RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports

RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945

Message

bradfordkay -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 9:31:17 AM)
I am with Byron13 right now in still being slightly confused. I've been playing the game expecting that any TF on the map is vulnerable to air attack, including torpedoes. So this is what I understand to be the case: Disbanded ships in port are invlunerable to torpedo attack. They can only be attacked as part of a port attack. All the remaining cases will be Naval Attacks. TFs that are docked (loading or unloading) are vulnerable to air launched torpedo attacks but not to submarine launched torpedo attacks. TFs that are anchored (loading or unloading) in a port are vulnerable to all torpedo attacks. TFs that are not docked or anchored in a port hex are vulnerable to all torpedo attacks. Is this impression correct?

mogami -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:07:22 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl MOGAMI I never said the didn't attack Singapore. I said they couldn't quite make the trip in TORPEDO-BOMBER mode. Flying in BOMBER mode, and especially with a reduced payload, they could range out to about 1400 miles and back. Hi, This seems to be where people part company. (attack range of G3M/G4M) The normal bomb load of the G3M and G4M was the same weight as the torpedo. For comparison. B-17 normal range max bomb load 1100 miles 6000lbs of bombs G4M 12x 60kg (120lb) bombs, carried 4x3 OR (often carried 10 rather then 12) 4x 250kg (550lb) bombs, carried 2x2 OR 2x 500kg (1,102lb) bombs OR 1x "naval torpedo" OR 1x 800kg (1,764lb) bomb (most G3M/G4M on patrol carried 6x60kg bombs) but the range fully loaded was 1400+ miles. These aircraft had 1/3 the bomb load but greater range compared to B-17. I've found to my suprise the G3M and G4M1 always flew without bomb bay doors except for transfer and unarmed patrol. The aircraft had no inflight operating door.

Pascal_slith -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:42:11 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Lol! before you Allied Fanboys are finished, you will have the Betty flying less distance the a B-25! Empty: (G4M1) 14,860 lb (6,741 kg); (G4M2) 17,623 lb (7,994 kg); (G4M3) 18,500 lb (8,391 kg) Loaded: (G4M1) 20,944 lb (9,500 kg); (G4M2,3) 27,550 lb (12,500 kg) Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 28,350 lb (12,860 kg); (G4M2,3) 33,070 lb (15,000 kg) Range at Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 3,132 miles (5,040 km); (G4M2) 2,982 miles (4,800 km); (G4M3) 2,262 miles (3,640 km) The whole reason the darn things were paper thin was because of the range! There was NOTHING on the aircraft in the way of protection to keep the weight down to keep the RANGE up! Mr. Frag, where did you find this data? Have a good reference book?

Luskan -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 3:26:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: bradfordkay I am with Byron13 right now in still being slightly confused. I've been playing the game expecting that any TF on the map is vulnerable to air attack, including torpedoes. So this is what I understand to be the case: Disbanded ships in port are invlunerable to torpedo attack. They can only be attacked as part of a port attack. All the remaining cases will be Naval Attacks. TFs that are docked (loading or unloading) are vulnerable to air launched torpedo attacks but not to submarine launched torpedo attacks. TFs that are anchored (loading or unloading) in a port are vulnerable to all torpedo attacks. TFs that are not docked or anchored in a port hex are vulnerable to all torpedo attacks. Is this impression correct? Yes, correct, however all these allied fanboys are missing an important distinction between WITP and UV. You can disband LOADED ships (with cargo or even troops I think) into port and they'll unload. Since you are usually UNLOADING at forward bases (in enemy bombing range) disbanding your tfs becomes and even more gamey (and undetectable) tactic to avoid the torps.

Mr.Frag -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 4:51:11 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Pascal quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Lol! before you Allied Fanboys are finished, you will have the Betty flying less distance the a B-25! Empty: (G4M1) 14,860 lb (6,741 kg); (G4M2) 17,623 lb (7,994 kg); (G4M3) 18,500 lb (8,391 kg) Loaded: (G4M1) 20,944 lb (9,500 kg); (G4M2,3) 27,550 lb (12,500 kg) Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 28,350 lb (12,860 kg); (G4M2,3) 33,070 lb (15,000 kg) Range at Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 3,132 miles (5,040 km); (G4M2) 2,982 miles (4,800 km); (G4M3) 2,262 miles (3,640 km) The whole reason the darn things were paper thin was because of the range! There was NOTHING on the aircraft in the way of protection to keep the weight down to keep the RANGE up! Mr. Frag, where did you find this data? Have a good reference book? Original navy design specs - 1938. The puppy had 5,000 liter wing tanks, thats why they were so easy to flame. It wasn't until the G4M3 that these tanks were reduced in size and the range dropped. The design specs demanded a range of 2,000 nautical miles, which is one of the reasons there are only 2 engines. Misubishi wanted to put 4 engines on these planes but were not permitted due to the range reduction that it would have caused. It is the very same reason that Japan had such range on their float planes and patrol aircraft. The Navy boys knew they were on an island and that way of thinking affected every design that they got their hands on. You will notice that the exact opposite is true with the Army designed aircraft, they have virtually no range at all. The USA, being more of a level headed bunch ended up with a general bill of goods that worked for both the Army and Navy, middle range and good payload.

Pascal_slith -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 5:10:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag quote: ORIGINAL: Pascal quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Lol! before you Allied Fanboys are finished, you will have the Betty flying less distance the a B-25! Empty: (G4M1) 14,860 lb (6,741 kg); (G4M2) 17,623 lb (7,994 kg); (G4M3) 18,500 lb (8,391 kg) Loaded: (G4M1) 20,944 lb (9,500 kg); (G4M2,3) 27,550 lb (12,500 kg) Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 28,350 lb (12,860 kg); (G4M2,3) 33,070 lb (15,000 kg) Range at Maximum Overload: (G4M1) 3,132 miles (5,040 km); (G4M2) 2,982 miles (4,800 km); (G4M3) 2,262 miles (3,640 km) The whole reason the darn things were paper thin was because of the range! There was NOTHING on the aircraft in the way of protection to keep the weight down to keep the RANGE up! Mr. Frag, where did you find this data? Have a good reference book? Original navy design specs - 1938. The puppy had 5,000 liter wing tanks, thats why they were so easy to flame. It wasn't until the G4M3 that these tanks were reduced in size and the range dropped. The design specs demanded a range of 2,000 nautical miles, which is one of the reasons there are only 2 engines. Misubishi wanted to put 4 engines on these planes but were not permitted due to the range reduction that it would have caused. It is the very same reason that Japan had such range on their float planes and patrol aircraft. The Navy boys knew they were on an island and that way of thinking affected every design that they got their hands on. You will notice that the exact opposite is true with the Army designed aircraft, they have virtually no range at all. The USA, being more of a level headed bunch ended up with a general bill of goods that worked for both the Army and Navy, middle range and good payload. Again, though, Mr. Frag. What is your book/article source? Where did you find this information? Thanks...

Mr.Frag -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 5:19:02 PM)
Like I said ... Navy design specs ... Mitsubishi aircraft ... 1938

TIMJOT -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 5:47:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl I think you will find the distance from Rabaul to Lunga is just about 600 statute miles as the crow flys..., and while the Japanese were certainly able to make torpedo attacks there they were pretty much "at the end of their rope." At Lunga they had the great advantage of knowing exavtly where the targets would be before they left---so there was no need to allow a fuel "reserve" to search the area when they arrived. And there were plaenty of "friendly checkpoints" on the route to avoid any navigation hazards. It was about as good a situation for making a long ranged strike as they could hope to get. The same is basically true of a strike on Singapore (the harbor wasn't going to move) but the additional 75 miles out and 75 miles back were enough to make the "possible" into the "totally unlikely". Which is why in reality they waited to intercept Phillips until the range was down to about 450 miles---this gave them enough "search radius" when they arrived at the "reported sighting" to hunt down the British TF and attack it with great success. If the game keeps "stretching" the combat radius of the A/C involved, it's going to end up playing out in strange and ahistoric ways. It needs to model the realistic capabilities of the actual war for all airgroups and not be based on a few ex- ceptional examples. Mike I have to respectfully disagree. I think if you go back and recheck your atlas, you will find Lunga just over 700mi from Rabaul as the crow flies. Niether did they have the advantage of knowing exactly where they were going from the get go, in that they set out initially to find the USN CVs, which is probably why they were armed with torps in the first place, I doubt they would have waisted torps if transports had been the primary target. Regardless, the Japanese did not wait for Force Z to come to them because Singapore NB was out of range. They waited because a torp attack by Med.bombers was impossible there. They did not wait until Force Z got within 450 miles. They were frantically searching for Force Z as soon as they discovered that it left harbor. It was sited by both sub and airsearch but loss contact each time. The reason the IJN bombers were at the limit of there range at the time of the actual attack was becuase they had been aloft for hours searching for the elusive Force Z.

TIMJOT -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 6:02:16 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Luskan Yes, correct, however all these allied fanboys are missing an important distinction between WITP and UV. You can disband LOADED ships (with cargo or even troops I think) into port and they'll unload. IS this true?[X(] You can dispand loaded ships and they will unload? If it is I think its great as long as we eventually get limits on how many ships can be dispanded in port at any given time.

Mr.Frag -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 6:20:01 PM)
quote: IS this true? You can dispand loaded ships and they will unload? If it is I think its great as long as we eventually get limits on how many ships can be dispanded in port at any given time. Yes, ships can be disbanded with cargo onboard now.

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 6:22:41 PM)
it does not, to my knowledge, unload though....it just sits on the ships

Mr.Frag -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 6:22:42 PM)
quote: The reason the IJN bombers were at the limit of there range at the time of the actual attack was becuase they had been aloft for hours searching for the elusive Force Z. Great point Tim, glad someone brought it out. It is one thing to take off, form up, and fly directly to an unmoving target. It is something else entirely to take off, fly search looking for a TF, then reform and attack.

bradfordkay -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 6:48:26 PM)
Okay, here are my thoughts on the matter. Ships that are in port, docked, and loading/unloading would normally be invulerable to torpedo attacks. Ships that are in port and anchored (whether loading/unloading or disbanded) could be vulnerable to torpedo attacks. Note the COULD BE aspect. This doesn't mean that any anchored ship in any port would be, there are some ports where this would not be possible. However there are ports where anchored ships would be vulnerable to attack. In my thinking UV had it backwards: disbanded ships that are anchored in the harbour were invulnerable while ships tied to the piers unloading were being attacked. The new rules protect the ships that are unloading, but leaves the ships that could have been attacked invulnerable. Since we cannot choose which ports are vulnerable or not, and we cannot seem to distinguish between ships tied to a pier and ships that are at anchor, I am still in favour of allowing a limited number of a/c set on port attack to be armed with torpedoes.

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 7:12:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag quote: The reason the IJN bombers were at the limit of there range at the time of the actual attack was becuase they had been aloft for hours searching for the elusive Force Z. Great point Tim, glad someone brought it out. It is one thing to take off, form up, and fly directly to an unmoving target. It is something else entirely to take off, fly search looking for a TF, then reform and attack. Lets be aware of the "hindsight" factor here. The Japanese did not attack Singapore aka "Pearl Harbor" because on 12/7 and before they had no plans to do so. On dec 8th though, a C5M recon plane did fly over the base with the intention of determining whether or not Force Z was still in the harbor. It was at this point that the Japanese determined that they had to "do something" about Force Z because they didn't want it interfering with their invasion and they realized that Force Z was more powerful than their two BB's covering the invaison. They resolved at this point to conduct a torpedo attack [Shores...pg 108 vol I) However Force Z then belatedly put to sea...throwing the Japanese into a panic and making them scramble to locate the ships.....that led to the big search, and the subsequent attack.

Subchaser -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 7:33:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mogami I've found to my suprise the G3M and G4M1 always flew without bomb bay doors except for transfer and unarmed patrol. The aircraft had no inflight operating door. Actually some Betty were equipped with doors operating mechanism produced by Katashika industries, I saw photo of G4M1 model 11 s/n 2238 with such mechanism installed, second G4M1 prototype also had power-operated bomb bay doors, but during flight tests it was figured out that design of bay doors was poor, when Betty was flying with open bomb bay doors aircraft experienced heavy drag and it was very hard to keep selected heading, thus bombing accuracy could not be suitable. Doors on serial planes were made removable and, as you have pointed out, IJN crews did not fly combat missions with doors attached, even when new bulged doors were introduced on later production models of G4M2, crews were still preferring to remove them. BTW as I remember there was no bomb bay at all on G3M.

Subchaser -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 7:35:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Original navy design specs - 1938. The puppy had 5,000 liter wing tanks, thats why they were so easy to flame. It wasn't until the G4M3 that these tanks were reduced in size and the range dropped. The design specs demanded a range of 2,000 nautical miles, which is one of the reasons there are only 2 engines. Misubishi wanted to put 4 engines on these planes but were not permitted due to the range reduction that it would have caused. This is incorrect. Kiro Honjo was really advocating 4 engine design of new bomber, cause only 4 Kinsei engines could provide performance characteristics demanded by 12-Shi specification, but guys from Technical department of Koku Hombu, Rear admiral Misao Wada personally, rejected 4E bomber idea, because they thought that 4E bomber could not be maneuverable enough to be used as torpedo bomber, and this was supposed to be the primary job for G4M, IJN wanted kogeki-ki � torpedo attack aircraft, not clean bomber, it�s amazing, even IJN aircraft were designed under �decisive battle� doctrine.

Subchaser -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 7:55:55 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nikademus The Japanese did not attack Singapore aka "Pearl Harbor" because on 12/7 and before they had no plans to do so. Incorrect. Japanese were going to attack british capital ships in Singapore port on 9th dec (at night and with bombs!), mission wasn�t flown due to the known reasons. They attempted to attack Singapore on 8th dec also, in the morning Nells from 22nd Koku Sentai was trying to deliver some bombs on Singapore, but due to the heavy weather mission was aborted. Kanoya Ku was given a task to attack British Eastern Fleet with torps, and idea of Singapore port attack was discussed but was abandoned because Matsunaga thought that bombers would suffer extremely heavy losses, but initial plan was to get Force Z in port, that�s why torpedoes (type 91 kai 2) designed for PH were delivered to Kanoya air group, they quite successfully used them on Force Z, but in the open sea.

TIMJOT -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 7:59:07 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nikademus Lets be aware of the "hindsight" factor here. The Japanese did not attack Singapore aka "Pearl Harbor" because on 12/7 and before they had no plans to do so. On dec 8th though, a C5M recon plane did fly over the base with the intention of determining whether or not Force Z was still in the harbor. It was at this point that the Japanese determined that they had to "do something" about Force Z because they didn't want it interfering with their invasion and they realized that Force Z was more powerful than their two BB's covering the invaison. They resolved at this point to conduct a torpedo attack [Shores...pg 108 vol I) However Force Z then belatedly put to sea...throwing the Japanese into a panic and making them scramble to locate the ships.....that led to the big search, and the subsequent attack. Nik, I find this very interesting. I have Shores (Vol. II) but not (Vol.I) yet, I find his work very credible and well researched. However, I can site many very credible sources that state unequically that the bombers of the 22nd AirFlotilla were sent to indo-china specifically to deal with the the threat of Force Z. It was to be the equalizer for the IJNs outgunned BBs. That they hadnt planned on attacking force Z in harbor , had more to do with the fact that the war started in Malaya at roughly 1:00am (Night) Dec 8th. I doubt the suspected force Z would still be there by daybreak and even if it had the make up of the base would make a successful torp attack unlikely at best. I know of the attack ordered on the 8th but this is the first I have ever heard that it was to be a torpedo attack. I have no reason to doubt "Shores" and certainly it was possible that out of panick and desperation a torpedo attack was ordered. Just the same I also have no doubt, based on what I know of the layout of the naval base and the berthing dispositions (which included torp netting ) that had such an attack occured it would have been futile and failed miserably.

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:04:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Subchaser Incorrect. Japanese were going to attack british capital ships in Singapore port on 9th dec (at night and with bombs!), mission wasn�t flown due to the known reasons. They attempted to attack Singapore on 8th dec also, in the morning Nells from 22nd Koku Sentai was trying to deliver some bombs on Singapore, but due to the heavy weather mission was aborted. Kanoya Ku was given a task to attack British Eastern Fleet with torps, and idea of Singapore port attack was discussed but was abandoned because Matsunaga thought that bombers would suffer extremely heavy losses, but initial plan was to get Force Z in port, that�s why torpedoes (type 91 kai 2) designed for PH were delivered to Kanoya air group, they quite successfully used them on Force Z, but in the open sea. I was reffering, Subchaser...to Japanese plans to attack Force Z 'ala' Pearl harbor. I am aware of the 12/8 night attack. This raid was a combined attack on the port and the airfields, conducted at night which ended up being very inaccurate. I would not expect them to try to conduct a dedicated torpedo attack on the ships at night, using LBA at such a range

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:09:41 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: TIMJOT Nik, I find this very interesting. I have Shores (Vol. II) but not (Vol.I) yet, I find his work very credible and well researched. However, I can site many very credible sources that state unequically that the bombers of the 22nd AirFlotilla were sent to indo-china specifically to deal with the the threat of Force Z. It was to be the equalizer for the IJNs outgunned BBs. That they hadnt planned on attacking force Z in harbor , had more to do with the fact that the war started in Malaya at roughly 1:00am (Night) Dec 8th. I doubt the suspected force Z would still be there by daybreak and even if it had the make up of the base would make a successful torp attack unlikely at best. I know of the attack ordered on the 8th but this is the first I have ever heard that it was to be a torpedo attack. I have no reason to doubt "Shores" and certainly it was possible that out of panick and desperation a torpedo attack was ordered. Just the same I also have no doubt, based on what I know of the layout of the naval base and the berthing dispositions (which included torp netting ) that had such an attack occured it would have been futile and failed miserably. Correct.....I'm not disputing the "Reason" why the 22nd was moved to Indo China....i'm just saying that the Japanese had no "set plan" on 12/7 to attack the harbor in the style of Pearl Harbor....partially i'm sure for the reasons you have cited. I'm just saying that the reasonology that "they didnt' attack the harbor with torps on 12/7 (or 8)" therefore they couldn't" has some flaws in it. Hence the hindsight factor. The japanese were being cautious and conservative and trying to decide "exactly" how to deal with Force Z. Players of course have the advantage of a greater awareness and can thus be more decisive more quickly

mogami -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:13:11 PM)
Hi, As Japan I always set the Betty/Nell in Saigon to Naval attack on turn 1. The reason is POW and Repluse. (and I don't port attack Allied ports on turn 1 except for PH)

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:18:02 PM)
myself....i always attack Singapore's airfields first in the hopes of catching as many planes on the ground as possible. I have 'faith' [;)] in my covering forces. In one game one of my picket subs even put three torpedoes into PoW. on 12/8 i set 22nd to Naval Attack

mogami -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:32:30 PM)
Hi, Singapore does not suffer from the first turn suprise rules (like PH and Clark) Because I expect the RN to come out of port on Dec 8th I do not tire out my airgroups on Dec 7th.

Nikademus -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 8:57:50 PM)
I still usually reap a good bounty of RAF planes anyway. I find it justifies the fatigue.

Bulldog61 -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 9:03:11 PM)
I've had several occasions where force Z got thru to the transports and one where it was intercepted by the covering force.

Pascal_slith -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 9:14:01 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Like I said ... Navy design specs ... Mitsubishi aircraft ... 1938 But where did you find these?

TIMJOT -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:21:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Subchaser quote: ORIGINAL: Nikademus The Japanese did not attack Singapore aka "Pearl Harbor" because on 12/7 and before they had no plans to do so. Incorrect. Japanese were going to attack british capital ships in Singapore port on 9th dec (at night and with bombs!), mission wasn�t flown due to the known reasons. They attempted to attack Singapore on 8th dec also, in the morning Nells from 22nd Koku Sentai was trying to deliver some bombs on Singapore, but due to the heavy weather mission was aborted. Kanoya Ku was given a task to attack British Eastern Fleet with torps, and idea of Singapore port attack was discussed but was abandoned because Matsunaga thought that bombers would suffer extremely heavy losses, but initial plan was to get Force Z in port, that�s why torpedoes (type 91 kai 2) designed for PH were delivered to Kanoya air group, they quite successfully used them on Force Z, but in the open sea. Subchaser, I would be really interested in your source. Not that I doubt it, just that early war operations is a particular interest of mine and I am very interested in any new information can get on the subject. I have no doubt a torp attack was initially considered, It obviously would be the first questioned asked as soon as the arrival of force Z was known. But I have never come across any information that would indicate that planning went much beyond that stage. Does your source indicate what the exact plan of attack was? The feasibility of flight paths, approaches, depths, dock locations, harbor defences, ect..... Did they train on a dummy harbor ala the Pearl Harbor attack force? Keeping in mind they only became aware that the Force Z was going to be deployed at Singapore on Nov.28th, that would only leave about a week to prepare for an attack.

Mike Solli -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:29:37 PM)
Interesting. The Japanese expected to lose 1/3 of the PH striking force (some 150 planes and pilots, not to mention the ships) yet were unwilling to risk the Nells/Bettys against Singapore.

Pascal_slith -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:35:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: TIMJOT Subchaser, I would be really interested in your source. Not that I doubt it, just that early war operations is a particular interest of mine and I am very interested in any new information can get on the subject. I have no doubt a torp attack was initially considered, It obviously would be the first questioned asked as soon as the arrival of force Z was known. But I have never come across any information that would indicate that planning went much beyond that stage. Does your source indicate what the exact plan of attack was? The feasibility of flight paths, approaches, depths, dock locations, harbor defences, ect..... Did they train on a dummy harbor ala the Pearl Harbor attack force? Keeping in mind they only became aware that the Force Z was going to be deployed at Singapore on Nov.28th, that would only leave about a week to prepare for an attack. You can read the Japanese operational orders on the Hyperwar website. See http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/index.html#usn This is an EXCELLENT site with many, many primary and secondary sources.

Pascal_slith -> RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports (4/28/2004 11:36:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Pascal quote: ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag Like I said ... Navy design specs ... Mitsubishi aircraft ... 1938 But where did you find these? So, Mr. Frag, I'm still waiting and anxious to know. Where did you find these? Where can others of us obtain these?

Page: << < prev 4 5 6 [7] 8 next > >>

Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

1.125