and training are taken. If placed in the conditions the Israeli army operates under, the Danish army would achieve similar levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunatelt, for any combat sim or wargame simulating the conditions of ground (or combined arms/3D) combat on NATO's Central Front from 1988-1991, the Danes would take a major hit on readiness, from skill levels, to equipment on hand, both quantities and quality, but not equipment maintenance and certainly not from morale.

Rune Iversen -> Re: Rating the Combatants (6/22/2003 10:48:21 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS [B]With apologies to Mr. Iverson, but at the request of Dagfin: Ratings are based on the following: Size of defense budget provided for operations & maintenance (overall, per capita per soldier and per capita per recruit/conscript) Training facilities, opportunities, restrictions and constraints Training equipment, systems, doctrine and organization Individual and collective training Training cycles Experience and training of training cadre Personnel management systems (methods of induction, transfer within force and maintenance of organizational strength, rotation policies, initial enlistment/conscription commitment and retention) Unit cohesion (percentage of professional cadre, retention of officers, NCOs and junior EM, frequency of conscript/recruit classes, training responsibilities of cadre within units) AC/RC integration (percentage of reservists integrated into an organization, commitment to RC equipment, training and personnel, RC organization, training and service commitments) Many of these factors can be determined objectively and some cannot. Some armies have more informatioon than others available. Skill is only one factor in readiness along with morale and equipment (EOH and ER). I do not insist I am totally correct or that my subjectives ratings are better than anyone else's. These are just the factors I would use in determining the INITIAL skill level of various NATO ground forces. On the RDA itself, there is nothing wrong with the individual conscript, the professional cadre or the training doctrine. The skill level is for battalion through division organizations. Such organizations perform most effectively when trained as a unit. In 1988-1991, even the Jutland Division was manned at only 20% of its wartime strength. Nine months AD from its conscripts and the lowest percentage of professional cadre along with the lowest level of funding, the availability of training opportunities, both individually and collectively, for the reservists, the lack of manuever and training areas for even battalion level exercises are major detractors. In a mobilization with immediate deployment into combat, these detractors would mean significant mission failures and major levels of casualties even during successful ops. If mobilized and then given time before commitment to combat, some of the detractors could be eliminated. Combat experience, other than an immediate collapse, would also increase, if painfully, the skill level. There is nothing wrong with relying on reservists, if the appropriate steps in funding, professional cadre, and training are taken. If placed in the conditions the Israeli army operates under, the Danish army would achieve similar levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunatelt, for any combat sim or wargame simulating the conditions of ground (or combined arms/3D) combat on NATO's Central Front from 1988-1991, the Danes would take a major hit on readiness, from skill levels, to equipment on hand, both quantities and quality, but not equipment maintenance and certainly not from morale. [/B][/QUOTE] No problem, but to answer some questions: -Danish Brigades were not really supposed to fight "division" battles, but at the brigade level, since ķt was believed this would secure a greater dispersal of forces in the case of NBC attacks. If you look at the structure of the mechanized brigades they are for all purposes independent units. -Service time in the late 80s- early 90s. were: -Tankers, high level maintanence units: Professional soldiers. -Armoured/Motorized infantry: 12 months. -Artillery/Engineers: 10 months. -Supplies/Medics etc.: 8 months. -Battalion level excercises were (and still are) carried out in the Oeksboel training area, so I don“t know where you are getting this from. Brigadelevel excersises, like the one i“mgoing on in the fall, is carried out in civilian terrain. As I have already alluded, the 72 hour off the bat scenario is not applicable to either Denmark or Norway, since WAPA would have been unable to mobilize enough of their forces for deployment in theatre in such a short time. The more believeable timescale would be a couple of months of mobilization first, which was the time the army reckoned they needed for sorting out the mobilization and get the trroops moving. Some troops would still have been of better quility than others (The mechanized infantry in the mech brigades, whose time in the army might only lie a few years back, versus the Mot. Infantryman in the battlegroups whose training might be several years old for instance)

LTCMTS -> Danish Army (6/23/2003 12:53:20 AM)
I agree that there parts of any army which will lie above or below the mean. Any average factor needs to be adjusted for that. One would not rate each brigade of the 82d ABN DIV in peacetime the same as the brigades run on training cycles, and the DRB would be at a higher readiness compared to the others. The 2 AD was inactiviating in 1990, and the three brigades and the division base were at different states of readiness when the Gulf War erupted. As I stated in the spreadsheet, AD time after mobilization will modify the INITIAL ratings. It will depend on the scenario being used. If the 72 hours "jump start" is used, whatever Danish forces available would be cooperating with TK Schleswig-Holstein and GE 6 PzGD in holding some form of defense between the Baltic and Hamburg against elements of the GDR 5A. For each month in delay of the start date, the Danish forces would be further reinforced with reservists as would the Germans, and the Volksarmee units would be reinforced with Soviet CAT A divisons from Leningrad MVD and Polish CAT A/B units. I love to debate these issues if the result is an acceptance of the right to differ and the exchange of information provides data for others to consider in their studies. Again, the ratings are what I would use based on my research, but others may have come to a different conclusion. I do not demand others accept my ratings but reserve the right to defend and retain them or to modify them as I re-evaluate the analysis. Since we have no demonstrated historical proof to utilize, we just have to go with what we get. I would suggest when the game becomes available that we run a series of studies using the editor to determine possible outcomes based on different ratings of NATO and WP ground forces.

Rune Iversen -> Re: Danish Army (6/23/2003 1:02:55 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS [B]I agree that there parts of any army which will lie above or below the mean. Any average factor needs to be adjusted for that. One would not rate each brigade of the 82d ABN DIV in peacetime the same as the brigades run on training cycles, and the DRB would be at a higher readiness compared to the others. The 2 AD was inactiviating in 1990, and the three brigades and the division base were at different states of readiness when the Gulf War erupted. As I stated in the spreadsheet, AD time after mobilization will modify the INITIAL ratings. It will depend on the scenario being used. If the 72 hours "jump start" is used, whatever Danish forces available would be cooperating with TK Schleswig-Holstein and GE 6 PzGD in holding some form of defense between the Baltic and Hamburg against elements of the GDR 5A. For each month in delay of the start date, the Danish forces would be further reinforced with reservists as would the Germans, and the Volksarmee units would be reinforced with Soviet CAT A divisons from Leningrad MVD and Polish CAT A/B units. I love to debate these issues if the result is an acceptance of the right to differ and the exchange of information provides data for others to consider in their studies. Again, the ratings are what I would use based on my research, but others may have come to a different conclusion. I do not demand others accept my ratings but reserve the right to defend and retain them or to modify them as I re-evaluate the analysis. Since we have no demonstrated historical proof to utilize, we just have to go with what we get. I would suggest when the game becomes available that we run a series of studies using the editor to determine possible outcomes based on different ratings of NATO and WP ground forces. [/B][/QUOTE] Sounds reasonable, since we have now agreed that the values you have assigned would only hold good for the 72 hour come as you are party. As I too have pointed out, the Danish army was not geared (based upon the threat picture) to handle such a war, nor would it need to be, since the only forces WAPA would be able to have in-country in 72 hours would be the strategic reserves of the VDV.

scarletto -> (6/23/2003 2:51:05 AM)
Whilst it is easy for us all to speculate on how ones army or its allies would perform. Certainly for two of us (Americans + British) one factor cannot be added to its rating. Simply put, the others where fighting on their own soil or where in danger of being invaded. I do not think that Britain would have been attacked by anymore than special forces from either soviet or eg armys. Mainly to disrupt our air forces based there or maritime forces. This fact alone would have been a bigger incentive to morale than anything else,whilst we would see it as just another town or village lost, to those of the WG/Danish etc it would be rather more personal

Rune Iversen -> (6/23/2003 3:29:10 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by scarletto [B]Whilst it is easy for us all to speculate on how ones army or its allies would perform. Certainly for two of us (Americans + British) one factor cannot be added to its rating. Simply put, the others where fighting on their own soil or where in danger of being invaded. I do not think that Britain would have been attacked by anymore than special forces from either soviet or eg armys. Mainly to disrupt our air forces based there or maritime forces. This fact alone would have been a bigger incentive to morale than anything else,whilst we would see it as just another town or village lost, to those of the WG/Danish etc it would be rather more personal [/B][/QUOTE] Bingo. While Britain or the CONUS might have been the victims of air raids or submarine launched cruise missiles, nothing short of a nuclear exchange would have damaged the countryside/civilian population to the degree that was expected in Europe. The two times the Danish army mobilized it“s ready forces during the cold war (1962 Cuba Crisis and 1968 WAPA invasion of Tchekoslowakia) the usually recalsitrant/indifferent (for want of a better word) conscripts went about their tasks in record time (my father remarked that he never saw a foxhole dug faster) because it might have been for real.

Black Cat -> Re: Rating the Combatants (6/23/2003 4:43:29 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS "Ratings are based on the following:" Most interesting discussion. I would be interested in how you would apply actual combat experience, as a percentage, ( or anyway you choose ) in the case of some NATO VS WP forces. Certainly this would vary in different timeframes, from immedtiate post WW II to the mid 1970`s. Assuming actual combat experience of senior NCO`s and Officers at the Brigade, Division and Corps levels, both in Staff and line units. I am also tempted to ask how one would ( or even if one should ), in your evaluations, attempt to qualify an " institutional " experience of actual large scale warfare. This would be a body of knowledge ( or Myth ) , based upon actual experience, over a very long period of time, unique to that Society and it citizens. Thanks

LTCMTS -> Some examples (6/23/2003 5:46:19 AM)
Again, some evaluated factors will have to be subjective and can never be validated (thankfully) by history (except in a limited sense for the US, UK and Fr forces who participated in the Gulf War). Also the subject is "skill" level, seperate from other readiness factors. As an example, let us take 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), VII Corps, 7A/USAREUR (3Bde/US 1 ID(M)/US VII/US 7A), headquatered at Goeppingen, FRG from 1988-90. The US Army in this period provided ~six months of individual training to recruits enlisting in the combat arms MOS. This training would be completed before the soldier was forwarded to his first duty assignment. Most junior enlisted were on a three & three year enlistment (3 yrs active and 3 yrs in the reserve). Arriving in FRG, they would serve two years in a unit and then return to CONUS for processing unless they re-enlisted, then they would serve a third year before transferring out. Corporals in the combat arms usually had at least a year in their units before promotion and then were transferred to another squad. Most re-enlisted EMs were promoted to Corporal if they demonstrated any leadership skills. SGTs, who were fire team leaders in the infantry, generally had at least three years experience and had graduated PNOC. Senior NCOs, WOs and officers served three year tours, usually within the same battalion for company grade officers and division for field grade. SSGs, who were squad leaders or tank commanders, had at least six years in and graduated from BNOC. SFCs/PSG, usually the senior platoon NCO had at least nine years and were ANOC graduates. MSG/1SG, the senior company NCO, had at 12 years and were candidates for SMA or had complated Battle Staff. WOs were divided fairly equally. Those who had recently received their warrants under the WOBC program, with around 2-4 years enlisted experience, mostly aviators and those who had received warrants after demonstrated performance as NCOs, after at least 12 yrs. Other than aviators, most warrants served in support positions. 2LTs had received a minimum of two years equivalent in training in military individual combat and leadership skills, whether commissioned from West Point, OCS or ROTC and including OBC. The OCS and at least 25% of the ROTC products would have a minimum of two years enlisted experience. 1LTs were promoted at 18 months. Captains had at least three years service and had completed AOC. Command assignments usually rotated every 18 months, so that Captains, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels would usually spend 18 months in command of a company, battalion or brigade and then 18 months on battalion, brigade or division staff. Rarely did officers assigned to Corps and Army staffs rotate through commands in that tour. Majors had around six to eight years experience and formed the backbone of the divisional and corps staffs when not serving as battalion XOs. Lieutenant Colonels had 8-12 years experience, most had C&GSC. Colonels had at least 12 years experience as officers, command time at company and battalion and most had completed the AWC. It was generally considered that it took 3-6 months to integrate a new soldier of any rank into a unit and for a soldier to assimilate his new duties. Thus at any one time, 15-17% of the privates in US 3/1 ID(M) would not yet have been fully integrated into their units, though 100% would have completed basic/AIT. 15-17% of all corporals would be new to their fire teams, 15-20% of all NCOs would be new to their assignments, while 90% would have completed the required schools for their rank, 15-20% of all platoon leaders (2LTs), 25-33% of all company, battalion, brigade and division commanders, 25-33% of all battalion, brigade and divison staff officers would be new to their assignments, while over 95% would have completed the required schools for their rank and grade. The US 3/1 ID(M) would be theoriticaly manned at 100%, though usually 95% would be the average of which 5% would be unavailable for duty for various reasons. The brigade would have 100% of its equipment, all of which were weapon systems issued in the last six months and therefor all NET had been completed. Over 90% of the equipment would be FMC. All units would have 3 DOS UBL within immediate reach. The brigade may or may not have just completed a rotation at Graffenwoehr or participated in Reforger.

LTCMTS -> As a Comparison (6/23/2003 6:23:04 AM)
Now, let's take the 21st Motorized Rifle Division, 2d Guards Tank Army in Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. The Soviets conscript their recruits twice a year for a two year commitment. The recruit has had some prior exposure to military training in school and through the Party, but the standards and depth of experience would vary widely in the normal conscript intake except for Guards Airborne. It was stated by a reformer, MAJ Lopatin, in 1990 (and therefor the data should be taken with a grain of salt) that in 1989, 45% of the conscripts had "mental aberrations" (my quotes) and fifteen percent had criminal records. Over a third could not even understand enough Russian to follow simple commands. This would probably not be the case for a CAT A division in the GSFG, but is an indivcation of the quality of conscript being received by the Soviet Army in this period. The recruit is sent directly to the SU 21 MRD and is held for 30 days before being inducted. He then participates in a six month training cycle that ends with battalion or higher level exercises. His actual individual and collective training is thus half of his US counterpart. His re-enlistment rate is 1-2% compared to a 70-80% rate for his US counterpart. Less than 5% of the NCOs are long-service professionals. Thus 95% of the NCOs in the 21 MRD are conscripts with less than two years in the army. At any one time, 50% of the privates in the 21 MRD will be less than fully effective. Duties usually performed by US NCOs are performed by Praporshchiki, warrant officers, though 67% of these will have less than five years service. Most aviators are senior warrants. Most lieutenants will be like their US counterparts, with two or more years of military training and serving three years in their division. Most, however, will remain in their assignment for their entire tour. Captains have six years experience, while officers can reach major and a battalion command in nine years. All career officers receive extensive schooling. The 21 MRD is at 100% strength, but twice a year in June and December, 50% of all privates and 95% of all NCOs will leave the unit. Some 30-35% of all warrants and junior officers will rotate out of the MRD, though many field grade officers extend their tours, thus only around 20% of the majors, LTCs and COLs rotate. The 100%, however, is nominal. 10, even 15% of a Soviet division's strength could be non-available for a number of reasons, mostly health and discipline. The unit has the latest equipment at 100% on-hand and will roll out at 100% FMC for the stored sets, though at closer to 80-90% for those company sets just used in the training cycle. Sometimes T-62s are used for training, so there may be a comfort gap for some crews manning their T-80s. A lot of training is done with mechanical simulators and sub-caliber systems, and is performed to a minimum standard and to rote. In 1988, the Chief of the MCTD in an inspection of an MRR in the Kiev MVD noted that none of the company commanders could execute a deployment on line from column of march. The training "norm" for tank gunnery in 1987 was 60 secs to engage and destroy a target. As a comparison, the slowest engagement time at the CAT87 was 16.2 secs for the German, Belgian and Canadians Leo 1 crews. One US M1 crew scored a 6.2 sec cycle. This is NATO's best, so something slower would be appropriate to the avaerage crew, but that would still remain 2-3 times faster. The unit's UBL is at hand. This is just an example of some of the analysis that needs to be done, and not all factors discussed previously can be answered from the data we have. But a reasonable approximation should be possible, given that NATO and the WP "wargamed" this conflict for fifty years.

Dagfinn -> Norwegian Army (6/23/2003 2:12:03 PM)
Perthaps I should be flatered , but... IMHO I have difficulties to belive how you can rate the norwegian army just belove USSR Abn forces and just above USSR WGF forces. Could you please explain to me how you consider the Norwegian conscript army better than crack WP forces? This is not meant as critic, but if you can defend your numbers, I am going to have to rethink my views about the "northern front" in a NATO-WP conflict...

Dagfinn -> Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/23/2003 2:23:24 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Rune Iversen [B]As I have already alluded, the 72 hour off the bat scenario is not applicable to either Denmark or Norway, since WAPA would have been unable to mobilize enough of their forces for deployment in theatre in such a short time. [/B][/QUOTE] I dont know mutch about WGF and the situation in Denmark, but I beg to differ regarding Norway. In 1989 Soviet had atleast a cat. A Naval Bg and two cat.C MRD's close to the Norwegian border. The Naval Bg alone was IMHO capabel of making headway in northern Norway. If you then combine the cadres of the two cat.C MRD's, the Soviets has got quite a force to launch at Norway, while we are mobilizing. How fare they can go before enough mobilized Norwegians arive, is a nother question though...

Rune Iversen -> Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/23/2003 2:25:26 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B]I dont know mutch about WGF and the situation in Denmark, but I beg to differ regarding Norway. In 1989 Soviet had atleast a cat. A Naval Bg and two cat.C MRD's close to the Norwegian border. The Naval Bg alone was IMHO capabel of making headway in northern Norway. If you then combine the cadres of the two cat.C MRD's, the Soviets has got quite a force to launch at Norway, while we are mobilizing. How fare they can go before enough mobilized Norwegians arive, is a nother question though... [/B][/QUOTE] Exactly. Without mobilizing extra forces WAPA would have been unable to get very far in northern Norway (read up on how the germans stopped the soviet attacks in [I]Telemarken[/I] during WW2) If WAPA has the opportunity to call up reserves, well so does NATO.

Dagfinn -> (6/23/2003 2:27:28 PM)
Ehum, LTCMTS. You have used SGF in your excel sheet. I hope this is a typo and you mean WGF. Or have I got something wrong????

Dagfinn -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/23/2003 2:39:29 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Rune Iversen [B]Exactly. Without mobilizing extra forces WAPA would have been unable to get very far in northern Norway (read up on how the germans stopped the soviet attacks in [I]Telemarken[/I] during WW2) If WAPA has the opportunity to call up reserves, well so does NATO. [/B][/QUOTE] Yes buty in a jumpstart scenario, Norway is in deep ****. It takes time to deploy mobforces from the south, and while waiting we had not more than an reinforced Bg and the home guard (militia) to stop a crack Naval Bg + a quasi MRD. And now we havent even started looking at forces in the air...:( IMHO Soviet forces would probaby have little problems with reaching initial objects in northern Norway. Btw, this has probably nothing to do with "Rating the combatants" :D ;)

byron13 -> (6/23/2003 8:54:27 PM)
Jumping in a little late, but one quality factor that LTCMTS all but said in the first post on this thread is the quality and realism of the training. Quantity of training is one thing, training under realistic conditions is another. I'm sure the USAREUR forces trained a lot in the fifties, but I wouldn't don't think they would have acquitted themselves well in a war. The light came on for us after Viet Nam, and the services now emphasize realistic exercises that place a great deal of stress on the entire chain of command down to the lowest level. Computer simulators multiply the opportunities to train. For the time and money spent, I think most field exercises are a huge waste. Much more is learned on more focused training like ARTEPS and - the King of Training - a vacation at the NTC. [QUOTE]Originally posted by scarletto [B]Whilst it is easy for us all to speculate on how ones army or its allies would perform. Certainly for two of us (Americans + British) one factor cannot be added to its rating. Simply put, the others where fighting on their own soil or where in danger of being invaded. I do not think that Britain would have been attacked by anymore than special forces from either soviet or eg armys. Mainly to disrupt our air forces based there or maritime forces. This fact alone would have been a bigger incentive to morale than anything else,whilst we would see it as just another town or village lost, to those of the WG/Danish etc it would be rather more personal [/B][/QUOTE] I'm not sure the psychology would work like this. Maybe LTCMTS has some harder data, but the reverse could be true. WWII and the devastation wrought by WWII is still fresh in the minds of the Germans, and the affects can still be seen throughout Germany. A war today would likely be more destructive - at least in the countryside - than it was then. Germany is more pacifistic than it was sixty years ago and is more likely to be the host for a war begun over issues that do not involve German national interests. Finally, I'm not sure the West has as much stomach for the losses it had prior to 1950 due to any number of sociological factors. Finally, the existence of the DDR was proof that losing to the Soviets would not result in all males being put to the sword; a young German may figure that living under the Soviet boot may be better than dying and laying his country to waste just as the is was prospering after the its hard reconstruction. And, since an ever smaller percentage of GDP and employment is provided by farming but is, instead, provided by service and high tech industries that largely require an undisrupted economy and infrastructure, a war may cripple a country for a longer period of time. Throwing all of that in the mix, and I'm not sure the typical German soldier is going to hold the city of Kleinstadt "at all costs" when to do so means the total destruction of the city, 50% casualties, and the war started because of some flare up between the U.S. and the Soviets over oil, Iran, Afghanistan, submarine cable tapping, or some other esoteric issue that only the U.S. and USSR cared about.

Black Cat -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/23/2003 10:09:03 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B]Yes buty in a jumpstart scenario, Norway is in deep ****. It takes time to deploy mobforces from the south, and while waiting we had not more than an reinforced Bg and the home guard (militia) to stop a crack Naval Bg + a quasi MRD. And now we havent even started looking at forces in the air...:( IMHO Soviet forces would probaby have little problems with reaching initial objects in northern Norway. Btw, this has probably nothing to do with "Rating the combatants" :D ;) [/B][/QUOTE] I believe the Brits. had tasked a Royal Marine Brigade + to deploy ( quickly ) to Northern Norway, and at certain points in time the US had an Amphib. Marine Brigade + in the area as well. Air assists from England, and USN Carrier Battle Groups would almost certainly been deployed as well. Holding Northern Norway ( Narvik area at least ) was critical to control of the Norwegian Sea, and NATO`s strategy of bottling up the USSR Surface and Submarine forces. The importance of this in regard to reinforcing the Central Front, by Sea from the USA cannot be overstated. A failure, allowing USSR long range Naval Strike Aircraft ( especially the Naval Backfire Rgts. ) as well as USSR small surface combatants bases, would have been nothing less then a major Military Disaster, irregardless of what happened on the centeral front.

LTCMTS -> OOps and other Re: (6/23/2003 10:38:25 PM)
SGF is Soviet Group of Forces. SGFG is SGF, Germany, SGFP is Poland, SGFH is Hungary and SGFC is Czechoslovakia. What I meant was that the 21 MRD would lose 25% of its privates and 47-48% of its NCOs every June and Dec. Math was my worst subject in HS. I think that the impact of the NTC has been understated. If anything jumps out at you in all the AARs, LLs and analysis of the Gulf War in 1990-91 is the constant refrain "the NTC was harder than the war". Nothing improved the level of experience for the US Army better between 1985 - 1990 than going to Fort Irwin and getting your A** handed to you by the OPFOR, the finest MRR in the world and what the Soviets always wanted to be. Soviet doctrine executed with drive, flair and initiative in their home stadium and with surprise and numbers on their side. The humbling experience combined with the OCs and the AAR process caught people's attention, shook them out of their old ruts and got them started on the process of improvement. The second time a brigade went to NTC, even though most of the participants in the first time through had left, they had institutionalized the experience in the unit's battle drills and SOPs and they did better. By the third time through, they were starting to beat the OPFOR regularly. USAREUR did not send any bdes to the NTC, and only a few battalions would have been through the mini-NTC at 7ATC. But most of the CPTs, MAJs, LTCs and COLs and senior NCOs would have experienced a NTC rotation by 1989. More important was that the "lessons learned" were assimilated and institutionalized by Fort Leavenworth. As far as combat experience, you have to be careful there. In 1866 and 1871, the army with the lesser combat experience won. (The Prussians over the Austro-Hungarians and then the French). In 1914, the army with the least recent combat experience (the Imperial German) almost beat three armies (French, British and Russian) with more. In 1914, the Germans, despite their lack of direct recent combat experience, arguably had the most realistic tactical doctrine. More recently, Israeli combat experience in 1956 and 1967 actually proved a disadvantage in the first phase of the '73 War. The Iraqi Army went into Kuwait in 1990 with ten years of very recent combat experience, but it was never institutionalized and it was in the marshes and the mountains of the Iraq-Iran border, not the desert along Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. I think the NTC experience has actually given the US Army that first 30 days experience which has diminished the "friction" experienced by units in their first "contact". As far as experience at the operational and strategic levels, BCTP and similar map/computer exercises, when run with realistic scenarios and rules, brutally honest OCs and mentors and under field conditions, can provide the necessary level of training and experience. The Germans did fairly well in Poland in 1939, despite having run no Korps level manuevers with troops before about 1937. The problem is the honesty. I have been at "Warfighters" where it was announced that logistics would not impede the tactical play, where OCs "magic'd" POL and ammo for units whose staffs had not properly planned and executed for the necessary support (I bet the shade of Rommel would have something to say about that). This is opposite from the NTC experience where failure to execute logistics (in the joint definition) doctrine means your wounded die from lack of evacuation, you run out of food, fuel and ammo (but not water due to safety concerns) and you don't get replacements. As far as Germans and the defense of Germany, I can only go with what I experienced with my "sister" unit in 1980-83 in the FRG, and with what my brothers-in-law and their friends have told me. One BIL was a Leo 2 gunner for his 18 months in 1985-86. One is a state policeman, who served in the "barracks" polizei, and his friend, Udo, recently retired as a platoon sgt of a SP mortar platoon in a PZG battalion. The "ohne mich" syndrome was real and affected a significant part of the FRG's youth. But most young Germans were not "Greens", they were young Germans. Conscientuous objections never topped 10% of the conscript intake, refusal to serve never topped 5%, which meant that 85% of each conscript class more or less willingly served. Most young West Germans understood what "communism" really stood for as evidenced by the Wall. An unprovoked attack by the WP would have been met first by the standing forces, because of their discipline and commitment and the leadership of the professional cadre. The reservists would report because they were Germans defending Germany, their homes and family at risk. The thought that the Soviets and the GDR would not put all young Germans to the sword is true, since they would need them as a labor force. All those inemical to the GDR regime would have gone into camps, and that would have included many young Germans who were members of democratic parties, Catholic and business organizations, and especially any with military experience. Moreover, I don't think anyone can underestimate the well of German patriotism. I know the Soviets were leery of fighting a German army on German soil. I'll address the Norwegian army rating in a later message.

LTCMTS -> Not the Later Message (6/23/2003 11:40:23 PM)
USMC maintained a MPSRON in Norway to sustain an MEB. The troops would be flown in with their personal equipment. The Brits had a Marine Cmdo, a light infantry bde (w/Abn Rgt) and the Canadians would commit a light, air transportable mechanized (Grizzlys etc) BCG. Maybe the French would commit the Mtn Div from the FAR.

LTCMTS -> Still not the later message (6/24/2003 4:30:59 AM)
As a point of interest, over 65% of the soldiers in the 21 MRD have three or fewer years service. On the other hand, 3/1 ID(M) has over 65% of its soldiers with three years or more service.

LTCMTS -> Another example (6/24/2003 6:25:16 AM)
Let's take 15 Pz Bde, 5 Pz Div, III Korps (GE 15 Pz/5 PzD/III K). 45% of the soldiers are conscripts, basically making up 90% of the junior enlisted and 5% of the junior NCOs. They serve 15 months, three months basic training at a basic training unit and then six months with their unit. All or part of this training will occur in an ad hoc training (ersatz) company. Usually, the 4th (mobilization) company of each Btn is used for this purpose. This also allows better coordination of refresher training for the reservists. If not, they will serve their remaing 12 months in the same company. They then serve out the final six months with their units. They can then re-enlist for 21 months to 15 years or in increments as did the volunteers. 5% of the privates are volunteers completing initial training before attending NCO schools and 5% are officer candidates. The brigade is manned at 95%, with 5% of its strength being reservists, enlisted, NCO and officer, that return to the Bde to fill out the mobilization Btn. All have been released from AD within the last two years. The brigade receives its newly trained conscripts four times a year. This means that 25% of all privates will not have completed advanced training and 50% will not have been fully integrated into their units. They will also lose 5% of their privates each quarter to NCO and officer schools. 95% of the NCOs are long-service professionals. Unteroffiziere (SGTs) receive the complete training of the privates and then 3 months initial NCO training. Each rank will have served three years at the lower rank and completed progressively more stringent schools. The brigade, however, is short 15% of its NCOs and 5% more are conscripts in their last three months service. The officers will have received six months basic and advanced training at a training unit and with a line unit. After that, they will receive a minimum of two years of military oriented education before returning to a line unit, where they will spend most of their remaining careers. Oberleutnants are promoted after four years service and reach Hauptmann after seven to eight. At 13 years service, all CPTs eligible for promotion attend the "Grade C" course. Those who successful pass are promoted to major. 8-10% go onto a 2 year advanced course, similar to the Kriegsakadamie of the past and enter the fast track to LTC and COL. 100% of the officers are long service (over 12 years commitment) or regulars (life, ie.55-58). Both the NCO and officer educational systems are superb. The Bde will conduct company and battalion level exercises twice a year and participate in brigade/divisional once a year, such as Reforger. Weapon systems simulators are as good as the US Army, but are not linked like SIMNET. MILES equipment is available and used in "force on force" training, but there is no instrumented training site, like the USAREUR's 7ATC or a dedicated OPFOR. As an aside, the Bde is in better shape for personnel and training then most Pz Rgts were in 1939. The Bde has 100% of its equipment and will be at 90-95% FMC. As with most PzBtn in the Pz Bdes, the 15 PZBde has the Leo 2. It has its UBL positioned at the Kaserne and at sites on the way to the GDP positions.

Rune Iversen -> Re: Another example (6/24/2003 10:53:49 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS [B]Let's take 15 Pz Bde, 5 Pz Div, III Korps (GE 15 Pz/5 PzD/III K). 45% of the soldiers are conscripts, basically making up 90% of the junior enlisted and 5% of the junior NCOs. They serve 15 months, three months basic training at a basic training unit and then six months with their unit. All or part of this training will occur in an ad hoc training (ersatz) company. Usually, the 4th (mobilization) company of each Btn is used for this purpose. This also allows better coordination of refresher training for the reservists. If not, they will serve their remaing 12 months in the same company. They then serve out the final six months with their units. They can then re-enlist for 21 months to 15 years or in increments as did the volunteers. 5% of the privates are volunteers completing initial training before attending NCO schools and 5% are officer candidates. The brigade is manned at 95%, with 5% of its strength being reservists, enlisted, NCO and officer, that return to the Bde to fill out the mobilization Btn. All have been released from AD within the last two years. The brigade receives its newly trained conscripts four times a year. This means that 25% of all privates will not have completed advanced training and 50% will not have been fully integrated into their units. They will also lose 5% of their privates each quarter to NCO and officer schools. 95% of the NCOs are long-service professionals. Unteroffiziere (SGTs) receive the complete training of the privates and then 3 months initial NCO training. Each rank will have served three years at the lower rank and completed progressively more stringent schools. The brigade, however, is short 15% of its NCOs and 5% more are conscripts in their last three months service. The officers will have received six months basic and advanced training at a training unit and with a line unit. After that, they will receive a minimum of two years of military oriented education before returning to a line unit, where they will spend most of their remaining careers. Oberleutnants are promoted after four years service and reach Hauptmann after seven to eight. At 13 years service, all CPTs eligible for promotion attend the "Grade C" course. Those who successful pass are promoted to major. 8-10% go onto a 2 year advanced course, similar to the Kriegsakadamie of the past and enter the fast track to LTC and COL. 100% of the officers are long service (over 12 years commitment) or regulars (life, ie.55-58). Both the NCO and officer educational systems are superb. The Bde will conduct company and battalion level exercises twice a year and participate in brigade/divisional once a year, such as Reforger. Weapon systems simulators are as good as the US Army, but are not linked like SIMNET. MILES equipment is available and used in "force on force" training, but there is no instrumented training site, like the USAREUR's 7ATC or a dedicated OPFOR. As an aside, the Bde is in better shape for personnel and training then most Pz Rgts were in 1939. The Bde has 100% of its equipment and will be at 90-95% FMC. As with most PzBtn in the Pz Bdes, the 15 PZBde has the Leo 2. It has its UBL positioned at the Kaserne and at sites on the way to the GDP positions. [/B][/QUOTE] Excellent work, but it could get even better if you could give information on what part(s) of the unit the conscripts/professionals were concentrated in. Were they sprinled evenly around, concentrated in supply/maintanence, infantry etc. I saw your notice about "institionalized excellence". You wouldn“t happen to be a disciple of the Dupuy school of military thinking would you?

Dagfinn -> Re: OOps and other Re: (6/24/2003 1:00:23 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS [B]SGF is Soviet Group of Forces. SGFG is SGF, Germany, SGFP is Poland, SGFH is Hungary and SGFC is Czechoslovakia.[/B][/QUOTE] Outch :o I'm used to another version: WGF: Western Group of forces - East Germany NGF: Northern Group of Forces - Poland CGF: Central Group of Forces - Czechoslovakia SGF: Southern Group of Forces - Hungary Anyway...:)

Dagfinn -> NATO forces to reinforce Norway (6/24/2003 1:15:00 PM)
Yoy are both partialy right, LTCMTS and Black Cat Basicaly there would first arive a Royal Marine Bg and a US Marine Bg. The RM Bg has changed in content over time thoug, somtimes it included the Canadian contigent and somethimes a Dutch contigent. Second, both the 2.USM Div and the 10.Mtn Div had at some point a contingency mission in Norway I have never been aware of any French units beeing suposedly deployed in Norway thoug... :confused: What we have to consider is the Norwegian political will to ask for these units to deploy though...:( IMHO the request would not go out before WP forces crossed the borders in a jumpstart scenario.

Dagfinn -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/24/2003 1:21:43 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Black Cat [B]Holding Northern Norway ( Narvik area at least ) was critical to control of the Norwegian Sea, and NATO`s strategy of bottling up the USSR Surface and Submarine forces. The importance of this in regard to reinforcing the Central Front, by Sea from the USA cannot be overstated. A failure, allowing USSR long range Naval Strike Aircraft ( especially the Naval Backfire Rgts. ) as well as USSR small surface combatants bases, would have been nothing less then a major Military Disaster, irregardless of what happened on the centeral front. [/B][/QUOTE] Just to hold Narvik area "aint good anough" by a long shot. There are useable airfields several places far north of Narvik, and precious few Norwegian units...

Rune Iversen -> Re: NATO forces to reinforce Norway (6/24/2003 1:22:09 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B] What we have to consider is the Norwegian political will to ask for these units to deploy though...:( IMHO the request would not go out before WP forces crossed the borders in a jumpstart scenario. [/B][/QUOTE] That would depend upon the level of WAPA buildup/mobilization and posturing. Most of the NATO units slated for Denmark was mobilization forces from other countries anyway, but I can see the importance of deployment schedules vis-a-vis Norway, since the NATO forces scheduled for that theatre was already formed and ready to go.

Rune Iversen -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/24/2003 1:26:10 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B]Just to hold Narvik area "aint good anough" by a long shot. There are useable airfields several places far north of Narvik, and precious few Norwegian units... [/B][/QUOTE] Holding around Narvik would have been good enough, since the airfields would have been totally demolished pending soviet capture. AFAIK the norwegian plan for holding off the russians was to pretty much write off [I]Telemarken[/I] and run a delaying defense southwards untill NATO could mobilize and reinforce. As you also might know, northern Norway is not ideal country for offensive operations, and it is my belief that any WAPA attacks on northen Norway of a serious nature would have had to be preceded by a corresponding logistical buildup.

Dagfinn -> (6/24/2003 1:27:17 PM)
The forces meant for Norway was standing units. And I'm talking about a jumpstart scenario where WP attacks from their Barracks. Basicaly it means VERY little warning, atleast so little that many democratic NATO countries would hessitate to mobilize or call for allied help. This was AFAIK the most feared scenario during the cold war.

Dagfinn -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/24/2003 1:31:35 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Rune Iversen [B]Holding around Narvik would have been good enough, since the airfields would have been totally demolished pending soviet capture. AFAIK the norwegian plan for holding off the russians was to pretty much write off [I]Telemarken[/I] and run a delaying defense southwards untill NATO could mobilize and reinforce. As you also might know, northern Norway is not ideal country for offensive operations, and it is my belief that any WAPA attacks on northen Norway of a serious nature would have had to be preceded by a corresponding logistical buildup. [/B][/QUOTE] Yes and no. :D ;) Holding Narvik is NOT enough. Yes, Northern Norway aint the most favoured terrain. I'v spent one year up there in Brigade North/Armouered Btn/Arm Recon. :cool: And once again I'm talking about a jumpstart scn. In the north thw Soviets will come as they are. IMHO they will make headway with that.

Rune Iversen -> (6/24/2003 1:45:10 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B]This was AFAIK the most feared scenario during the cold war. [/B][/QUOTE] Not here;) The entire danish defence concept was based upon the fact that WAPA would have been unable to attack Denmark with anything during a 72 hour scenario. Barring the deployment of the strategic reserve of airborne forces, and the possibility of airraids, We reckoned that the 72 hour scenario would affect mobilization plans in minor ways only. As regards attacks on Scandinavia, I do not believe that the 72 hour plan was viable for WAPA, and from what I have seen they didn“t even belive it themselves. The East Germans plans I have seen/heard off talked about a preparation time of weeks, and preferably months, in order to ensure that the amphibious invasion of Denmark would go off without a hitch.

Rune Iversen -> Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Rating the Combatants (6/24/2003 1:46:53 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dagfinn [B]Yes and no. :D ;) Holding Narvik is NOT enough. Yes, Northern Norway aint the most favoured terrain. I'v spent one year up there in Brigade North/Armouered Btn/Arm Recon. :cool: And once again I'm talking about a jumpstart scn. In the north thw Soviets will come as they are. IMHO they will make headway with that. [/B][/QUOTE] The soviets might have made headway, but tanks run on gas, and the logistic tail supporting operations in northern Norway was afaik not even geared to support the advance of a single div.+ in a 72 hour scenario.

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