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LTCMTS -> Australia (10/20/2003 11:40:14 PM)
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The problem with Australia was not that the IJA didn't have ten divisions, but that those ten divisions woudl have to come from theaters that the IJA had committed Japan's national survival (in their eyes) against. Something like a Nationalist-Communist Chinese collapse and a complete revision of IJA strategic focus (since 1905) on Siberia and Manchuria would have to happen in mid-1941 to give the Japanese the ten divisions needed to attempt a conquest of Australia. Remember that in 1942, there was nothing of value in northern Australia and the invasion force would either have to land directly on the south-western coast (if the shipping could be collected) or march overland. The overland march would be in the face of Australian militia, mostly WWI (Gallipoli/ANZAC Western Front) vets. By late 1942, Australia had even built three incomplete militia armored divisions with Lees, Grants, Stuarts and Matildas, certain better than anything the IJA could deploy. In any case, such an operation would have had to follow up a successful Operation MO (which historically was not a success) and would have to assume no US naval ops in the central Pacific (Doolittle Raid, carrier raids of Marshalls or even Home Islands) to rivet the attention of the IJN to its own strategic focus, the USN.
For Hawaii in late 1941 or early 1942, the IJA would have to commit at least four divisional equivalents to overcome the two or three divisional equivalents of US troops on Hawaii, along with control of the seas during the invasion and consolidation periods, say at least three months, to prevent a US counter-offensive. Again, where do the four divisions come from? Delay operations in SEA? Bypass the Philippines? Can the Combined Fleet maintain a sufficient prescence in Hawaiian waters for 3 months with its available tankers? What about air cover? Midway? And where does the shipping come from. BY Mid-1942, you're talking at least six division equivalents, all the carriers and Midway as a land based aviation base. In both cases, the IJN would have to crush the USN with very little loss to retain sufficient airpower to establish air superiority over the island. Think of this as a smaller version of the US invasion and conquest of Okinawa w/o the resources the US applied in early 1945.
The India option tantalizes, but it is based on a subjective call. Were enough Indians, especially of those castes, classes and religious or ethinic groups that had supported the Empire since 1858 and before, ready to swap the British for the Japanese? Remember that Churchill's offer of independence upon successful conclusion to the war helped reduce the power of the nationalists. There were also a number of Indian minority groups (Sikhs, Pathans, Moslems, etc) who were not prepared to live in a Hindu dominated nationalist state. Despite nationalist sentiment, India-Pakistan provided the majority of troops that fought in Burma, along with those sent to Persia, Syria, North Africa and Italy, een before the tentative offer of independence. Logistically, you have to question whether the IJA could have sustained an offensive through Burma into India, w/o a "strategic/operational pause" that would allow the Brits to reorganize and refit. Such an offensive, to be successful would draw resources from the NEI and SW Pacific. Add in the diversion of the majority of the IJN for at least 6 months from Apr 1942, with the USN still capable of raiding in the western Pacific.
In any case, each option was explored by IGHQ, and rejected or modified due to the inability of the IJA and IJN to agree on the strategic focus for Phase II operations. If the game provides reasonable strategic/operational outcomes and the powerful editor as advertised, then it will be interesting to try anyway, just to explore the outcomes. Imagine the impact on the SW Pacific campaign of an IJA invasion of Australia?
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