Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (Full Version)

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Macclan5 -> Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/30/2019 6:26:04 PM)

Curious to opinions about MacArthur’s strategy and (i) the game (ii) verses real life.

Firstly I do understand and fully apologize for extrapolating the game verse real life – there are clearly a lot variables / reactions in the real world simply beyond the scope of most anything to model outside of Big Blue or other AI super computers. I am not suggesting based upon the game alone there is an obvious answer.

Secondly I apologize if this has been debated to death in some older thread before my time

I am curious about the ‘informed opinions’ of this community.

In real life MacArthur advanced (summarized for simplicity)

Port Moresby>>Lae >> Wewak >> Biak >> Leyte

His strategy was clearly influenced by his own commitment to the Philippines. Advisors, Staff, and other intelligence he would have had.
Further MacArthur may have been constrained by Washington (Marshall / King) to work with Halsey / Nimitz on the plan to take Rabul (and eventually deciding to bypass). Finally the political situation in Australia may have been a minor contributing factor albeit – MacArthur was not especially diplomatic with Australian allied forces.

It simply is / was the plan laid out. Its success can really only be debated in terms of the ‘cost verses results’.

Many games in PBEM and verses the AI have chosen the alternate (summarized for simplicity)

Darwin >> Timor >> Makassar>> Balikpapan>> Davos (or slight variations)

Would have this been a more effective real life strategy?

Given that Balikpapan was targeted for bombing in the original Watchtower – would this Watchtower 2 been more direct and effective? Would have it brought Brunei and other oil centers into suppression range?

Given that the IJA was essentially stationed and confined to Singapore / Palembang would it have been more risky? The Carriers still had to get to the home islands to reconstitute their air groups so really the threat remained the BBs?

I suppose because of distance it would have made sharing assets between 3rd/5th and 7th fleet more onerous... more distance to commute to support one fleet or another.

--

I am curious of your opinions.

Of course real life view points are skewed by almost 20-20 perfect hindsight - knowing what we know.

However I am more and more of the opinion that the Darwin >> DEI >> Davos advance should have been the main corridor of advance - having played / read / and read other community thoughts





rustysi -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/30/2019 7:30:31 PM)

Let me start by saying that what's to come is JMHO.

quote:

MacArthur was not especially diplomatic with Australian allied forces.


Like to add, that that's a polite understatement, regarding one of our most sincere Allies.

Now, back on topic.

quote:

Port Moresby>>Lae >> Wewak >> Biak >> Leyte


While MacArthur's choices my have been both political and personal, I think they work pretty well in game terms as well. Of course that's just me, but I will explain.

This line of approach, coupled with the historical naval route through the Marshalls/Gilberts, stresses Japanese assets the most. Of course if done with thought and perseverance. The reason I say this is this avenue, while historical, has the shortest line of advance (opposed to through the Aleutian Islands, but lets not go there) and will sever Japan from her assets of oil/fuel (which the Aleuts will not). This should be of utmost priority as far as the Allies are concerned. As we should all be aware once Japan runs out of the 'black gold' its only a matter of time.

So what do I mean, "stresses Japans' assets the most". Well everything that is needed in these areas must be 'brought there' from the 'outside'. Fuel, supplies, reinforcements. To add to that there's no 'cover'. I know this as a JFB, and I'm pretty sure everyone realizes it deep down. You say 'cover', WTF???????? Well that's easy.

Let's look at your alternative.

quote:

Darwin >> Timor >> Makassar>> Balikpapan>> Davos (or slight variations)


First of all, much of what I need is produced right in the region. Mainly fuel and supplies. The rest can come in through the many islands (cover) along the way, mostly through the PI. Add to that the Allied sloc, while not really vulnerable (which Allied sloc is after say '42) is rather long, as you've pointed out.

With the central route Japan has rather wide open spaces to transverse to get stuff to where its needed. Prime hunting grounds for Allied subs. Especially for those AFB's who bemoan their ineffectiveness. It would be extremely difficult for Japan to close this area to Allied sub threats. TBH against the AI its no problem, but I don't think I have the assets (June '43) to do it in a PBEM. Even if I did it would be one he$$-of-a-fight.

As for the Allied side. Yes, they will face the same challenges, but by mid-'43, these should be swinging to their advantage. Just seems to me most Allied players don't wish to wait that long. That's not to say they can't bring pressure before that, like a Guadalcanal, or some such. An 'historical approach' does not mean every single thing has to happen as it did. You do need to hit 'em where they ain't, so to speak. I remember a screen shot posted by a long time member (can't recall the name right now, senior moment[;)]) whose 'island hopping' was rather ingenious, and amusing as well.

At any rate, these are some of my thoughts on the matter. I do look forward to trying them out as an AFB some day.

As always YMMV.[:)]




Uncivil Engineer -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/30/2019 7:39:47 PM)

You asked for it, so here's my 2 cents -

Unity of Command - one of the principles of war - totally disregarded in the Pacific. Since the Pacific was a Navy area of operations, in my view Nimitz should have been the overall commander in the Pacific. MacArthur could have been retired. The ONLY reason MacArthur fought back to the Philippines was POLITICAL. (I'm retired Army).

Objective - another principle - Japan was the objective, the Philippines were not (except in MacArthur's mind).

As anyone who's played this game more than 5 minutes can tell you, it's all about LOGISTICS. The shortest supply lines are through the Central Pacific - PH - Midway - Saipan - Iwo Jima - Japan. Granted, going from Darwin north through the DEI can take out a lot of oil - but, did the pre-war civilian "owners" of those oilfields want them totally destroyed. The submarine force did plenty taking out tankers to cut the amount of fuel and oil getting back to Japan. Having Yamato and Musashi essentially parked for most of the war shows that.

MacArthur's route, and the route through the DEI, should have been secondary axes of advance, only to keep the Japanese guessing, and to spread their defenses. Once the Marianas Islands are taken, Truk and Rabaul become irrelevant because they can't be supplied by Japan.



rustysi -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/30/2019 7:56:23 PM)

quote:

MacArthur fought back to the Philippines was POLITICAL.


Partly, but IMHO, it was mostly personal. Just sayin'. Edit: That was one big ego.

quote:

MacArthur's route, and the route through the DEI, should have been secondary axes of advance, only to keep the Japanese guessing, and to spread their defenses.


With this I can mostly agree. Just like to add that it helped 'cover' the central advance as well. Never liked the 'thin single thrust' line of advance. Too easy to disrupt. Can you say Market-Garden.



Yaab -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/30/2019 8:10:14 PM)

Look at the map.

Basically, all US-made supplies would have to move on ships through the Torres Strait to Darwin. Imagine the losses to xAKs from Jap subs and aircraft.

Japs subs would come from Rabaul and Truk , and probably from Davao and Surabaya.



jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 2:33:43 AM)

My 2c, 1c per word: Logistics and Infrastructure.
The east cost of Australia had some logistics capability and was able to be developed, albeit with considerable resources and engineers from the US.
Darwin and the NW of Oz was even less developed and populated than now with still next to nothing in the central areas.
Building logistics support infrastructure in Queensland, at Brisbane, Townsville, Cairns was required to open up a viable supply route to Darwin anyway, so Port Moresby was the next logical step especially seeing as the outcome of Kokoda was favourable.

Then once Buna/Gona were retaken there was a practical need to stay in contact with the enemy to keep airfields and ports secure, which led to clearing the north coast of PNG.

Looking back, the allies didn’t give up territory in PNG without a fight, especially airfields and ports.
Then once the initiative switched, it was a methodical process of establishing allied air bases to provide fighter cover to support the next step forward, or in the process of clearing airfields established by Japan, using those that could be developed further to assist.

By the time that places like Morotai were developed as allied air bases, it would have been a backwards step to invade Timor for example.
Plus the historical route along the north of PNG provided airfields that could be used to mutually support the USN led cenpac route to the Philippines.
By retaking the Phillipines, all of Burma, the DEI and Borneo were cut off from Japan and didn’t have to be physically retaken by putting boots on the ground.

We’ve probably all experienced what happens in game when you get impatient and get too many ships or troops too far ahead of established air bases.



Barb -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 7:30:10 AM)

Basically such route as was taken IRL was "forced" into the MacArthurs hands:

1.) Navy (King) didn't want their ships under Army command - so no capital ships available for anything bolder.
2.) There were a lot of troops in Australia available once the crisis waned (Aust 6th & Aust 7th AIF Divisions, plus US 32nd, 41st) with various formations on the way
3.) Australia was closest and largest possible logistic base in the Pacific - both for supplies and troops (there were just so many places where more than 50,000 troops could be stationed)
4.) Australian eastern coast had some developed infrastructure as well a space and workforce to enlarge it to support growing Army and Air formations
5.) Once he got the upper hand in the air, he could proceed by small leaps within his own air cover without requesting the Navy support - All he needed from the Navy were Landing Crafts/Landing Ships.
6.) Up till the Philippines MacArthurs Navy consisted at most of 3-4 light cruisers with 1-2 US DesDiv plus misc allied ships (HMAS and HMNZS) - the single exception was Hollandia/Sarmi landing when TF58 was at hand for few days. A handful CVEs were at hand too.
7.) Northern/Western Australia were too removed, and lacked manpower - everything would have to be brought there by ships - and Darwin/Perth/Freemantle would not be able to handle it - not to mention the length of the lines-of-communication would be even longer (being long as it was).
8.) Going north of Darwin would keep the enemy on both flanks at least till the spearhead joined the CenPac drive around Philippines.
9.) Philippines as a target of liberation were under political objectives - Philippines being US "territory" and their people "US Subjects" it was a political obligation to liberate them.

So I would say MacArthurs campaign along the New Guinea to Philippines was probably the most logical and maybe only practical way of advance from base in Australia.



jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 8:15:22 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Uncivil Engineer

Objective - another principle - Japan was the objective, the Philippines were not (except in MacArthur's mind).



Some good discussion here but I can’t agree with the above statement.
Fron 1941 to 1944 the objective for both USN and Army seems to have been to retake the Philippines, probably as it was “American” soil.

Supported by the following from Wikipedia:

“Upon Admiral Halsey's recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Canada, approved a decision to not only move up the date for the first landing in the Philippines, but also to move it north from the southernmost island of Mindanao to the central island of Leyte, Philippines. The new date set for the landing on Leyte, October 20, 1944, was two months before the previous target date to land on Mindanao.”

I assume that by retaking the Philippines and strangling the Japanese economy the joint chiefs were expecting the Japanese to surrender.
Only when that didn’t occur did they start seriously planning mainland Japan as a military objective.

My main question from all this, why would the Joint Chiefs have been meeting in Canada!?



Trugrit -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 12:24:33 PM)

This is ground that historians have been picking over for the past 70 plus years.

The reality is that the strategy was not MacArthur's. It was a national strategy.
You cannot separate war and politics. War is political.

In 1942 there was a fear that the Japanese were going to invade Australia.
The United States made a national political commitment to defend Australia.
This decision meant that lots of American forces were going to Australia.

Once in Australia, when Australia was secure, they were only going to go in one direction, toward Japan whether MacArthur was there or not.

The decision to not by-pass the Philippines was also a national strategy made by the joint chiefs of staff. MacArthur played a major role but it was not his decision to make.

This is a balanced video well worth watching:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhVg5ao3P14

Some outstanding photographs, many not well known.
“The four Horesmen” Barbey, Kenny, Krueger, …… important commanders not well known because MacArthur overshadowed them.

This video is also good at shooting down some MacArthur myths as well.

My father served in the Philippines under MacArthur. He worshiped MacArthur.
He believed the myth that casualties under MacArthur was less than in the central Pacific.

I’m also a fan of MacArthur. He was very complex.




Macclan5 -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 1:00:55 PM)

Thanks.

Thanks also for cited readings. I have not covered them and will look to do so.

I concur:

1) It was a political decision not just MacArthur

2) SLOC and supply north and west to Darwin would have been problematic - or at least more so than the northern coast of New Guinea. Shipping scarcity would be an issue.

3) Relative development of Eastern Seaboard of Australia vis a vis Darwin I had not considered in fairness.

However I still ponder

(ii) Despite extended SLOC would the Darwin >> DEI >> Davos advance actually cut off more supply to the Japanese Economy Earlier ?

The Battle of Biak was May 44 - August 44 followed by Leyte in October.

By this time USN Submarines had already significantly harmed the merchant fleet.

Assuming we 'speculate' the Battle of Balikpapan for May 44 - August 44 followed by Davos I think there is sufficient time to build up the SLOC / supply and Darwin as a port.

The bigger threat may be that the heart of the IJN Navy is much nearer at Singapore and Palembang. This location fits with Japan's desire for the "decisive final battle" closer to their diminishing oil supply at this time; further whether the Carriers and Airgroups were reconstituted.

However there is no reason to actually believe the outcomes of Naval clashes would be significant different assuming TF38/58 is on point.

While the Japanese may have had more airfields regionally compared to Biak - the Allies would also have Airfields in Timor to compensate. Further Allied 'built up' Airfields in Timor could have spent time suppressing Palembang / Balikpapan / etc / etc

I am uncertain if the airfields of Balikpapan and the DEI in general were of higher quality. One challenge clearly for the Japanese is the lack of high quality airfields vis a vis Wewak / Aitape / Hollandia... this may have been a consideration.

--

Not sure there is a definitive conclusion - I will have to read more and review the YouTube documentary

Thanks for your thoughts / comments





Buckrock -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 1:14:01 PM)

It might also be worth chasing up references covering the planning for Operation RENO in its various forms. Several sources I've seen in the past have described how MacArthur and his staff considered and then dismissed a direct drive from Northern Australia through the DEI to the Philippines (Mindanao). The planning references would probably cover why they didn't go that route, though I doubt you'll see many additional reasons beyond those already mentioned by several of the posters above.



Alfred -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 2:45:03 PM)

Firstly, Darwin did not have the

  • drinking water reservoirs
  • electricity capacity
  • transportation facilities
  • climate

to support the skilled population base required to sustain the forward operations which AE players engage in.  None of these critical logistical factors are covered in detail in AE.  Given time and sufficient expenditure of treasure and time, some of the deficiencies could be addressed but not all.  But why waste time when the east coast was available now, not sometime in the late 1940s as Darwin would have entailed.

Secondly, from Darwin all approaches traverse colonies belonging to European countries who lacked any resources to garrison their "liberated" territories.  It was never American policy to facilitate the return of the colonial powers.  Imagine the intra Allied diplomatic fight when Dutch or Portuguese "territory" was liberated by American forces but not being garrisoned by American troops, the locals decided to take matters into their own hands by breaking away from their colonial masters.  American troops were not sent in large numbers to India precisely for this reason, there British forces could take care of liberating their own "territory" in Burma and Malaya.  Similar story with New Guinea where the bulk of the fighting was undertaken by Australian troops to liberate their "territory", which coincidentally meant next stop was the Philippines.  Remember whose boots were used in Borneo in mid 1945, a period when the end of the war was in sight and the hiatus until the arrival of Dutch troops to garrison was known to be short.

Again the internal Allied politics is not modelled in the game and most players just ignore the real world considerations which impacted on operations.

Alfred



Gridley380 -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 3:10:59 PM)

As noted, running your logistics through the Torres Straight is... sub-optimal. Running them all the way around the Australian Bight is... probably worse, honestly.

So, you need to go overland. Realistically that means building a railroad to Darwin. I actually made a rough estimate at one point that with a US Engineer General Service Regiment it would take about a year to build a single-track line, and you'd need several hundred thousand tons of supplies (much of it probably imported from the US). Obviously you can cut that down by using more troops, but there's a limit before they start getting in each other's way and there's only so many troops you can spare.

If the US Army Transportation Corps ran the line it would take about 8,000 personnel to keep it going (running several hundred locomotives and a thousands of cars - again figure some will be imports), with a throughput of ~9,000 tons a day. Aussie civilian workers would probably do the job instead, but whoever is running the line that's manpower not available for other units.

The Army figured a single-track line could support a field army, but you'll be providing a lot of bulk fuel and aviation support as well. By the time you're past Timor you'll want that line to be double-tracked and supplemented by a pipeline, and at some point you're going to max out Darwin's port capacity.

These are all ballpark numbers and the reality would probably be worse, not better - the Outback isn't a fun place to do large projects.

There are also, of course, all the other factors that others have covered.

I'm in the 'Central Pacific supported by South Pacific was the right route' camp.



Kull -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 3:34:21 PM)

Lots of real good points here - the "Spice Island axis" didn't make sense for a lot of real life reasons. But even in AE, divorced from political considerations, that whole area is just a hornet's nest for the attacking allied player:

- Unlike atoll warfare, every one of these islands can support a near-unlimited number of defensive troops
- The largest Allied base in the region is Darwin, and if it becomes the repository for invasion-required supply and fuel, ALL of that will have to be shipped in through Japanese-contested airspace. Even ignoring cargo ship attrition, it means the Japanese player will have plenty of warning that something is afoot.
- Japanese Carrier support can shuttle relatively quickly from the Marshalls to the Moluccas, but the same is not true for the Allies. Committing a sizable Allied carrier force to this region will keep it far away a myriad of Pacific regions, making them vulnerable to a KB-backed strike.
- Absent Allied carrier support, Japanese SCTFs should be able to wreak havoc among the Allied TFs, especially during the near-mandatory "Timor First" invasions. The Japanese would have large airbases nearby, fully capable of providing their own air cover, while the Allies would have to rely on distant, land-based air support. Not a recipe for success.

This invasion axis requires the allies to "split their forces", which is usually a bad idea. At least the advance along Northern New Guinea allowed for mutual support from the assets supporting the Cent Pac invasions, but Timor et al are just too far away.



sstevens06 -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 5:18:17 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: jdsrae


quote:

ORIGINAL: Uncivil Engineer

Objective - another principle - Japan was the objective, the Philippines were not (except in MacArthur's mind).



Some good discussion here but I can’t agree with the above statement.
Fron 1941 to 1944 the objective for both USN and Army seems to have been to retake the Philippines, probably as it was “American” soil.

Supported by the following from Wikipedia:

“Upon Admiral Halsey's recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Canada, approved a decision to not only move up the date for the first landing in the Philippines, but also to move it north from the southernmost island of Mindanao to the central island of Leyte, Philippines. The new date set for the landing on Leyte, October 20, 1944, was two months before the previous target date to land on Mindanao.”

I assume that by retaking the Philippines and strangling the Japanese economy the joint chiefs were expecting the Japanese to surrender.
Only when that didn’t occur did they start seriously planning mainland Japan as a military objective.

My main question from all this, why would the Joint Chiefs have been meeting in Canada!?




Agreed, great discussion here.


The meeting in Canada was of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meaning the British Imperial General Staff and the US Joint Chiefs. This combined group met several times during the course of the war. The specific conference you refer to was code-named "Octagon" and occurred in Quebec City, Canada on September 14, 1944. I believe Winston Churchill was also present at that conference.



Macclan5 -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 5:55:23 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Firstly, Darwin did not have the

  • drinking water reservoirs
  • electricity capacity
  • transportation facilities
  • climate

to support the skilled population base required to sustain the forward operations which AE players engage in.  None of these critical logistical factors are covered in detail in AE.  Given time and sufficient expenditure of treasure and time, some of the deficiencies could be addressed but not all.  But why waste time when the east coast was available now, not sometime in the late 1940s as Darwin would have entailed.

Secondly, ...  It was never American policy to facilitate the return of the colonial powers. 

Again the internal Allied politics is not modeled in the game and most players just ignore the real world considerations which impacted on operations.



My personal thanks Alfred. [8D]

Very informative as per usual.

That speaks to my earlier point I had "underestimated" the relative development of the eastern seaboard vis a vis Darwin. I have very little knowledge about Australia at that period of time.

All the more interesting (!!) because the Japanese raids on "Darwin" were "by historical consensus" to nullify Darwin as an Allied base of operations. I seem to be operating under the same fallacy as the Imperial Council albeit there may be other Japanese reasons for said raids not well documented (fear, warning Australia to stay out of the war, propaganda, etc)

You other points about the politics I concede



Macclan5 -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 6:03:32 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

- Absent Allied carrier support, Japanese SCTFs should be able to wreak havoc among the Allied TFs, especially during the near-mandatory "Timor First" invasions. The Japanese would have large airbases nearby, fully capable of providing their own air cover, while the Allies would have to rely on distant, land-based air support. Not a recipe for success.



Interesting perspective. Thanks Kull

Even until 44 - Allied strategic planning was swayed by the thoughts that land based air cover was necessary for amphibious operations. In fact if I am not wrong - this was one of the considerations for Tarawa as 1st step in the Central Pacific.

I do concur on "Timor" or the first leg especially i.e. Carrier support. I see eye to eye with you.

By the date range 44 ( invasion of Biak ) I think the Americans planning such an invasion would have considered this mandatory.

I do wonder though - does not Timor represent as good a air platform - as any place in New Guinea on the northern coast ?? Perhaps even better as it is "withing closer range" to many Japanese industrial sources (??)

This perhaps summarizes my curiosity more than any other question about the feasibility in real life - ignoring the political constraints - and the obvious 'facility gaps' I noted above as per Alfred.

Purely speculative on my part - need to do some reading and research [8D]






jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (7/31/2019 9:23:37 PM)

The beauty of the game is you can try it and see how it goes. Despite various realities not being modelled it’s a valid area for the allies to do something to keep the pressure on Japan so they keep a decent garrison in places like Timor and Java.
Even in game, I think of the offensive axis north from Darwin actually starting at Perth and air bases having to be developed along the NW coast of Aus first.
Game hexes like Exmouth and Derby are good places for airfields (google “Operation Potshot”, plus modern Learmonth and Curtin airfields for some history) but they need time, engineer units and supplies to build them up.

But with Perth as the start point, that means a SLOC from East Coast USA via Cape Town. That splits all US convoy assets and everything else from the Pacific to the other half of the globe. “Concentration of Force” is a principle of war, and this option does the opposite.

Consider the following in the context of committing large numbers of allied troops to the NW of Aus:

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim - A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.
Concentration of Force - Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power (conceptual, physical, and moral) to realize intended effects, when and where required.
Economy of Effort - Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.
Sustainability - To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.



Buckrock -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 8:24:44 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Macclan5
I do wonder though - does not Timor represent as good a air platform - as any place in New Guinea on the northern coast ?? Perhaps even better as it is "withing closer range" to many Japanese industrial sources (??)

Timor did offer additional benefits as a first step north for an Allied offensive. There were already two adequate airfield complexes there (established pre-war and then "improved" by the Japanese) plus several satellite fields. Taking Timor would have effectively ended the historical Japanese air threat to Darwin and as you suggested, it would have brought most of the DEI resource centers within the maximum striking range of any Timor-based US heavy bombers, particularly the B-24 that would soon supplant the B-17 in the Pacific. Probably only the Sumatran resource centers would have been out of B-24 range from Timor. How many bomber groups would be then needed to render the DEI oil resources unworkable for the Japanese (and keep it that way) is anyone's guess.

However, MacArthur in mid '42 (Radiogram to Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 24 Jun) chose north-eastern New Guinea over Timor as the objective for the first SWPA offensive, citing it as being the most practical use of the then limited SWPA assets. In regards to Timor, he stated....

"....the action projected northwest of Australia, [attack on Timor] even if successful, cannot be supported as is the case in the New Britain area; doubtful whether Timor could be held under present circumstances in view of nearby Japanese bases and their control of the sea; its capture should not be undertaken unless we are prepared to support it fully which includes the continuous control of the sea lane between there and Australia; the situation is entirely different in the New Britain-New Ireland area, which if captured can unquestionably be held; no effort from the northwest coast of Australia should be made until naval and air forces are built up which will insure retention of objectives....".

The above was taken from "The Reports of General MacArthur" at the hyperwar site - https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/RptsMacA/I/RptsI-3.html

Additionally, Admiral King during the planning discussions had apparently vetoed the use of the Torres Strait as a transit for USN capital ships in any potential future naval operations north of Australia until the strait could be adequately surveyed, improved through dredging and given additional security against submarine and mine attacks at the approaches.

IMO, a Timor invasion was not an early option (ie '43) for the historical Allies and by the time it could have been, the force commitment and momentum of the New Guinea (and Central Pacific) operations virtually ensured there would be no consideration for a diversion of effort, especially since the offensive in New Guinea was intended to lead directly to the invasion of Mindanao (originally planned for late '44), from which air and naval operations would then be expected to adequately sever the Japanese Home Islands from her DEI possessions anyway.

That's not to say a Timor and beyond approach can't be viable as an Allied strategy in the game.



Alfred -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 8:47:35 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Macclan5


quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Firstly, Darwin did not have the

  • drinking water reservoirs
  • electricity capacity
  • transportation facilities
  • climate

to support the skilled population base required to sustain the forward operations which AE players engage in.  None of these critical logistical factors are covered in detail in AE.  Given time and sufficient expenditure of treasure and time, some of the deficiencies could be addressed but not all.  But why waste time when the east coast was available now, not sometime in the late 1940s as Darwin would have entailed.

Secondly, ...  It was never American policy to facilitate the return of the colonial powers. 

Again the internal Allied politics is not modeled in the game and most players just ignore the real world considerations which impacted on operations.



My personal thanks Alfred. [8D]

Very informative as per usual.

That speaks to my earlier point I had "underestimated" the relative development of the eastern seaboard vis a vis Darwin. I have very little knowledge about Australia at that period of time.

All the more interesting (!!) because the Japanese raids on "Darwin" were "by historical consensus" to nullify Darwin as an Allied base of operations. I seem to be operating under the same fallacy as the Imperial Council albeit there may be other Japanese reasons for said raids not well documented (fear, warning Australia to stay out of the war, propaganda, etc)

You other points about the politics I concede


The regular bombing of Darwin throughout 1942-43 was a valid operation for Japan because it was by far the most important Allied base in the "vicinity" of the eastern DEI raw material centres. That it had logistical limitations as an Allied offensive base does not detract from its Allied defensive value.

1. The 19 Feb 1942 KB raid on Darwin was a larger Japanese effort than Pearl Harbor had been. Coming 4 days after the surrender of Singapore which cut off the western part of the DEI LOC back to Allied bases, the Darwin raid was specifically undertaken to seal off the eastern DEI LOC before Japanese forces would land on Java. After the raid the only tenuous LOC was via Broome using float planes. Which is why Broom was the second most important Australian target after Darwin. Effectively, the DEI was cut off from any Allied support after 19 Feb and this situation goes a long way to explaining why ten Poorten agreed to an early surrender.

2. Timor remained an active guerrilla theatre for the whole of 1942. A small Australian force tied down considerable numbers of enemy forces. Until they were extracted in 1943 the Japanese did not know how long the guerrilla operations would continue and how much logistical support they were receiving from Darwin. Guerrilla operations are not really modelled in AE but in any case IRL they are far easier to logistically support than the huge offensive operations undertaken from Darwin by AE players.


When assessing the real world value of Darwin as an offensive base it is good to bear in mind that one result of the Feb 1942 raid was the Australian decision to evacuate to the south non military personnel. Such an action degrades, not upgrades, the value of a location to serve as the main base for offensive operations.

Alfred



Alfred -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 9:04:40 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

quote:

ORIGINAL: Macclan5
I do wonder though - does not Timor represent as good a air platform - as any place in New Guinea on the northern coast ?? Perhaps even better as it is "withing closer range" to many Japanese industrial sources (??)

Timor did offer additional benefits as a first step north for an Allied offensive. There were already two adequate airfield complexes there (established pre-war and then "improved" by the Japanese) plus several satellite fields. Taking Timor would have effectively ended the historical Japanese air threat to Darwin and as you suggested, it would have brought most of the DEI resource centers within the maximum striking range of any Timor-based US heavy bombers, particularly the B-24 that would soon supplant the B-17 in the Pacific. Probably only the Sumatran resource centers would have been out of B-24 range from Timor. How many bomber groups would be then needed to render the DEI oil resources unworkable for the Japanese (and keep it that way) is anyone's guess.

However, MacArthur in mid '42 (Radiogram to Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 24 Jun) chose north-eastern New Guinea over Timor as the objective for the first SWPA offensive, citing it as being the most practical use of the then limited SWPA assets. In regards to Timor, he stated....

"....the action projected northwest of Australia, [attack on Timor] even if successful, cannot be supported as is the case in the New Britain area; doubtful whether Timor could be held under present circumstances in view of nearby Japanese bases and their control of the sea; its capture should not be undertaken unless we are prepared to support it fully which includes the continuous control of the sea lane between there and Australia; the situation is entirely different in the New Britain-New Ireland area, which if captured can unquestionably be held; no effort from the northwest coast of Australia should be made until naval and air forces are built up which will insure retention of objectives....".

The above was taken from "The Reports of General MacArthur" at the hyperwar site - https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/RptsMacA/I/RptsI-3.html

Additionally, Admiral King during the planning discussions had apparently vetoed the use of the Torres Strait as a transit for USN capital ships in any potential future naval operations north of Australia until the strait could be adequately surveyed, improved through dredging and given additional security against submarine and mine attacks at the approaches.

IMO, a Timor invasion was not an early option (ie '43) for the historical Allies and by the time it could have been, the force commitment and momentum of the New Guinea (and Central Pacific) operations virtually ensured there would be no consideration for a diversion of effort, especially since the offensive in New Guinea was intended to lead directly to the invasion of Mindanao (originally planned for late '44), from which air and naval operations would then be expected to adequately sever the Japanese Home Islands from her DEI possessions anyway.

That's not to say a Timor and beyond approach can't be viable as an Allied strategy in the game.


Sneaky fellow, whilst I was composing my previous post, Buckrock posts what I was going to say about Timor.[:)]

However there is one other important consideration regarding Timor which is absolutely never taken into account by AE players but was very relevant in early 1942.

The island of Timor was divided between the Netherlands and Portugal. Technically Japan did not invade Portuguese Timor as it moved in to "protect" the maintenance of Portuguese interests. Any Allied attempt to evict the "protecting" power could be seen as a hostile action against Portugal and un der international law furnish Portugal with a casus bellum. In early 1942 the Battle of the Atlantic was far from being won by the Allies. Direct Kriegsmarine access to Portuguese ports, Atlantic islands and African colonies was a situation not in the best interest of the Allies. Why risk pushing Portugal into the Axis camp? By the time it didn't really matter how Portugal responded, the Allied drive into New Guinea and the Solomons was well underway and making good progress.

Alfred



jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 10:15:44 AM)

How many allied players commit the assets to develop the Corunna Downs dot hex into a B-24 capable airfield?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corunna_Downs_Airfield

And the dot hex at Truscott. It’s been a few years since a burnt a few hours reading through details on the following web page:
https://www.ozatwar.com/truscott.htm



Ian R -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 10:43:59 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Firstly, Darwin did not have the

  • drinking water reservoirs
  • electricity capacity
  • transportation facilities
  • climate

to support the skilled population base required to sustain the forward operations which AE players engage in.  None of these critical logistical factors are covered in detail in AE.  Given time and sufficient expenditure of treasure and time, some of the deficiencies could be addressed but not all.  But why waste time when the east coast was available now, not sometime in the late 1940s as Darwin would have entailed.


I agree with that. I went to Darwin last year. The B737 had to do a few circuits of the airport while we watched VMA something or other land their F18s in pairs. Hot, humid, and uncomfortable. Nice seafood though. And I was there in August, when the weather is nice... for a few weeks. Formation landing was impressive. Not a lot of separation.

quote:

Secondly, ....


The colonialism argument, not so much.

Alfred, this post is not up to your usual standards.

One of the reasons the AIF was sent to Borneo in 1945, was that COMINCH (King) was looking for ways to ease the fuel squeeze in the Westpac. Shell Oil engineering experts went in behind the assault wave to rehabilitate the refineries.

Dugout Doug was happy to send them off on a tangent so he didn't have to accommodate any AIF units in the PI. He had been very unhappy with the AIF ever since Eichelberger used the 6 Div to dig the 32nd Div out of the pooh at Buna. If you look back now and read some of Dugout Doug's utterances about the Australian troops, it is really quite insulting.

There was a lot of politics involved, but it is not really the Whig/Tory sort of self-determination divide that plays to the populist media.




Ian R -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 10:57:36 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Gridley380

So, you need to go overland. Realistically that means building a railroad to Darwin.


It eventually got built ... in 2004.

I remember fondly explaining to people on the old pacwarnet forum in the 1990s that there was no real land link to Port Darwin during the war.

The fact of the matter is, if you want to land in Ambon/Kendari/Menado and build an air supremacy corridor road to the PI, you do it from Perth or Townsville.

And it's not that hard. Large groups of Heavy bombs fly airbase suppression at 8k. Once you suppress the IJ airbases around your Sealoc you can ship a million supply a month in from any/all of Capetown/Perth/East coast - depending on your routing an EC-2 cargo TF can shunt stuff all the way from the CONUS.

To quote Sir Winston, "It's all just a matter of brute force".



rustysi -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 9:35:07 PM)

quote:

If you look back now and read some of Dugout Doug's utterances about the Australian troops, it is really quite insulting.


Don't take it too personal, he insulted everybody.



rustysi -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/1/2019 9:42:13 PM)

quote:

It eventually got built ... in 2004.

I remember fondly explaining to people on the old pacwarnet forum in the 1990s that there was no real land link to Port Darwin during the war.



The Ghan, would love to ride the thing some day. They did have a railway part way, to Alice Springs or Katherine something was it? Intended to go all the way, just couldn't complete it for some reason. IIRC they choose a poor route, which was altered later when it was finally finished.



jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/2/2019 6:41:38 AM)

A story on the Ghan popped into my news feed just yesterday:
https://www.communitynews.com.au/western-suburbs-weekly/news/celebrations-on-track-as-the-ghan-turns-90/
I’ve driven Darwin to Alice in a day (hire car, open speed limit!)
Darwin to Adelaide in a few days, and Canberra to Darwin via Brisbane a few times taking about a week each time with stops on family/friends.
Lesson learnt a few times over, it’s a bloody big country...



Buckrock -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/2/2019 8:36:26 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ian R
One of the reasons the AIF was sent to Borneo in 1945, was that COMINCH (King) was looking for ways to ease the fuel squeeze in the Westpac. Shell Oil engineering experts went in behind the assault wave to rehabilitate the refineries.

From what I'd seen on this in official documents, the paper trail for the Operation Oboe planning and its oil justification appears to lead back to MacArthur rather than King. One of the supporting arguments accompanying Mac's plan (although later disowned by his HQ) when it first did the Washington rounds in early '45 was that the captured oilfields could be up and running in 3 months and aid in supporting later planned operations against the Japanese in SE Asia and China. This particular claim was rejected by the analysts in Washington who believed it would take at least a year for the heavily damaged refineries to reach a useful output. Regardless of where the claim came from, it appears to have had little influence on the final decision to give Mac the go-ahead for Oboe.

As for King, he admittedly was an advocate for MacArthur's Borneo invasion plan but his support appears to have rested primarily on his desire to see Brunei captured for use as the main base for the British Pacific Fleet. King had even argued during JCS discussions that the invasions of Balikpapan and Tarakan should only be undertaken if they did not interfere with the capture of Brunei.

A cynic might also suggest King's prioritizing of the capture of Brunei was because he wanted to quickly hand the British Pacific Fleet a main operating base positioned well clear of the planned US operations against Japan in '45 as well as keeping them thievin' Brits well away from the USN's Pacific Fleet train.



Ian R -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/2/2019 9:04:14 AM)

I did say "one of the reasons". I think I saw the King suggestion in Weinberger's book; could be wrong though. It does sound like he was in favour of it, if not the precise operational plan. Anyway I defer to your reading of the primary documents.

quote:

it appears to have had little influence on the final decision to give Mac the go-ahead for Oboe.


What do the primary documents show were the major influences?








jdsrae -> RE: Semi OT : Allied corridors of advance - real life (8/2/2019 9:38:35 AM)

I haven’t read much on the British Pacific Fleet, but what I have showed that the USN made it clear that the RN were welcome to play in the Pacific but only if they also brought their own logistics support.
Same goes for Borneo I haven’t read much on it, but I don’t think it is cynical to think that a major factor would have been to get the RN their own base closer to, or on, their previous territory.



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