quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

They naysayers in the thread seem to overlook the fact that the greatest weakness with modern MBTs is that they require a human crew.

An M1A2 can sit on a hilltop and have RPG's fired at it all day pretty without a complaint. The human crew, less so.

Then there's the cost-savings found from down-sizing multi-man tank crews to smaller teams controlling unmanned AFVs, as well as the advantages of cutting out the crew from the AFV design process (no crew = more space = more engine/armour/guns).

As Obvert points out, the transition to unmanned AFVs is an evolution that makes sense.

Yeah...no. Bush lost is **** when he found RPG-7Vs had been supplied to Iraqi resistance about 15 years ago.

15 years ago. I can assure you-M1A2es have not kept pace. Obsolete.

According to you, the United States should unilaterally disarm. Sieg Heil, comrade.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

If he was a trainer at Irwin, was he in the Blackhorse Regiment?

As far as the US Marines giving up their tanks, did they get an agreement from the Army to provide tanks on demand when they need them? That would be important.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

If he was a trainer at Irwin, was he in the Blackhorse Regiment?

As far as the US Marines giving up their tanks, did they get an agreement from the Army to provide tanks on demand when they need them? That would be important.

So, I talked to him, and he is ok with the Marines giving up their large, heavy crew served tanks...so then I asked will the Army follow the Marines lead...and he laughed and said emphatically no.

Being the good little troll and armchair warrior with no actual experience that is not from a keyboard or book I opined: but aren't large, heavy crew served tanks very vulnerable to missiles, to drones, to which he replied laughingly.....

No.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

If he was a trainer at Irwin, was he in the Blackhorse Regiment?

As far as the US Marines giving up their tanks, did they get an agreement from the Army to provide tanks on demand when they need them? That would be important.

So, I talked to him, and he is ok with the Marines giving up their large, heavy crew served tanks...so then I asked will the Army follow the Marines lead...and he laughed and said emphatically no.

Being the good little troll and armchair warrior with no actual experience that is not from a keyboard or book I opined: but aren't large, heavy crew served tanks very vulnerable to missiles, to drones, to which he replied laughingly.....

No.

Lowpe,

This entire issue just screams to me that a fundamental rethinking of the use of the Marines is at the root of this change. A move away from using the Marines in the frontline of the battlefield, towards a light infantry force tasked for mobile, amphibious operations able to be quickly deployed overseas. Heavy tanks reduce mobility, occupy valuable ship space and increase the logistical tail. The heavy duty fighting would still be undertaken by the army, with their tanks.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

"Larger traditional clashes...". Huh? What hypothetical army shall we further make American citizens debt-serfs to to fight?

I mean this **** costs lots and lots of MONEY. We are broke. Let Europe defend itself and bring our boys home and save money.

It's like the insanity of "Defending South Korea". You have to be tripping on retard-pills to be ignorant of SK massive military advantage over NK.

quote:

ORIGINAL: obvert

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

You guys got me thinking about this, and I will ask my sons what they think about armor. Haven't talked to them about armor in a long time. One of them has been in combat recently, and most recently a trainer at Fort Irwin -- and I suspect he will probably think it is ok for the Marine Corp to do it (smaller, specialized)...but that there are plenty of solid applications that armor solves the problem for in the Army. My guess is he would prefer to fight an enemy that didn't field tanks while his side did....but we shall see.

I do know that Joint readiness training switched several years back to feature larger, more traditional clashes and away from insurgency models-- I think the Army was at the time prepping for a conflict in Syria which thankfully never came to be -- although I do know several young man that did fight there.

The Marines are ditching their current tanks. This doesn't mean they are giving up on armored fighting vehicles. My bet is they already have an array of specialized smaller manned and unmanned vehicles that can be flown in and dropped, swim in on their own, and won't either break the bank or put crews at risk in the same way as traditional armour.

This is moving quickly. I know someone here that works in transport focusing on cars, and he says self-driving taxis will be common in five years in the UK. If it's in the civilian sector, then those technologies will be far ahead in the military sector.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

They naysayers in the thread seem to overlook the fact that the greatest weakness with modern MBTs is that they require a human crew.

An M1A2 can sit on a hilltop and have RPG's fired at it all day pretty without a complaint. The human crew, less so.

Then there's the cost-savings found from down-sizing multi-man tank crews to smaller teams controlling unmanned AFVs, as well as the advantages of cutting out the crew from the AFV design process (no crew = more space = more engine/armour/guns).

As Obvert points out, the transition to unmanned AFVs is an evolution that makes sense.

I wasn't saying we should not try out the concept, but let's not phase out all human operated equipment too quickly. War is full of unexpected situations and no machine is as adaptable as a well-trained human.

Battleships are still relevant thinking. Wrong.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

They naysayers in the thread seem to overlook the fact that the greatest weakness with modern MBTs is that they require a human crew.

An M1A2 can sit on a hilltop and have RPG's fired at it all day pretty without a complaint. The human crew, less so.

Then there's the cost-savings found from down-sizing multi-man tank crews to smaller teams controlling unmanned AFVs, as well as the advantages of cutting out the crew from the AFV design process (no crew = more space = more engine/armour/guns).

As Obvert points out, the transition to unmanned AFVs is an evolution that makes sense.

Yeah...no. Bush lost is **** when he found RPG-7Vs had been supplied to Iraqi resistance about 15 years ago.

15 years ago. I can assure you-M1A2es have not kept pace. Obsolete.

According to you, the United States should unilaterally disarm. Sieg Heil, comrade.

Disgusting how Matrix tolerates an open and blatant neo-Nazi such as yourself to spew your venom.

Matrix, you allow this?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

...We're not broke, though.

Sovereign nation finances are not analogous to household finances. I know that's hard for nearly everyone to understand, but it's the simple truth.


There are other valid arguments for not fighting overseas (just as there are valid arguments to do so), but "we are broke" doesn't hold water.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

This entire issue just screams to me that a fundamental rethinking of the use of the Marines is at the root of this change. A move away from using the Marines in the frontline of the battlefield, towards a light infantry force tasked for mobile, amphibious operations able to be quickly deployed overseas. Heavy tanks reduce mobility, occupy valuable ship space and increase the logistical tail. The heavy duty fighting would still be undertaken by the army, with their tanks.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961


...Excluding our involvement in WW2, our only "won" war in the last 100 years, since when has "military effectiveness" resulted in a victory? I see lots and lots of industrialists and contractors getting rich, yet I see nothing for it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

They naysayers in the thread seem to overlook the fact that the greatest weakness with modern MBTs is that they require a human crew.

An M1A2 can sit on a hilltop and have RPG's fired at it all day pretty without a complaint. The human crew, less so.

Then there's the cost-savings found from down-sizing multi-man tank crews to smaller teams controlling unmanned AFVs, as well as the advantages of cutting out the crew from the AFV design process (no crew = more space = more engine/armour/guns).

As Obvert points out, the transition to unmanned AFVs is an evolution that makes sense.

Yeah...no. Bush lost is **** when he found RPG-7Vs had been supplied to Iraqi resistance about 15 years ago.

15 years ago. I can assure you-M1A2es have not kept pace. Obsolete.

According to you, the United States should unilaterally disarm. Sieg Heil, comrade.

Disgusting how Matrix tolerates an open and blatant neo-Nazi such as yourself to spew your venom.

Matrix, you allow this?

So Rusty1961 believes he has uncovered "an open and blatant neo-Nazi" posting on the forum. Let's subject this claim to some basic independent logical analysis, because Rusty1961 certainly fails the test in that area.

1. The object of the claim has not presented a single comment which indicates he is personally in favour of, or is an adherent to. Nazi ideology. Quite the contrary the object (ie RangerJoe) is making the point that he believes that on the basis of Rusty1961's comments (admittedly an inference), Rusty1961 has some attachment to that ideology. Accordingly, the correct response from Rusty1961 would have been to make the record straight regarding where he stands on that ideology, not to instead hurl such an accusation, without evidence, at RangerJoe.

2. By directly querying why Matrix has allowed this situation, Rusty1961 has once again just invented a "fact". There is in fact no evidence that the forum moderator, who is the Matrix forum representative, has not already seen the exchange and concluded that no Matrix policy has been breached by RangerJoe. Alternatively, it is possible the moderator, who is not a paid full time employee of Matrix, has not yet read this thread. In which case there is nothing at all preventing Rusty1961 from contacting the moderator to complain. Of course were he to do that, he would have to present the facts which sustain the claim, a task which point 1 above demonstrates would be rather difficult to achieve.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961


...Excluding our involvement in WW2, our only "won" war in the last 100 years, since when has "military effectiveness" resulted in a victory? I see lots and lots of industrialists and contractors getting rich, yet I see nothing for it.

Even by your pitiful standards of scholarship/analysis/debating, this is really a new low in displaying ignorance.

First thing is to understand context. Primarily for international law and public opinion reasons, there has been no formal war anywhere in the world since 1945. Every time a media outlet refers to a post 1945 military operation as a war, they are technically wrong. Just as every time a journalist refers to a Bradley IFV as a Main Battle Tank (usually just abbreviated to "tank") or a Guided Missile Destroyer as a "Battleship", they are wrong and merely displaying their ignorance.

Explaining to you the relevant international law is pointless as you simply lack the comprehension skills. One subtle consequence of the effect of the international law, is that the metrics of judging the appropriateness of and effectiveness of the post 1945 military operations, is now much more complicated than back in the day when the assessment metric was largely based on the written peace treaty.

So how does one assess the following post 1945 military operations which were solely or primarily American led.

1. 1948 Berlin Airlift. A straight out military operation with casualties which at any stage could have turned into a "hot" military conflict with the USSR. End result, a Soviet backdown with access to the land corridors from the USA/British/French zones of control to Berlin reinstituted.

2. 1950-53 Korean War. A UN authorised but totally delegated to the USA military conflict. After the sneak attack by North Korean forces on the under equipped South Korean forces, the arrival of predominantly American forces recapture in full the lost terrain, thereby meeting the UN authorisation. Only a profoundly ignorant and biased person would fail to include this military operation as a "win".

3. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An excellent exemplar of the post 1945 nuance. JFK's imposition of a naval blockade was a military operation and in international law, a casus bellum even though no actual shot in anger were fired. It definitely achieved its political objective when the Soviet ships were ordered by Kremlin to return before reaching the American military forces. Sounds very much like an American win to me, brought about by the deployment of assets in a pre- emptive military operation.

4. 1983 Grenada. Operation Fury involved the invasion of a sovereign state. No war declared by the USA but a clear cut military operation. Anyone seriously going to suggest the Grenadians and their Cuban military advisers defeated the American military.

5. 1989-90 Panama. Operation Just Cause, another invasion of a sovereign state. Again no war declared by America on Panama. Personally I've never met anyone who has claimed Panama defeated the American forces. Certainly Norriega never boasted from his American prison cell how he defeated the Gringos.

6. 1990-91 Iraq, Operation Desert Storm. Although another UN mandated military operation, primarily dependent on the deployment and use of American forces. Still no war declared by the USA. Ultimate outcome, infliction of massive losses on the then 4th largest army in the world (Iraq national army and its elite Republican Guard) and in accordance with the UN authorisation, the liberation of Kuwait. Having complied with the UN mandate, how exactly can this outcome be described as an American military loss?

7. 1999 Kosovo. Not a UN but a NATO operation, again heavily dependent on the use and deployment of American military forces. Needless to say, no war declaration forthcoming. A 10 week bombing campaign forced the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and led to a de facto independence status for Kosovo. A state of affairs which last month was transformed into de jure status with the signing of the Serbian - Kosovo Treaty brokered by Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. As this military operation is another one omitted by Rusty1961, he clearly considers it to have been an American defeat.

8. 2002 Afghanistan. Strange behaviour for the "victorious" Afghani government over the American led forces to run away from Kabul and their military victory to set up a government in exile in neighbouring Pakistan. All those perks of office lost after their "stunning victory". Must have been galling to see their governing policies of no education for females reversed by the losers in the military operation. Nonetheless a good exemplar of the post 1945 non war declaration complications in assessing the long term "won/lost" metrics. Still the military operation did achieve its legal authorisation.

9. 2003 Iraq, Gulf II. A very complicated international law question, anyone who says to the contrary is either biased or simply not across the complexity. For the purpose of this post, the relevant facts are (a) no war declaration by the USA, (b) the military operation primarily conducted by American forces but with significant contributions from the UK and Australia (with a small Danish contribution), and (c) the military operation did achieve it's goals, rather comprehensively. Rusty1961 makes the typical mistake of conflating "nation building" with military. A basic error encouraged by pop culture discussions led by non experts who don't know a thing about international law.


To the above could be added the American contributions to the ousting of Gaddafi in 2011 and the more recent liberation of the ISIS caliphate "controlled" territories.

I fail to see how an unbiased and knowledgeable individual could seriously claim that all the above exemplars demonstrate American losses. Pre 1945 they almost all would have involved a declaration of war and a subsequent peace treaty. Because such a relatively simple metric no longer exists, it allows for the false association of "nation building" with the preceding conduct of military operations. It is like saying that the Entente did not win in 1918 because the "nation building" exercise of fostering a democratic German republic failed when the Third Reich eventually arose in the defeated Germany. Or that Japan ultimately defeated the Allies because the post war Chinese Civil war was won by Mao and the European colonial territories in the SRA ultimately were given their independence.

To the above American military operations, there are hundreds of post 1945 military operations which have not involved America. Examine the flare up since the weekend in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is a very good case study of the operation of international law post 1945.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961


...Excluding our involvement in WW2, our only "won" war in the last 100 years, since when has "military effectiveness" resulted in a victory? I see lots and lots of industrialists and contractors getting rich, yet I see nothing for it.

Even by your pitiful standards of scholarship/analysis/debating, this is really a new low in displaying ignorance.

First thing is to understand context. Primarily for international law and public opinion reasons, there has been no formal war anywhere in the world since 1945. Every time a media outlet refers to a post 1945 military operation as a war, they are technically wrong. Just as every time a journalist refers to a Bradley IFV as a Main Battle Tank (usually just abbreviated to "tank") or a Guided Missile Destroyer as a "Battleship", they are wrong and merely displaying their ignorance.

Explaining to you the relevant international law is pointless as you simply lack the comprehension skills. One subtle consequence of the effect of the international law, is that the metrics of judging the appropriateness of and effectiveness of the post 1945 military operations, is now much more complicated than back in the day when the assessment metric was largely based on the written peace treaty.

So how does one assess the following post 1945 military operations which were solely or primarily American led.

1. 1948 Berlin Airlift. A straight out military operation with casualties which at any stage could have turned into a "hot" military conflict with the USSR. End result, a Soviet backdown with access to the land corridors from the USA/British/French zones of control to Berlin reinstituted.

2. 1950-53 Korean War. A UN authorised but totally delegated to the USA military conflict. After the sneak attack by North Korean forces on the under equipped South Korean forces, the arrival of predominantly American forces recapture in full the lost terrain, thereby meeting the UN authorisation. Only a profoundly ignorant and biased person would fail to include this military operation as a "win".

3. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An excellent exemplar of the post 1945 nuance. JFK's imposition of a naval blockade was a military operation and in international law, a casus bellum even though no actual shot in anger were fired. It definitely achieved its political objective when the Soviet ships were ordered by Kremlin to return before reaching the American military forces. Sounds very much like an American win to me, brought about by the deployment of assets in a pre- emptive military operation.

4. 1983 Grenada. Operation Fury involved the invasion of a sovereign state. No war declared by the USA but a clear cut military operation. Anyone seriously going to suggest the Grenadians and their Cuban military advisers defeated the American military.

5. 1989-90 Panama. Operation Just Cause, another invasion of a sovereign state. Again no war declared by America on Panama. Personally I've never met anyone who has claimed Panama defeated the American forces. Certainly Norriega never boasted from his American prison cell how he defeated the Gringos.

6. 1990-91 Iraq, Operation Desert Storm. Although another UN mandated military operation, primarily dependent on the deployment and use of American forces. Still no war declared by the USA. Ultimate outcome, infliction of massive losses on the then 4th largest army in the world (Iraq national army and its elite Republican Guard) and in accordance with the UN authorisation, the liberation of Kuwait. Having complied with the UN mandate, how exactly can this outcome be described as an American military loss?

7. 1999 Kosovo. Not a UN but a NATO operation, again heavily dependent on the use and deployment of American military forces. Needless to say, no war declaration forthcoming. A 10 week bombing campaign forced the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and led to a de facto independence status for Kosovo. A state of affairs which last month was transformed into de jure status with the signing of the Serbian - Kosovo Treaty brokered by Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. As this military operation is another one omitted by Rusty1961, he clearly considers it to have been an American defeat.

8. 2002 Afghanistan. Strange behaviour for the "victorious" Afghani government over the American led forces to run away from Kabul and their military victory to set up a government in exile in neighbouring Pakistan. All those perks of office lost after their "stunning victory". Must have been galling to see their governing policies of no education for females reversed by the losers in the military operation. Nonetheless a good exemplar of the post 1945 non war declaration complications in assessing the long term "won/lost" metrics. Still the military operation did achieve its legal authorisation.

9. 2003 Iraq, Gulf II. A very complicated international law question, anyone who says to the contrary is either biased or simply not across the complexity. For the purpose of this post, the relevant facts are (a) no war declaration by the USA, (b) the military operation primarily conducted by American forces but with significant contributions from the UK and Australia (with a small Danish contribution), and (c) the military operation did achieve it's goals, rather comprehensively. Rusty1961 makes the typical mistake of conflating "nation building" with military. A basic error encouraged by pop culture discussions led by non experts who don't know a thing about international law.


To the above could be added the American contributions to the ousting of Gaddafi in 2011 and the more recent liberation of the ISIS caliphate "controlled" territories.

I fail to see how an unbiased and knowledgeable individual could seriously claim that all the above exemplars demonstrate American losses. Pre 1945 they almost all would have involved a declaration of war and a subsequent peace treaty. Because such a relatively simple metric no longer exists, it allows for the false association of "nation building" with the preceding conduct of military operations. It is like saying that the Entente did not win in 1918 because the "nation building" exercise of fostering a democratic German republic failed when the Third Reich eventually arose in the defeated Germany. Or that Japan ultimately defeated the Allies because the post war Chinese Civil war was won by Mao and the European colonial territories in the SRA ultimately were given their independence.

To the above American military operations, there are hundreds of post 1945 military operations which have not involved America. Examine the flare up since the weekend in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is a very good case study of the operation of international law post 1945.

Alfred

You're the first person I know to declare we have won the Afghanistan war. Even the US Military admits we can't achieve victory, yet you say it is over and we have one.

I need only point this out example of twisted reasoning to discredit the rest of your assertions.

Stick to games.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Examine the flare up since the weekend in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is a very good case study of the operation of international law post 1945.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961


...Excluding our involvement in WW2, our only "won" war in the last 100 years, since when has "military effectiveness" resulted in a victory? I see lots and lots of industrialists and contractors getting rich, yet I see nothing for it.

Even by your pitiful standards of scholarship/analysis/debating, this is really a new low in displaying ignorance.

First thing is to understand context. Primarily for international law and public opinion reasons, there has been no formal war anywhere in the world since 1945. Every time a media outlet refers to a post 1945 military operation as a war, they are technically wrong. Just as every time a journalist refers to a Bradley IFV as a Main Battle Tank (usually just abbreviated to "tank") or a Guided Missile Destroyer as a "Battleship", they are wrong and merely displaying their ignorance.

Explaining to you the relevant international law is pointless as you simply lack the comprehension skills. One subtle consequence of the effect of the international law, is that the metrics of judging the appropriateness of and effectiveness of the post 1945 military operations, is now much more complicated than back in the day when the assessment metric was largely based on the written peace treaty.

So how does one assess the following post 1945 military operations which were solely or primarily American led.

1. 1948 Berlin Airlift. A straight out military operation with casualties which at any stage could have turned into a "hot" military conflict with the USSR. End result, a Soviet backdown with access to the land corridors from the USA/British/French zones of control to Berlin reinstituted.

2. 1950-53 Korean War. A UN authorised but totally delegated to the USA military conflict. After the sneak attack by North Korean forces on the under equipped South Korean forces, the arrival of predominantly American forces recapture in full the lost terrain, thereby meeting the UN authorisation. Only a profoundly ignorant and biased person would fail to include this military operation as a "win".

3. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An excellent exemplar of the post 1945 nuance. JFK's imposition of a naval blockade was a military operation and in international law, a casus bellum even though no actual shot in anger were fired. It definitely achieved its political objective when the Soviet ships were ordered by Kremlin to return before reaching the American military forces. Sounds very much like an American win to me, brought about by the deployment of assets in a pre- emptive military operation.

4. 1983 Grenada. Operation Fury involved the invasion of a sovereign state. No war declared by the USA but a clear cut military operation. Anyone seriously going to suggest the Grenadians and their Cuban military advisers defeated the American military.

5. 1989-90 Panama. Operation Just Cause, another invasion of a sovereign state. Again no war declared by America on Panama. Personally I've never met anyone who has claimed Panama defeated the American forces. Certainly Norriega never boasted from his American prison cell how he defeated the Gringos.

6. 1990-91 Iraq, Operation Desert Storm. Although another UN mandated military operation, primarily dependent on the deployment and use of American forces. Still no war declared by the USA. Ultimate outcome, infliction of massive losses on the then 4th largest army in the world (Iraq national army and its elite Republican Guard) and in accordance with the UN authorisation, the liberation of Kuwait. Having complied with the UN mandate, how exactly can this outcome be described as an American military loss?

7. 1999 Kosovo. Not a UN but a NATO operation, again heavily dependent on the use and deployment of American military forces. Needless to say, no war declaration forthcoming. A 10 week bombing campaign forced the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and led to a de facto independence status for Kosovo. A state of affairs which last month was transformed into de jure status with the signing of the Serbian - Kosovo Treaty brokered by Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. As this military operation is another one omitted by Rusty1961, he clearly considers it to have been an American defeat.

8. 2002 Afghanistan. Strange behaviour for the "victorious" Afghani government over the American led forces to run away from Kabul and their military victory to set up a government in exile in neighbouring Pakistan. All those perks of office lost after their "stunning victory". Must have been galling to see their governing policies of no education for females reversed by the losers in the military operation. Nonetheless a good exemplar of the post 1945 non war declaration complications in assessing the long term "won/lost" metrics. Still the military operation did achieve its legal authorisation.

9. 2003 Iraq, Gulf II. A very complicated international law question, anyone who says to the contrary is either biased or simply not across the complexity. For the purpose of this post, the relevant facts are (a) no war declaration by the USA, (b) the military operation primarily conducted by American forces but with significant contributions from the UK and Australia (with a small Danish contribution), and (c) the military operation did achieve it's goals, rather comprehensively. Rusty1961 makes the typical mistake of conflating "nation building" with military. A basic error encouraged by pop culture discussions led by non experts who don't know a thing about international law.


To the above could be added the American contributions to the ousting of Gaddafi in 2011 and the more recent liberation of the ISIS caliphate "controlled" territories.

I fail to see how an unbiased and knowledgeable individual could seriously claim that all the above exemplars demonstrate American losses. Pre 1945 they almost all would have involved a declaration of war and a subsequent peace treaty. Because such a relatively simple metric no longer exists, it allows for the false association of "nation building" with the preceding conduct of military operations. It is like saying that the Entente did not win in 1918 because the "nation building" exercise of fostering a democratic German republic failed when the Third Reich eventually arose in the defeated Germany. Or that Japan ultimately defeated the Allies because the post war Chinese Civil war was won by Mao and the European colonial territories in the SRA ultimately were given their independence.

To the above American military operations, there are hundreds of post 1945 military operations which have not involved America. Examine the flare up since the weekend in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is a very good case study of the operation of international law post 1945.

Alfred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961


So he expended 90 minutes to 200 minutes composing a college level paper trying-in vain-to prove me wrong. It took me all of 10 seconds to type the words I typed-words that drove him apoplectic- and he still failed to refute my point.


I'm living rent-free inside his head and loving every minute of it.

quote:

Lowpe,

This entire issue just screams to me that a fundamental rethinking of the use of the Marines is at the root of this change. A move away from using the Marines in the frontline of the battlefield, towards a light infantry force tasked for mobile, amphibious operations able to be quickly deployed overseas. Heavy tanks reduce mobility, occupy valuable ship space and increase the logistical tail. The heavy duty fighting would still be undertaken by the army, with their tanks.

Alfred

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ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101

A few points to highlight on the USMC shift:

1) This is not without institutional resistance and the USMC leadership as a whole is not entirely aligned on the process. Yes the tanks will likely go but the future operational concepts of the Corps are still in heated discussion. As always, budgetary and congressional blocks can still interfere as well.

2) It may seem like it is, but this is not exactly the Marines going back to their amphib roots. The entire deployment model is being reconsidered. The new direction drives the USMC closer to the tri-service 'distributed lethality' concept that's been accelerated over the last few years. The USMC's role is less the break in force as much as the forward littoral presence. When talking about China for instance where much of this is being focused by, the idea is to hold the first island chain with missiles and unmanned rather than with guns and tanks in vulnerable mega bases. As Commandant Berger recently said, the USMC is no longer going to do the slaughter across the beach approach. The idea is not to fight the way in, it is to live there every day (good piece on this: https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/new-ships-in-navy-plan-no-slaughter-across-the-beach-for-marines/)

3) Yes this is a bit of a notable shift (and faces pushback as mentioned), but this is not out of the blue either. As far back as a decade ago the USMC was seriously reconsidering its force structure given China's A2/AD development. Back then I was asked to look at if a contested beach landing was still even viable. The disaster that was the EFV development didn't help confidence in the matter either.

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ORIGINAL: Alamander

quote:

ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101

A few points to highlight on the USMC shift:

1) This is not without institutional resistance and the USMC leadership as a whole is not entirely aligned on the process. Yes the tanks will likely go but the future operational concepts of the Corps are still in heated discussion. As always, budgetary and congressional blocks can still interfere as well.

2) It may seem like it is, but this is not exactly the Marines going back to their amphib roots. The entire deployment model is being reconsidered. The new direction drives the USMC closer to the tri-service 'distributed lethality' concept that's been accelerated over the last few years. The USMC's role is less the break in force as much as the forward littoral presence. When talking about China for instance where much of this is being focused by, the idea is to hold the first island chain with missiles and unmanned rather than with guns and tanks in vulnerable mega bases. As Commandant Berger recently said, the USMC is no longer going to do the slaughter across the beach approach. The idea is not to fight the way in, it is to live there every day (good piece on this: https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/new-ships-in-navy-plan-no-slaughter-across-the-beach-for-marines/)

3) Yes this is a bit of a notable shift (and faces pushback as mentioned), but this is not out of the blue either. As far back as a decade ago the USMC was seriously reconsidering its force structure given China's A2/AD development. Back then I was asked to look at if a contested beach landing was still even viable. The disaster that was the EFV development didn't help confidence in the matter either.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that the intent is to convert the USMC into the equivalent of a set of functionally independent garrison battalions.

If this is the case (again... correct me if I am wrong), this indicates a fundamental shift in the entirety of U.S. post Cold War geostrategy. It seems the U.S. is moving away from the aggressive use of the military as an instrument of regime change and reverting to a strategy of "containment," especially in response to China.

Watching events from afar, I have often thought that in the age of Trump, there were 2 forces battling inside the American government (and inside the intelligence agencies... i.e. Flynn and Rogers at the NSA vs. Brennan at the CIA) for control of foreign policy and using the media and ultimately the electorate as their proxies.

There is the "America First" camp, who support Trump, which is pushing for a more defensive, containment policy focused almost exclusively on China and an old guard of what were once called "neo-cons" still advocating for their "American century" in which numerous regimes are rearranged so as to function as American satellites. With the rise of Trump, these "neo-cons" seem to have migrated to the Democratic Party, where they find themselves in the awkward position of depending for power upon an electorate which is heavily Marxist and decisively against American imperialism.

It seems to me that the age of Trump is bigger than one man and there are forces beyond Trump in the U.S. intelligence and military apparatus which are changing America's posture toward the world. The old guard of neo-cons, whether they ultimately bring down Trump or not, seem to be on the way out, and America is destined, now or in the near future, to take a more defensive, less intrusive, and less aggressive posture in the world. Whether this change is for good or ill can be debated now and decided later by history. I offer no such editorial.

These are simply my thoughts on the big picture of what these changes in military capabilities indicate about geostrategy. I would be interested to hear yours or to correct me if I am wrong in understanding what is being proposed for the USMC.

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ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101


I think garrison is the wrong word for it because it denotes passivity. The idea is still to have a powerful and flexible USMC that is highly proficient in network centric warfare. It's just that the focus is increasingly on a strategic defensive posture oriented around great power competition conflict. The U.S. can afford to take the strategic defensive since China is the revisionist power while the U.S. is the status quo power. Operationally speaking, it means to avoid the need for costly break in operations against the Chinese anti-access arsenal by reinforcing the forward presence (largely along the first island chain, and increasingly northern Australia and other Pacific Island nations), and a survivable one at that (which increasingly means dispersed).

As to the actual geostrategy.... well, there is no unified geostrategic outlook besides the consensus that China is the benchmark adversary and to a degree a strategy of containment is being pursued. IMO, there is a real dearth of geostrategic thinking in the U.S right now, and it didn't help that a number of great thinkers like Andy Marshall of the ONA have passed or moved on. You touch upon this with some of your comments, but basically a huge part of this is the serious dysfunction and lack of unity between the two parties - good luck trying to come up with a serious long-term strategic plan when there is little continuity and the focus could shift when the next President assumes power. That is why I laugh when I read that the Navy's upcoming force structure review will call for 534 ships. Not that I blame the Navy, we just have to be realistic about the lack of stability right now which really impacts on long term planning and geostrategic policy implementation.

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ORIGINAL: Alamander

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ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101


I think garrison is the wrong word for it because it denotes passivity. The idea is still to have a powerful and flexible USMC that is highly proficient in network centric warfare. It's just that the focus is increasingly on a strategic defensive posture oriented around great power competition conflict. The U.S. can afford to take the strategic defensive since China is the revisionist power while the U.S. is the status quo power. Operationally speaking, it means to avoid the need for costly break in operations against the Chinese anti-access arsenal by reinforcing the forward presence (largely along the first island chain, and increasingly northern Australia and other Pacific Island nations), and a survivable one at that (which increasingly means dispersed).

As to the actual geostrategy.... well, there is no unified geostrategic outlook besides the consensus that China is the benchmark adversary and to a degree a strategy of containment is being pursued. IMO, there is a real dearth of geostrategic thinking in the U.S right now, and it didn't help that a number of great thinkers like Andy Marshall of the ONA have passed or moved on. You touch upon this with some of your comments, but basically a huge part of this is the serious dysfunction and lack of unity between the two parties - good luck trying to come up with a serious long-term strategic plan when there is little continuity and the focus could shift when the next President assumes power. That is why I laugh when I read that the Navy's upcoming force structure review will call for 534 ships. Not that I blame the Navy, we just have to be realistic about the lack of stability right now which really impacts on long term planning and geostrategic policy implementation.

In my opinion, there has been a lack of serious geostrategic thinking, based upon Realpolitik, in the upper echelons of the U.S. government since World War II. Far too often, nefarious operatives more interested in their Wall-Street business partners and clients, such as the Dulles brothers, have carved out their own private imperial provinces (at the State Department and CIA) and directed foreign policy for the benefit of their multinational clients in place of serious thinking based upon Realpolitik and the national interest. At other times, second-rate legacy graduates from Harvard (which seems to have some special connection to Washington), such as McNamara, have led the nation's foreign policy into disasters based upon simple-minded foolishness.

No one, in my opinion, did more damage to American foreign policy, however, than Kissinger (another Harvard fellow) who promoted what he called Realpolitik, but fundamentally misunderstood what Realpolitik was for 19th-century Germany and what it implied for America's global position during the Cold War period.

When we speak of "globalization," what we are really speaking about is "westernization." This must be clear before we can approach geo-strategic issues from the perspective of Realpolitik, and this is where Kissinger went wrong. Realpolitik is the strategic use the power of the state in a pragmatic manner to promote Enlightenment thinking so far as possible within the constraints of the real world. Maintaining open sealanes, free of piracy and other dangers, for example, would be a goal of Realpolitik, and one that the U.S. has pursued successfully.

Unfortunately, instead of the values of the Enlightenment, Kissinger viewed consensus as the ultimate basis for global stability. He felt if he could build consensus between China, Russia, The U.S. and Western Europe, then even the Communist nations would somehow, by magic maybe, conform themselves to Enlightenment, liberal ideas. This is why he pursued detante with Communist Russia and naively thought that he could open Communist China to free trade. He thought that by building consensus, he was building long-term stability. He wanted to be the Metternich of his age, but his was not the age of Metternich, and no long-term consensus can be built between nations that pursue free trade and open sea lanes and Communist nations that view all forms of commerce as inherently illicit.

The lesson of the first two world wars was that colonial mercantilism and the unrestrained national competition for resources leads to global wars. The alternative was a system of exchange in an international marketplace rather than in walled-off colonial fiefdoms. While the U.S. has done an excellent job after the Second World War of securing international trade routes and incorporating former colonial rivals, such as England, Japan, and Germany, into a Pax-Americana market, they have never successfully incorporated China or Russia into that order.

With Russia, the opportunity was there to do so in 1989, but again there was little or no geo-strategic thinking. Kissinger's detente (which then would have been appropriate for Russia in terms of Realpolitik) was replaced with neo-con, Wall-Street-style imperialism, ala Dulles. Russia was looted by Wall-Street financiers and their friends in Russia (whom the media now refers to as "oligarchs")and never properly incorporated into the Pax-Americana.

As a result of Kissinger's desperation for consensus at all costs, China now has converted itself into a modern mercantile nation that has rejected the lessons of the first two world wars and seeks to gain access to ever more resources to fuel its domestic industry. Such mercantile ambitions cannot be checked by a mere policy of containment, and as more and more nations are transformed into resource colonies for China, what little stability there is globally will shatter.

You are right. The U.S. is in desperate need of some serious geo-strategic thinking based on Realpolitik. However, I am not certain that those capable of doing so will ever occupy the positions that direct the country.

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ORIGINAL: Alfred


IIRC, Kissinger's doctoral thesis, and if it wasn't that, it was certainly the theme of his main scholarly book (which I read so many years ago I've forgotten its title[:)]) was the interplay of an uneven number of Great Powers. Which meant Europe primarily in the 1700s. It was the balancing act between them which most exercised Kissinger's mind.

Alfred