1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (Full Version)

All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> Command: Modern Operations series >> The War Room



Message

SunlitZelkova -> 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/4/2021 11:27:14 PM)

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/japan/GreenMurataWP.htm

Interesting article on Cold War planning for cooperation between the JSDF and US forces. It has good info on the interaction between US and Japanese forces during the Cold War and a little insight into thinking in regards to what the actual Soviet threat to Japan proper was.



Gunner98 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 11:03:56 AM)

Thanks for sharing

Useful & timely for some of my scenarios.

B



Coiler12 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 11:57:59 AM)

The snarky comment that the Hokkaido prefecture police could handle the Soviets makes me want to run a small-scale game featuring officers with .38 revolvers against isolated VDV paratroopers.

(As for the actual Soviet threat to Hokkaido, I agree with the substance of the article but think it's a chicken-egg case where I interpret it differently. I feel it's less "There was no serious threat, therefore there was no need to bulk up" and more "because they were bulked up, there was no serious threat." )



Gunner98 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 12:35:32 PM)

When I looked at Hokkaido situation I saw no reason for the Soviets to try and capture the island, indeed I think that would have mired them into the wrong sort of war.

I believe, and this is my assessment only, that their main objective would be to neutralize Japanese and American offensive capability based on Hokkaido and, secondarily to ensure that the use of La Pérouse Strait was under their control. The use of the strait would be very difficult I think.

As far as landing forces, although there were no VDV divisions assigned to the Far East, there were two air landing Bdes (the 130th & 13th - although I am not sure the status of the 13th), several air landing battalions and a complete Naval Infantry Division. So more than enough to raid and secure key points but not enough to hold onto the ground against a determined assault.

The 55th Marine Infantry Division is an interesting beast. For the life of me I cannot figure out what its purpose was, except perhaps as a threat. The Pacific Fleet does not have the lift to do anything significant or long distance with a landing force this size, and no real targets - except Hokkaido - are handy.

B



Coiler12 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 1:05:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Gunner98
The 55th Marine Infantry Division is an interesting beast. For the life of me I cannot figure out what its purpose was, except perhaps as a threat.


Threat against the US and its local allies, but also there for use against China on land?



Gunner98 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 1:49:27 PM)

Yes but with 2 Tank and 30ish Motor Rifle Divisions in the Far East and Transbaykal Districts, I don't think they would spend the extra training and equipment effort on a NI Div if they didn't need it.

A physical threat against Japan and South Korea, yes but it was so obviously hollow that I don't think anyone took it seriously. Wasn't really viable against the Aleutians or Alaska due to its positioning and lift capability.

I've been scratching my head on how to use if for Pacific Fury and beyond rapid positioning for defence of the Kuril islands, cannot think of one. Maybe that is enough?

B



BDukes -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 4:26:44 PM)

Perhaps a small Inchon along the DPRK or South Korean east coast?

Mike



CHM -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 6:07:18 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: BDukes

Perhaps a small Inchon along the DPRK or South Korean east coast?

Mike


Not a chance the Soviets, even Gunner's enhanced 1994 super Soviets, could sustain that. I think the 55th would be used purely defensively, garrisoning islands, radar stations, naval bases, etc. A bit of muscle to complicate US planners.



Gunner98 -> RE: 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (8/5/2021 9:56:36 PM)

quote:

even Gunner's enhanced 1994 super Soviets,


[;)]I would argue smart Soviets vice the cardboard cut-out targets we in the west made them out to be for 70 years.

Although I'll admit that their equipment, training, morale and leadership may be slightly enhanced[:D]

Concur however that a stand alone single division raid which couldn't immediately be reinforced with 2 or 3 MRDs and a secure SeaLOC would be foolhardy and doomed. That is why I'm struggling with the 55th. Defensive use, in the Kurils especially, seems reasonable but very...un-Soviet.

The fractious command setup I try and portray in the first few scenarios comes from this sort of thinking. Perhaps the Navy kept their own army because they couldn't trust the army to protect their assets.



Page: [1]

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
0.8901367