RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing?

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warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/16/2019 10:52:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy But I meant to finish up by saying that, if I read Curtis Lemay's comment re: 'the Rubicon' correctly, that his argument supports mine. Namely, Poland was only a guarantor of imminent warfare because the British chose to draw the line there, instead of Czechoslovakia. They didn't have to do either. The only Rubicon that would have guaranteed war was the Channel. Well, the original 'crossing the Rubicon' was just a line that the Roman Senate had drawn. They didn't have to react to it when Caesar crossed it with his army (as expressly forbidden). They could have changed their mind and invited him into Rome. Or put a new 'line' further south. There had been no fighting yet. So I would argue that the way Warspite1 uses the term 'crossing the Rubicon' fits perfectly here. In my humble opinion, that is. warspite1 Its not the way I've used it that is the 'problem'. Reading and re-reading the various posts, it seems we are talking about two different things. Thankfully we all know what Crossing the Rubicon means. Sadly both Curtis Lemay and Chickenboy feel they need to tell me that Poland didn't have to be the Rubicon, like in some way I didn't know that .... have a look at the number of times I've used the word chosen/picked, let alone the last sentence.... honestly you couldn't make it up..... [sm=dizzy.gif] Yes, Poland was the Rubicon. It was the line in the sand that the British Government picked because Poland was to be Hitler's first victim post him making clear (Prague 1939) that Versailles revision was not his goal. That was the Rubicon chosen. It could have been Czechoslovakia - in which case Munich would not have happened and war would have begun then. But Czechoslovakia WASN’T chosen as the Rubicon because Britain was not going to war because 3m Sudeten Germans wanted the right to self-determination. Britain was however going to war over Poland - NOT Danzig, but Poland. So yes, regardless of what you say, factually Poland was HMG's Rubicon. You may not like the Cabinet's decision, you may not agree with the Cabinet's decision, but that was their decision and that was what 3rd September 1939 shortly after 11 o'clock was all about. You can't deny Poland was the Rubicon.... er because she was. For the last time and I hope this works. Britain and France could have said no to Hitler at anytime and chosen war. Their line in the sand (their Rubicon) could have been whatever the hell they chose, Rhineland, Austria, Czech, Poland, Soviet Union or whatever they chose. They chose Poland for the reason I've repeated a billion times. At the risk of sounding like Doctor Phil, Do we have closure here?

Chickenboy -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 1:33:38 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Please can you provide post numbers and/or specific quotes - thank-you. Sigh. No. Sorry. Won't do homework for you. I've no wish to engage in a diatribe with you on this matter. PM me if you feel like discussing further. Good day.

Capt. Harlock -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 1:43:18 AM)
quote: So if war was inevitable why wait to be attacked and have Pearl Harbor and the PI inflicted on American forces? You said above that none of the reasons for the British and French not going to war count if war is inevitable. Japan had no oil but were making no plans to quit, how could he have not realised Japan was not going to stop at war? Why didn’t Roosevelt attack Japan? Well because like Chamberlain and Daladier he didn't know. He, like they, probably feared it was possible, dreaded that it may be possible - but he didn't know. Just to clear up any misunderstandings: There was a time when a number of people in both Washington and Tokyo believed that a settlement could be achieved and war avoided. That chance, if there ever really was one, disappeared when the U. S. presented a poorly phrased demand for Japanese withdrawal which was interpreted as requiring Japan to withdraw from Manchuria as well as China proper. The answer as to whether or not Roosevelt knew that war with Japan was inevitable is therefore (believe it or not) yes to both. It's all about the time point: for years Roosevelt did not think it was inevitable, and he badly wanted to avoid it since he wanted to join the fight against Nazi Germany, and two-front wars are always a major challenge. But by sometime in Autumn 1941, it had been realized that the Japanese were simply not going to back down; they would attack. But Roosevelt and the State Department were very anxious to have Japan fire the first shot. You are absolutely right in pointing out that in a democracy, you need public opinion behind you. And this policy succeeded so brilliantly that to this day some theorists believe that Roosevelt knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked and deliberately did nothing. As I have written elsewhere, though Pearl Harbor was a smashing tactical victory for the Japanese, on the grand strategic level it was a war-losing catastrophe. It led to mobilization of the American economy and manpower on a level that would have been politically impossible otherwise. (Compare U. S. tank and aircraft production in WWI to that in WWII.)

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 7:32:40 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Please can you provide post numbers and/or specific quotes - thank-you. Sigh. No. Sorry. Won't do homework for you. I've no wish to engage in a diatribe with you on this matter. PM me if you feel like discussing further. Good day. warspite1 Sigh [:(]. You know full well there is no homework to be done - because those posts don't exist and this was all so unnecessary. You also know this was no diatribe. This thread was just a grown up, interesting debate with plenty of back and forth - and with Nev getting the usual battering [X(] and me fighting a rearguard action in defence [;)].... and what? A regular poster and friend of this and the WITP-AE forum had the temerity to suggest that they believed there was an element of (or out and out, I know not which) appeasement in the Cuba Missile Crisis resolution - and suddenly you're lashing out in anger in all sorts of uncoordinated directions on appeasement and Chamberlain. I know it was just anger because you've got basic facts wrong, dates wrong, and spent too much time on getting in buzz words and phrases to make any constructive points. Sigh indeed [&:]

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 7:41:54 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: So if war was inevitable why wait to be attacked and have Pearl Harbor and the PI inflicted on American forces? You said above that none of the reasons for the British and French not going to war count if war is inevitable. Japan had no oil but were making no plans to quit, how could he have not realised Japan was not going to stop at war? Why didn’t Roosevelt attack Japan? Well because like Chamberlain and Daladier he didn't know. He, like they, probably feared it was possible, dreaded that it may be possible - but he didn't know. Just to clear up any misunderstandings: There was a time when a number of people in both Washington and Tokyo believed that a settlement could be achieved and war avoided. That chance, if there ever really was one, disappeared when the U. S. presented a poorly phrased demand for Japanese withdrawal which was interpreted as requiring Japan to withdraw from Manchuria as well as China proper. The answer as to whether or not Roosevelt knew that war with Japan was inevitable is therefore (believe it or not) yes to both. It's all about the time point: for years Roosevelt did not think it was inevitable, and he badly wanted to avoid it since he wanted to join the fight against Nazi Germany, and two-front wars are always a major challenge. But by sometime in Autumn 1941, it had been realized that the Japanese were simply not going to back down; they would attack. But Roosevelt and the State Department were very anxious to have Japan fire the first shot. You are absolutely right in pointing out that in a democracy, you need public opinion behind you. And this policy succeeded so brilliantly that to this day some theorists believe that Roosevelt knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked and deliberately did nothing. As I have written elsewhere, though Pearl Harbor was a smashing tactical victory for the Japanese, on the grand strategic level it was a war-losing catastrophe. It led to mobilization of the American economy and manpower on a level that would have been politically impossible otherwise. (Compare U. S. tank and aircraft production in WWI to that in WWII.) warspite1 I don't think there are any misunderstandings. As said previously, you won't find me an enemy of the American action in the build up to the Pacific War, the need not to be the aggressor, and what Pearl did to unite the American people in a way that no politician with any number of fancy words can. What is so incongruous is that Chamberlain does not get the same treatment. "But Roosevelt and the State Department were very anxious to have Japan fire the first shot". So why no such concern for Chamberlain and Daladier? What makes it right that they should have just gone in all guns blazing regardless of the wishes of their own public, the wishes of the Empire, the wishes of the US (what was it Roosevelt said to Chamberlain about his efforts to find peace? "Good Man"), the parlous states of the nations finances, the unpreparedness for war and of course, most of all, the fact there was no casus belli that stands up to scrutiny. You see, they would also be going to war against the wishes of approx 25% of the population of the country they were supposedly going to war for. You've suggested the Allies should have moved on the 18 September 1938 - so this is before Hitler launches Fall Grun and that means Britain and France will be the aggressors, declaring war and firing the first shot. And why? Because of the establishment of the Freikorps? What (apart from Hitler's meddling which is taken as read) does the establishment of this unit tell us? What does the fact that so many Sudeten Germans refused to join up when the Czech army was mobilised tell us? What does the result of the 1935 parliamentary elections tell us about the strength of feeling of the 3m Sudeten Germans (circa 25% of the population)? The Sudeten German Party was, by 1935, the largest party in the country. So what is the great casus belli by which millions of young British and French are to be sent back to war 20 years after many of their fathers and uncles came back mutilated (if at all)? A fight over a country that, left alone, may well have either torn itself apart or at least descended into civil war in any case. Er...where do I volunteer? [8\|] And finally, lets be crystal clear what you are defending here and give it further context. It's one thing being responsible for starting a war when there isn't one and its uncertain whether there really needs to be one. But in August 1941 Roosevelt and the American people are in a very different position from Chamberlain and Daladier in 1938. Let's be absolutely clear here so there is no misunderstanding. The Western Democracies have a major problem. France is defeated, Britain has been fighting alone, is bankrupt, is losing everywhere she fights, is in danger of being kicked out of Egypt, she can't even repair her own ships, but has at least just got an 'ally' thanks to Barbarossa. But that ally is about - according to all sound military thinking around the world - to suffer total destruction. At that point Germany - the Nazis - will be in effective control of the entire European continent.... and Britain and the Middle East will follow.... and we haven't even discussed Japan. This is not about the UK, her Empire, the USSR or the fate of Vichy France. This is now about the US. This is all about the US and what happens if the German Army do what they show every sign of doing after just two months of Barbarossa. This is real, this is happening..... and yet, faced with all of that, Roosevelt still can't get the US in the war. And yet you criticise Chamberlain and Daladier for not getting Britain and France into a war in 1938 because of something that might happen at some point in the future and despite all the cogent reasons for not doing so?.....

Curtis Lemay -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 2:38:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well. I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book. No wonder Khrushchev was sacked shortly thereafter. Yes, it was a mistake by Khrushchev to agree to keep it a secret from the world that the Soviets had come out on top. That they in fact had "won". And I hardly call two years "shortly thereafter". They couldn't sack him immediately after the crisis - that would have multiplied the humiliation. They had to wait till it was long gone from the headlines. And let's be clear - without Cuba, he would have died in office - just like every other Marxist monster.

Curtis Lemay -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 2:43:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Sadly both Curtis Lemay and Chickenboy feel they need to tell me that Poland didn't have to be the Rubicon, like in some way I didn't know that .... have a look at the number of times I've used the word chosen/picked, let alone the last sentence.... honestly you couldn't make it up..... [sm=dizzy.gif] Yes, Poland was the Rubicon. It was the line in the sand that the British Government picked because Poland was to be Hitler's first victim post him making clear (Prague 1939) that Versailles revision was not his goal. That was the Rubicon chosen. It could have been Czechoslovakia - in which case Munich would not have happened and war would have begun then. But Czechoslovakia WASN’T chosen as the Rubicon because Britain was not going to war because 3m Sudeten Germans wanted the right to self-determination. Britain was however going to war over Poland - NOT Danzig, but Poland. So yes, regardless of what you say, factually Poland was HMG's Rubicon. You may not like the Cabinet's decision, you may not agree with the Cabinet's decision, but that was their decision and that was what 3rd September 1939 shortly after 11 o'clock was all about. You can't deny Poland was the Rubicon.... er because she was. Then what on Earth are we talking about here? The title of the thread is "Did Nevile Chamberlain do the right thing?" Wasn't picking the location of the line in the sand his decision? Isn't that very decision what this thread is about?

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/17/2019 3:22:29 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Sadly both Curtis Lemay and Chickenboy feel they need to tell me that Poland didn't have to be the Rubicon, like in some way I didn't know that .... have a look at the number of times I've used the word chosen/picked, let alone the last sentence.... honestly you couldn't make it up..... [sm=dizzy.gif] Yes, Poland was the Rubicon. It was the line in the sand that the British Government picked because Poland was to be Hitler's first victim post him making clear (Prague 1939) that Versailles revision was not his goal. That was the Rubicon chosen. It could have been Czechoslovakia - in which case Munich would not have happened and war would have begun then. But Czechoslovakia WASN’T chosen as the Rubicon because Britain was not going to war because 3m Sudeten Germans wanted the right to self-determination. Britain was however going to war over Poland - NOT Danzig, but Poland. So yes, regardless of what you say, factually Poland was HMG's Rubicon. You may not like the Cabinet's decision, you may not agree with the Cabinet's decision, but that was their decision and that was what 3rd September 1939 shortly after 11 o'clock was all about. You can't deny Poland was the Rubicon.... er because she was. Then what on Earth are we talking about here? The title of the thread is "Did Nevile Chamberlain do the right thing?" Wasn't picking the location of the line in the sand his decision? Isn't that very decision what this thread is about? warspite1 We are debating whether Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement was the correct thing to have done (allowing for all factors, considerations and circumstances of which he would have been aware). In working out whether the action he took and the policy he pursued – and which is indelibly linked with his name – was really the best he could have done, we need to examine what other realistic options were open to him and whether they would have provided better outcomes. Yes, picking the optimum line in the sand, i.e. the point at which he should have chosen to say enough is enough is one of those areas to be considered, although so too is the option that there is no line in the sand drawn i.e. Chamberlain could have decided there will be no war and that if Hitler wants to take on the USSR then, so long as he guarantees UK security (and maybe French) then he can do what he wants. When Chamberlain becomes Prime Minister the re-occupation of the Rhineland has happened but it still makes sense to bring this into the discussion if considered necessary (and some posters have brought this up) because Chamberlain was part of the Government that, in early 1936, decided no British action would be taken if Hitler decides to occupy that area.

philabos -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/19/2019 12:29:48 AM)
While everyone is understandably horrified today, I seriously doubt there was a single European country displeased with the Munich Agreement, except of course The Czechs. Certainly not the Poles or Hungarians, both of which helped themselves to Czech territory. Certainly not the Slovakians who eventually wound up with a separate state, puppet that it was. And strangely enough recreated yet again after the fall of the USSR. Outside Prague, there was general relief that war had been avoided. And new territorial opportunities created for some. Aside from attending Munich in the first place, since the UK had no obligation to Czechoslovakia, Chamberlains ever lasting bungle was the peace in our time routine. He successfully transferred the formal French obligation to defend the Czechs to himself , his country, and thus this conversation. In that, he is certainly guilty.

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/19/2019 4:42:19 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: philabos While everyone is understandably horrified today, I seriously doubt there was a single European country displeased with the Munich Agreement, except of course circa 75% of the Czech population. The other 25% never get mentioned for some reason but they were probably delighted too...... warspite1 Fixed that slightly for you [:)] Uncle Joe Stalin was probably a tad nervous about that development too....

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/19/2019 4:56:53 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: philabos While everyone is understandably horrified today, I seriously doubt there was a single European country displeased with the Munich Agreement, except of course The Czechs. Certainly not the Poles or Hungarians, both of which helped themselves to Czech territory. Certainly not the Slovakians who eventually wound up with a separate state, puppet that it was. And strangely enough recreated yet again after the fall of the USSR. Outside Prague, there was general relief that war had been avoided. And new territorial opportunities created for some. warspite1 In all seriousness, thank you for this sensible post. One only has to look at the number of countries that declared themselves neutral, one only has to look at the reception that Chamberlain and Daladier got from their public having seemingly secured peace, one only has to look at the reaction of the Italians when Chamberlain visited Rome (much to Mussolini's displeasure), one only has to look at Roosevelt's words of encouragement to Chamberlain, and one only has to look at the reception Chamberlain got in Germany. The Nazis were mightily hacked off that Chamberlain was feted as a hero coming to save Europe from war.... And of course as you mention, and has been touched on previously, there were European powers that gained territorially from the carve up of Czechoslovakia. No sensible human being wanted war in the 1930's and it remains totally bemusing to me how Roosevelt can be so praised for adopting a policy of not wanting to fire the first shot but Chamberlain and Daladier are damned for adopting the very same approach. Indeed it is doubly curious as at least Chamberlain and Daladier did draw a line in the sand, to confirm this was not peace at any price, while even in the summer of 1941 public opinion and isolationists in congress were stopping the US from doing the same thing - even as the situation in Europe (and the possibility of Asia) was turning to hell. As said I 100% understand the US position in the 1920's and even the 1930's - this was Europe's problem. But by 1941, seriously - this was America's problem? quote: ORIGINAL: philabos Aside from attending Munich in the first place, since the UK had no obligation to Czechoslovakia, Chamberlains ever lasting bungle was the peace in our time routine. He successfully transferred the formal French obligation to defend the Czechs to himself , his country, and thus this conversation. In that, he is certainly guilty. warspite1 [:D]

philabos -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 12:03:15 AM)
Just as a reminder, Roosevelt's December 8 address to Congress on December 8 1941 in response to the Pearl Harbor attack made no reference to Germany or even Europe. Had not Hitler declared war, we can only imagine if and when Roosevelt would have moved against Germany. 1941? Probably not.

Capt. Harlock -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 1:06:15 AM)
quote: No sensible human being wanted war in the 1930's I'm afraid I can't agree. When the Nazis re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, this was a clear causus belli -- a violation of the Versailles treaty. There was a considerable debate in France as to whether they should attack Germany, and if what I've heard is accurate, the Poles offered to join in. This would have been a sensible thing to do, for at that point the Wehrmacht was not strong enough to stand up to the French army alone, never mind a two-front invasion. The war would have been over fairly quickly, and the German high command knew it. This was one of the reasons that Churchill dubbed the European part of WWII "The Unnecessary War". quote: and it remains totally bemusing to me how Roosevelt can be so praised for adopting a policy of not wanting to fire the first shot but Chamberlain and Daladier are damned for adopting the very same approach. I can help you with that one. Germany's military strength had been reduced to a mere shadow after WWI, and a war against her would have been, as mentioned above, short and certain up to at least mid-1937. I believe that a war in the autumn of 1938, before Germany had assimilated Czechoslovakia, would have been successful if France and Britain had joined together, and would have seen far less death and devastation than eventually happened. But Japan is another story entirely. A war against her would always have been largely a naval one, and after WWI Japan was already the third strongest naval power in the world. There was no advantage to striking early as there would have been in Europe. quote: Indeed it is doubly curious as at least Chamberlain and Daladier did draw a line in the sand, to confirm this was not peace at any price, while even in the summer of 1941 public opinion and isolationists in congress were stopping the US from doing the same thing - even as the situation in Europe (and the possibility of Asia) was turning to hell. As said I 100% understand the US position in the 1920's and even the 1930's - this was Europe's problem. But by 1941, seriously - this was America's problem? Yes, it was a problem, and Roosevelt and others were doing something about it. The truth is that by late October 1941, the U. S. was a combatant against Germany in all but name. America had supplied large quantities of arms to Britain: I believe that one of the reasons that only a single U. S. Army division was found combat-ready after Pearl Harbor was that they had been stripped of weapons to the minimum to replace what had been abandoned at Dunkirk. Roosevelt established an exclusion zone in the western Atlantic where he forbade the U-boats to operate (though he had no justification under international law). This led to a shooting war between U-boats and American destroyers acting as escorts to British convoys. (The U-boats were winning, but that's beside the point.)

philabos -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 2:40:28 AM)
Goring was dispatched to Warsaw in advance of the reoccupation of the Rhineland to ask for Polish neutrality in the event of a French response. Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, had suggested internally to the Polish government that Poland would support France in the event of war, however he was equally sure France would do nothing. His response to Goring was that Poland wished for better relations and would not move against Germany. Playing both sides of the fence in a sense. The British had no interest in a new continental expedition . While we now know Hitler was indeed bluffing with a couple of battalions, his bet was ultimately France and Britain would do nothing. One cannot focus on foreign relations in isolation. France during the late 30's was embroiled in significant internal disputes and economic disruptions. Going to war was simply not in the cards in 1936 or 1938. Some would say nothing had changed even in 1939.

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 4:51:08 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: No sensible human being wanted war in the 1930's I'm afraid I can't agree. When the Nazis re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, this was a clear causus belli -- a violation of the Versailles treaty. There was a considerable debate in France as to whether they should attack Germany, and if what I've heard is accurate, the Poles offered to join in. This would have been a sensible thing to do, for at that point the Wehrmacht was not strong enough to stand up to the French army alone, never mind a two-front invasion. The war would have been over fairly quickly, and the German high command knew it. This was one of the reasons that Churchill dubbed the European part of WWII "The Unnecessary War". warspite1 Despite all the evidence in terms of how the public and governments of all democratic countries acted (and the public of the dictatorships), you can't agree no one wanted another war?? Another war. That is astounding. What had the average European, born in say 1890, known in his life. Poverty (in most cases), World War, Depression, periods of being unemployed, risk of revolution, unstable governments... and you think they were all gunning for another war? And once again with the Casus Belli. You continue to pointedly ignore that public opinion and sympathy were with Germany and Versailles. And what would it mean? As said before, under the terms of the treaty the British and French were due to withdraw troops from the Rhineland and actually had done so early. The Rhineland was German territory. We know from history how well things tend to go when foreign troops occupy foreign soil. Apart from the moral aspect (and the view of Versailles), there are the practical aspects, it's expensive, it breeds resentment and it runs the constant risk of protests against the 'enemy invader' and possibly a shooting war with occupation troops firing on civilians and all that cobblers some of us know all too well. With little public support, with sympathy for Germany and with the rather basic problem that France could not afford the commitment financially, the arguments against moving into the Rhineland were manifold. The fact that the act was in breach of Versailles kind of loses its meaning if the opinion of Versailles is that is was too harsh and needs revision. Where have you heard this about the Poles in 1936. You know they had a non-aggression pact with Germany - signed in 1934 - that they were seeking to renew - it was Germany that cold shouldered Poland - not the other way around. Why have you simply ignored this? And re Rhineland, what would they have needed to join in on? If France had acted there would have been no war to 'join in' on. The issues for France (and Britain had she supported France) would be financial, moral and the fact that world public opinion would see Germany as the victim and France (and Britain) as the bad guys.

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 5:12:03 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: and it remains totally bemusing to me how Roosevelt can be so praised for adopting a policy of not wanting to fire the first shot but Chamberlain and Daladier are damned for adopting the very same approach. I can help you with that one. Germany's military strength had been reduced to a mere shadow after WWI, and a war against her would have been, as mentioned above, short and certain up to at least mid-1937. I believe that a war in the autumn of 1938, before Germany had assimilated Czechoslovakia, would have been successful if France and Britain had joined together, and would have seen far less death and devastation than eventually happened. But Japan is another story entirely. A war against her would always have been largely a naval one, and after WWI Japan was already the third strongest naval power in the world. There was no advantage to striking early as there would have been in Europe. warspite1 quote: Germany's military strength had been reduced to a mere shadow after WWI, and a war against her would have been, as mentioned above, short and certain up to at least mid-1937. This isn't about Germany's military strength in that period. This is about what is considered right, about the treatment of Germany, and whether revision of Versailles was reasonable. ANY attack by France on Germany pre-Fall Grun would not have the support of the world community, and I won't list the other problems because I keep listing them and you ignore them - those very real problems and concerns are unimportant in your view (while American public opinion is sacrosanct). quote: I believe that a war in the autumn of 1938, before Germany had assimilated Czechoslovakia, would have been successful if France and Britain had joined together.... As per the answer above, this is pre Hitler breaking his word re Versailles so sees France and Britain as the aggressor nation. You pointedly ignore that circa 25% of the Czech population were happy to be assimilated. quote: and would have seen far less death and devastation than eventually happened. Well firstly as has been shown, that is your opinion and not in any way shape or form certain (there is nothing to say WWII 2.0 would not have resulted), secondly that is not an argument because that is hindsight and no one knows at that stage what level of death and devastation would result from any specific course of action. And thirdly, once again you have one rule for Britain and France and one for the US. If we are going down the "leaders in the 30's should have known what was coming" routine then Roosevelt should have fired first because it would have stopped American losses at Pearl and on the PI, it would have brought a quicker end to the suffering in China etc etc. Why the two different and very convenient treatments? quote: But Japan is another story entirely. A war against her would always have been largely a naval one, and after WWI Japan was already the third strongest naval power in the world. There was no advantage to striking early as there would have been in Europe. Well you could try telling those aboard Arizona. Tell those on the Bataan death march, tell those Chinese citizens.... If you are going down the (leaders should have known what's coming routine) of course there was benefit in a strike first. How can you possibly say there is not. Strike first and Japan are going to struggle to get oil from the NEI, strike first and they are going to struggle to take the PI. The war is going to be over one hell of a lot quicker. They struggled with the limited oil they got from NEI - how do they manage with none????

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/20/2019 5:56:57 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Indeed it is doubly curious as at least Chamberlain and Daladier did draw a line in the sand, to confirm this was not peace at any price, while even in the summer of 1941 public opinion and isolationists in congress were stopping the US from doing the same thing - even as the situation in Europe (and the possibility of Asia) was turning to hell. As said I 100% understand the US position in the 1920's and even the 1930's - this was Europe's problem. But by 1941, seriously - this was America's problem? Yes, it was a problem, and Roosevelt and others were doing something about it. The truth is that by late October 1941, the U. S. was a combatant against Germany in all but name. America had supplied large quantities of arms to Britain: I believe that one of the reasons that only a single U. S. Army division was found combat-ready after Pearl Harbor was that they had been stripped of weapons to the minimum to replace what had been abandoned at Dunkirk. Roosevelt established an exclusion zone in the western Atlantic where he forbade the U-boats to operate (though he had no justification under international law). This led to a shooting war between U-boats and American destroyers acting as escorts to British convoys. (The U-boats were winning, but that's beside the point.) warspite1 quote: Yes, it was a problem, and Roosevelt and others were doing something about it. All considered military thinking in the US and everywhere else believed that in the autumn of 1941 the end-game was being played out in the Soviet Union and that, just as France before them, the USSR was about to be finished off. No one knows what is going to happen, there are no crystal balls. What the President 'knows' is what he's being told by his advisors. They are telling him Stalin is finished. At some point, probably in early 1942, Nazi Germany will own Europe from Brest to the Urals, from Petsamo to the Black Sea. Britain and the Middle East will be next. Forgetting Japan for the moment, where would even that, leave the US? Nazi Germany (and her Italian lackey) will soon have control of Europe, much of Asia, North Africa and the Near East. So yes the US are in the war in all but name but clearly its not enough and while the US remain out of the war (no one knows that Hitler will declare war) the USSR and Britain are losing and no one knows that the Soviet Union will hold on and the British will do the same in Egypt. What does history say now? Well perhaps its: quote: (The U-boats were winning, but that's beside the point.) But, and I repeat, according to your thinking US public opinion when it comes to joining a war is everything, while British, French and indeed world opinion when it comes to starting a war means nothing. And that is just the public opinion angle, I do not comment again on the aspects you simply don't feel the need to address.

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/23/2019 7:15:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: philabos The Wall Street Journal just reviewed a new book, Appeasement, by Tim Bouverie. I have not read the book, but according to the review the author is firmly in the Chamberlain was a fool camp, missed many opportunities to stop AH. According to the review, $30. There was a letter to the editor in the WSJ today in response to the Appeasement review. The writer admits Britain and France did little after 1938 to prepare for war, but one notable exception was the RAF focus on production of more Hurricanes and Spitfires which later stood them well. As for France making a move in 1938 without Britain, Watts in his book maintains Lord Halifax had to drag the French kicking and screaming into war in 1939. Highly unlikely they would have acted differently in 1938. warspite1 I read the letter - thanks philabos - and though short and sweet it contained the usual criticism (albeit tempered by reference to the build up of fighter command) without any context. Essentially Britain didn't do what Germany did and 'rapidly' expand its armed forces after Munich..... Well they kind of spent what they had without bankrupting the country. No one knew when war would break out and so spending every penny a country has in 1938 - only to find the war doesn't begin for another 2-3 years - is really rather short-sighted. Italy did something similar when getting involved in Spain... which is one of the reasons the air force was full of biplanes come June 1940... There was slightly less than one year between Munich and Case White. What should Britain have done? Sure, with hindsight they should have realised the French Army was going to fold the way it did and immediately expanded the army by what? 30+ divisions (together with equipment)... but that wasn't the policy. No one really knew - and certainly not the Germans - about the actual state of the French Army in 1938. Britain's priority, for obvious reasons, was naval - and latterly air force re-armament. The naval program was at its maximum, new builds of all classes, modernisation of older vessels together with desperately updating obsolete ships that had no right to still be in commission, simply to keep the required numbers up. Air Force re-armament (and particularly fighter defence) was, as conceded, given a degree of priority. The First World War had seriously affected the UK's financial position, as had the economic problems that followed - stopping the bankrupting of the economy was important - and just how perilous the position was was proved by early 1941. It can be hardly surprising that the 10-year rule and the almost collapse in defence spending meant that industry was not geared to cope with so sudden a turnaround - even if that were possible. Lack of capacity was allied with lack of skilled labour. But while plenty was done, the collapse of France was going to be a major blow no matter what had been done in that year. The lack of investment in the navy (and particular the Fleet Air Arm) was never going to be a quick fix and added to all the problems mentioned above there were also plenty of mistakes made - the importance of decent naval aircraft and the belief that ASDIC had largely negated the threat of the submarine. Some countries had time to learn from the practical experiences of others and rectify mistakes that they too had made - for Britain and France there was no such learning period.... Life is so much easier with hindsight - but sometimes even hindsight can't fix problems that can't readily be fixed.

philabos -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/25/2019 10:37:56 PM)
I doubt anyone could have foreseen the collapse of the French Army in 1940. Particularly on defense with the impregnable Maginot Line. Gamelin said the French could not go on the offensive until 1941, almost 2 years after the start of the war. He had been in charge of the army since 1933. His Dyle Plan was intended to keep the battlefield outside the borders of France to avoid the devastation of the Great War., in that he succeeded, just not in the way he intended. Apparently one of his major selling points was his staunch political support of the Third Replublic.

ernieschwitz -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/25/2019 10:47:00 PM)
Speaking from the stance of history and philosophy, then he absolutely did the right thing... unless you don't like the outcome. [sm=dizzy.gif]

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/26/2019 5:18:05 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: philabos Gamelin said the French could not go on the offensive until 1941, almost 2 years after the start of the war. He had been in charge of the army since 1933. warspite1 But apparently, according to some, less than 12 months before, this same man would have been full of the offensive spirit that was total absent during the Saar Offensive, where the French had approx 2:1 superiority in divisions (and more in front line divisions), a huge superiority in artillery and no German tanks to oppose hundreds of French. Yes, if the Czechs had held off the Germans, then the French might have been willing to cross into Germany, but given what we know happened, it is more likely that they would have turned tail at the first sign of Czech reverse - no matter how minor - and that assumes they would have launched an offensive in the first place. The chances that a British and German declaration of war in September 1938 would have ended in a similar stalemate to the actual war ranks pretty highly in my opinion - and as said, with the added problems that: - World opinion would have been more sympathetic to Germany - Britain and France would have been the aggressor states - The Dominions had already made clear they did not support this move - Public opinion in Britain and France not fully behind the decision for war - The military - of either country - even less prepared for war than they were 12 months later - The financial position of both countries not strong - The position of the US more uncertain thanks to the British and French being the aggressor nations. - In all likelihood the Polish and Hungarians would have fought over the Czech carcass. - Soviet horror at French inertia would have been similar to their reaction to Munich and a Nazi-Soviet pact very likely to protect the Soviet position

Orm -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/30/2019 6:28:12 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well. I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book. No wonder Khrushchev was sacked shortly thereafter. Yes, it was a mistake by Khrushchev to agree to keep it a secret from the world that the Soviets had come out on top. That they in fact had "won". And I hardly call two years "shortly thereafter". They couldn't sack him immediately after the crisis - that would have multiplied the humiliation. They had to wait till it was long gone from the headlines. And let's be clear - without Cuba, he would have died in office - just like every other Marxist monster. I do not think they sacked him because of Cuba. If Khrushchev had been weak enough after the Cuba crisis then they would have removed him from office at once. They wouldn't have considered public opinion. Even less so what the West would have thought. And when they removed him it had everything to do with internal power struggles, and failed internal policies. Cuba wasn't a factor here. Although, if you have any sources you might share that supports your stance, I wouldn't mind giving them a look.

Zorch -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/30/2019 7:10:38 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well. I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book. No wonder Khrushchev was sacked shortly thereafter. Yes, it was a mistake by Khrushchev to agree to keep it a secret from the world that the Soviets had come out on top. That they in fact had "won". And I hardly call two years "shortly thereafter". They couldn't sack him immediately after the crisis - that would have multiplied the humiliation. They had to wait till it was long gone from the headlines. And let's be clear - without Cuba, he would have died in office - just like every other Marxist monster. I do not think they sacked him because of Cuba. If Khrushchev had been weak enough after the Cuba crisis then they would have removed him from office at once. They wouldn't have considered public opinion. Even less so what the West would have thought. And when they removed him it had everything to do with internal power struggles, and failed internal policies. Cuba wasn't a factor here. Although, if you have any sources you might share that supports your stance, I wouldn't mind giving them a look. +1 'It's the economy, stupid' was what brought K down. And the realization that he had no solutions, only bravado and bluster.

Curtis Lemay -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/30/2019 9:47:26 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm I do not think they sacked him because of Cuba. If Khrushchev had been weak enough after the Cuba crisis then they would have removed him from office at once. They wouldn't have considered public opinion. Even less so what the West would have thought. And when they removed him it had everything to do with internal power struggles, and failed internal policies. Cuba wasn't a factor here. Although, if you have any sources you might share that supports your stance, I wouldn't mind giving them a look. If "failed internal policies" could bring down one of these Marxist tyrants, none of them would ever last a week. And there is no piece of paper that could shed any light either - they were consummate liars. The truth has to be inferred from the facts. And the facts are that he was sacked as close to the crisis as decorum allowed. Name any other established Soviet ruler who was sacked.

Zorch -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (11/30/2019 10:34:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Orm I do not think they sacked him because of Cuba. If Khrushchev had been weak enough after the Cuba crisis then they would have removed him from office at once. They wouldn't have considered public opinion. Even less so what the West would have thought. And when they removed him it had everything to do with internal power struggles, and failed internal policies. Cuba wasn't a factor here. Although, if you have any sources you might share that supports your stance, I wouldn't mind giving them a look. If "failed internal policies" could bring down one of these Marxist tyrants, none of them would ever last a week. And there is no piece of paper that could shed any light either - they were consummate liars. The truth has to be inferred from the facts. And the facts are that he was sacked as close to the crisis as decorum allowed. Name any other established Soviet ruler who was sacked. Certainly the Cuban Missile crisis was a factor, but 2 full years is a very long time to wait for 'decorum'. The failed harvest of 1963, and resulting famine (remember Lysenko?), was the last straw for Brezhnev/Kosygin, who began planning to remove Khrushchev in spring 1964. K fell because he lost the support of the entire Politburo.

Curtis Lemay -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (12/1/2019 2:15:30 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Certainly the Cuban Missile crisis was a factor, but 2 full years is a very long time to wait for 'decorum'. The failed harvest of 1963, and resulting famine (remember Lysenko?), was the last straw for Brezhnev/Kosygin, who began planning to remove Khrushchev in spring 1964. K fell because he lost the support of the entire Politburo. Substitute "plausible deniability" for decorum, then. Check out Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba for examples of Marxist tyrants staying in power despite ruling economic basket cases. The Soviet Union had cannibalism in the '30s, things were so bad. Marxist tyrants are not removed for those reasons. Lose a war, however, (check what happened after Afghanistan) or suffer military humiliation on the world stage, and you're gone.

Orm -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (12/1/2019 2:59:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Certainly the Cuban Missile crisis was a factor, but 2 full years is a very long time to wait for 'decorum'. The failed harvest of 1963, and resulting famine (remember Lysenko?), was the last straw for Brezhnev/Kosygin, who began planning to remove Khrushchev in spring 1964. K fell because he lost the support of the entire Politburo. Substitute "plausible deniability" for decorum, then. Check out Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba for examples of Marxist tyrants staying in power despite ruling economic basket cases. The Soviet Union had cannibalism in the '30s, things were so bad. Marxist tyrants are not removed for those reasons. Lose a war, however, (check what happened after Afghanistan) or suffer military humiliation on the world stage, and you're gone. Are you claiming that Khrushchev lost a war? Or the equivalence of that? And after they lost the war they waited before taking action?!

Zorch -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (12/1/2019 3:46:31 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Certainly the Cuban Missile crisis was a factor, but 2 full years is a very long time to wait for 'decorum'. The failed harvest of 1963, and resulting famine (remember Lysenko?), was the last straw for Brezhnev/Kosygin, who began planning to remove Khrushchev in spring 1964. K fell because he lost the support of the entire Politburo. Substitute "plausible deniability" for decorum, then. Check out Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba for examples of Marxist tyrants staying in power despite ruling economic basket cases. The Soviet Union had cannibalism in the '30s, things were so bad. Marxist tyrants are not removed for those reasons. Lose a war, however, (check what happened after Afghanistan) or suffer military humiliation on the world stage, and you're gone. Dictatorships fall when the people around the dictator lose confidence in him. Losing a war can do this but not always (Saddam Hussein lost the war for Kuwait; Kim l Sung lost the Korean war; Arab dictators stayed in power after the 1967 war). The economy can cause this; the Soviets remember that the Czar abdicated because of food riots. Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were not removed because of Afghanistan; they were willing to pay a high price to have a friendly regime there. Gorbachev wasn't willing to pay that price.

warspite1 -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (12/1/2019 6:01:36 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay Lose a war, however, (check what happened after Afghanistan) or suffer military humiliation on the world stage, and you're gone. warspite1 You are suggesting they went because they lost a war i.e. Afghanistan?? Surely not. They were gone because they kind of died in office. Brezhnev was pretty much senile, Andropov died of renal failure and with Chernenko it wasn't a case of what he died from - more a case of what did he not suffer from? Badly losing the war in Afghanistan (and not having the guts to pull out (unlike Gorbachev) had nothing to do with their removal from office.

Curtis Lemay -> RE: Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing? (12/2/2019 2:01:21 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Certainly the Cuban Missile crisis was a factor, but 2 full years is a very long time to wait for 'decorum'. The failed harvest of 1963, and resulting famine (remember Lysenko?), was the last straw for Brezhnev/Kosygin, who began planning to remove Khrushchev in spring 1964. K fell because he lost the support of the entire Politburo. Substitute "plausible deniability" for decorum, then. Check out Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba for examples of Marxist tyrants staying in power despite ruling economic basket cases. The Soviet Union had cannibalism in the '30s, things were so bad. Marxist tyrants are not removed for those reasons. Lose a war, however, (check what happened after Afghanistan) or suffer military humiliation on the world stage, and you're gone. Are you claiming that Khrushchev lost a war? Or the equivalence of that? And after they lost the war they waited before taking action?! No. The other one: Military humiliation on the world stage.

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