LargeDiameterBomb -> RE: SELECTIVE targets for HARMs used by SEAD units (1/3/2020 12:07:58 AM)
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First, even though I absolutely agree with apache85 that there's a "gamification" aspect to this and SeaQueens comment about SEAD crew always suppressing any SAM system that fires on an friendly aircraft, one can certainly come up with realistic, but unusual, situations where SEAD escorts would be ordered to not engage older SAM systems even if they fire on a friendly aircraft in a strike force. To illustrate this, let's say we have a the following situation: A Greek strike force pulled from a squadron of 10 operational aircraft - F-16CM Blk 52+s with conformal fuel tanks that can carry four main air-to-ground weapons each (Consisting of two sections of bomb trucks ie F-16CMs with 4x GBU-10 Paveway IIs per aircraft, a SEAD section with 4x HARM Bs per aircraft and two counter-air sections with 4x AIM-120C-7/2x IRIS-T per aircraft) are being prepared for a interdiction mission against a large resupply convoy when a time critical very High Value Target is identified with the help of HUMINT sources and this squadron is the only one that will have any chance of striking the HVT due to time constraints, range and considering the loadouts on or being loaded on available aircraft within range. An ATO is prepared that designates the squadron as the whole strike force. The weapons were just started to be loaded on the aircraft when the ATO was completed. The time critical target is the Chief of the Army of the adversary, a commander regarded as extremely competent and who has a background as a "soldier's commander" and thus his leadership is considered to be crucial for the morale of the adversaries ground forces. This chief of the Army is assessed to be visiting a known, easily identifiable building for 45-60 minutes for a short meeting with local higher army commanders starting in 1 hour in a city with a population of about 50.000 people. Time will be very short and earliest possible take-off will be in little more than an hour and unfortunately, by necessity the strike force will have to fly through the firing envelope of one standard (Not modernized in any way) SA-3b system for about a minute on the way to the target to reach it in time. Furthermore they will have to spend at least some of the time attacking the HVT in the absolute outer envelope of another SA-3b system. An electronic OoB from the night before also had a SA-11 Buk-M1 battery radiating in the area around the target building but it has not been observed since - but because the Buk battery has been observed as being in the area for the last week they are expected to just have gone silent, repositioned to new firing positions while remaining in the area. Five days ago a Buk-M1 TELAR was assessed as destroyed in this area by a AARGM fired by a USN Super Hornet so the battery probably is not up to full strength and lack at least one TELAR. Still, three functioning Buk-M1s in the area will make up a formidable foe. Also, earlier low-level attacks in this area has always observed or been attacked by MANPAD teams and some aircraft have been hit and/or lost by SAMs assessed as SA-24s, a very dangerous weapon system for any fighter jet flying at low altitude. A nap-of-the earth approach and a lofting release is therefore out of the question. Higher command has assessed the situation as this being the only realistic chance of taking out this HVT and the only way to do it is by flattening the quite large compound the HVT will be visiting with at least 6x of the 16x GBU-10s carried by the strike force and the dropping aircraft will therefore have to do a total of 4 to 6 passes over the target. The squadron commander concurs with this assessment and quickly a mission briefing is performed where everybody agrees the correct way to complete the mission is to enter the area at 15 k ft AGL, do a total of 4-6 passes from the same altitude to drop and lase for the the LGBs on the large compound and most crucially, every available HARM must be spared for destroying or suppressing the Buk-M1 battery that is expected to be in the area, unless a SA-3b system manages to shoot down a bomb truck, to have a chance of success even though this absolutely sucks for the aircrews. But the orders from higher up are that the HVT is to be destroyed at all costs. As the aircraft are all equipped with the very modern AN/ALQ-187 I-DIAS self-protection ECM suite and the path of the strike force will only cross the projected envelope of the first SA-3b battery for about a minute on the way to the target area the battery are not to be fired upon and HARMs are to be conserved for use in the HVT area unless one GBU-10 carrying aircraft is shot down by the SA-3b battery. The strike force will simply have to take their chances while crossing this bit of the path and trust in their ECM systems and dropped countermeasures since the HARMs will as assessed desperately be needed to suppress the SA-11 Buk-M1 battery, which will certainly reveal itself during the attack phase, to have a chance of striking the HVT successfully. This of course in reality is a very unusual, but not unrealistic mission (Meaning it could never happen). However, it might very well be something that more advanced scenario designers would want to include in a scenario as a special event for increased tension and suddenly increasing complexity with a hard to solve problem but with a big reward in scoring with some luck. Besides, in reality, many or most self-protection ECM suites do not only affect the chance of the missile hitting the aircraft in the endgame as modeled in CMANO/CMO but also has the ability of stopping semi-active missile illuminating radars locking on the aircraft and might also be able to break lock from the radar in case the missile will quickly veer off course. In CMANO/CMO terms, they are a combination between OECM/DECM suites where the OECM suite have very low jamming power and an ability to only jam one emitter, so the risk of spending some time at the outer edges of the firing envelope of a SA-3c with low RCS platforms such as the F-16, equipped with a very effective self-protection ECM suite will mean a very low risk of a 1960s SAM system locking on and keeping lock-on until missile impact, so commanders might very well be willing to take their chances in a scenario as described above, even though the aircrew will probably not be so happy. So I agree with DWReese on this one. This abovementioned mission will have to be micromanaged constantly in the attack phase which will last several minutes to have any chance of success as AI and mission mechanics currently is and that is sub-optimal when one probably has a lot of other forces to simultaneously control in the scenario. What exactly to do about it, I have no idea, but most of DWReese's suggestions sounds reasonable from a player's standpoint.
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