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Alamander -> RE: OT: Something I've been meaning to bring up. (9/6/2020 9:47:34 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
The Japanese peace proposal was on fantasy land, they were willing to accept the following:
- withdrawal from former colonies
- disarmament, but not under Allies supervision
- no Allied occupation of Japan
- no Allied prosecution of war criminals (they were to be tried, but by Japan itself)
- no "regime change", keep the Emperor and the militarists in power
that was obviously not going to work,
There was really no consensus as to what they wanted as part of a negotiated peace, and we lack the documents to confirm exactly who was advocating for what. Whatever consensus there was basically revolved around making any further advances as difficult as possible for the U.S. and her allies in order to improve what little bargaining position they had.
Bix (Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan- Pullitzer Prize Winning history of Hirohito's reign) and his Japanese research assistants (who have probably done the most research of anyone on this subject) tend to make the case that Hirohito himself was the architect of this consensus: to make the going as tough as possible in order to win better terms. It seems the idea was to discourage the U.S. from trying to invade and occupy Japan and hopefully to retain control of Manchuria.
The Soviet DoW obviously made this latter request superfluous, and I suspect atom bombs or no, given a bit more time, Japan would have surrendered with only 2 conditions: no occupation and the emperor retaining power. I think it is important to understand that many in senior positions were not enamored with the idea of democracy, especially Hirohito, and were, at heart, monarchists. They were battling, not just for Japan or her sovereignty, but for the retention of monarchy, and traditions of the feudal moral code upon which the Meiji Restoration rested, in the face of an ever-encroaching democratic, and in some cases, socialist world order. If one views the last year of the war in these terms, it is probably easier to understand their obstinance and their differing opinions: as some were more sympathetic to democratic reforms than others.
They were not simply fighting to preserve an "empire;" rather they were fighting to preserve a way of life that they viewed as specifically Japanese, as opposed to Western, and many felt that a U.S. occupation would destroy this way of life forever, regardless of what place Japan was given in the post-war world order. As it turns out, from their perspective, they were right. The occupation did fundamentally alter Japanese society and, in some cases, their culture. As a proper historian, it is sometimes best not to say whether such things were for the better or the worse: merely to explain why people did what they did.
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