Leaders (Full Version)

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Major Tom -> Leaders (9/29/2000 8:27:00 AM)

I would like to see a larger base of leaders than PacWar offered. Every leader down to about Brigadier General/Rear Admiral should be included. Also, LCU's should have leaders assigned specifically to them (instead of just allowing leaders at bases). Divisions would have Major Generals, Brigade/Regiments Brigadier Generals, etc... I think that Aircraft HQ's should also be included. the 5th USAAF operated with MacArthur's SW Pacific force, the Royal Air Force had branches in Malaya, Burma, Ceylon and India. Airgroups, like LCU's should be attacked to specific Air HQ's and would only operate in the region, designated by their HQ. This would also require a set of new leaders (RAF Air Marshals). I think that subordinate HQ's not seen in the game should be included as well. Citing the British 14th Army, there should be IV Corps, XV Corps, and XXXIII Corps. The US formations would have sub-units like I Corps, III Amphibous Corps, V Amphibious Corps, etc.. The Japanese should have ALL of their Area Armies included in the game, along with a few Armies that were left out (BY 1944 there were 3 Armies under the Burma Area Army in Burma, not just the 15th Army).



dhuffjr -> (9/29/2000 9:17:00 PM)

Great idea! Along with including ALL of the leaders with a sky is the limit memory how bout all of the land units involved. Obviously as a strategic game you draw a line on how far down the chain to go but there are many units like Corps artillery units etc. that could be up to the whim of higher levels of command where to send them. Also the rocket equiped LCU's and tracked landing vehicles. Both are a big plus for the amphib assault but there numbers are finite and the decission to use for one assault over another effects both. While I don't want to see the game broken down to a battalion level land combat focussed game I would like to see some reality to the divisions of units, say to brigade or regiment level or battalion level where appropriate and then stop the division there.



Drex -> (10/9/2000 3:20:00 AM)

Yes, definitely a good idea with the historical leaders pre-assigned and manual replacement(from a leader pool) occurring if they are killed or perform badly.



RevRick -> (10/10/2000 3:32:00 AM)

Regarding LCUs: I would really like to see Land Combat and LCU's handled realistically. Divisions should be logically broken down (i.e. regiments or brigades, battalions [as in engineers, etc.] and not by percentages. Also, the LCU headquarters should not grow when a smaller unit is split off of it - unless that unit is replaced. I would rather see divisional level combat, even corps level (on mainland Asia) with attention to terrain, training and preparations levels, morale, and equipment which would give a better feel for that aspect of the game. Also, it should NOT be possible to load an atoll, Kwajalein, Tarawa, up with several divisions preparing for an invasion. They just were not big enough. God Bless; Rev. Rick ------------------ tincanman



Kris Hubble -> (10/10/2000 7:23:00 AM)

Just a bit of extra chrome, but I would like the ability to promote to 5-star rank for appropriate leaders.



mjmooney -> (10/18/2000 8:51:00 PM)

I think there should be an option to have leaders values kept hidden and they should be randomized. It is easy to replace a admiral with a low naval rating for one with a high one..In real life the only way to judge a leader was performance. Also you should make it tougher to replace leaders (especially somone like MacArthur). This system was incorporated in the old SSI No greater Glory game (ok I just Dated myself)-this should be an OPTION-I still like playing with leaders with their historical abilities.



sethwrkr -> (1/3/2001 7:46:00 AM)

Yeah, I would like to spend my time doing personell management. I do not get enough at work. Maybe we should model everyone down to Captain? Can we model draft boards?I would like to take active part in managing the Japanese rationing system. Seth



Ed Cogburn -> (1/3/2001 2:22:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by sethwrkr: .... I would like to take active part in managing the Japanese rationing system.
LOL! That rationing system is a little complex. You sure you're up to the challenge? [img]http://www.matrixgames.com/ubb/smile.gif[/img] Seriously, we don't need more leaders. We need leaders whose capabilities are not automatically known at the beginning. Force the player to test all the leaders before discovering the good ones. This would be an option. Allow the player if they wish to have leaders with their historical capabilities. I won't mind more HQs but only if they are easier to manage. In PAC you can't even put 2 HQs in one base (easily), even if the second HQ is a subordinate of the first HQ. Subordinate Army HQs should automatically follow their parent HQ unless the player specifically assigns it elsewhere. An alternative is to allow Army HQs to move to bases without requiring the base be turned over to that Army HQ. The presence of the Army HQ causes higher supplies to be sent to that base as normal (for that Army HQs LCUs) but the base is still controlled by the parent HQ.



sethwrkr -> (1/5/2001 7:41:00 AM)

Not knowing learship quality at the beginning may make it hard for the Japanese to take advantage of this Historical advantage in leadership quality. Of course the default leaders could be good. Also it might take away from game play by not having historical leaders with historical characteristic. Say no Tanaka or worse yet, Tanaka is a scrub. Seth



chanman -> (2/12/2001 7:33:00 AM)

Not sure about having thousands more leaders to keep track of. I do suggest having some more characteristics for them. I suggest some sort of matrix to model how the leaders will get along. Not everyone is a good fit to be a subordinate of MacArthur, for example. Stillwell did not get on well with Wavell, but cooperated well with Mountbatten and Alexander. This can impact which leader you are going to put in charge of a task force or base. You might take this further to determine how troops will perform under a commander (Australians functioning well for MacArthur, but maybe not so good for Geiger). I also think that a leaders confidence, possibly modified by some other factor (stubborness? bad name, but maybe useful). When a leader has lost his confidence (Wavell after the fall of Burma, Ghormley after Savo, for example), the leader should be reassigned "to a position more commesurate with his abilities" to recover his confidence. Just some rambling.



Major Tom -> (2/12/2001 12:29:00 PM)

Actually, Australians in the military tended to dislike MacArthur, it was only the civilians who bought into him. When he constantly downplays their actions in the field and states publically that every Australian victory is really an Allied victory, but every US victory is an American victory didn't sit too well with officers and enlisted men. This might be too difficult of an option to implement, as, for one we will never know how well Halsey might command a multinational command, since he never did!



Ed Cogburn -> (2/13/2001 11:23:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Major Tom: and states publically that every Australian victory is really an Allied victory, but every US victory is an American victory
Damn, did he really say that? I always considered MacArthur to have too much of an ego.



Major Tom -> (2/13/2001 11:34:00 AM)

He also refused to allow Australians to take part in the liberation of the Philippines. He wanted it all American, so that he can portray himself not needing outside support, when in reality much of the brunt of fighting early in the PNG campaign was taken up by the Australians. If not for the Australians doing most of the work in 1942 he couldn't have got to the Philippines by 1944.



chanman -> (2/14/2001 2:52:00 AM)

I didn't know about MacA's issues with the Australians. Difficult to model in game terms, maybe a readiness hit for certain nationality LCU's assigned to certain leaders. Marines should suffer no penalties serving under Geiger, for example, but maybe wouldn't do so well for Brett. US Army units should suffer no penalty for serving under Hodge or Wainwright, but would suffer a penalty for serving under Van Helfrich (probably misspelled). And so on. Just a thought.



mdiehl -> (2/14/2001 5:47:00 AM)

This is just the sort of speculation that made me cringe in the politics section. There is no evidence that Mac's propaganda adversely affected logistics and supply to Australian troops in 1942-43, or that USA units serving under Australian command were shorted. One might argue that, "for realism," a special prohibition against the use of Aussies in the PI could be in effect, based on the historical precedent. Overloaded with restrictions that affect tactical felxibility, a game would not be too appealing, at least not to me. IMO unless you constrain both players to exactly the same moves and strategies that were used historically, and therefore the same results (one hopes, if the simulation is a good one, but then that would be boring), then it is better to acknowledge that players are taking on the job of operational and strategic planning, and should therefore be allowed to make their own decisions about allocation of resources, and the units that will be used for assaults. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 13, 2001).]



Ed Cogburn -> (2/14/2001 1:07:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by mdiehl: One might argue that, "for realism," a special prohibition against the use of Aussies in the PI could be in effect, based on the historical precedent. Overloaded with restrictions that affect tactical felxibility, a game would not be too appealing, at least not to me.
If the restrictions are *historical* then they should be in the game. We can have an option to turn off all restrictions so you can play an unrestricted, but totally ahistorical, game.



chanman -> (2/15/2001 3:38:00 AM)

Hi mdiehl, the mechanics of the game can be used to *influence* behavior instead of force it. For instance, some of the forces the British sent into CBI were rushed there for the purpose of defending Singapore. Should I decide to abandon Singapore, the game could stretch out the reinforcements. I still get to play the "what if" so the game hasn't forced me to replay history. In terms of your comment: "There is no evidence that Mac's propaganda adversely affected logistics and supply to Australian troops in 1942-43, or that USA units serving under Australian command were shorted." I agree. Let me choose a more extreme example to illustrate what I was getting at. Should I , as allied commander, place someone like Slim or Alexander (or any other British commander) in charge of Lashio containing the Chinese 5th and 6th armies and then activate the armies to attack a Japanese LCU, the Chinese armies readiness should drop to zero. This is historical, Chiang Kai Shek would interfere with his units performance in the field and countermand orders he did not agree with. On the other hand, if the commander is Stilwell or maybe Chennault, maybe the readiness would only drop by 50%. The example is extreme, but shows what I am getting at. Some troops behaved better for some commanders than others. The granularity that the game could model this by could be pretty coarse (nationality or type of troop compared to nationality of commander) or very fine (specific commmanders compared to specific units) or somewhere in the middle. The purpose is to influence the player, but not force him. If y'all think that victory is best achieved by having that expeditionary force of the 1st Cav, 17th Inf (UK), 1st Mar and 1st Arm (AU) commanded by Van Helfrich, go ahead. Chanman



mdiehl -> (2/15/2001 4:35:00 AM)

Fair enough, Chanman. Some of the restrictions on Chinese units are already in place in GGPW anyhow. Activating a Chinese unit usually burns readiness points, but almost never initiates a combat (unless the IJA has completely vacated the location). Restrictions though should be avoided unless there is overwhelming and compelling evidence that the institutional or interpesonal rivalries really caused problems. More often than not, boardgames that I've tried that have diplomatic tables and unit restrictions seem to create ludicrous results based on what amounts to pure speculation. It is as though the thought process moves automatically from "I wonder whether or not army units would have fought as effectively for a marine commander" to "they might not" and therefore, "would not." Then, as in some board games, the hypothesis is hypostatized as a game mechanic without any compelling historical evidence to support its use.



Major Tom -> (2/15/2001 5:22:00 AM)

Unfortunately if we were to ignore every possible scenario that didn't happen we would be restricted to having a game that would only be able to follow the historical process. Probably having conflicts with individual leaders is going too far, but, nationalities and HQ's will have problems. The Chinese were more responsive to American commanders than British ones (ie. they tended to be more subordinate in following logical orders). Also, after the fall of the Dutch East Indies, Australia went close toward the American camp than the British camp. Certain things CAN be fairly easily modeled, and remember, this isn't a board game relying on humans to ensure that they remember each rule and implement it to the creator's vision on how it should be implemented. From what I know of these games, the rules are long and complicated, and easy to misinterpret or skip a section. In a computer game the engine itself can solve these problems. What I just don't want is a game devoid of any practical considerations to restrictions. The Royal Navy COULD NOT abandon the Indian Ocean to sail off its carriers and battleships to the South pacific. The IJA and IJN could NOT coordinate effectively after the 1st 6 months of the war. The Japanese could not remove any unit from Manchuria for fears of possible Russian moves. The Japanese were forced to initiate a decisive battle (at Midway?) as this was what all of their prewar planning dictated would happen. The British could not abandon Singapore without a fight. An international force of Allied vessels who have not worked up with one another will perform badly in action (Java Sea, et al.). The Japanese will suffer in the South Pacific due to the fact that Rabul and the Solomans were IJN territory, resulting in the IJNAF having the job to maintain air superiority, one better suited to the IJAAF. The IJA wanted Australia, the IJN wanted New Caledonia-Fiji, neither could/would support eachother. The problem about Pacific War and War in the Pacific, is, that the role of the player technically did not exist. There wasn't an entire Japanese commander (not even Tojo) and there was no Allied commander (no Pacific version of Eisenhouer). A way must be devised in order to place restrictions on a position that was in all practice impossible to have in the first place [img]http://www.matrixgames.com/ubb/smile.gif[/img] Ignoring politics would be like ignoring land combat. It isn't critical to playing a Pacific war game (like Carrier Strike, Carriers at War) but it sure adds a lot to the game. Before you say that it is impossible to put into practice (before you have any comparison), why not let the Matrix team tell you how/if it is to be done?



Ed Cogburn -> (2/15/2001 2:14:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by Major Tom: There wasn't an entire Japanese commander (not even Tojo) and there was no Allied commander (no Pacific version of Eisenhouer).
We Yanks are quick to forget the Soviets aren't we? [img]http://www.matrixgames.com/ubb/smile.gif[/img] Ike was only in charge of the western half of the European Theatre, he had no say in the east, so even he doesn't count.
quote:

Ignoring politics would be like ignoring land combat.
True, who was it that said "War is merely an extension of Politics"? They were right, you really can't separate the two. [This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited February 15, 2001).]



mdiehl -> (2/15/2001 8:57:00 PM)

M-T, your remark "Unfortunately if we were to ignire every possible scenario that didn't happen we would be restricted to having a game that would only be able to follow the historical process" seems like a non-sequitur. It is certainly not a logical implication of anything that *I* have suggested in this forum. By the way, IIRC His Majesty did offer to lend CVs to the USN for use in the South Pacific immediately following the Battle of Santa Cruz Isl. At the time it was judged that the IJN, having lost so much CV strength, was no threat in the Indian Ocean. So possibly removing CVs from the Bay of Bengal should be a risk that is better judged by the player than something with hardcoded penalties in the game mechanics. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 20, 2001).]



grumbler -> (2/16/2001 6:23:00 AM)

mdiehl, If you look on pages 331-335 of HP Wilmott's _The Barrier and the Javelin_ you will find a pretty comprehensive analysis of the British position on sending carriers to the Pacific. Politics, in essence, forbade (even though the idea had been a British idea to begin with). The British COS essentially concluded that the risk was simply too great, for reasons that in part are outside the game and outside the control of any possible role the players could have in such a game. Thus, a hardcoded decision to delete this option is perfectly reasonable. You do not want TOO much "realism" in this game, lest you find halfway through the game "your transport airplane has just crashed and you are dead. Game over." You want enough of the politics to get the right feel without getting bogged down in details. Ditto for leaders. I would rather have just a few leaders who would really make a difference represented. then, you can decide what commands really need the leadership and assign those leaders accordingly. Having to choose from a laundry list of leaders who are rated in a dozen skills each is the most boring possible use of my playing time, IMO. The key to the game is restricting the player to decisions that are interesting and meaningful, and using the computer to handle the others. Personally, I think even the level of leadership representation in PacWar is too much.



chanman -> (2/16/2001 12:52:00 PM)

I am not sold on the idea of needing every leader O6 and above rated in the game. I do think some additional categories would add some depth to the gaming experience. Surely not as many as a dozen, but things like fatigue or maybe confidence would give some additional flavor. In PacWar, I tend to leave Wavell in as my top British commander for the length of the war since by mid '43 he tends to have 9's in the Air and Land leadership categories. Historically, he didn't last the war there due to a number of reasons. In game terms, Tanaka should always command the IJN fleet that is going to get into surface tiffs with the Allies, but he was relieved too. For the Japanese, "face" was important and if a leader "lost face", he had to go. A good leader with a high face rating would be extremely valuable to the IJN, someone who could "make good decisions" (per the AI) and still retain the job if he encounters a couple of reverses. Yamamoto would have an extreme "face" value, to go along with his other high ratings. Just an example, but hopefully it illuminates how an additional rating category fleshes out the game. We don't need thousands of leaders, IMO. Having them add more "personality" to the game would in my mind add to the experience.



Major Tom -> (2/18/2001 3:53:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by mdiehl: M-T, your entire response was a non-sequitur built around a red herring. Very glib. Didn't address the point. Do what you will. It's your design. By the way, IIRC His Majesty did offer to lend CVs to the USN for use in the South Pacific immediately following the Battle of Santa Cruz Isl. At the time it was judged that the IJN, having lost so much CV strength, was no threat in the Indian Ocean. So possibly removing CVs from the Bay of Bengal should be a risk that is better judged by the player than something with hardcoded penalties in the game mechanics. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 15, 2001).]
I don't want to make this personal, but, since you have insisted, this is one of the reasons why War in the Pacific won't be "my design". Your arguments on just about everything appear not only to be pro-American, but anti-Japanese. Every criticism or suggestion you make is always to increase the Allied standing in the game, or to fight off something you see as helping the Japanese. You state using comparisons with a few cardboard games that Politics CANNOT be modeled, while ignoring other cardboard games and computer games that actually do model Politics, and quite effectively (Master of Orion series, Civilization II, among other empire building scenarios & Wargames). Did I say that Politics SHOULD ALWAYS TOTALLY RESTRICT THE PLAYERS TO FOLLOW HISTORI EXACTLY!!?!?!? No, I said it should be a guideline, not a forced corridor, but you keep on ignoring it. You also ignore the proposals that Politics will affec the Japanese as much as the Allies. You said many times that this is only done to create a false situation where the Japanese can win. What I say, without politics, a false situation of the Allies during the first few months allow them to behave better than they possibly could have. I looked at your revised OBC regarding improving aircraft manuverability with regards to speed, and the only things you changed were Allied planes, and VERY disproportionately. For example, the P-40E (24 Man) was compared with both the A6M2 (22 Man) and the Ki-61 (23 Man) as being totally superior. HOWEVER, the A6M2 was vastly more manuverable, and not that much slower than the P-40E. The Ki-61 is FASTER, has better climb rates, and it is more manuverable than the P-40E. Your changes only represented possible relations in manuverability with Allied aircraft, you did nothing to represent speed for Japanese aircraft. You once accused me and others for being 'Japanese-Sympathetic' or doing things just to benefit the Japanese, I propose you are doing the same for the Americans, if anyone is indeed doing anything of the sort. Frankly, I am through with these stupid debates, with one person nagging that certain stats are too good for the Axis, and another whining that they are too poor for the Axis, or vice versa for the Allies. Speculation that politics is impossible is based on NOTHING, except your inability to change your position. Before you condemn the Matrix Games, how about you give them some credit. Before you insult anyone thinking contrary to you, maybe you should make sure that what you are saying is at or remotley close to the truth. I have had my fill in debating with you. Your debates get to the point where if they don't agree with you, they are wrong. We are in hypothetical realms here, nobody is 100% wrong, nor 100% right. The only thing regarding any Pacific War game that I will ever do is to respond to reasonable bugs and historical modifications to the Pacific War OBC files. If people propose things that are totally inconsistant with accepted research or visible trends without sufficent support to back it up it, or act like a child when their proposals aren't accepted by the majority, it will not be included. I don't really care how you take it, because frankly I have had it with whiny people whose sole contribution is criticism and unconstructive demands. Oh, and regarding British Carriers, there weren't any in the Indian Ocean during the Battle for Santa Cruz. After the Japanese incusion in April 1942 they were soon withdrawn for operations in the Medeterranean/Atlantic. It wasn't until 1943-44 until Carriers were in the Indian Ocean again. The HMS Victorious was lent, but, only for an insignificant period, and it wasn't up to the US Commander or British Commander in the Pacific, but, the British Command in London, not respresented in Pacific War or War in the Pacific.



mdiehl -> (2/19/2001 9:39:00 PM)

Sure M-T, the only planes that I had changed were the Allied ones. *I told you that when you asked for the file, and specifically mentioned that I was still working on the IJN/IJA ones.* Those were the conditions on which I released the file to you. Very gentlemanly of you ignore that and to slam them here, though. In addition, as to material facts, the Ki-61's top speed was 368 mph at 15945 feet. This compares to 362 mph for the P40E at 15,000 feet. These are of course ideal speeds with well-maintained a/c. Unfortunately the Ki-61 in-line (the HA-40 and the upgraded HA-140 a lightweight knock-off of the Daimler in-line used in the ME109) was very unreliable. "Chronically unreliable" is the phrase used by Stewart Wilson (Aircraft of WWII, Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Australia, 1998:104) but you can find similar comments in almost any text about the Ki-61. Under battle conditions, where IJA maintenance was notoriously bad, it probably performed comparably or worse than the P-40E. It was a competent middle-of-the-road aircraft, slightly behind the times in terms of performance when compared with other a/c designed in or before 1941 by other powers, but a decent enough plane for 1943. For example, the P-38 (designed from the XP38 in 1939) offered 389 mph at 20000 feet in the first production variant (the "D" variant). In my view teh Ki61 would rate somewhat better than the F4F and dead equal to the P40E (which could still outmaneuver the Ki-61 at high speeds). Note also that the Mitsubishi A6M2's top speed was 328 MPH, which is why I rate the P40E as a better aircraft. As to the rest... I agree that further conversation with you will be unproductive. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]



grumbler -> (2/20/2001 8:02:00 AM)

We appear to have gotten off the topic of leaders, no? mdiehl, I don't understand why you appear to assume that M-T is acting on some hidden agenda. He is just trying his best, like the rest of us. Insulting him gets us nowhere. "non-sequiter built around a red herring"? Was that intended to communictae an idea or just throw in an insult? Quite frankly, it was opaque to me. Can you use the language to actually communicate an idea in the future? I don't think M-T or anyone else is getting rich off this project. If people here want to argue historical points (like which aircraft really had what capability), then fine. If you disagree with someone, then that is okay, too. Just avoid the insults (of course, this is easier for me to say than to do, but I try and I do know how to apologize as opposed to simply saying "I give up trying to communicate with you.") Ratchet down the pride, and ratchet up the interest in honest debate, and we can all have fun and enjoy this.



Ed Cogburn -> (2/20/2001 8:21:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by grumbler: We appear to have gotten off the topic of leaders, no?
Yep, so back to leaders. There's a discussion going on in the UV forum about Task Force sizes, and about breaking up TFs into "Task Groups". Now assume for the moment that a TF is composed of multiple TGs of different types (air combat, surface combat, transport, etc, etc). If your TF is attacked by a surface combat group, your surface combat TGs are the ones that defend the whole TF. If this is close to how they do things, then wouldn't we want the TGs to have their own leaders, like putting Halsey in charge of the whole TF, Mitschner for the air combat TGs, and Scott for the surface combat TGs. Leader skill would also decide the maximum size of the TGs and TFs. This may require more available leaders, but I think it would be very useful, and a major improvement over PAC, but it means handling as many as say 6 leaders for a TF and its TGs (6 = TF commander plus leaders of 5 TGs). Too much? Not worth it?



Andy Brown -> (2/20/2001 2:54:00 PM)

Just a quick comment on Chanman's observation about the relationship between Chinese and British leaders. The Chinese fought for Stillwell because he was American and the Americans had all the goodies Chiang Kai Shek needed to defeat both the Japanese and the communists and to reestablish dominance over China. Even today, the British are far better at dealing with other nationals than the Americans. This is admittedly due to experience gained through 300 years of colonial exploitation but that's the way it goes. Anyway, I wanted to quote the following passage from "Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion" by Ian Lyall Grant and Kazuo Tamayama. It deals with the fighting for the Yenangyaung oil fields. "The Chinese commander, Lieutenant-General Sun Li Jen, was one of the bright young officers whom Chiang Kai Shek had sent to get their military education abroad. He had been educated at the Virginia Military Academy in America and spoke English well. General Slim was much impressed by his personality and character. As the Chinese had no tanks or artillery, Slim offered to put one squadron of tanks and E Troop RHA under his command for a proposed attack the next day. This offer, which was accepted ... greatly enhanced General Sun's prestige with his division".



mdiehl -> (2/20/2001 9:36:00 PM)

Thr crux of the problem, with respect to design, will be the extent to which one confidently views the small number of cases that we have as anecdotal evidence as proof of the need for a systemic rule. Chinese-American and Chinese-British relations provide a case in point. One view seems to be, based on some posts on this forum, that the relations between the higher level diplomats (Churchill-Chiang, or, I guess prior to 1944, Roosevelt-Chiang) would have affected the performance of junior officers and units in the field, if and when they were called upon to fight. It is one thing to say Chiang reserved the bulk of his army for the coming war with the Communists. It is another thing entirely to say that, as an extension of Chiang's reticence, Colonel so-and-so would, if attacked, fight better for an American commander than a British one. Then too, if it is true that higher level relations affected lower level performance, would Chinese units really have fought more effectively for Stillwell, given the acrimonious relationship between Stillwell and Chiang, and between Stillwell and Chennault? How does one model this? An acrimony rating when general x interacts with general y, or a more general rule (all units of nationality x fight poorly for a general of nationality y)? Maybe an overall acrimony rating for Chiang with a random probability that upon assigning an American or British commander in the theater, Chiang will be a pest?



chanman -> (2/21/2001 3:51:00 AM)

Hi Andy and mdiehl, I guess what I am after is a bit more depth to the leaders than just Air, Land, Sea and Agressiveness. During the war, the various commanders had to make some hard decisions as to who to place in various commands. Their decisions were based on more factors than just their absolute skill values. Again, I am not suggesting anything that would force the player down a specific path, but would provide more factors for them to consider when selecting the commander. I used the CBI for most of my examples since that arena tends to illustrate so well. Incredible problems coupled with some of the strongest personalities (Chiang Kai Shek, Stillwell, Chennault, Mountbatten, for example) in command positions. [This message has been edited by chanman (edited February 20, 2001).]



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