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Paul Goodman -> (1/1/2001 12:31:00 AM)
To: RevRick Well, I think you also have to include the Yorktown at Midway, finished off by an I boat. The Lipscombe Bay was also torpedoed, heavily damaged, but did not sink, the Gilberts, I think. However, you only amplify my point. The I class submarines were not particularly formidable weapons. In fact, the Wasp was forced into totally unsuitable duty, as convoy escort from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal when she got nailed. Seth, Ed is exactly right. Of course, anything hit by a Long Lance is in serious trouble. For example, the torpedo spread that got the Wasp, also got the North Carolina (dry dock 4 months) and sunk a destroyer; the Hornet spotted the bubble trail and maneuvered to avoid the torpedoes. The trick is to avoid the counterattack. And that, the I boat could not do after mid 1943. Paul

Major Tom -> (1/1/2001 12:58:00 AM)
Here's what some I-Boats managed to do... I-6 Hit Saratoga January 10, put out of action until just after Midway I-26 Hit Saratoga August 31, out of action again during crucial fighting (solomans) I-26 Sank the CLAA Juneau I-19 Sank the Wasp, and indirectly damaged the North Carolina (putting her out of action for a long time), and sinking the DD O'Brien. These last two were hit by US torpedo's fired to scuttle the Wasp. I-58 sank the Indianapolis. I-168 put the final torpedo into the Yorkown I-175 Sank the CVE Liscome Bay and so on... What is as important as sinking a ship is to knock it out of action for crucial months. The Saratoga was sent out of two crucial actions because of sub torpedo hits. However, the IJN CV TF's could/would not exploit this advantage. Initially, both the USN and IJN had their submarine forces as fleet supporters (ie. scouts and warship killers). The USN picked up on the potential success of commerce raiding through seeing first hand the results of the U-Boat war. It isn't necessarily a technical penalty for the IJN Subs for attacking Merchant vessels, but, it would be a morale or tactical penalty. Since they were primarily trained that sinking Warships was their main goal, and that this offered the best way to end the war as their concept was more of a war between warriors, instead of a total war. Also, the Mini-Subs weren't were not originally intended as suicide craft. MANY weapons, not just Japanese, were considered to be 'suicide' weapons. Driving Sherman tanks against King Tigers was seen as 'suicidal', but, the midset of the pilots was not to die, optimally, they would survive so they could kill more enemies at some later point.

sethwrkr -> (1/1/2001 6:47:00 AM)
Thanks Major T. I think it is clear that I boats were effective shipping killers. If they had been turned on less defended, slower merchants they would have had a greater impact than they did historically. Seth

Ed Cogburn -> (1/1/2001 6:57:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by Major Tom: Here's what some I-Boats managed to do... No one is questioning what I-boats with Long Toms or suicide torpedos are capable of. What we're arguing is that I-boats were not good at surviving after the kill for whatever reason. The obvious exceptions for lone warships like the Indianapolis, or crippled carriers left to sink, are granted. But for protected ship groups, i.e. convoys, protected by DD/DE ships and/or aircraft providing ASW from escort carriers, the I-boats had a hard time suviving the first salvo. Look at what GG does in PacWar. While US subs get better torpedoes, and become harder to kill, I-boats become easier to kill later in the war, to represent increasing ASW skill by the US. Japan lost about 130 of its submarines to only 50 by the US despite the fact that the US sub fleet was much larger, and the USN figure is for both the Atlantic and Pacific. We're also saying it is not some trivial action to get the IJN subs to start sinking merchants. They had serious problems with this because of their Bushido Code and their doctrine covering the use of subs. I would love to see this as a scenario option in WitP to represent the possibility, however remote, that the Japanese could overcome their problems and use their subs as merchant raiders, but otherwise there should be some kind of restriction on Japanese subs, if WitP aims to be an accurate simulation of the war (assuming this scenario option is not selected). Furthermore, there is obviously going to be a response to this use of IJN subs as merchant raiders by the US. So this scenario option should have a counterpart, where the US responds by escalating the production of DE types and escort carriers and long range ASW planes. There should be some penalty to this as well, perhaps the US must delay some other construction to allow this escalated production of ASW craft to happen. This is an example of the kind of scenario options that WitP should have, BTW. Any option like this would have a counter-response by the enemy, or some other penalty for its use. In this case, if the IJN chooses to allow subs to attack merchant shipping, they will not have those subs available for other military operations, and the US is then given a counter-option it can choose to use. Again, the US choosing this option then has a penalty elsewhere. This makes the game much more interesting without being unrealistic, since giving the IJN this option and not giving the USN the opportunity to respond in an obvious way would be unrealistic. [This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited January 01, 2001).]

sethwrkr -> (1/1/2001 10:21:00 PM)
ED, If you put to many restrictions on Japanese freedom of action you may find it hard to find somone who is willing to play the Japanese. After all we know how the war turned out. When I play the Japanese I am hoping for a different outcome. Seth

Major Tom -> (1/2/2001 1:34:00 AM)
USN Convoys were usually heavily protected by DD's, and especially later on by innumerable DE's. One thing that a bunch of books noted was that the IJN Submariners tended to be less aggressive than any other branch of the Japanese military. If it weren't for their supurb torpedo's, I would have severely doubted that they would have been successful at all. Their determination to confirm a kill, or to get close enough to guarantee a kill was lacking (as shown by the high number of damaged USN vessels, but, relatively few sunk). As was already mentioned, most of the warships attacked in the Pacific War were done so WITHOUT the loss of the IJN sub. This is primarily due to the fact that they kept well out of range, fired a big spread of torpedo's of high quality and tended to get fewer hits. Attacking a Convoy in this manner will result in relatively few ships sunk (as the escorts primary job is to look out for submarines, instead of fleet destroyers acting primarily as surface escorts). IJN Subs weren't designed to be convoy stalkers. They were, on average, larger and clumsier than USN Submarines. Their doctrine ever since their creation was to act as fleet support units, attacking Military targets, as, this was what was seen as the way to win the war. However, since WitP is supposed to allow the greatest freedom of choice for both players on how to wage a war, I would state that total restriction of their ability to perform commerce raiding should not be inacted. Yet, I still believe that they would perform much worse than their USN counterparts, primarily through the lack of aggression of their captains and crew, along with representing the relative inflexability of the Japanese High Command to accept that this was a total war with tactics reflecting this.

Ed Cogburn -> (1/2/2001 3:17:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by Major Tom: As was already mentioned, most of the warships attacked in the Pacific War were done so WITHOUT the loss of the IJN sub. This is primarily due to the fact that they kept well out of range, fired a big spread of torpedo's of high quality and tended to get fewer hits. I don't know how we can square this with the statistic of 130 IJN subs lost to 50 for the USN. Somebody was killing IJN subs in a rather proficient manner. For all the rest I do agree with you. You concisely mentioned all the reasons why the IJN sub fleet was never used against the Allied merchant fleet. WitP should reflect this reality in some fashion, and that may mean restrictions of some type on IJN subs. A pre-war option representing the IJN overcoming these problems and using their subs against merchants is ok as long as its balanced. [This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited January 01, 2001).]

Ed Cogburn -> (1/2/2001 3:23:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by sethwrkr: If you put to many restrictions on Japanese freedom of action .... If the restriction is historical then I'd argue we shouldn't make a game that bypasses those historical problems. An option available to represent an ahistorical result is ok, as long as the counter-response by the other side is supported as well. An IJN sub fleet going after Allied merchants would certainly have triggered counter-actions by the Allies.

Paul Goodman -> (1/2/2001 8:33:00 PM)
I think that we would all agree that, if Japan was to win, it had to do so in 1942. After that, the most it can hope for is to inflict enough casualties to achieve some form of face-saving peace. The actual historical events give many interesting opportunities. "Miracle at Midway" was exactly that. Under computer game conditions, where ultimately, cold hard numbers take over, Midway will be a significant Japanese victory. The "what then" offers the Japanese player immense strategic opportunities even in a realistic model. Also, the Guadalcanal operation was really a shoestring operation that probably should (and if they knew about the Long Lance, would not have)not have been undertaken. A little cooperation between IJA and IJN, with a full scale attack by the combined fleet, it seems to me, would have resulted in a major Japanese victory and destruction of the 1st Marine Division. How would that go with the American public. So, in an accurate model, I think the Japanese have some excellent opportunities, just as they had in reality. Creating an unrealistic model to facilitate playability is unnecessary and unwanted. Paul

mdiehl -> (1/2/2001 10:09:00 PM)
A technical correction to the post on IJN submarines. They did not carry Long Lance torpedoes. The submarine torpedoes were reliable, had somewhat greater range than early US submarine torpedoes, comparable speed, and a comparable warhead (with a reliable contact detonator). As to the rest. They had some tactical successes against US warships. Listing the US CVs and CAs &c sunk by Japanese submarines is not a meaningful way to assess their relative contribution to the war effort though, either by comparison with other IJN services or US submarines. American submarines sank more warships (and hundreds more merchant ships) than their Japanese counterparts... partly because of numbers but also for reasons that Paul Goodman listed above. US submarines were superior to most (only the German Type XXI was faster underwater or could dive deeper than the US Gato class), and once the torpedo bugs were solved they were devastatingly superior. Beyond these things, US submarine doctrine was superior to IJN doctrine, and US command and control of submarines in the field was far superior. The latter is important and reflects the ability to find and interdict convoys and warships... both because of technical abilities such as radar and because of superior US radio direction finding and intelligence apparatus. So Japanese submarines should be substantially penalized when attempting to contact any American ship (or, alternatively, US submarine groups of equal size should make contact far more often), and Japanese submarines should be less effective against merchant ships (which their captains and crew disdained). I suppose that in theory IJN submarines should be allowed to attack US merchant convoys. Just make the IJN submarines highly vulnerable (as they were), limit the size of the groups in which they operate so that they are unable to form large wolf packs (to reflect the fact that the Japanese never adopted that dotrine), and make them very easy to detect. If the IJN player wishes to embrace 1:2 or 1:1 sub losses v. merchant kills, let him. The US player should welcome such an exchange. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited January 02, 2001).] [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited January 02, 2001).]

mdiehl -> (1/3/2001 1:07:00 AM)
Torpedo Tech specs: "Long Lance" (carried by IJN surface ships only). Type 95 torpedo. 24" diameter. Maximum speed 49 knots. Maximum range:22,000 yards. Warhead: 1098 pounds. Type 93 Torpedo (carried by Japanese submarines). 21" diameter. Maximum speed 45 knots. Maximum range: 13,000 yards. Warhead: 891 pounds. Interestingly, GGPW underrates the quality of US S-boat and Flush Deck DD torpedoes in the early war. The S-boats and many flush deckers carried the very reliable and accurate (though mediocre of range and detonation weight) Mark X torpedo, not the Mark XIV torpedo, and they used a simple contact exploder, not the Mark VI magnetic exploder or the contact exploder on the Mark XIV. So these should not suffer the reliability problems of the Mark XIV equipped vessels.

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