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CommC -> (9/28/2003 6:33:11 AM)
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Two tidbits of information have come to light only recently that are relevent to the victory conditions debate.
1. The Japanese tried to surrender to the US some time (several weeks?) before the A-bomb was dropped. To save face, they tried to surrender using the Soviets (Stalin) as an intermediary. This was a mistake as Stalin sat on the info and did nothing to forward the request to the US. This of course was deliberate on Stalin's part as he was hoping to prolong the war so Soviet forces could enter the conflict and the Soviets could get more of the "spoils". The US was anxious to end the war as quickly as possible before the Soviets could intervene, hence the A-bomb was used as soon as possible, without any delay to attempt to gain a Japanese surrender.
Even if Tinian is captured early (say 1942), the A-bomb can't be used. It simply wasn't ready until the date it was dropped historically.
2. After the Doolittle raid, the Japanese high command realized they could not win a protracted war with the US and resolved to try to end it by gaining overwhelming victories early in the hopes of demoralizing the US, and gaining a negotiated early surrender. To this end, their plan was to capture Midway, destroying the US carriers in the process, then use Midway as a spring board to invade and capture Hawaii. Again, they hoped that the loss of Hawaii would prompt a US surrender or cessation of hostilities in the Pacific.
This would make an interesting Japanese "automatic victory" if indeed some one could capture Hawaii as the Japanese player.
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