warspite1 -> RE: OT: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (6/13/2020 5:40:42 PM)
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ORIGINAL: Orm quote:
ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote:
ORIGINAL: Orm I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win. BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory? warspite1 Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes? Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action? Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany. First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term. What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field. Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated. Sorry for being off the topic. BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies? With warspite1 Sorry we were talking about the Channel Dash so assumed you were picking up on this as an example of why you dislike subsequent pronouncements of strategic victories. If you weren't then my comments remain generally, but not in answer to your post! If the Germans had subsequently sought to breakout then yes, the strategic victory would remain true. Why? because any such breakout would be naturally: - more dangerous because: - longer to travel - having to pass through more patrol zones - closer to aircraft at more stages of the journey - closer to the home fleet for a large part of the journey - a longer journey, necessitating more fuel expenditure (not a commodity in great supply!) which means more reliance on tankers (not a commodity in great supply!). The conditions in 1942 were not those of 1939, 1940 or even 1941. The chances of a successful breakout through the North Sea/Norwegian Sea was much less. But even if it was successful, for the reasons given above, this would not negate that the withdrawal was a strategic defeat. Without St Nazaire Tirpitz would only be considered as a one way trip and Hitler, scared for his Northern flank, would never have countenanced such an operation anyway. The only possibility I would see for a change of view, would be if the Kriegsmarine were transferred north and decimated convoy after convoy. They didn't, they were a waste of resources, men and material - have you seen what the Germans employed just to try and keep Tirpitz safe? - and its difficult to see what they could have done to change that.
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