RE: Why was Patton so great?

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IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 10:26:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Von Rom quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: Von Rom GENERAL PATTON NEVER LOST A CAMPAIGN I like this one. Neither did Monty (MG was a battle), neither did Bradley. Neither did Ike. Neither did Alexander. I don't think Clark did either, which is saying something. Neither did Hodges, neither did Simpson. Devers, there's another one. Dempsey, Crerand, about two dozen Admirals and Air Marshalls, oh then there's Leese, whoever ran the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and I don't remember John Wayne losing one either. It just goes to show you what a winning team the Allies had. Patton made everyone look good: in Sicily, in France, in the Bulge. . . Von Rom, I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking. Regards, IronDuke (P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany. I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation).

IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 10:36:07 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Frank von Rom, Would you please be so kind as to explain me why an point gets better and better if you make it several times? I only wonder why you tell the same stuff over and over and over again. As a conclusion of all the hick hack in this thread I found that Patton did not invent anything new. He hadn´t any new ideas about strategy. He hadn´t any new ideas about logistics. He only managed to win battles in which his forces were very very much stronger than his enemie´s. He was a competent worker given the resources he had. He had his off days and he had his good days. So why do you try to lift him on a podest? Yes, he was the best Allied general. No he wasn´t THAT great compared to other generals of his time. If you get an answer to this, I'd appreciate an e-mail telling me. As for your analysis, I'd disagree about logistics, I think he was good at logistics, just never accepted that if they were in poor shape, the best policy was to rein in your ambition. I'd agree he was competent, much of the Allied High Command was this much, what he did offer over and above everyone else was a drive and style that other more cautious Commanders didn't have. That said, his drive was fast, but only possible against a beaten and demoralised enemy. I don't think he driove as cleverly as others did. I don't think he would have outmanouevred the early Africa Corp on a one for one basis in the wide open desert, and I don't think he would have fared too well in Russia. However, he wasn't asked to, so I'd baulk at criticising for not being good at something he was never asked to do, it'd be speculation. Regards, Ironduke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 11:23:00 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: diesel7013 Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion... We all know that a knowledge of supply and logistics seperates the great generals from the merely good ones... We also know that great generalship is more than strategy, tactics, operational control, ect.. it is also inspiring your men to reach inside themselves and perform at a higher level than they themselves though possible And finally, great generalship is creating an environment ( and I mean an environment that changes based upon weapons, tactics, time frame, ect.. ) where your army, division, company, whatever where your men can accomplish a mission even without your direct input at all times... Now - to General Patton and why I think he was a fine and great general.... 1. Over time, he did begin to understand the relationship between logistics and strategy and their balance - he never lost focus on movement and risk... 2. Patton came into Africa and rebuilt an army that had not performed as well as was hoped and though force of will, personality, and planning, put into effect that changes neccessary to turn the army around and make it successful in Africa and Sicily - In neither Africa nor Sicily was the outcome so far concluded that a lessor man could have accomplished what he did... 3. His staff learned to plan ahead in a way that most amatures of the time could not do - to plan for other contengincies that may arise ( the Bulge counter-attack ) He forced his people to be better than they thought they could be.... Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time diesel7013, Thanks for your thoughts. I think a good General is more than this, though. Your absolutely correct that a good General must understand logistics, no argument. However, I don't think Patton understood them so well it governed his actions like it should have done. In other words, faced with logistics issues in Lorraine, he does well to husband his supplies for the November assaults, proving innovative and open to ideas, but what are we to make of the logistical impossibility that was his desire to drive through the West Wall and take Germany alone? Whilst Patton never lost focus on movement and risk, I just don't see that focus being all that clever. Much lies in what he wanted to do, as much as what he did, but I see no great encirclements in the dash across France. Germans troops that were encircled were effectively finished the minute they were told to stop and retreat into the ports to deny them to the Allies, not by any move from Patton. In terms of risk, this is Patton's achilles heel. I think it is wrong to suggest (as his supporters have suggested here, before you intervened) that movement takes care of the flanks, or that tactical air power can protect them for you. This sort of movement only works against beaten and retreating forces. When the forces facing you are still dangerous and well organised, it is foolhardy, (as Von Manstein illustrated at Kharkov) to advance hard and deep with no thought for your flanks. Patton displays this style of manouevre as early as 1941 in field excerises, so it was not merely a case of horses for courses in 1944. Again, you make very perceptive points about what separates good generals from great ones, but the basics you mention, shared by all the good ones are the bedrock of Command. You mention them yourself, Strategy, tactics, operational control. Faced with fixed defences, Patton had no more idea than any other Allied Commanders about how to concentrate and defeat them. The drive on the Bulge looks to me like a dissipation of force. Three divisions strung out across 25 miles, facing three enemy divisions. 3:1 is an overly simplistic rule of thumb for the attacker, but attacking everywhere not only weakens your assault, but spreads out the supporting assets (air, artillery) that do so much to make the breakthrough possible. This is not a drive that would be taught as an illustration of how to do it. I generally try and imagine how someone would have fared had you taken him from his command and put him elsewhere, perhaps even in an opposition command. If I can see him performing well, then there is a chance for greatness. Great Generals are also (IM very HO) comfortable with most or all the aspects of command. It is why I would judge Kesselring only good (for example), because whilst clearly very competent defensively, there is little evidence (apart from a brief spell in Africa) to judge him on the attack. If Patton had changed places with Dempsey, I see nothing to suggest the attacks on Caen would have been any less costly. Patton displayed no talent for breaking fixed defences in depth. Had he changed positions with Bradley, I think the carnage in the Bocage would have been worse, because Patton occasionally displayed a tendancy of persisting in the face of failure, as if effort and will alone would see him home. Tired, demoralised troops losing a man per yard in the drive on St Lo would have been asked to persist longer, and been driven harder, with predictable results. In Russia, I see no evidence Patton would have possessed the quality of movement in the expanses to perform better than Guderian et al. In the environment of 1941, he might have driven as hard and as far as Guderian (he had the necessary qualities), but his tendancy to attack and drive on a number of differing angles would have left his forces unconcentrated when the time came to close the jaws behind Russian Armies in the field, and seal them off. On the plus side, he offered things no other Allied Commander could, but I think he needed supervision, because his lust for glory was apt to make him throw Military logic out the window in the rush for action and glory. Palermo is an example for a number of things, but Bradley despaired at this drive, and I think it illustrates why he was perhaps best as a Corp Commander. Had I been Bradley in Normandy, I'd have taken 2nd Armoured and the Big Red One off Hodges, added them to the growing performance of Wood and 4th Armoured, and given them all to Patton. I would then have ordered him to attack on as narrow a front as possible towards my key objective. It might sound surprising, but I can see Patton ending the war in 1944, but only had he commanded XXX Corp on the drive to Arnhem. I think he would have been in his element, would have drove the men into the ground to get there in a few days, and would most likely have driven into Arnhem in time to save Frost's command and take the town. From there, I'd have aimed him at something else... Many thanks for your intervention. Things were getting a little stale around here. You also remind me that there is more to consider than the books I occasionally get buried in. I have never served, so suspect I lack the insights about reality on the ground and the nature of command that will be second nature to you. That said, I don't doubt you're read plenty yourself as well (which makes you a dangerous opponent [:)]) Regards, IronDuke

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 11:26:08 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Kevinugly quote: ORIGINAL: Von Rom quote: ORIGINAL: Kevinugly 1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts. 2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that quote: despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign is yet another of your blatent falsehoods. 3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site.[:D] Attack the facts not the sources. 4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time. 5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'[:D]. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result. 1) All info I gave is from that article you, yourself posted! It is from the Command and General Staff College. What is YOUR source for the 700 tanks? 2) The sheer shoddiness of those articles you posted is again indictative of your very poor analysis. So you own a dictionary. Next time spend more time on doing research, and less time on playing with your dictionary. 3) All quotes for my analysis above is from the article YOU posted. It's YOUR source. Heheheh It alone completely demolishes your argument. Completely! 4) A person would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe most of what you try to pass off as analysis. 5) Contrary to you and most of the other critics who try their best to trash Patton at Metz and in the Lorraine Campaign, your so-called analysis simply CANNOT hold water. THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES In just NINE days, from the start of the offensive on November 10, until November 19th, and in spite of poor weather, flooding, rain, bad roads, river flooding, and attacking the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe, Metz fell to Third Army. It achieved victory. Your argument has been demolished. Those quotes do indeed come from my source, the same source criticising Pattons conduct in Lorraine, The Command and General Staff College. Since you're quoting from their study I can only presume that you regard them as an unimpeachable source! You must therefore agree with their findings.[&o] Game, Set and Match[:D] Oh, brother [8\|] Here is the link to that article you posted from the Command and General Staff College: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed. Where on earth did you get that figure of 700 tanks being destroyed? What's your source? Yes, Third Army did get re-supplied during October, but it was NEVER at FULL supply. Most of the supplies Third Army got was from their own scrounging. Third Army achieved enough supply for 4-5 days for a full offensive: quote: Third Army was relatively dormant from 25 September to 8 November. Patton's forces utilized the time to carefully husband resources and build up reserves for future operations. Stringent gasoline rationing went into effect on 3 October, and although gasoline receipts for the month were only 67 percent of requested amounts, Third Army managed to amass a small reserve. The larger calibers of ammunition were also strictly rationed. To take the place of silent artillery tubes, tanks, tank destroyers, and mortars were surveyed in for use as artillery. Extensive use was also made of captured German ordnance. One time on target (TOT) fired in XX Corps' zone was executed with captured German 105-mm howitzers, Russian-made 76.2-mm guns and French 155-mm howitzers (also captured from the ' Germans), and German 88-mm antitank guns. Eighty percent of the artillery ammunition expended by XX Corps in the last week of October was of German origin. By the time full-scale operations resumed in November, Third Army's program of rationing and local procurement had resulted in the establishment of substantial reserves. On the average, each division held 4 days of Class I and 5 days of Class III supplies when the eastward advance was resumed. Except for heavy artillery shells, the ammunition shortage was no longer critical. So even though Third Army was NOT at FULL supply by Nov 8, it still had enough to WIN a DECISIVE VICTORY by taking Metz in just NINE days, using Combined Arms, maneuver, infiltration, surprise, armour breakthrough, and bypass operations. So, even though Third Army started the Lorraine Campaign with half its troops and planes taken away; even though it had little gas and supplies; even though the rains, terrain and flooding caused severe hardships; even though it had little air cover; even though it never had full supplies; and even though it attacked the MOST heavily fortified place in Europe; even with ALL of this against it, Third Army STILL achieved a DECISIVE VICTORY in Lorraine. So what on earth are you arguing? [8\|] You have had all the time in world to do your research, and this is the best you could do? You did not have 4 or 5 people attacking you as I have had to contend with these past two weeks. You had lots of time to find evidence to show how terrible Patton did in Lorraine. Yet, the FACTS PROVE OTHERWISE So, please this is a waste of time. . . Why are you even bothering. . .

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 11:35:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: Von Rom quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: Von Rom GENERAL PATTON NEVER LOST A CAMPAIGN I like this one. Neither did Monty (MG was a battle), neither did Bradley. Neither did Ike. Neither did Alexander. I don't think Clark did either, which is saying something. Neither did Hodges, neither did Simpson. Devers, there's another one. Dempsey, Crerand, about two dozen Admirals and Air Marshalls, oh then there's Leese, whoever ran the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and I don't remember John Wayne losing one either. It just goes to show you what a winning team the Allies had. Patton made everyone look good: in Sicily, in France, in the Bulge. . . Von Rom, I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking. Regards, IronDuke (P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany. I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation). quote: Von Rom, I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking. Bye. How many times is this you said you were leaving this thread? I lost count. . . My methods and agenda? [8\|] For the past two weeks I have been forced to deal with at least 3 or 5 to one odds in this thread. I have been called many derogatory names; my character has been attacked; and people have tried their best to drive me from this thread. Patton has been attacked in a number of ways, which subsequent research has shown to be totally false. And yet, poor little 'ol me is accused of being the bad boy? [8\|] Please, if that statement wasn't so pathetic, it would be laughable. I have yet to be allowed to just debate only one person at a time. Usually, it is several at a time, throwing multiple posts at me. Again, bye. . . quote: P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany. I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation). [8\|] Have you been smoking something? We are dealing only with Patton and his battles. He never lost a campaign.

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/28/2004 11:53:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: diesel7013 Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion... We all know that a knowledge of supply and logistics seperates the great generals from the merely good ones... We also know that great generalship is more than strategy, tactics, operational control, ect.. it is also inspiring your men to reach inside themselves and perform at a higher level than they themselves though possible And finally, great generalship is creating an environment ( and I mean an environment that changes based upon weapons, tactics, time frame, ect.. ) where your army, division, company, whatever where your men can accomplish a mission even without your direct input at all times... Now - to General Patton and why I think he was a fine and great general.... 1. Over time, he did begin to understand the relationship between logistics and strategy and their balance - he never lost focus on movement and risk... 2. Patton came into Africa and rebuilt an army that had not performed as well as was hoped and though force of will, personality, and planning, put into effect that changes neccessary to turn the army around and make it successful in Africa and Sicily - In neither Africa nor Sicily was the outcome so far concluded that a lessor man could have accomplished what he did... 3. His staff learned to plan ahead in a way that most amatures of the time could not do - to plan for other contengincies that may arise ( the Bulge counter-attack ) He forced his people to be better than they thought they could be.... Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time diesel7013, Thanks for your thoughts. I think a good General is more than this, though. Your absolutely correct that a good General must understand logistics, no argument. However, I don't think Patton understood them so well it governed his actions like it should have done. In other words, faced with logistics issues in Lorraine, he does well to husband his supplies for the November assaults, proving innovative and open to ideas, but what are we to make of the logistical impossibility that was his desire to drive through the West Wall and take Germany alone? Whilst Patton never lost focus on movement and risk, I just don't see that focus being all that clever. Much lies in what he wanted to do, as much as what he did, but I see no great encirclements in the dash across France. Germans troops that were encircled were effectively finished the minute they were told to stop and retreat into the ports to deny them to the Allies, not by any move from Patton. In terms of risk, this is Patton's achilles heel. I think it is wrong to suggest (as his supporters have suggested here, before you intervened) that movement takes care of the flanks, or that tactical air power can protect them for you. This sort of movement only works against beaten and retreating forces. When the forces facing you are still dangerous and well organised, it is foolhardy, (as Von Manstein illustrated at Kharkov) to advance hard and deep with no thought for your flanks. Patton displays this style of manouevre as early as 1941 in field excerises, so it was not merely a case of horses for courses in 1944. Again, you make very perceptive points about what separates good generals from great ones, but the basics you mention, shared by all the good ones are the bedrock of Command. You mention them yourself, Strategy, tactics, operational control. Faced with fixed defences, Patton had no more idea than any other Allied Commanders about how to concentrate and defeat them. The drive on the Bulge looks to me like a dissipation of force. Three divisions strung out across 25 miles, facing three enemy divisions. 3:1 is an overly simplistic rule of thumb for the attacker, but attacking everywhere not only weakens your assault, but spreads out the supporting assets (air, artillery) that do so much to make the breakthrough possible. This is not a drive that would be taught as an illustration of how to do it. I generally try and imagine how someone would have fared had you taken him from his command and put him elsewhere, perhaps even in an opposition command. If I can see him performing well, then there is a chance for greatness. Great Generals are also (IM very HO) comfortable with most or all the aspects of command. It is why I would judge Kesselring only good (for example), because whilst clearly very competent defensively, there is little evidence (apart from a brief spell in Africa) to judge him on the attack. If Patton had changed places with Dempsey, I see nothing to suggest the attacks on Caen would have been any less costly. Patton displayed no talent for breaking fixed defences in depth. Had he changed positions with Bradley, I think the carnage in the Bocage would have been worse, because Patton occasionally displayed a tendancy of persisting in the face of failure, as if effort and will alone would see him home. Tired, demoralised troops losing a man per yard in the drive on St Lo would have been asked to persist longer, and been driven harder, with predictable results. In Russia, I see no evidence Patton would have possessed the quality of movement in the expanses to perform better than Guderian et al. In the environment of 1941, he might have driven as hard and as far as Guderian (he had the necessary qualities), but his tendancy to attack and drive on a number of differing angles would have left his forces unconcentrated when the time came to close the jaws behind Russian Armies in the field, and seal them off. On the plus side, he offered things no other Allied Commander could, but I think he needed supervision, because his lust for glory was apt to make him throw Military logic out the window in the rush for action and glory. Palermo is an example for a number of things, but Bradley despaired at this drive, and I think it illustrates why he was perhaps best as a Corp Commander. Had I been Bradley in Normandy, I'd have taken 2nd Armoured and the Big Red One off Hodges, added them to the growing performance of Wood and 4th Armoured, and given them all to Patton. I would then have ordered him to attack on as narrow a front as possible towards my key objective. It might sound surprising, but I can see Patton ending the war in 1944, but only had he commanded XXX Corp on the drive to Arnhem. I think he would have been in his element, would have drove the men into the ground to get there in a few days, and would most likely have driven into Arnhem in time to save Frost's command and take the town. From there, I'd have aimed him at something else... Many thanks for your intervention. Things were getting a little stale around here. You also remind me that there is more to consider than the books I occasionally get buried in. I have never served, so suspect I lack the insights about reality on the ground and the nature of command that will be second nature to you. That said, I don't doubt you're read plenty yourself as well (which makes you a dangerous opponent [:)]) Regards, IronDuke Ironduke: I thought you were leaving? Oh, well. . . 1) Logistics: Patton didn''t know logistics? Give me ONE example. 2) Maneuver: Patton and Third Army has been credited with a brilliant drive through France. NO ONE, except you disputes this. ONLY Bradley's timidity allowed 100,000 Germans to escape from the Falaise Gap. 3) Flanks: In war you take risks. In France Third Army's XIX Tactical Air Command flew 12,000 sorties in August alone covering Patton's flanks. I have produced two very well researched articles that call the coordination between Third Army and its Air Command one of the most perfectly coordinated operations of the war. 4) The rest of your post deals with hypotheticals that have no relevance to the discussion. 5) Speaking of good/bad generals and good/bad operations, I'm STILL waiting to read your analysis of the so-called brilliant German blitzkrieg operations between Sept/39 to Jan/42. Show us all how Germany won superior victories against little Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Fance, etc. . . You criticize Patton on every tiny detail. Well, let's see how well you do with the German General who was in command of Army Group Centre when it stalled outside the gates of Moscow in 1941, and how that army was driven back by the Soviet counterattack.

UndercoverNotChickenSalad -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 12:30:45 AM)
Patton is cool b/c he sunk the Bismark [img]http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/micons/m6.gif[/img]

Kevinugly -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 2:18:37 AM)
quote: It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed. It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following - quote: At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed. Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures. quote: So, please this is a waste of time. . . Why are you even bothering. . . Because I'm right! Oh and Chicken (sorry, 'UndercoverNotChickenSalad', my mistake) he didn't just sink the Bismarck, he shot Hitler too[:D]

Kevinugly -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 2:25:26 AM)
Von Rom wrote quote: I have yet to be allowed to just debate only one person at a time. Usually, it is several at a time, throwing multiple posts at me. If you didn't issue multiple challenges and were prepared to stick with one issue at a time this would be less of a problem for you[:-] This is a 'public forum' so stop whingeing about it. If you really want to debate with one person at a time you could do it via e-mail or 'private messaging', it's not difficult.

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 4:54:22 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Kevinugly quote: It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed. It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following - quote: At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed. Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures. quote: So, please this is a waste of time. . . Why are you even bothering. . . Because I'm right! Kevinugly: quote: It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following - I know what it says. However, in my research I have found that usually Patton was correct in what he did, and that he was a strict disciplinarian and was strict about everything being done in his army. He trained his men hard and demanded efficiency from them. He set very high standards for his men and demanded their best. So, the more I dig, the more Patton and Third Army can be relied upon for what they say and do. quote: At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed. You said: quote: Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures. Not so. As I mentioned I have come to have more and more faith in Patton and Third Army the more research I do. What I have is that the numbers given by 4th armoured Division is fairly close. I had to do some digging, but this is what I found: The Fourth Armored Division Official History: The Fourth Armored Division: 4th Armored Division in WWII from the Beaches to Bavaria. Considered General Patton's "steady" armored division, the 4th Armored Division missed only one of the Third Army's 281 days of combat. Captured 90,354 Nazis, killed est'd 13,600 & destroyed 579 German tanks. 6,000 men of the 4th Armored Division received Purple Hearts. An Official U.S. Army Division History First published in 1946, this outstanding history has 295 pages, 102 superb photos and illustrations, and 2 maps. Chapters include initial combat in Normandy, the breakout and dash across France, the battles for the Moselle River, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final operations deep in Germany. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia. 1,356 KIA; 4,551 WIA http://www.military.cibmedia.com/main-search-detail.asp?idsearch=4th+armor&productcode=BP-04A *The Following has been found in Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.* [NOTE: M = Mellenthin] German Loses: 19-30 September 1944, Nancy Initial tanks - 10 Sept 18 - 50 tanks destroyed - M, p.377-78 Sept 20 - no number specified - 113th Pz Brigade (89 tanks)- M, p.378# Sept 22 - 47 tanks/TDs destroyed - 111th Pz brigade (7 tanks left) - M, p.378* Sept 24 - no number specified - VGD, 11th Panzer Div & 106th Panzer Brigade (50 Tanks) - M, p.380 Sept 26-29 - no number specified - 11th pz, 58th pz corps, VGDs, M, pp.380-81 Nov - 140 tanks could be mustered - M, p.385 What I have found by piecing the info together from Mellenthin's book as well as the OoB of a couple of German units in Lorraine at the time, is that there were at least 253 German tanks and tank destroyers present during the week that I have been able to find. This is a rough estimate. But it is far higher than the double digit numbers you gave. The Battle of Arracourt was one of the largest tank battles on the western front. There were many more German tanks and tank destroyers than this because the following German military organizations were also in Lorraine at the time and so would have contributed more armour and TDs as well as armoured cars and half-tracks: First Army, Nineteenth Army, and Fifth Panzer Army, panzer grenadiers (mechanized infantry divisions) and elements of Waffen SS units, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, just arrived from Italy, VGDs, etc, etc. . . And even after all the tank battles in October, according to Mellenthin's book, the Germans could still muster 140 tanks (p.385). Therefore, if we take into account German tanks, tank destroyers, armoured cars, TD half-tracks, plus many more armoured units that could have easily been in the area, then 4th Armoured Division's number of 285 German armoured vehicles destroyed could very well be an accurate (or close to accurate) number. This is a rough estimate. ******************************************* 111th Panzer Brigade+ OoB 9/18/44 1 HQ JagdPanzer IV/70 3 pltns of 3 JagdPanzer IV/70 each (9) 2 x MkIVH 3 MkIV companies each with--- (6) 1 coy HQ 2 x MkIVH 3 MkIVH Pltns each with (12) 4 x MkIVH 1 AA company 1 20mm AA pltn w/4 Moebelwagens (20mm quad mount) 1 37mm AA pltn w/4 Moebelwagens (37mm sing mount) 4 x Pz V 3 Pz V companies,each with-- (6) 1 coy HQ 2 x Pz V 3 Pz V pltns , each with (12) 4 Pz V http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:deesJoELG7QJ:spearhead1944.com/gerpg/ger111.htm+battle+of+arracourt&hl=en&lr=lang_en ***************************************************** 113th Pz Brigade# OoB - 9/18/44 113th Pz Bde (Commander Saeckendorff) Bde HQ ASSETS - Bde staff 1/2 track mounted 1 251/6 2 251/3 -radio - signal pltn (Opel Blitz truck) - motorcycle (Kettenkrad) messenger pltn 113th PzGren Pioneer co.(motorized) - 2 rifle pltns (6 LMG each) - 1 Hvy Wpns Pltn - 2 81mm mortars - 2 HMG teams 113 recon Co. (remnants of 58th Recon Bn) - Armored Car Pltn - 3 SdKfz 222 - 2 SdKfz 234/1 - Half-track Pltn - 1 SdKfz 250/10 (37mm AT) - 2 SdKfz 250/1 (each with foot recon section) - 2 SdKfz 7/1 quad 20mm AA Arty Support 1198 Arty Bn attached for Arracourt (1/2 track towed) - 2 3-gun batteries 152mm (ex-Soviet) - 1 4-gun battery 150mm German INFANTRY ASSETS 2113 Pz Gren Regt - signals pltn (Opel Blitz) - motorcycle (kettenkrad) pltn - towed AT pltn - 3 50mm AT - towed, truck - HW company - 1st Pltn - 3 150mm inf guns-towed, truck - 2nd pltn - 3 75mm Inf guns-towed.truck - 3rd pltn - 4 120mm mortars,truck - AA pltn-towed,truck - 8 20mm Flak 38 single barrel - I & II Bn-motorized - Administrative staff - 3 rifle companies - 3 rifle pltns with 6 LMGs each - 1 HW pltn with 4 HMGs and 2 81mm mortars - 1 HW company - 3 75mm At,towed,truck - 4 120mm mortar ARMOR assets - 2113th Pz Bn ( Pz Replacement Bn 35 )(45 Mk IV) - Bn Hq/recon section - 3 Pz Mk IV - 3 MkIV kompanies 14 Pz IV each - I Bn/130 Pz Lehr (44 Mk V) - Bn Hq/recon section - 2 Pz Mk V - 3 Pz V kompanies 14 Mk V each - Armored AA company - 4 20mm WirbelWinds - 4 37mm Flak/Pz IV Moebelwagen - Workshop units - Light workshop co. - Hvy workshop co. NOTES: Armor Bns must be attached to Infantry battalions for communications--the tanks did not have compatible radios to talk to Brigade HQ. DEPLOYMENT for Battle orders 9/18/44 KG BROSE - 2113 Pz Bde Hq(including the commander 113th Pz Bde) - 2113 Bde Signals co. - I Bn 2113 PzGrenReg - I/130 Pz Bn (MkV) - 1st Pltn Pioneers - 1st Pltn HW co.(105mm Inf Guns) - 1st section towed AA guns (4 20mm) KG FEISS - 2113th PzGrenReg Hq - II Bn/2113 PzGrenReg - 2113 Pz Bn (MkIV) - 2nd Pltn Poineers - 3rd Pltn HW co.(120mm mortars) - 2nd section towed AA co. RESERVE - Recon co. - HW pltn Pioneer co. - 2nd Pltn HW co.(75mm Inf Gun) Here is the list of commanders of the 113th Pz Bde as of 9/18/44-- (just before the Battle for Arracourt) 113th Pz Bde Col Freiherr von Saeckendorf (KIA 9/21/44) 2113th Pz Gren Reg Col Brose I Bn Capt Schrader(Capt Kirschner during battle) 1 kompanie 1st Lt Winkler 2 kompanie 1st Lt Mauff 3 kompanie 1st Lt Lange 4 kompanie 1st Lt Rebel II Bn Capt Feisse 5 kompanie 1st Lt Sadder 6 kompanie 1st Lt Schmidt (9/22/44-Lt Rausche) 7 kompanie 8 kompanie 1st Lt Dietrich (captured 3hrs into battle 9/19/44) Pioneer kompanie 1st Lt Maier http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:vgkKXCcWPbMJ:spearhead1944.com/gerpg/ger113.htm+113th+Pz+Brigade&hl=en&lr=lang_en *************************************************** quote: Because I'm right! Sorry to disappoint you. The number is closer to 4th Armoured Divisions, than to your estimate of there being just a double digit number of tanks in Lorraine. The number appears to be closer to between 400 to 500 German armoured vehicles in Lorraine.

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 4:58:32 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Kevinugly Von Rom wrote quote: I have yet to be allowed to just debate only one person at a time. Usually, it is several at a time, throwing multiple posts at me. If you didn't issue multiple challenges and were prepared to stick with one issue at a time this would be less of a problem for you[:-] This is a 'public forum' so stop whingeing about it. If you really want to debate with one person at a time you could do it via e-mail or 'private messaging', it's not difficult. Me whine? Never. It's only when others complain about a comment or two that I make, considering all the trash that has been thrown at me. Let's see how well you stand the heat when 4 or 5 people come gunning for you, my friend. As far as sticking to one topic - that is all I have tried to do. But it becomes difficult when 4 or 5 people bombard you with different topics. Right now YOU and I are debating the Lorraine Campaign, and you are doing terribly. Prepared to go down with the ship are you? I have completely demolished your argument using YOUR OWN SOURCES. [:-]

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/29/2004 8:49:01 AM)
Kevinugly: I don't want us to butt heads over this. It's not worth it. Who needs the stress, right? So relax. I don't want it to be a contest. No one has won or lost anything. OK? To be fair to you, I can understand why you and several others believe what you do about Patton and about the Campaign in Lorraine. Many historians, including D'Este have left out a lot of info about Patton and Third Army that has done them a great injustice. Just stand back for a minute and read about what was done to Third Army by the end of August 1944, and then later what they had to endure in the Lorraine fighting. Even to me, it is a far different picture than what has been presented by many historians. In particular, I am quite unhappy with D'Este for what he has left out of his book about Metz. My research indicates that he has painted a very unfair picture of Patton during this period. Also, I'm highly critical of D'Este for what he leaves out of his book about the Bulge. Just the Official History alone contains so much info about Third Army at the Bulge, that I just shake my head in wonderment how D'Este could not have included it. If people are getting a slanted view of Patton, then there is a reason why. Patton makes all of the other Allied generals look bad. In addition, my research has uncovered some very disturbing things that should make anyone sit up and ask questions: 1) Why did a British fighter with Polish markings try to shoot down Patton's plane at the end of April, 1945? 2) Why did a small group of newspapers and reporters launch a campaign to get Patton removed from command in 1943 and 1945, even against the wishes of Ike, Marshall and Bradley? 3) Why has an investigation not been done into the scandalous workings of John Clifford Hodges Lee, who was second in command of the European Theatre to Ike, and who oversaw COMM Z, which supplied the Allied Armies? While Third Army sputtered to a halt just before the Moselle River for lack of gas, Lee was using hundreds of trucks and thousands of gallons of fuel to move his bloated headquarters of 30,000 people to Paris to claim 400 hotels and their rooms; while Third Army soldiers lacked adequate food, Lee was sending bombers to North Africa to ferry in oranges for himself; and while Third Army ran low on ammo and artillery shells and had 18,000 cases of trench foot because of improper footwear, Lee used badly needed trucks and fuel to carry in prefabricated homes for his supply staff. I could go on and on about this fellow. Why was there NO investigation? Patton and Bradley despised Lee. Even D'Este has contempt for him. Yet Ike did nothing. . . Anyway, I have been finding lots interesting stuff. If I was going to do a masters degree in military history, I think I would do it on Patton in the Lorraine Campaign or the Bulge, just to help set the record straight. Really some interesting stuff. A while back Ironduke posted a quote from D'Este where General Balck gives an unflattering remark about the Americans at Lorraine. D'Este tried to indicate that this unflattering comment was about Patton. However, I have recently come across another comment by General Balck who had this to say about Patton: General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgetable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505). 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin Cheers!

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