Flashpoint and Support Ops

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LTCMTS -> Flashpoint and Support Ops (6/25/2003 4:40:24 AM)
How does Flashpoint handle support ops and support units. Many sims/games cover support ops (more or less) but ignore the terrain and maneuver impact of support units. As an example from US Army doctrine, c.1989, each brigade within the heavy division has a Forward Support Battalion (FSB), The FSB sustains the Bde with resupply in daily or multidaily cycles as the battalions expend their UBLs. Ammo, water, food, fuel, contact (maintenance and recovery) teams go out, casualties, remains, EPWs and NMC equipment come back. Each 2 x 1 bde has a ~700 man FSB and the 2 x 2 bde has a ~800 man FSB. The FSB is usually positioned 10-15km (or more depending), equidistant from its supported customers. It will usually cover a 3-5 sq.km Brigade Support Area (BSA). All soldiers except senior commanders, chaplains and some medical personnel will be armed with M16A2 AR, some with M203 GL. There will be M249 SAW, M60 GPMG and .50 M2HB HMGs, along with AT and AP mines, inc. Claymores, and LAWs. While the FSB has little offensive potential, it is secure against most rear area threats and, if dug in, can resist a conventional attack for some time. The problem with the FSB engaging in combat is that it is diverted from its primary mission of sustaining the bde's combat units. Resupply ops would place corps support troops in the BSA, and if a FA Bn is placed in DS to the bde with other divisional elements, parts of the Main Support Bn (MSB) would be attached to the FSB, bringing personnel up to as many as 1000. Resupply and retrograde will generally come from and go back to the corps/COSCOM level. The MSB would support the divisional elements such as the DIVARTY, air cav sq, CAB, cbt eng bn, ADA bn, HQ elements not attached to bdes. It would be centrally located in the divisional rear (division support area (DSA) and usually cover ~ 5 sq.km with ~800 soldiers assigned. It would not usually resupply the FSBs. Also in the DSA could be from one Combat Support Bn (CSB) to an entire Corps Support Group (CSG) with up to 5 CSBs, depending on the mission of the division and the number of attached/OPCON corps troops, such as the ACR, artillery, engineers, etc. Each CSB would have ~700 soldiers task organized for their support mission. The CSB would cover ~3-5 sq.km but would not be as heavily armed as an FSB/MSB. CSBs would provide the resupply and accept retrograde from the FSBs. Not all CSBs in a CSG providing direct support to a division would be in the DSA. They also provide DS to the corps units in the DSA. Normally there is one CSG per division in a corps, but this is not required, and the CSG is aligned with, not attached or assigned to the division and can be realigned as the Corps/COSCOM commander needs and missions dictate. The CSG can act in direct support of the division during the displacement of the DISCOM as the division maneuvers. The CSGs are assigned to a COSCOM, which will have 3-5 CSGs, a Med Bde, and other corps CS and CSS elements. Each brigade will establish a tactical ops center and an ALOC (admin/log center). The TOC will usually be centrally located or behind the area of interest and contain most of the 138 soldiers in the HHC. Security is usually provided by a plt detached from one of the Bns. Some of those soldiers will man the ALOC colocated with the FSB HHC in the BSA. The ALOC serves as an alternate CP for the Bde. The TOC and ALOC may be reinforced by elements of the divisional signal and CEWI Bns. The divisional TOC and ALOC are similar in nature but larger, the DTOC having up to ~500 soldiers assigned/attached to it. Security is provided both by the MP Co and detached combat plts. The MP Co is also responsible for rear area security, battlefield traffic management and EPW handling (EPWs will usually be evacuated straight back to TA level to the EPW MP Bde. They will be equipped with normal infantry combat systems, and with HMMVs mounting M60, M2HB and Mk.19 40mm AGL. Each Corps has a combat MP bde assigned. The 3-5 MP Bns provide rear area security and traffic management for the Corps, extending into the DSA and even into the BSA when escorting convoys. This is just a quick sample of the density of support units in the brigade, division and corps operating areas.

LTCMTS -> Rear Area Ops (7/1/2003 1:11:25 AM)
CS and CSS units in echelon above division (EAD) formed "base defense clusters" of battalion or equivalent size, and in the FRG were intended to be augmented by German Territorial Army Heimatsgeschuetze companies and platoons with light infantry weapons, including Carl Gustav and PzF 44.

IronManBeta -> (8/5/2003 1:19:30 AM)
This is really interesting and I printed it off for future consideration. In a nutshell, Flashpoint will not really deal with these issues at all. We had a fair discussion near the beginning (probably a year ago now) about how long most vehicles can go between refueling and loading up ammo, and also some of the techniques used for same. Our conclusion was that for a company / platoon game lasting 8 hours max it just wasn't worth getting into the logistical end of things in a meaningful way. (I had all kinds of scenario ideas come to mind though as I read your description. I had never seen material on this topic before BTW.) These are my notes on the topic: Flashpoint Logistics Supply is the Achilles heel of all modern armies. It is used up at ferocious pace during operations and commanding officers are constantly ‘topping up’ their units. In game terms this activity is presumed to occur whenever a unit receives Rest and Refit orders. There is a lull in the action and the supply trucks and other vehicles come forward and provide ammo and fuel to combat vehicles in place. Alternatively, individual vehicles drive a short distance to the rear to resupply and then return to their original location. There is also a very limited emergency resupply capability that can occur on the fly. Given the basic scale and duration of the game, ammunition is likely to be far more of a limiting factor than fuel, rations or other forms of supply. The lesson of the 1973 Arab Israeli war was that ammo gets used up far faster than expected in most tactical situations, and it is an important part of the command dilemma to be able to ration it out effectively. · Game Setup – Realism Option - Emergency Resupply (Y/N). o If “Yes” then any unit within command range (or is off-map) that has less than three ammo points is automatically restored to three ammo points at the end of each turn resolution. Unit orders have no effect on emergency resupply and the unit may be moving and/or fighting at the time. o If this option is set to “No” then the unit must be manually resupplied as needed by way of a judicious use of ‘Rest and Refit’ orders. · Effects of command radius: o 12 km for regiments and brigades, 4 km for battalions. o Units must be within range to receive emergency resupply. · Unit Description Panel “Ammo” Rating. An estimate of the number of five-minute rounds of combat the unit has ammunition for – either on board or immediately to hand. This necessarily is a somewhat elastic number since it covers everything from intermittent sniping to an intensive ‘mad minute’ by some or all of the unit. The intent is to impose a reasonable ammo limitation. Currently most NATO units default to between 18 and 30 ammo points to start and most WP units to 12 to 20, although in both cases artillery units get something more like twice that. · Ammo Supply Description: > 5 points = “OK Ammo”, 1 – 4 points = “Low Ammo”, 0 points = “No Ammo” · Unit Orders - Rest & Refit – the unit stands down and is allowed to recover from the ordeal of battle until further notice. Officers inspect their men and vehicles and make changes as needed. Vehicles are topped up as quickly as possible, weapons are cleaned and then the men perhaps can eat. The fatigue rating of the unit is improved (reduced) by three and morale by one for every thirty minutes that this order persists. NATO units recover to a minimum of 18 ammo points after the first 30 minutes, and Warsaw Pact units to 12 ammo points. If the unit is attacked or spots an enemy unit it immediately converts to a Screen order. The unit is available to be assigned new orders at any time. Orders prep time is 0 minutes, 10% combat strength is available.

byron13 -> (8/5/2003 7:26:18 AM)
If emergency resupply is set to yes, can a unit ever run out of ammo? Or can a unit use more than three points per turn? I don't know. If this is just a rule to allow players to resupply regardless of their situation, i.e., turn realism off, then fine. But resupplying on the move should, at a minimum, require a substantial hit on movement points to represent the fact that you have to stop, and resupplying while engaged should require a hit on combat capability to represent the fact that you have to pull units/vehicles back to some degree in order to resupply. The support platoon simply isn't going to sent a five-ton up to each tank in the middle of a firefight. Even if they're not actually shooting, it would be very risky to run a truck to each vehicle's position if contact is likely. I guess you could do it if the truck has cover or concealment on the line, e.g., behind the crest of a hill, but this would be catch as catch can. And there will be times when the positions cannot be reached by a resupply vehicle due to terrain conditions or positions with poor back door access. There needs to be some penalty for undertaking such half-a**ed resupply efforts.

IronManBeta -> (8/6/2003 2:17:17 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by byron13 [B]If emergency resupply is set to yes, can a unit ever run out of ammo? Or can a unit use more than three points per turn? I don't know. If this is just a rule to allow players to resupply regardless of their situation, i.e., turn realism off, then fine. But resupplying on the move should, at a minimum, require a substantial hit on movement points to represent the fact that you have to stop, and resupplying while engaged should require a hit on combat capability to represent the fact that you have to pull units/vehicles back to some degree in order to resupply. The support platoon simply isn't going to sent a five-ton up to each tank in the middle of a firefight. Even if they're not actually shooting, it would be very risky to run a truck to each vehicle's position if contact is likely. I guess you could do it if the truck has cover or concealment on the line, e.g., behind the crest of a hill, but this would be catch as catch can. And there will be times when the positions cannot be reached by a resupply vehicle due to terrain conditions or positions with poor back door access. There needs to be some penalty for undertaking such half-a**ed resupply efforts. [/B][/QUOTE] Hey Byron, good discussion! Now I have to go and rethink it all again. 1. A 'unit' of ammo is good for two to five minutes (a "tick") of average combat with another enemy unit. Exception #1: If ordered to, an artillery unit can fire off 3 units per tick. Exception #2: Up to three unit duels can be resolved per tick so a unit in a target rich environment can easily consume three ammo points per tick. 2. Game turns run six ticks each so an emergency resupply of 3 at that interval is not a whole lot in pressing circumstances. 3. It is, as you intuited, a quicky crutch for new players to mitigate some the worst consequences of their own folly and keep the game moving along. Giving them not quite enough ammo to get by is just my vindictive way of rubbing their noses in it.... With just 3 ammo points available they will still be showing as "Low Ammo" and therefore prompted still to be feeling anxiety. 4. I agree with your view of the sacrificial nature of the duty imposed on the resupply vehicles. It is also terrible battlefield security - that is why I prefer the 'Rest and Refit' orders mechanism. A penalty cost to deter this is not a bad idea. We could fine the player some victory points every time it happens. Not an extravagant amount but enough to make it hurt if he relies on it too much? Hmmmm.... Question - when a vehicle runs out of ammo in real life what is it supposed to do? Automatically head to the rear? Stop and find a place of local safety while it reports in? Carry on to the objective regardless? Is there a bingo point (say x rounds) such that if the vehicle drops below it it radios for instructions and basicallly husbands what is left until resupply is arranged? Or is it up to whatever the local commander decides? I might as well reflect this all now while I am working on it. Thanks Byron - Cheers, Rob.

byron13 -> (8/7/2003 9:58:20 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by RobertCrandall [B]Question - when a vehicle runs out of ammo in real life what is it supposed to do? Automatically head to the rear? Stop and find a place of local safety while it reports in? Carry on to the objective regardless? Is there a bingo point (say x rounds) such that if the vehicle drops below it it radios for instructions and basicallly husbands what is left until resupply is arranged? Or is it up to whatever the local commander decides? I might as well reflect this all now while I am working on it. [/B][/QUOTE] Jeez, Rob, I've never really thought about it before. LTCMS may have a better idea having worked through all levels. I suppose there is an SOP, but, quite frankly, I don't know what it was if there was one. In the M60's, we had a basic load of 63 rounds. It would have to be a pretty big fight to ** that many rounds off. And, in theory anyway, we would withdraw through pre-stocked ammunition caches, but I was never too confident in those. I'm just not too sure how often the support platoon leader or the support battalion went over their battle books and reconned the cache sites. Even then, you'd be relying on a PFC to read a map and find the right location, something I'm not sure they were up for. Anyway, I guess the answer to your question is: it depends. I base this purely on what I would have done. If low on ammo and I was in danger of being overrun by an assault, I'd certainly shoot everything I had; why hold rounds back if you won't be alive to shoot them? There'd probably be some order to ration ammunition, but it's hard to ration yourself to four rounds when there are ten T-80s driving on you. Arty, ADA, and even infantry can ration because they aren't in quite the same kill-or-be-killed situation as are the tanks. On the other hand, I'd probably not shoot at anything moving laterally across my front or at a tank platoon sunning itself on the hill over there. If nothing else, I wouldn't want to them off and cause them to come after me. Basically, you would engage anything that was an immediate threat and leave alone anything that was not. (Of course, this assumes that there is not another reason for, say, shooting your entire load at units that are not an immediate threat but have broken through on your flanks and are heading to the Rhine). Remember that it was SOP to redistribute ammunition after each encounter if possible. This would probably be within the platoon but, if there was sufficient time, you could redistribute within a company as well. As for your specific questions, I don't think you would send a vehicle to the rear. One vehicle out of ammo is probably safer staying with or immediately near the unit if the other vehicles have ammo. That first klick to the next terrain feature could be pretty sporty in a fluid situation, and you're always more exposed while moving. If you're lucky, you could just pull back off the crest, be completely hidden, and hope the assault doesn't crest the hill. Or hide behind a building or pull back into woods. Cover at the FEBA is just as good as three clicks back because the line will either hold or it won't. Plus, sending a tank back a ways just increases the likelihood that they'll get lost or not be able to rejoin the unit if it moves. You could get a frag order at any time to move a considerable distance, and you may never see that other tank again - even if he's still in radio range initially. And, as I say, everyone else in the unit will be running out of ammo soon, so you might as well stay with them. Any vehicle pulling off the line wouldn't go back to a support area to rearm because it is too far away and would take too long. As for pressing on to the objective, I should hope that any assault would be pre-loaded with enough ammo. If not, then, yes, probably hang back with the first sergeant until you take the objective and then rejoin the unit and redistribute ammo. The local platoon leader and company commander will make a lot of these decisions. Because of redistribution, everyone should be in pretty much the same boat. At the platoon level, if one tank runs out, then everyone else will be pretty much empty and, therefore, in essentially the same condition. Once you're that low, the commander will make a decision for the entire unit. Since retrogading an entire unit low on ammo in a hot fight will only result in the enemy trailing you at 1500 meters with a-end shots, I think you either (i) shoot the whole load to try and defeat the assault and, if you fail, run like heck, (ii) defeat the assault, stay put hoping there's not a follow-up assault and hope for resupply, or (iii) hope someone like a reserve or the flanking units can relieve you or counterattack from the flank to relieve the pressure. If the entire company/battalion starts at low ammo levels, they may very well have planned for relieving counterattacks - especially by planning for a mobile reserve to augment at the point of attack or provide a mobile second line of defense deployed at the point of attack. At the company and battalion level while starting at low ammo levels, you would probably plan for either counterattacks to try and hold the line, or plan for phased retrogrades to try and maintain some distance and not get decisively engaged. Overall, I can't think of a worse position to be in than being an armor unit on the defensive with no ammo. Presumably, you've shot your load against other armor and, if you pull out of the line, you've presumably got enemy armor now pouring through the gap and into the rear. Even if you successfully hide, there's now indians between you and the supply trains, making resupply dicey - not to mention the other bad things that can happen. I'm probably overly pessimistic because the M60's were huge, very slow targets, and my worst nightmare was trying to withdraw with faster, smaller, better-armored vehicles chasing me at a very close distance. Unless you've got another platoon to cover your withdrawal, it didn't make for a very good day. All of our platoons within a company were deployed on-line, so there was no platoon within the company that could cover you. Ideally, you would have a company deployed to cover the same kill zone which would allow for phased and covered withdrawals; but, in average or dense terrain, all too often each platoon would be covering a different axis of advance, and there was little, if any, mutual support. If there was a reserve within the battalion, it generally wasn't deployed to cover you for that first click because (i) too many units to cover and (ii) if deployed that close to the line, it would get decisively engaged and lose its value as a reserve. Most of this doesn't help in you game design, I know. But, if one vehicle runs out of ammo, you are in some real deep doo-doo because the entire unit will be on the verge of running out and with very few options. Maybe the answer is to have your refit option, which degrades a unit's combat power but resupplies a unit quickly. This represents an organized re-arming period with tanks going to a re-arming point to top off and returning to the line (or, if you bring the trucks to the tanks, a penalty for getting caught with your pants down). If you have any "modes" that require advance planning before it could be entered, this would be one. The other option is something akin to your automatic reload/restoration of x ammo points per turn, which reflects redistribution or a generic concept of running a truck up to the tanks and hastily rearming. This second option would not degrade combat potential (at least until you've got no bullets), but this auto reload could only occur if the unit does not take fire during that turn or no enemy units are within x distance during the turn. Also, the number of points gained per turn would have to be very limited since, in effect, it represents the average chance of a truck actually dropping some ammo at your position while contact is very likely and you being able to distribute/deliver the ammo to vehicles spread over several hundred meters. It acknowledges that you CAN bring trucks right to the battle position when contact is likely, but also acknowledges that this is a discouraged practice.

Blackhorse -> (8/7/2003 3:30:26 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by RobertCrandall [B]Question - when a vehicle runs out of ammo in real life what is it supposed to do? Automatically head to the rear? Stop and find a place of local safety while it reports in? Carry on to the objective regardless? Is there a bingo point (say x rounds) such that if the vehicle drops below it it radios for instructions and basicallly husbands what is left until resupply is arranged? Or is it up to whatever the local commander decides? I might as well reflect this all now while I am working on it. Thanks Byron - Cheers, Rob. [/B][/QUOTE] Byron13 is correct. There was no ammo "bingo point" SOP for vehicles. If a combat vehicle ran out of rounds it was the responsibility of the small-unit commander (Platoon Leader, or, at most, the Company / Troop Executive Officer) to redistribute ammo to keep everybody in the fight. The situations where an individual MBT would be detached from a platoon and sent to the rear in search of ammo would be exceptional, indeed. With or without ammo, the normal SOP for a vehicle would be to stay with its parent unit -- even in an advance. Where you might see local commanders excersing discretion is where the entire unit was low / out of ammo . . . depending on the tactical situation and his own moral fortitude a commander might well order his unit to pull back, even without coordination with or authorization from, higher authority. While definitely not SOP, history -- and human nature -- suggest that such withdrawals would not be uncommon.

byron13 -> (8/7/2003 8:37:20 PM)
Gee, guys, aren't we taking the profanity editing a little too seriously? I don't think that a slang word for urinating is going to upset anyone. It kind of urinates me off that I have to say, "You can't afford to urinate off rounds if you're running low." Certainly nicer to say "p*ss me off" than "jerk me off" (assuming that the latter isn't edited as well).

LTCMTS -> Company Resupply (8/16/2003 11:17:44 PM)
This is causing flashbacks. In Div 86/AOE, resupply to the company/platoon was the battalion's responsibility. Company 1SGs and supply sergeants were supposed to monitor readiness status (maintenance, food, water, ammo, fuel) and report that back daily through the CO CO or/and XO on a LOGSTAT to the Bn TOC and ALOC (if seperate). The S4 would get with the support platoon leader and arrange for contact teams to move from the battalion trains to the company/platoon location for distribution of supplies or on-site TI and repair. Unserviceble, non-repairable equipment would be evacuated to higher echelon (Brigade FSB or Corps). The idea would be to monitor the LOGSTATs and based on current and projected ops and the BN CO's priorities, distribute support across the companies as required. If a tank platoon was low on ammo, resupply in a HEMMT cargo truck would be pushed forward that evening (most all resupply is in the dark at night and subject to resupply vehicles getting lost (if without radios and PLGRS) or accidents occurring during resupply ops. The CO 1SG was usually the POC for resupply and distribution and the receipt and integration of replacements and the collection and evacuation of wounded and remains. Wounded would be evacuated to the BN Aid Station and the remains to the BSA. Replacements would be managed by the BN S1. Usually the BN XO was the WSIM (weapons System Integration Manager) enduring the right people got to the right place and were with the right equipment. Class VII (Major End Item) resupply would usually not happen below the BN level, with surviving crew being integrated with replacements and their new equipment during lulls in ops and then forwarded to the companies/platoons. The BN S1 and S4 would be sending a report back to the Bde S1 and S4 at the ALOC in the BSA daily for resupply of the BN Trains or even direct support to the companies/platoons as needed, especially for fuel and ammo. Mail was always to be delivered to the CO 1SG for distribution. This is just an outline, the reality is far more complex (as Cl;ausewitz said, "In war, all things are simple, yet the simplest things are the hardest (in reference to hios concept of "friction")The level of difficulty depended on the combat situation, the availability of resources, terrain, rear area security, type of ops (its harder to do this on the move (ie. during offensive ops and mobile defense). You had more to move in the "heavy" units than the "light", but you had more resources too.

LTCMTS -> Missing Link (8/16/2003 11:28:00 PM)
I just noticed I forgot the use of "spot" reports for emergency resupply. This would occur when units reached "bingo" and resupply would be directed as possible based on the BN and CO Cdr's priorities. CSS resupply vehicles (other than tracked ambulances in mechanized units) are not armored in the US Army and therefor are at risk when running resupply during the day under fire. And in a "non-linear" situation as has occurred in Iraq (and had occurred in Vietnam, we just never seem to learn) you're going to have to fight the resupply up the MSR. Byron 13 is right. Under most combat conditions, the basic load of the weapons should last the immediate engagement. Add to this the soldier's propensity to load up beyond the basic load and you should get through the engagement even in a target rich environment. (Part of the Shermans tendancy to brew when hit was the extra ammo and fuel US crews tended to carry and which the protected ammo storage in the M1 helps to restrict) The BN would usually be carrying 3 DOS (UBL) in the trains so during normal ops, the would get a resupply from the FSB every 2-3 days. He's also right about what happens to a unit's determination and morale (other than pre-1945 Japanese) when supplies, especially ammo and fuel get tight. No fuel, no maneuver, no ammo, no fight.

IronManBeta -> (8/18/2003 7:34:45 AM)
This is very illuminating - wish I had heard it a year ago! I have studied a ton of WW2 data over the years and was always struck by the incongruity of theoretical weapon rates of fire vs ammo loads vs resupply requirements. Sustained combat rates of fire in the field are clearly a couple of orders of magnitude less than the theoretical ROFs but it is hard to get anyone to talk about it. Remember how SPI used to use 'mad minute' rates of fire to work out combat values for it's wargames? It does indeed provide a theoretical maximum that is a useful guideline, but no one in real life would ever do it unless they were in a total panic. It is not really representative. So if a MBT has 44 rounds of main gun ammo and a ROF of 4 to 6 rounds per minute, how many hours of ammo does it have in real life? It sounds to me like the answer is 'a good days worth' based on the previous discussion. A year ago I was trying to work out the psychology of it all. You are 20 years old, have a full ammo load, and a great hull down position. You see the first T-72 of the day at longish range and you figure you have a respectable but not overwhelming chance of hitting and killing it on your first shot. Assuming you are free to open fire, do you take the shot? Is it worth 2 or 3 rounds but no more? Or do you just watch it to see if any of his buddies come out too? One target is not enough but 6 to 10 is dandy? Does your answer change if you have only 22 rounds left? 11? 5? 2? My assumption was that - engagement doctrine allowing - the average crew with lots of ammo would be fairly keen to use it initially but that as the supply on hand dropped they would become increasingly frugal and require a higher and higher first kill probability before firing. There would be a constant tradeoff between the reward of getting a kill and the danger of being caught out in a tank rush with insufficient ammo to survive. This model implicitly assumes that resupply is inconvenient and risky. After some debate I ended up with the position that tankers are taught to max out at max range without regard to ammo stocks. Modern tank guns are so lethal and so accurate that there is no point in holding anything back. Use it or lose it. If they run down their ammo to any significant extent, well, they are so mobile and the battlefield so fluid that it is no big deal to retire a mile or two and rendezvous with the supply echelon for a 30 minute top up. They will be in motion most of the time anyway so they just need to stop while moving to their next position and there is hardly any inconvenience at all. That is pretty much the viewpoint in Flashpoint right now. Now I am unsure again. Reading about the 1973 Arab Israeli war often helps me out when trying to figure out what some of the real world possibilities are, but all I know from that was the ammo consumption was vastly higher than anticipated and that it caused substantial problems to both sides throughout the war on both fronts. I don't have any more detail than that though. Flashpoint goes 12 hours max for a game. Once the shooting starts it is mostly over in 2-3 hours. I guess I should just relax about ammo supply. At this scale a simple ammo allowance plus a limited emergency resupply capability should be enough to prevent bizarre results. I could drive myself crazy trying to research and model it properly! This all relates to ammo. I should mention that we decided that since most vehicles have more than adequate range that worrying about fuel at this scale was a waste of time. Cheers, Rob.

byron13 -> (8/19/2003 2:18:35 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by RobertCrandall [B]So if a MBT has 44 rounds of main gun ammo and a ROF of 4 to 6 rounds per minute, how many hours of ammo does it have in real life? It sounds to me like the answer is 'a good days worth' based on the previous discussion. [/B][/QUOTE] Yes. Remember, each tank is part of a platoon of four tanks (Nato, anyway), so you've really got 172 rounds. That's a lot of targets for one day. [QUOTE][B]A year ago I was trying to work out the psychology of it all. You are 20 years old, have a full ammo load, and a great hull down position. You see the first T-72 of the day at longish range and you figure you have a respectable but not overwhelming chance of hitting and killing it on your first shot. Assuming you are free to open fire, do you take the shot? Is it worth 2 or 3 rounds but no more? Or do you just watch it to see if any of his buddies come out too? One target is not enough but 6 to 10 is dandy? Does your answer change if you have only 22 rounds left? 11? 5? 2?[/B][/QUOTE] As usual, it depends. There certainly is not a willy-nilly "First one to hole that T-72 gets a six-pack!" attitude. At long range, I can't see anyone taking shots at a single T-72. First, it gives your own positions away, provides some intelligence as to your supply state, and even the quality of your training or maintenance if you don't hit the target. Why give that away for one kill? It also tells the enemy, in a general sense, where the FEBA is, how you're going to treat recon units (e.g., doctrine was actually to let them through), etc. You might have also eliminated a chance of drawing a whole platoon or company into a kill zone. It just gives up too much. There might be exceptions but, generally, I don't see a platoon leader issuing a fire command for a single tank that looks to me for all the world like it might be doing a form of recon by fire in reverse. [QUOTE][B]My assumption was that - engagement doctrine allowing - the average crew with lots of ammo would be fairly keen to use it initially but that as the supply on hand dropped they would become increasingly frugal and require a higher and higher first kill probability before firing. There would be a constant tradeoff between the reward of getting a kill and the danger of being caught out in a tank rush with insufficient ammo to survive. This model implicitly assumes that resupply is inconvenient and risky.[/B][/QUOTE] On defense, you're generally guarding an axis of defense and are part of a larger defensive scheme. Barring an unusually low supply of ammo on hand, I don't see the ammo supply being a factor in the decision whether to shoot at something. They're either going to be an immediate threat or doing something you're expressly trying to prevent (an obvious shoot situation) or they're not (probably don't shoot). I just don't see any low probability shots being made just because you've got a full load and nothing better to do. [QUOTE][B]After some debate I ended up with the position that tankers are taught to max out at max range without regard to ammo stocks. Modern tank guns are so lethal and so accurate that there is no point in holding anything back. Use it or lose it. If they run down their ammo to any significant extent, well, they are so mobile and the battlefield so fluid that it is no big deal to retire a mile or two and rendezvous with the supply echelon for a 30 minute top up. They will be in motion most of the time anyway so they just need to stop while moving to their next position and there is hardly any inconvenience at all. That is pretty much the viewpoint in Flashpoint right now.?[/B][/QUOTE] To the extent you're talking about 105mm, which was all the U.S. had in the early '80s and still the predominant round in 86 - 87, I'm not so sure. There was an unclassified report presented to Congress that a standard 105 sabot round could not penetrate the frontal armor of a front-line WP tank beyond 750 yards. Don't know if that was true, but it made you think. Grafenwoehr didn't have any targets beyond 1800 meters; while we could hit that fairly reliably (even with HEAT), I don't think we could obtain the reliable hits that the 120 got in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. I'd guess 2200 meters or so was pretty much max for the 105 - and that's after you had just boresighted the gun. If you're on an M60, who knows when you last boresighted. Of course, after you'd gained some actual experience as to your capabilities, you might shoot further. Your chances of penetration decrease at that range as the round slows. I'm thinking that I wouldn't begin engaging until about 2000 meters - if I ever had a 2000 meter shot. In any event, no one is going to bee bop back for a quick reload. Battalion trains are farther back than a mile or two, and you would usually top off as a unit. If you were static, the support platoon would come to you. You wouldn't pull an entire platoon off the line to wander back to the trains without being able to plug that hole, and you wouldn't send individual vehicles back. The entire operation would be more planned, e.g., a planned top off during a march or a resupply at 0100 at your position. You saw what happened to that maintenance company in Iraq; you just don't cavalierly send a couple of trucks up to the line without some planning and preparation or they're likely to spend the rest of the war in a POW camp. [B][QUOTE] Flashpoint goes 12 hours max for a game. Once the shooting starts it is mostly over in 2-3 hours. I guess I should just relax about ammo supply. [/B][/QUOTE] Probably - if you start out with a full basic load. I don't know if it's worth designing the game system around a situation that may only be present in a couple of scenarios.

byron13 -> (8/19/2003 8:44:58 PM)
To synchronize what LtC said about how support ops are conducted with my doomsday description of what would happen to a unit low on ammo, I should emphasize that my scenario presumed that something had already gone seriously wrong with the logistics chain and the unit was already critically low on ammo without exploring why. If everything works right (or even marginally), you obviously should never have a tank company with an average of five rounds per tank in the ready rack. Robert, you should probably study LtC's description as it provides insight as to how likely it is that a unit would get that critically low on ammo. Of course, the support platoon could always lose a couple of HEMMTs or five tons or be the unlucky recipient of a 152mm barrage that could deplete its haul capability, so one never knows. . .

dd371 -> (8/20/2003 2:25:59 AM)
Fascinating reading on info from LTC. On some of the resupply questions/answers I always figured I would never have to worry about that, my tank would be knocked out by Pact armor, missiles, helos, jets, enemy arty, or friendly arty long before total expenditure of ammo. But then I was in the much maligned Army of the late 70' and early 80's. By the way, I can figure some of it but what is HEMMT?

jrcar -> (8/20/2003 6:20:12 PM)
In answer to Byron13 comments on the use of 105mm MBT rounds. My Aide Memoir gives the following: Gun/Ammo Max effective range (to hit) 105 APDS 2500 105 HEAT 2000 105 HESH 1200 105 APERS 4400 100 APDS 1000 115 APDS 1500 125 APDS 2000 The L7 105 is a very accurate gun! But this assumes boresighted gun with trained crew. Cheers Rob

byron13 -> (8/21/2003 12:53:23 AM)
Wonder what the definition of "effective range" is. 90% hit rate? Anyway, 2500 m is a darned long shot even at a stationary vehicle. At that range, other gunnery factors really start to have an effect. I forget the eight factors of gunnery, but things like tube droop, thermal bending, heat shimmer, wind, altitude, cant, temperature, round-to-round dispersion, tube memory, improper boresight, and the entire system not being synchronized will affect your accuracy. Can I sling the lingo, or what? Even a tank is pretty small at 2500 meters. Add in that it may be partially defilade or moving. And trying to find center-mass of a little white ill-defined blob on your thermal sight gets difficult when the blob is that small. Weather conditions would affect things. Don't know about the M1, but the M60 sights were prone to fogging up in the winter if the crew heated the tank and, once fogged, could not be de-fogged by just turning off the heat; the sights had to be purged by a mechanic with compressed air. But, as much as I whine, the boys in green proved it could be done in Iraq - twice. These were usually stationary targets, though. Two advantages of the M1's in Iraq have over the M60s in Germany in the mid '80s: the 120mm and the muzzle reference system for boresighting. You could boresight the M1 at just about any time, boresighting the M60 took a bit more time and effort. You will tend to lose the boresight over time - especially if you do a lot of moving. The M1 system may have also been designed to tighter specs to take advantage of the 120, but I wouldn't know. In any event, I'm sure a 105mm could hit targets with sabot at 2500m on a fairly regular basis, but I wouldn't want to regularly start engagements against moving targets at that range. The HEMTT is a groovy looking, eight-wheeled heavy truck that Oshkosh started delivering to the Army in the '80s. There's a tanker version and a cargo version and probably others as well. It looked like it could hit 100 mph on the Autobahn. I think it has a 10 ton capacity but, as I recall, the tanker version didn't carry as much fuel as was needed to support the M1, which came out at the same time. Everyone went "Oh, s**t" and they had to modify the TO&E to provide enough fuel capacity. LTC would remember. I had the impression that the fuel capacity problem was not so much the weight as it was that the cargo load was carried so high that it limited the size of the tanks it could carry. Also, the cargo version had a whimpy crane on the back that could not lift a pallet of main gun ammunition. Figures. They may have that fixed the problem since, but . . .

dd371 -> (8/21/2003 2:27:32 AM)
Thanks Byron13 on the HEMMT. We had "Goats" and "Goers" which I believe were leftovers from the Vietnam era. I started out on M60A1's and then we upgraded to brand new M60A3's. I don't ever remember us having any problems with fogging of the sights but I do remember turret mechanics gassing the optics maybe twice a year? Now my memory of something 20+ years ago is a little hazy but I think 2000-2200 was our max desired range for engaging heavies with either 1400 or 1600 for battlesight engagements but I could clarify that with either a master gunner friend of mine or another bud from that time. The A3's were much more accurate as they were newer, had the thermal gun shields, laser range finder, etc. However, the stadiometric (sp?) was pretty reliable considering the weather. I may be getting away from the original thread, if so, my apologies. By the way, I was with D co, 1/11 ACR in Fulda. Have TONS of photos...

jrcar -> (8/21/2003 3:58:16 AM)
Byron13, I don't know what effective means in this case.... 2 round hit probability of 100%? We have Leo1's with the SABCA firecontrol system, it was (during the 80's) a very good setup. HE can be fired fairly accurately to 8000m! I think what the table shows is that we planned to engage enemy tanks at long range, where they could not hit us but we had a good chance of getting them. I think I read that the Soviets planned to get around this by using massed platoon fires at single vehicles at ranges of 1500m and more. Cheers Rob Rob

LTCMTS -> Quick comments (8/21/2003 7:57:45 AM)
If you check my web site you'll see a table for gun/missile penetration vs. max armor protection by WP/NATO vehicle. Assumption is a o degree horizontal angle and penetration and protection values adjusted to 0 degree vertical. Remember while the M68 in the M48A5, M60, M60A1, M60A3, M1 and M1 IMP was the same 105mm bore, the FCS and ammo made a major difference in performance. The M48A5, M60 and M60A1 with coincidence RF, analog computers, no stablizer, active infra-red night vision/sights and M392A2 APDS in 1962-1977 is going to have a lower effective range than the M1 and M1 IMP with integrated digital computer, thermal tank sights, muzzle rference system and stabilizer using the M833 DU APDSFS in 1985-89. BTW, didn't the M60A3 have the MRS. My impression is that the M60A3 had the same FCS as the M1 but not as fully integrated as a system and into the turret as the M1. Also remember that as more M60A3, M1, M1 IMP and M1A1 MBTs were deplyed from 1978 on, the US tankers would have gained an immense advantage from the TNS. (also in the Gulf 1991, the targets were stationary, but the M1's were not, often engaging and hitting at speeds up to 50 kmh). It would have taken some getting used to, but the first thing to do would be to smoke the "bad guys" or take a shot to get them to pour on the smoke themselves. The result is that with TTS/TNS, you can see them and they cannot see you. On ROF. At the Canadian Trophy in 1987, an M1 crew set the record of 6.2 secs from target pop-up to destruction, and the M1 averaged 10.2 secs for engagement cycles. But the real governor on ROF was target presentation. For an M1A1 to run out of ammo would require at least 22 Soviet AFVs to present themselves for destruction before supply could be accomplished. An M1A1 tank battalion could "service" over 1270 targets in a minute. There are a lot of other factors to consider, but you could see where when NATO begin fielding superior AFV FCS and "current" generation MBTs from around 1982, the gap between the WP and NATO really widened when compared to the difference from 1975-1982 when M60A1/M48/Leopard 1/AMX-30 and Chieftain faced T-55/T-62 and the new T-64.

byron13 -> (8/21/2003 9:04:16 PM)
Ah, yes. The Goers and Gamma Goats. We had those too when I first got to Germany. The Goer seemed pretty serviceable with a lot of cargo space. The Gamma Goat reminded me a lot of German WWII engineering: fascinating design but hardly practical. As for the fogging sights, it was a real problem for us. Rather, if you didn't purge the sights before a winter gunnery, you would expect your daylight and thermal sight to fog up. For the uninitiated, the thermal sight and the daylight sight were linked to the targeting computer (as opposed to the 105D ballistic or stadiametric sight that was essentially the WWII sight bolted to the side of the gun). The entire sight is a sealed package, 90% of which is inside the tank turret. In the winter, the turret interior is heated (often to an outrageous degree), which would heat the air inside the sight. Much like a warm car interior on a cold winter's day, the interface between the warmer air inside the sight and the cold outside was the glass or lens (windshield on the car) on the outside/top of the turret. If there was moisture inside the sight, the moisture would condense on the glass, degrading by visual and thermal optics. The solution - at least at the time - was to "purge" the sight by cycling compressed air through the sight to remove the moisture. For all I know, they may have a defogger of some kind now. Anyway, it was enough of a problem that I generally had my sights purged twice during winter gunneries. Maybe the sights had aged by that time so that seals were not quite as effective. But it was a problem. In an actual combat situation, I had decided that I would not operate the tank heater so as to eliminate the fogging problem and to reduce our thermal signature. No, the -A3 did not have a muzzle reference system. Rather, the -A3s in the 1st AD did not. It's possible that some later version had it added. We boresighted using the "Pye-Watson" device, which I think was of English design. It was inserted into the end of the gun tube and was itself a sight. A person stared into the device and directed the gunner to move the tube until the cross-hairs in the Pye-Watson were on a precise target at 1200 meters - usually the upper left-hand corner of a panel. The gunner would then adjust his sights so that the gun sights were also on the same spot. That's how the sights were aligned with the main gun. The process could take fifteen minutes, a crew member is fully exposed during this time, and you needed a clearly defined point at approximately 1200 meters to do it. On the plus side, the -A3's TTS was actually better than the first generation TIS for the M1. Until the 1st AD transitioned to M1A1s in '86 and '87, the basic load included only three or five DU rounds. I guess we were going to save those for extra special targets or something. The thermal sights were fabulous and of real benefit. At range, though, the resolution fades. I've been on night gunneries where there were hot somethings on the range and, if you didn't actually see the target pop up, you couldn't distinguish between the target and the other "hot" things out there. This wouldn't be a problem against moving vehicles since the engine and friction heat of the suspension would have been much hotter than anything else out there. But at long ranges, all you see is a little blob with no definition. It's hard to tell where center mass is, and the exhaust plume might shift the center of the heat source away from the center of the physical target. By the way, LTC, where is your website? I'd like to see the tables you refer to and see what I really could've done as opposed to what was speculated/presumed.

LTCMTS -> Web Site (8/22/2003 4:35:52 AM)
http://www.newnanbiz.net/msnyder/ The table is based on all the old manuals, the Jane's, etc that I've collected over the years. The information is entirely unclassified and is an educated guess based on the sources and some extrapolation from the formulas and data in "Technology of Tanks" a two volume discussion of mobility, firepower, protecetion, etc published in 1991, Orgorkiewicz, Richard M, I would say the values are around 90% accurate for average conditions for gun tubes and ammo in decent condition and fairly recent manufacture. Gun tube life, powder degradation, life cycle deterioration, etc all would reduce the values.

LTCMTS -> Interesting Fact (8/22/2003 5:16:02 AM)
In Zaloga, there's confirmation from the Russian side of some info I had seen on the US side. The 100mm D-10T/TG/T2S gun in the T-54/55 firing the BR-412D APHE round could not penetrate the M60A1 across the frontal quarter even at point blank range. This evidentally caused consternation and rage within the Soviet tank command. Since the T-62 was placed in production before the information on the M60A1 could have gotten to the Soviets, the T-62 must have been based on the tests of the US T95, from which the M60A1 derived its turret design.

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