stock torp dud rate

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Enforcer -> stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 3:20:16 PM)
In stock 2 what is the usn torp dud rate?

spence -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 3:32:49 PM)
Scenario 2 has the same dud rate as Scenario 1. The dud rate in DBB is also the same. The only Scenario of which I am aware in which the torpedo dud rate is the Big B Mod. In that one the dud rate is adjusted to 50% in April 42, again in Jan 43 (IIRC to 40%) and finally in Oct 43 (10%). According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" make the historical number of Japanese ships sunk/damaged impossible.

Chickenboy -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 5:56:42 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: spence According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" Not sure what you mean by this. Blair's work (Silent Victory) shows that no significant improvement in Mk. 14 torpedo performance was realized until September-October 1943-just like in stock games (sc. 1 or 2). Allied attrition of Japanese shipping IRL versus game comparatives is based upon many, many more factors than the dud rate-most of these factors are subject to gameplay deviations versus IRL and cannot be legitimately compared without this caveat.

Lokasenna -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 6:50:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: spence According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" Not sure what you mean by this. Blair's work (Silent Victory) shows that no significant improvement in Mk. 14 torpedo performance was realized until September-October 1943-just like in stock games (sc. 1 or 2). Allied attrition of Japanese shipping IRL versus game comparatives is based upon many, many more factors than the dud rate-most of these factors are subject to gameplay deviations versus IRL and cannot be legitimately compared without this caveat. You could put the dud rate at zero and still not be able to achieve the level of shipping sunk in real life.

geofflambert -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 6:57:51 PM)
Japanese doctrine is a factor, and it depends on the player. Japanese historical doctrine couldn't be worse as far as reducing shipping losses.

spence -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 7:53:31 PM)
JANAC - Joint Army Navy Assessment Committee. While the data may be inaccurate/incomplete since the it was compiled fairly immediately after the Japanese surrender (1947) the overall losses of IJN ships and Japanese merchant ships to submarine attack should be somewhat near the JANAC losses. With an 80% dud rate extending for the first year+ such losses are impossible. The torpedo crisis within the USN was the result of 3 different and unrelated problems. They were corrected at different times and by different persons.

LargeSlowTarget -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/8/2019 10:05:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: spence According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" Not sure what you mean by this. Blair's work (Silent Victory) shows that no significant improvement in Mk. 14 torpedo performance was realized until September-October 1943-just like in stock games (sc. 1 or 2). Allied attrition of Japanese shipping IRL versus game comparatives is based upon many, many more factors than the dud rate-most of these factors are subject to gameplay deviations versus IRL and cannot be legitimately compared without this caveat. +1 The story of the Mark 14 torpedo is pretty well-known - faulty depth mechanism, faulty magnetic exploder, faulty contact exploder - and one problem was hiding the others. The question is what justifies the first drop in the dud rate in April 42 in the Big B mod? According to various sources and accounts about the US submarine warfare in WWII, the first problem to be identified and solved was the depth mechanism. Long suspected by skippers, field-tests in June 1942 provided proof of deep running, followed by more tests by the Bureau of Ordnance - which admitted officially in August 1942 that the Mark 14 torpedoes ran deep and instructed submarine skippers to adjust depth settings accordingly as a stopgap measure. The problem with the depth running mechanism itself wasn't solved until summer 1943. So it seems that the first - slight - reduction in the dud rate should occur in August 1942 - not in Jan 1943 like in stock, but neither in April 1942 like in Big B mod.

spence -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 1:47:04 AM)
IMHO something changed earlier than August 42. If submariners had been dependent on the Bureau of Ordinance to fix their problems we would almost certainly still be waiting for them to have found something wrong with the Mark 14. The losses of merchant ships sunk attributed to US submarines up until Jan 44 in the JANAC papers are as follows (no IJN warships/auxiliaries included in totals, sinkings by Allied submarines are not included, no unknown causes included but ships lost presumed sunk by a US submarine are included) Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42 - 6 Feb 42 - 4 Mar 42 - 11 Apr 42 - 5 May 42 - 21 Jun 42 - 6 Jul 42 - 9 Aug 42 - 18 Sep 42 - 11 Oct 42 - 27 Nov 42 - 13 Dec 42 - 15 Jan 43 - 23 Feb 43 - 9 Mar 43 - 22 Apr 43 - 18 May 43 - 30 Jun 43 - 23 Jul 43 - 17 Aug 43 - 18 Sep 43 - 31 Oct 43 - 26 Nov 43 - 46 Dec 43 - 29

spence -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 2:06:09 AM)
If the variance between individual months is ignored but the totals for 3 consecutive month periods are looked at it becomes evident that something important changed in the spring of 1942. A further change seems to have occurred in the late summer of 1942.

Ian R -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:24:54 AM)
Didn't we have a thread on this a couple of months ago? Lockwood ordered some changes for the PH based subrons that were not implemented in the SWPAC subrons till months later. I forget the name of the guy who succeeded Lockwood at Fremantle when the latter went to PH, but he invented the magnetic exploder or something like that. Kinkaid ordered him to ditch it in the end. The funny thing is, the magnetic exploder might have worked better if the sub skippers put the torpedoes under the target, instead of taking hull shuts ;-)

BBfanboy -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 10:50:05 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: spence If the variance between individual months is ignored but the totals for 3 consecutive month periods are looked at it becomes evident that something important changed in the spring of 1942. A further change seems to have occurred in the late summer of 1942. That could be explained by the installation of radar in some boats, the opening of new sub bases closer to the front and Japanese moving forward into areas already being patrolled. The May 1942 spike is about the time the Japanese moved into the Solomons after the Coral Sea battle.

Trugrit -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 11:18:53 AM)
From what I understand of multiple sources: The Mark 14 torpedo had four major flaws. � It tended to run about 10feet deeper than set. � The magnetic exploder often caused premature firing. � The contact exploder often failed to fire the warhead. � It tended to run "circular".� http://everything.explained.today/Mark_14_torpedo/ Depth Problem: �By August 1942, the faulty running depth situation was resolved� Magnetic Exploder Problem: In late June 1943, Rear Admiral Lockwood (by then COMSUBPAC) asked Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) Chester Nimitz for permission to deactivate the magnetic exploders. The next day, 24 June 1943, CINCPAC ordered all of his submarines to deactivate the magnetic exploder. �Inactivation of the magnetic influence feature stopped all the premature explosions.� Contact Exploder: Final full solution: �In September 1943, the first torpedoes with new contact pistols were sent to war.� "After twenty-one months of war, the three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo had at last been isolated. Each defect had been discovered and fixed in the field�always over the stubborn opposition of the Bureau of Ordnance." The circular problem was minor. I would say three historical reductions. August 1942. June 1943. September 1943. I'm not sure that would work well in the game. This is a game after all and not history. I would tend go with Big B. There are other factors. As sub commanders and crews got more experience in the war their success rates would improve even with torpedo defects. In the game you have to factor in other variables.

Kull -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 1:11:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Trugrit In the game you have to factor in other variables. To me, the focus on dud rates seems a bit overblown. What about: - Allied player ability to ditch bad sub commanders for good ones IMMEDIATELY? - Allied players using S-boats and Dutch subs essentially as replacements for Fleet Boats (because with foreknowledge you know their torpedoes work)? - Japanese players using convoys right from Day 1? - Japanese players converting a ton of Cargo ships to PBs right away because they also know that Fleet boats have lousy torpedoes, so the most important thing is to prevent surface attacks? - Japanese players intensively training their air crews in Naval and ASW search right from the get-go because they KNOW how deadly submarines will become? - Allied players unable to get the level of late war intelligence that told sub commanders EXACTLY where to find the Japanese convoys and their pathetic escorts? - Absence of the "wolfpack" ability which allowed the Allies to decimate those known convoys in their known locations? It goes on and on, really. Tweaking one issue without accounting for the others is just going to shift the imbalance, not solve a problem.

obvert -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 1:51:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Lokasenna quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: spence According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" Not sure what you mean by this. Blair's work (Silent Victory) shows that no significant improvement in Mk. 14 torpedo performance was realized until September-October 1943-just like in stock games (sc. 1 or 2). Allied attrition of Japanese shipping IRL versus game comparatives is based upon many, many more factors than the dud rate-most of these factors are subject to gameplay deviations versus IRL and cannot be legitimately compared without this caveat. You could put the dud rate at zero and still not be able to achieve the level of shipping sunk in real life. +1 The real "problem" in game isn't just the dud rate. 1. The IJN in game can be used more effectively to convoy ships and hunt subs often with AV or AMC moving with them that include possible search and ASW floatplanes. The IJ player also doesn't need to use the most dangerous convoy routes away from LBA. 2. The ASW in game is miles better than in the war due to the ability to both train ASW pilots to expert levels and to use the IJAAF in concert with the IJN to provide much more extensive coverage of convoy routes and bigger, better platforms for sub killing. (I saw rader early on using Sallys on 50%ASW, 30% train, 20% rest and by about June 42 he had 70 skill ASW pilots flying all over the map basically making certain areas completely off-limits to Allied subs. I copied that. It works). 3. The IJ doesn't need to use ships in the way they did in the war, sending them inefficiently out with supplies and back empty, or vice versa, out empty to go pick up supplies. I find a good portion of my merchant marine as Japan sits idle in the mid-war, and I prioritize only the most efficient haulers to bring the goods back I need and always load them up on the way out (excluding the fuel/oil tankers). 4. The IJN in games often ends up with a plethora of small, older DDs, TBs, P, and E class ships in the mid-war which aren't critically needed for anything and can become sub-hunters with increasing success as the better classes become available in numbers. Once the Es start flowing in 43 Allied subs are in trouble. 5. The IJ can move more overland than was probably possible in the war, and especially across China can set this up fairly easily.

obvert -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 1:55:57 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Kull quote: ORIGINAL: Trugrit In the game you have to factor in other variables. To me, the focus on dud rates seems a bit overblown. What about: - Allied player ability to ditch bad sub commanders for good ones IMMEDIATELY? - Allied players using S-boats and Dutch subs essentially as replacements for Fleet Boats (because with foreknowledge you know their torpedoes work)? - Japanese players using convoys right from Day 1? - Japanese players converting a ton of Cargo ships to PBs right away because they also know that Fleet boats have lousy torpedoes, so the most important thing is to prevent surface attacks? - Japanese players intensively training their air crews in Naval and ASW search right from the get-go because they KNOW how deadly submarines will become? - Allied players unable to get the level of late war intelligence that told sub commanders EXACTLY where to find the Japanese convoys and their pathetic escorts? - Absence of the "wolfpack" ability which allowed the Allies to decimate those known convoys in their known locations? It goes on and on, really. Tweaking one issue without accounting for the others is just going to shift the imbalance, not solve a problem. The frustration is that Allied subs were a very potent weapon during the war and that success can, as you've pointed out in a few of your listed items, be thwarted in game. The Allied subs should be dangerous by mid-43, but by this time the IJN has already reduced the fleet through focus on the sub war and are well set up to make the remaining years difficult on the silent service. It just is the game, and no one is changing anything at this stage unless it's in a mod. But, you can do some modding and make things a bit different. [;)]

Chickenboy -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 3:03:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: spence IMHO something changed earlier than August 42. If submariners had been dependent on the Bureau of Ordinance to fix their problems we would almost certainly still be waiting for them to have found something wrong with the Mark 14. The losses of merchant ships sunk attributed to US submarines up until Jan 44 in the JANAC papers are as follows (no IJN warships/auxiliaries included in totals, sinkings by Allied submarines are not included, no unknown causes included but ships lost presumed sunk by a US submarine are included) Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42 - 6 Feb 42 - 4 Mar 42 - 11 Apr 42 - 5 May 42 - 21 Jun 42 - 6 Jul 42 - 9 Aug 42 - 18 Sep 42 - 11 Oct 42 - 27 Nov 42 - 13 Dec 42 - 15 Jan 43 - 23 Feb 43 - 9 Mar 43 - 22 Apr 43 - 18 May 43 - 30 Jun 43 - 23 Jul 43 - 17 Aug 43 - 18 Sep 43 - 31 Oct 43 - 26 Nov 43 - 46 Dec 43 - 29 Nobody is disputing the JANAC numbers of Japanese ships sunk by American submarine warfare, spence. What is disputable is the sole reliance on the 'dud rate' of Mk.14s to try to get the game to mirror reality. In reality, the sharpening of the American submarine 'spear' was multifactorial. Laconic or passive skippers were ruthlessly replaced in the field. Technological advances in radar were implemented that allowed American submarines to more effectively attack enemy shipping. As the war progressed increasingly actionable intelligence / SigInt was passed along to submarines to allow them to be at the right place and the right time for interception of Japanese shipping. More numbers of more capable fleet submarines (e.g., Balao, Gato classes) were brought into theater that carried more torpedoes and could loiter in target-rich waters longer than before. More AS and other support ships were brought into play that shortened the distance that submarines had to cover to get into prime hunting grounds, etc. etc. At the same time, Japanese ASW measures did not keep up with American improvements in submarine warfare. Convoy systems-except for the most important troop transports or surface combat armadas-were late in arriving. Comparatively few Japanese TFs were escorted by surface ships. Dedicated aerial ASW platforms were few and far between until late war (when it was too late anyways). In the game, few Japanese players allow for the lethargy and inattentiveness that the RL Japanese used in ASW. Nearly all Japanese players use convoy methods for their most valuable cargoes. ASW aerial reconnaisance is-IMO-much more important in the game than it was IRL. Escort shipping is much more commonplace for all make of convoys than IRL. Many Japanese players train up IJAAF(!) air forces for ASW roles as well-a laughably ahistoric happenstance. Alternative day 1 strikes on Manila reduce available Allied submarines for the early war in many games as well. All these factors should impact how the game approaches the JANAC figures. Using JANAC figures alone or assuming that decreasing the dud rate = JANAC levels of success with the Allied submarine effort belies the importance of these other variables. As for whether Allied historical success would be 'impossible' to replicate, I don't know. You'd need to undo all of the player-determined improvements in Japanese ASW AS WELL AS assume a more passive Allied approach to submarine warfare to compare meaningfully. Do you know any Allied players that don't replace their poorly rated captains ASAP? Maybe even faster than IRL? Because I don't. The equation of Allied submarine effectiveness is a multivariable equation. Changing one variable-or ascribing the value due to one variable-without taking the others into account is fallacious. ETA: After I posted, I noticed that others like Kull had already said exactly the same thing I did. Think of all the time I could have saved if I just "+1"ed his post. [:D]

Zorch -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:18:39 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: spence IMHO something changed earlier than August 42. If submariners had been dependent on the Bureau of Ordinance to fix their problems we would almost certainly still be waiting for them to have found something wrong with the Mark 14. The losses of merchant ships sunk attributed to US submarines up until Jan 44 in the JANAC papers are as follows (no IJN warships/auxiliaries included in totals, sinkings by Allied submarines are not included, no unknown causes included but ships lost presumed sunk by a US submarine are included) Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42 - 6 Feb 42 - 4 Mar 42 - 11 Apr 42 - 5 May 42 - 21 Jun 42 - 6 Jul 42 - 9 Aug 42 - 18 Sep 42 - 11 Oct 42 - 27 Nov 42 - 13 Dec 42 - 15 Jan 43 - 23 Feb 43 - 9 Mar 43 - 22 Apr 43 - 18 May 43 - 30 Jun 43 - 23 Jul 43 - 17 Aug 43 - 18 Sep 43 - 31 Oct 43 - 26 Nov 43 - 46 Dec 43 - 29 Nobody is disputing the JANAC numbers of Japanese ships sunk by American submarine warfare, spence. What is disputable is the sole reliance on the 'dud rate' of Mk.14s to try to get the game to mirror reality. In reality, the sharpening of the American submarine 'spear' was multifactorial. Laconic or passive skippers were ruthlessly replaced in the field. Technological advances in radar were implemented that allowed American submarines to more effectively attack enemy shipping. As the war progressed increasingly actionable intelligence / SigInt was passed along to submarines to allow them to be at the right place and the right time for interception of Japanese shipping. More numbers of more capable fleet submarines (e.g., Balao, Gato classes) were brought into theater that carried more torpedoes and could loiter in target-rich waters longer than before. More AS and other support ships were brought into play that shortened the distance that submarines had to cover to get into prime hunting grounds, etc. etc. At the same time, Japanese ASW measures did not keep up with American improvements in submarine warfare. Convoy systems-except for the most important troop transports or surface combat armadas-were late in arriving. Comparatively few Japanese TFs were escorted by surface ships. Dedicated aerial ASW platforms were few and far between until late war (when it was too late anyways). In the game, few Japanese players allow for the lethargy and inattentiveness that the RL Japanese used in ASW. Nearly all Japanese players use convoy methods for their most valuable cargoes. ASW aerial reconnaisance is-IMO-much more important in the game than it was IRL. Escort shipping is much more commonplace for all make of convoys than IRL. Many Japanese players train up IJAAF(!) air forces for ASW roles as well-a laughably ahistoric happenstance. Alternative day 1 strikes on Manila reduce available Allied submarines for the early war in many games as well. All these factors should impact how the game approaches the JANAC figures. Using JANAC figures alone or assuming that decreasing the dud rate = JANAC levels of success with the Allied submarine effort belies the importance of these other variables. As for whether Allied historical success would be 'impossible' to replicate, I don't know. You'd need to undo all of the player-determined improvements in Japanese ASW AS WELL AS assume a more passive Allied approach to submarine warfare to compare meaningfully. Do you know any Allied players that don't replace their poorly rated captains ASAP? Maybe even faster than IRL? Because I don't. The equation of Allied submarine effectiveness is a multivariable equation. Changing one variable-or ascribing the value due to one variable-without taking the others into account is fallacious. ETA: After I posted, I noticed that others like Kull had already said exactly the same thing I did. Think of all the time I could have saved if I just "+1"ed his post. [:D] +1! [:D]

fcooke -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:28:21 PM)
Ian - I think the SWPAC admiral you are referring to is Christie... I went to my sister's for Thanksgiving this year. In Plymouth Massachusetts (kinda funny if one knows the history of turkey day). Anyway I was driving up I-95 and realized I would be going by the US sub museum so decided that would be a good pit stop. Anyway, they had a MK 14 on display and IIRC the info sheet said it was in service until the late 70s. I was shocked it hung around that long [X(] I had hoped to stop at Fall River on the way back but I was racing against a snow storm, so that didn't happen. Too bad, I think it has been about 30 years since I last visited Big Mamie. edited to correct Ian's name.

Lokasenna -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:40:14 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: obvert quote: ORIGINAL: Lokasenna quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: spence According to JANAC sources Japanese ship losses thru Oct 43 pretty much track with his revised dud rates and the "Stock rates" Not sure what you mean by this. Blair's work (Silent Victory) shows that no significant improvement in Mk. 14 torpedo performance was realized until September-October 1943-just like in stock games (sc. 1 or 2). Allied attrition of Japanese shipping IRL versus game comparatives is based upon many, many more factors than the dud rate-most of these factors are subject to gameplay deviations versus IRL and cannot be legitimately compared without this caveat. You could put the dud rate at zero and still not be able to achieve the level of shipping sunk in real life. +1 The real "problem" in game isn't just the dud rate. 1. The IJN in game can be used more effectively to convoy ships and hunt subs often with AV or AMC moving with them that include possible search and ASW floatplanes. The IJ player also doesn't need to use the most dangerous convoy routes away from LBA. 2. The ASW in game is miles better than in the war due to the ability to both train ASW pilots to expert levels and to use the IJAAF in concert with the IJN to provide much more extensive coverage of convoy routes and bigger, better platforms for sub killing. (I saw rader early on using Sallys on 50%ASW, 30% train, 20% rest and by about June 42 he had 70 skill ASW pilots flying all over the map basically making certain areas completely off-limits to Allied subs. I copied that. It works). 3. The IJ doesn't need to use ships in the way they did in the war, sending them inefficiently out with supplies and back empty, or vice versa, out empty to go pick up supplies. I find a good portion of my merchant marine as Japan sits idle in the mid-war, and I prioritize only the most efficient haulers to bring the goods back I need and always load them up on the way out (excluding the fuel/oil tankers). 4. The IJN in games often ends up with a plethora of small, older DDs, TBs, P, and E class ships in the mid-war which aren't critically needed for anything and can become sub-hunters with increasing success as the better classes become available in numbers. Once the Es start flowing in 43 Allied subs are in trouble. 5. The IJ can move more overland than was probably possible in the war, and especially across China can set this up fairly easily. I'm of the opinion that it's entirely due to how subs attack in the game. Or rather, that while player doctrines make some difference vs. what happened in reality, they would not account for anywhere near the total. Simply having a single escort, a tuna boat with a gun on it, in a TF is enough to prevent a submarine from attacking on the surface. Submarines only attack 1 target at once, and torpedoes fired at one target can have no "contingency targets" in the game (a target that's behind another one on the torpedo's path). Submarine attacks rely on the same DL abstractions that work perfectly fine for surface and air actions, and there is no way to make them shadow any contacts other than the reaction abstraction (for which subs are limited to 1 hex).

Lokasenna -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:41:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: spence IMHO something changed earlier than August 42. If submariners had been dependent on the Bureau of Ordinance to fix their problems we would almost certainly still be waiting for them to have found something wrong with the Mark 14. The losses of merchant ships sunk attributed to US submarines up until Jan 44 in the JANAC papers are as follows (no IJN warships/auxiliaries included in totals, sinkings by Allied submarines are not included, no unknown causes included but ships lost presumed sunk by a US submarine are included) Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42 - 6 Feb 42 - 4 Mar 42 - 11 Apr 42 - 5 May 42 - 21 Jun 42 - 6 Jul 42 - 9 Aug 42 - 18 Sep 42 - 11 Oct 42 - 27 Nov 42 - 13 Dec 42 - 15 Jan 43 - 23 Feb 43 - 9 Mar 43 - 22 Apr 43 - 18 May 43 - 30 Jun 43 - 23 Jul 43 - 17 Aug 43 - 18 Sep 43 - 31 Oct 43 - 26 Nov 43 - 46 Dec 43 - 29 Using the numbers that you cited, I don't see any obvious difference in trend until August '42. Also, did you adjust for number of sub patrols? More subs were coming online in spring and summer of '42. Obviously, there would be more attacks (and more successes) if there were more subs patrolling.

Lokasenna -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:44:26 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy Do you know any Allied players that don't replace their poorly rated captains ASAP? I mean.... me? They're so lackluster that it's not worth my time. quote: ORIGINAL: Ian R Didn't we have a thread on this a couple of months ago? Lockwood ordered some changes for the PH based subrons that were not implemented in the SWPAC subrons till months later. I forget the name of the guy who succeeded Lockwood at Fremantle when the latter went to PH, but he invented the magnetic exploder or something like that. Kinkaid ordered him to ditch it in the end. The funny thing is, the magnetic exploder might have worked better if the sub skippers put the torpedoes under the target, instead of taking hull shuts ;-) Although it may not have worked anyway because the torpedoes ran too deep compared to their setting, so going for a magnetic explosion by intending to fire under the hull might have resulted in the torpedo passing under the target without exploding.

Chickenboy -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:49:33 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Lokasenna Although it may not have worked anyway because the torpedoes ran too deep compared to their setting, so going for a magnetic explosion by intending to fire under the hull might have resulted in the torpedo passing under the target without exploding. From Blair's discussion on the issues with magnetic exploders, the magnetic 'sphere' surrounding ships that causes a magnetic exploder to detonate functions differently in Northern or Southern latitudes than it does on or near the equator. Near the equator, the sphere flattens and extends to be almost disc or pancake-like in thickness. Magnetic exploders in tropical waters would have to be very near the surface / ship bottom to be effective and risk premature detonation (as happened numerous times) if they are too shallow when they contact the outer rim of the magnetic 'pancake'.

fcooke -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 4:51:33 PM)
Also - think 3 USN subs are assumed to have been lost to circular runs. I know off the top of my head that Tang was. So not such a minor problem.

Kull -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 6:17:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: obvert The frustration is that Allied subs were a very potent weapon during the war and that success can, as you've pointed out in a few of your listed items, be thwarted in game. The Allied subs should be dangerous by mid-43, but by this time the IJN has already reduced the fleet through focus on the sub war and are well set up to make the remaining years difficult on the silent service. It just is the game, and no one is changing anything at this stage unless it's in a mod. But, you can do some modding and make things a bit different. [;)] I understand, definitely. What I'm suggesting is that one has to do a lot more than mess with dud rates to improve late war Allied sub effectiveness. Because THAT is the real issue. And how does one do that? Well, yes, modding: 1) All Naval Search and ASW capability removed from IJA aircraft. 2) And while you're at it, maybe only IJN floatplanes get it too. 3) No conversions/upgrades from cargo to PB. Well maybe a few in 1945. If the Japanese player wants to maintain a high operational tempo, well fine, but there won't be enough escorts for everything. 4) All Japanese ASW weapons get depth settings that make it impossible to reach Allied subs working in ocean hexes. 5) Give Allied torpedoes a device upgrade in 1944 that adds enough power & accuracy that any hit is basically a kill. 6) Change the arrival dates for the vast majority of good Allied sub commanders so the player can't replace the paperweights until MUCH later. And/or increase the political point cost to replace them. By a LOT. 7) Nerf the S-boats and Dutch subs (or their weapons) so that those things are the abysmal entities they actually were in real life. That's just a few ideas off the top of my head, and sure many of them are extreme, but the idea is to widen the aperture of the discussion and come up with things which can be modded and which - hopefully - move the needle on the issue.

ITAKLinus -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 6:52:09 PM)
Ok, now I will probably get submerged by insults but... I think that the results we see in many games are somehow reasonable given the fact that doing worse than the Japanese in RL would be very very difficoult. And since nobody is obliged to commit the very same mistakes Japanese did in WWII, there is little room to say that subs are not working properly in the game. They are working properly given the conditions. If you run single ship TFs with little to no air ASW/NavS and even less ship-based ASW... Well, you'll see that you can get a rate of sinkings even higher than the one listed in the topic. Moreover, I see in many many games a relatively poor approach to sub operations. Many players just send them randomly, without sistematical check of their performances, with poor positioning, little NavS, modest coordination and the crappy captains many subs have at the beginning. For example, I have seen countless times hordes of subs near Truk, sitting idle just because of air ASW/NavS and ASW-TFs hunting them. Or, same thing, many subs sent to the limits of their operational range with a little time spent on patrol due to lack of fuel. And I could continue. If you couple the little attention given by many allied players to the incredible attention given by japanese players, you have that US subs aren't a very dangerous threat for most of the war. Again, if you try to maximise your US subs (and allied in general) with extreme focus and, at the same time, you have the Japanese player doing just as the real japs did, you have that subs actually outperform their historical counterparts. So, rather than a structural problem in the game, it's more a matter of restrospective knowledge and relative attention given by the two players. I suspect that trying to "fix" the subs wouldn't be right, since their different effectiveness in the game comes from players' actions, rather than from something not WAD. But that's just my opinion, of course Just a little anedoctial, stupid thing: in Jan-42, both Kaga and a CVL received a single torpedo each while in Singapore (protected by roughly 350 mines) shot by a single US sub. And I did Manila on 7th massacring most of them. I am still traumatized.

Zorch -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 6:54:21 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Kull quote: ORIGINAL: obvert 5) Give Allied torpedoes a device upgrade in 1944 that adds enough power & accuracy that any hit is basically a kill. Wasn't Torpex introduced in 1943, greatly increasing the explosive power of torps? Or is that already in the game?

obvert -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 8:15:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: ITAKLinus Again, if you try to maximise your US subs (and allied in general) with extreme focus and, at the same time, you have the Japanese player doing just as the real japs did, you have that subs actually outperform their historical counterparts. So, rather than a structural problem in the game, it's more a matter of restrospective knowledge and relative attention given by the two players. I suspect that trying to "fix" the subs wouldn't be right, since their different effectiveness in the game comes from players' actions, rather than from something not WAD. Well. No. I play both sides. I've played with the Allied subs against players that do a very good job of maximising their ASW. There is no chance to "outperform their historical counterparts" against a good Japanese player (and no Japanese player does what happened historically). It is a structural problem that has to do with the attack mission as stated by Loka above, with the air search metrics that keep a DL on the sub (increasing it's likelihood to be found again and reducing its ability to attack without being discovered) over time regardless of it's potential to dive, and which don't correctly account for USN radar which would have spotted air search before it got close enough for an attack anyway. It will not be fixed but it would be interesting to see if modding could alter the balance.

ITAKLinus -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/9/2019 8:25:58 PM)
Sorry Obvert, I think you misunderstood. Or I have expressed myself poorly. Or both. Anyway, I meant that if the Japanese player does the same things Japs did in RL, probably, the US subs will outperform their historic counterparts. Have a try and start sending stuff around with little air-borne ASW/NavS and no escorts... On the other side, in the meanwhile, put strong captains to US subs, place them correctly and use as much as you can your NavS assets to provide them targets. US subs will make a massacre. Even with faulty torpedoes. That was what I meant when I wrote "Again, if you try to maximise your US subs (and allied in general) with extreme focus and, at the same time, you have the Japanese player doing just as the real japs did, you have that subs actually outperform their historical counterparts.". Hope to have clarified what I meant in my post.

obvert -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/10/2019 7:35:35 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: ITAKLinus Sorry Obvert, I think you misunderstood. Or I have expressed myself poorly. Or both. Anyway, I meant that if the Japanese player does the same things Japs did in RL, probably, the US subs will outperform their historic counterparts. Have a try and start sending stuff around with little air-borne ASW/NavS and no escorts... On the other side, in the meanwhile, put strong captains to US subs, place them correctly and use as much as you can your NavS assets to provide them targets. US subs will make a massacre. Even with faulty torpedoes. That was what I meant when I wrote "Again, if you try to maximise your US subs (and allied in general) with extreme focus and, at the same time, you have the Japanese player doing just as the real japs did, you have that subs actually outperform their historical counterparts.". Hope to have clarified what I meant in my post. I read and understood what you meant, and I dismissed it ([;)]) as irrelevant because we're talking about how PBEM actually functions in the sub war. The dud rate among other features of the game as well as player choices reduce the effectiveness of Allied subs in relation to historical. It's not just about the dud rate regardless of the OP.

ITAKLinus -> RE: stock torp dud rate (12/10/2019 8:08:20 AM)
Ohhhhhhhh ok I see. Nevermind. My understanding of the issue is that subs are not working because of a-historical behaviours from players rather than poor designing. Now, my personal position is that the most game-changing element of the ASW is the possibility to devote huge IJAAF assets to it. In line of principle one can do the same using IJNAF assets, but using Betties/Nells for ASW, for example, has a clear and relevant cost-opportunity, which is much lower in case of, say, IJAAF Sallies. Thus, my first move to approach the issue would be to limit the amount of IJAAF dedicated air assets through an HR, which is also quite easy to put in place and monitor. Second issue I see is the terrible quality of many captains. In this case, an easy modification to the game would be to simply have by default very aggressive captains to USN subs since 7-DEC. It can be done in game by players but we all know that paying PPs for USN subs isn't a priority for most of the allied commanders. A third, and eventually last, element I'd give a try is a limitation through HR of the number of ships converted to PBs per-year. I think that these very few modifications can have major impacts on sub warfare without the need of re-designing too many things. They're pretty easy to implement. I think that limiting IJAAF ASW is the key, also.

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