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RevRick -> (2/17/2001 8:48:00 AM)
Teppo; I believe that I spoke in reverse, which is not abnormal for me. The book is about the USS Washington, and the report that crew had about the battle damage to the South Dakota at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 15 Nov 42. The engineer had wired the breakers so that they would not trip and drop power of line..which had the effect of wiring the entire ship in series, I believe is the term. The information stated that when the main guns fired, that dropped the whole load from engineering and all they had were the boilers, engines, and emergency steering control. Again, I have not seen any official documentation on the battle from any source, but that is what came to me from a historical book about the other BB involved in the action. If you have any more information, let me know were it is. I read the Morison series many years ago, but I don't remember much about his report of the action except the damage included the unexploded 14" round lodged against the #3 barbette. ------------------ God Bless; Rev. Rick, the tincanman

Greg Wilmoth -> (2/20/2001 6:34:00 AM)
Some of the earlier posts in this thread talked about ship design problems. Strategy & Tactics magazine just came out with an article I wrote on a class exercise on designing an aircraft carrier (S&T #204). It would take too long to go into detail here, but basically the class sat as the US Navy's General Board in 1931 trying to decide the characteristics of the Navy's remaining aircraft carriers under the Washington Naval Treaties. The exercise included edited versions of the actual exhibits the Board examined as testimony and evidence. The class was called Understanding Military Technology. It was part of the Strategic Studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, and anyone can get the exercise for a couple of bucks. Details can be found at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/depts/strategic/index.html Oh, and while there was no right answer for the exercise, the majority of the class unwittingly arrived at the historical outcome: two 20,000 ton carriers and one 15,000 ton carrier (i.e. the Enterprise and Yorktown, and the smaller Wasp).

dtatum -> (2/24/2001 5:57:00 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Sapphire: [B]Consider the following: In mid '42 the Japanese decided to emphasize carrier production over battleships. As a result the Musashi became their last battleship, and the Shinano became a carrier. That's historical fact. REPLY-- Why not give the Japs the ability to build a fighter, in some quantities, that, unlike the zero, stressed pilot protection equipment (self sealing tanks, armored cockpit, etc) Zeroes are fine for long distance work against an unprepared foe, but if you're going against US fighters, you want to keep those pilots alive. Especially the Japanese pilots, they were just about the best in the world, certainly the best carrier pilots.

grumbler -> (2/25/2001 7:53:00 AM)
Unfortunately, this idea enters the realm of hindsight. The charactor of the Japanese was such that losses were not considered as sigificant as mission accomplishment and maintenance of honor. To a Japanese pilot, changing from a premier offensive aircraft like the Zero to a more defensively-oriented aircraft (like the Irving) was seen as a slur on their honor and skill. Defensive capabilities were deemed unnecessary if the pilot was good enough to avoid getting shot at. Giving him a plane that was designed to take fire was telling him that he wasn't good enough to avoid taking fire. Had the elite pilots lived long enough to be offered such planes, I think they would have refused the opportunity vigorously.

Greg Wilmoth -> (2/25/2001 9:19:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by Paul Dyer: Two thoughts on this topic. 1/. .... 2/. .... P.S. Sapphire - I'm also an economics graduate (no economist jokes please - we've heard them all). I think Pacwar succeeds because it operates on many levels. A good war game and also a good resource management game. Agree few games ever model economies properly - Capitalism is one that comes to mind. We don't want to go overboard, but I note that games in areas like managing football teams often benefit by having to also manage the finances and face resource constraints. A bit of this could enhance Pacwar, especially if you could always turn it off. Could one of you economics majors explain how you would like to see the economy model changed? I'm not familiar with the game "Capitalism." Thanks.

dtatum -> (2/26/2001 10:49:00 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by grumbler: [B]Unfortunately, this idea enters the realm of hindsight. The charactor of the Japanese was such that losses were not considered as sigificant as mission accomplishment and maintenance of honor. Yes, it is in the realm of hindsight, and that's the problem with all these discussions of allowing US and Japan more choices, especially those that propose to start the game before 1941. But, if you're going to let players tinker with history, you can't readily restrict them in areas that would be under the control of the military's top brass. If I'm a Jap Admiral and I say that some Jap pilots will fly a more defensive plane, that is end of discussion. Besides, what military gives their pilots a 'choice'of what plane they will be flying?

mdiehl -> (2/27/2001 12:58:00 AM)
One problem with for example allowing the Japanese to build a/c with different characteristics (better pilot protection and so forth) is that their design was integrated with their production abilitities and with their tactical doctrine. The Zeke was in some ways perfect for Japan's economy and doctrine because: 1. It used a relatively inexpensive 900-ish Hp radial that ran well on low-octane fuel. 2. Because it only developed 900-ish it could not be all that robust, so it was light and maneuverable and as a by product had long range. 3. Because the plane was highly maneuverable (but not very fast) it was ideal for an a-a combat doctrine that emphasized skill at aerobatic maneuvers... 4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.) 5. ... and also being perfectly suited to the notion of a Japanese pilot being an individual Samurai and his plane his "sword." After all, it is not as though the Japanese did not care about losses (at least I do not think they were unconcerned). Certainly a different philosophy of resignation (or even glorification) to combat losses, but minimizing losses was definiteley desirable. Instead, the Zeke was the plane that was a concurrent product of the limitations on Japanese industry in combination with their (outdated by 1941) doctrine for a-a combat. Now, try making something like the Ki-44 and you end up with the historical product. A better plane, IMO, than the Zeke, when it worked at all, that was far less reliable, far more costly to mfr, and much more difficult to service, and that still did not compete well with many late-war Allied a/c (because it was still considerably slower than some of the late war Allied a/c). The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle). To fix the problem with producing the better airplane you reduce available manpower for combat and support units (cause they are all in 2-year technical schools), you ratchet down production to minimal levels at the precise moment that you need to field the maximum number of operational a/c and their replacements, etc. In game terms I suppose one could argue that the Japanese player should have the choice. But then, there should be very little with which to fight in 1941 and 1942... few replacement a/c, few pilots, few technicians, and not enough gasoline to go around, even before you start worying about losses caused by enemy pilots, submarines and so forth. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (2/28/2001 7:36:00 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: "4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.)" Which was to use their aircraft's superior diving speed for slash and run attacks--a tactic that was learned the hard way through early losses. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: "The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle)." Eric Bergerund in his book Fire In The Sky about the air war in the South Pacific notes the first Zero prototype was delivered to an airfield for its first test flight by ox-cart. He claims Japanese industry couldn't consistently achieve the machine tolerances necessary to manufacture key subassemblies for "second generation" WWII fighters. It seems to me that technological uncertainty is a critical missing element. When these planes were designed and first tested (on both sides), nobody really knew how they would perform. Like someone has suggested in another thread about leaders, maybe players shouldn't know exactly how well various aircraft are rated until they are first available for production. Then they can decide what to produce. I suppose it depends on whether the purpose of the game is to set the player in the position of the historical decision makers, or to set him up as a time traveller to the past with perfect knowledge of what happened historically. Either way is an interesting game in its own right, but they are different viewpoints. [This message has been edited by Greg Wilmoth (edited February 27, 2001).]

grumbler -> (2/28/2001 9:02:00 AM)
mdiehl, Great post. You got at the heart of what I was trying (and failing) to say. All of these factors are interrelated to a degree that is simply not possible to understand, perhaps, until you have "seen the procurement elephant". Greg, what you suggest is interesting, but doen't go far enough. In fact, no one can tell how good an aircraft (or any other) design REALLY is until it is in production and has seen combat. Them, it is too late to make the production decision - it has already been made, and all you can do is make the best of what you already have. That is why, in the end, using either (1) historical or (2) ahistorical but random production decisions really creates the interesting decisions in the game. If both sides get to concentrate on uberweapons using hindsight, then most of the interest goes away, at least for me. It is far more interesting to try to explot the limited strengths of what you get handed, IMO, than to try to figure out what the optimal, if unrealistic, production strategy ought to be. Probably no Admirals since Fischer ever saw the products of their design inputs, because the time lag from requirement to commisioning was longer than the time any WWII Admiral had in office. As players, if we accepted this truth, the game is much more challenging and interesting.

mdiehl -> (2/28/2001 8:49:00 PM)
Well, I would differ with you both on some of the finer points of detail. IMO most of the powers (possibly even Japan) knew exactly what they were getting after the first or second design go-round, with respect to durability, speed, diving/climbing characteristics, roll rate, and all that. The real question is whether or not they a) could produce a/c with different characteristics, and, b) wanted to. Consider the P38... everyone knew from the YP38 platforms that they had a pretty good a/c. It was very (very very!!) fast for its, uh, design window (1940-ish for the YP variants). Likewise, the Japanese knew that the A6M had control problems at higher speeds (problem of having a thin-skinned a/c and huge control surfaces) but made no efforts to alter it until the A6M5. I for one do not view the US/European focus on speed and hitting power as a design strategy that evolved by accident or through, say, some kind of selective pressure induced by combat losses (though I'm not sure that you implied that, grumbler, I may just be reading your post wrong). All the Euro/US and even the Soviet designers were going that way. Japan took a turn down a different path in the 1930s and it was just the wrong path. One reason for the Euro/US/USSR focus on speed and hitting power may have been the perceived threat from strategic bombers and high-speed medium bombers. And though it was known by all that the US was making efforts there, no one (outside of the USAAF) expected the development of a really long range bomber. So maybe Japan simply saw no threat in the vast reaches of the Pacific and from the ultra-underdeveloped nations in close proximity to the home islands. And of course, the analyses of the Spanish Civil War already pointed to the importance of speed in "pursuit" a/c. Greg, it is just not true that US pilots learned hit and run tactics as a result of attrition in 1942. Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941. Zoom and boom was the tactical doctrine for the USN/USMC thereafter. The USAAF and Commonwealth forces were all thoroughly retrained beginning in late 1940 based on UK analyses of tactics and results from 1940 (resulting in the abandonment of linear formations and big sections in favor of 4-plane sections divisible as two mutually supporting units of 2 a/c.) It shows too. I posted a brief analysis of Frank's loss list on the "a/c attributes" section in the GGPW discussion (blown away by the recent web-reset). F4Fs in 1942 typically shot down as many or more A6Ms in combat than they lost at Guadalcanal. (Claims that the Zekes were lost in surface attack, or that the numbers are affected by a/c losses due to CV loss are incorrect since both were excluded from that analysis). More than that, there are plenty of sources describing huge IJN losses at Coral Sea as a result of a/a combat. What I'd like to see is a good assessment of USAAF a/c vs IJN/IJA a/c for the period from January through April 1941 [* oops, 1942*] that excludes US a/c destroyed on the ground. I think that what you will find is that US a/c were only badly trounced when they had little warning of an incoming raid (& were at a tactical disadvantage at the onset of combat). The only consistent losers in the non-Chinese Allied a/c pool will be Hurricanes, F2s and P39s. (A shame that last one. With a decent supercharger the P39 would have wiped the slate against any Japanese a/c built through 1943). [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 01, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/1/2001 11:12:00 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: [B]Well, I would differ with you both on some of the finer points of detail. IMO most of the powers (possibly even Japan) knew exactly what they were getting after the first or second design go-round, with respect to durability, speed, diving/climbing characteristics, roll rate, and all that. The real question is whether or not they a) could produce a/c with different characteristics, and, b) wanted to. I think until the aircraft were actually flown an element of uncertainty remained. For example, R. J. Francillon in his book Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War states the Japanese Army was disappointed the Ki-61 did not reach the expected speed. This was after a considerable investment of time, talent and resources. And then there is the problem of bugs, like the tendency of the B-29's engines to catch fire on takeoff. I don't think this could have been forseen, except in the general sense that the development was rushed and something was likely to cause trouble. With regard to "a," I don't think there was a problem with the ability of the Japanese to design higher performance aircraft, but building them was a problem. Regarding "b," I think the issues are more complicated than just "wanting to," if for no other reason that there are always tensions regarding design between the military, the engineers, and the industrialists. Richard Overy makes the point in The War In The Air that the military in Japan and Germany had the final say in these questions, and the result was too many different designs and too many modifications to existing designs at the expense of new improved designs. The governments of the US, Britain, and in its own way the Soviet Union, insisted that the viewpoints of the engineers (design) and the industrialists (production) received equal consideration. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: Consider the P38... everyone knew from the YP38 platforms that they had a pretty good a/c. It was very (very very!!) fast for its, uh, design window (1940-ish for the YP variants). Likewise, the Japanese knew that the A6M had control problems at higher speeds (problem of having a thin-skinned a/c and huge control surfaces) but made no efforts to alter it until the A6M5. According to the Zero designer (whathisname) in Eagles of Mitsubishi, the IJN kept insisting on upgrades to the Zero (I don't remember which ones) which absorbed the available engineering talent and delayed development the A7M. But then maybe this is a strategy choice that ought to be included in the game. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: I for one do not view the US/European focus on speed and hitting power as a design strategy that evolved by accident or through, say, some kind of selective pressure induced by combat losses (though I'm not sure that you implied that, grumbler, I may just be reading your post wrong). All the Euro/US and even the Soviet designers were going that way. Japan took a turn down a different path in the 1930s and it was just the wrong path. Actually, I did imply that, but on the basis of relative differences. In other words, they had to tailor their tactics to handle more maneuverable Japanese aircraft in a way they wouldn't have to against some other country's aircraft that might be equally or less maneuverable. To me that is a tactical improvisation based on specific circumstances and different from the deliberate design decisions you mention. I basically agree with you that the US and the European powers opted for speed and hitting power, although only late in the 1930s. Experience in Spain was important, especially to the Germans, in deciding speed was more important than maneuveablity. The Italians were not so discerning. What I've read suggests the Japanese designers of the period were pushing designs with more speed when the pilots wanted more maneuverability. Japanese designs seemed to be based on their experience in China, which was very different from Spain. And the technology was expensive and changing very fast. Let's not forget the US still had biplane fighters on some carriers in 1939. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: One reason for the Euro/US/USSR focus on speed and hitting power may have been the perceived threat from strategic bombers and high-speed medium bombers. And though it was known by all that the US was making efforts there, no one (outside of the USAAF) expected the development of a really long range bomber. So maybe Japan simply saw no threat in the vast reaches of the Pacific and from the ultra-underdeveloped nations in close proximity to the home islands. And of course, the analyses of the Spanish Civil War already pointed to the importance of speed in "pursuit" a/c. Agreed, although the RAF was pushing bombers too. Designers in different countries tried to come up with specialized interceptor types of fighters (Japanese J2N "Jack" for instance), but the arrival of radar made this approach less important. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: Greg, it is just not true that US pilots learned hit and run tactics as a result of attrition in 1942. Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941. Zoom and boom was the tactical doctrine for the USN/USMC thereafter. The USAAF and Commonwealth forces were all thoroughly retrained beginning in late 1940 based on UK analyses of tactics and results from 1940 (resulting in the abandonment of linear formations and big sections in favor of 4-plane sections divisible as two mutually supporting units of 2 a/c.) This is news to me, although I can't dispute it. Of course there is always the problem of dissemination and indoctrination of doctrine. Certainly many an allied pilot in the first year of the war succumbed to the temptation to mix it up with a Zero or Oscar and paid dearly for it. The Brits must have moved very fast in their retraining since I believe they fought the Battle of Britain in the fall of 1940 using fighter tactics based on the three plane "vic." [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: It shows too. I posted a brief analysis of Frank's loss list on the "a/c attributes" section in the GGPW discussion (blown away by the recent web-reset). F4Fs in 1942 typically shot down as many or more A6Ms in combat than they lost at Guadalcanal. (Claims that the Zekes were lost in surface attack, or that the numbers are affected by a/c losses due to CV loss are incorrect since both were excluded from that analysis). Sorry I didn't get to see that. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: More than that, there are plenty of sources describing huge IJN losses at Coral Sea as a result of a/a combat. I wonder how well the US Navy and Army shared tactical lessons. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: What I'd like to see is a good assessment of USAAF a/c vs IJN/IJA a/c for the period from January through April 1941 that excludes US a/c destroyed on the ground. I think that what you will find is that US a/c were only badly trounced when they had little warning of an incoming raid (& were at a tactical disadvantage at the onset of combat). The only consistent losers in the non-Chinese Allied a/c pool will be Hurricanes, F2s and P39s. Don't know. I'd like to see that too. [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: (A shame that last one. With a decent supercharger the P39 would have wiped the slate against any Japanese a/c built through 1943). Reading Eric Bergerund's Fire In The Sky, a lack of warning of an incoming raid was responsible for a lot of the P-39 losses at Port Morseby. The development of engines and superchargers is a whole other story and interesting in its own right. I've read partisans of the P-38 and P-40 who felt the same sense of shortchange regarding superchargers.

mdiehl -> (3/1/2001 8:31:00 PM)
Sounds like we agree on most points. Richard Overy's book should be required reading for game designers. IIRC even the IJN had biplanes on their CVs in 1939. It was a question of sufficient lift with minimum launch-space... a problem not faced by land based a/c that could opt for a monoplane design. It is also true that the slower, less maneuverable a/c were in service, incl the P35, P36, into 1941. IIRC the Phillippine AF in 1941/42 still fielded a few relict P26s, one of which apparently scored some victories [!] in December 1941 (according to the blurb in the assembly instructions of my Tamiya product). But the new generation designs were already on the board in Europe and the US, and possibly Japan. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 01, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/2/2001 8:03:00 AM)
Do you have a source for this? [QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl: "Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941." I want to find out more about this. Who sponsored the trials? Was it a one-time event? How were the lessons-learned preserved and dissemenated?

mdiehl -> (3/3/2001 6:09:00 AM)
I think the source was Bergerud Fire in the Sky. A book that I do not own but have borrowed & read cople of times. I'm sure you'll find Thach directly in the index. I'm pretty sure that FitS will not go into great detail about who sponsored & how often. I will look for additional info. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 02, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/3/2001 9:54:00 AM)
Thanks. I just read Eric Bergerund's Fire in the Sky for the first time a couple of months ago. I must have missed it. I'll check again. If it doesn't have the source, I believe Bergerund's E-mail address is at the web site of the university in San Francisco where he's teaching.

grumbler -> (3/3/2001 9:32:00 PM)
John Lundstrom's The First Team (USNI, 1984) has an extensive section on the development of the "Thatch Weave" in Appendix 4. It notes that the first steps taken by the USN towards two-plane sections was made in October 1939. The Atlantic fleet tests of two vice three plane sections were so positive that pilots resented the stupidity of reverting to three plane sections when this was ordered by COMAIRBATFOR, Vice Admiral Halsey. Squadron commanders battled Halsey for almost two years until Halsey finally relented in July, 1941, and allowed the reorganization into two-plane scetions. Thatch took command of Fighting Three and boarded the USS Enterprise in April 1941. This was his first opportunity to test his ideas on the proper use of aircraft formations. He was especially active in experimentation when his squadron went ashore in the summer of 1941 to transition to Wildcats. While there, the word ame down about the charactoristics of the Zero, and Thatch devised a tactic that allowed his squadron's planes to deploy in mutual support that would allow them to engage a faster, more maneuverable, and fast-climbing enemy. He converted to four (vice six) plane divisions and place his sections in line abreast. The idea was that the planes could turn into an enemy attack on either section of the division, thus the Thatch Weave. Halsey refused to accept this change (which was both organizational and doctrinal, and thus doubly difficult to enact) for general use, but gave Thatch permission to use this tactic in his own squadron. Thatch employed Army fighters (P-39s) in testing this theory in May 1942 at NAS Kaneohe Bay, on his own initiative. The Army pilots were most impressed. They were unable to make unopposed attacks on any of Thatch's fighters (even when taking them by surprise), which meant their attacks were much less effective because they had to focus on defense rather than offense. The Thatch weave was first employed by Fighting Three in combat at the Battle of Midway. VF-3 destroyed four Zeros in air to air combat at a cost of one aircraft in their initial encounter. With the loss of Yorktown, VF-3 pilots were scattered to other fighter squadrons while VF-3 was rebuilt. They took the tactic, and their experiences with it, to the other squadrons and the Thatch Weave began to be widely, if informally, adopted. After James Flatley used the weave at the battle of Santa Cruz to successfully repel a large number of Japanese Zeros who caught the American pilots low on fuel and awaiting landing (none of the US aircraft could use more than 50% power because of fuel limits), he wrote a widely-disseminated After Action Report in which he first used the term "Thatch Weave" and claimed that it alone was responsible for the lack of losses to his fighters when caught in such a vulnerable position. He declared it "absolutely infallible when properly executed." At last, COMNAVAIRPAC accepted the tactic as a standard doctrine and ordered Thatch to write up the documentation, training plans, and syllabus. By mid-1943 this tactic was being taught to all USN/USMV squadrons. [The book isn't about Army avaiation so it doesn't go into the adoption by the Army.] The gist of all this is that it took atual combat experience to shake out which doctrines were going to be successful in combat and which were not. The correlary is that no one knew, until aircraft entered combat, just how good they were going to be. In fact, if we really wanted to model the interaction of aircraft and doctrine, the charactoristics of aircraft as shwon in the game should NOT be based on their theoretical/technical performance, but on their actual performance as impacted by their doctrine. High speed or maneuverability does not avail if the doctrine does not call for it, nor does lack of speed or maneuverability advantage much harm the aircraft's performance if it has a doctrine that doesn't call for them (as the Thatch Weave showed in Wildcat vs Zero combat). However, my reading seems to indicate that it is NOT true that the US was using the Thatch weave in 1939-1940.

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/4/2001 6:13:00 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by grumbler: [B]John Lundstrom's The First Team (USNI, 1984) has an extensive section on the development of the "Thatch Weave" in Appendix 4. Thanks for the notes and the citation. I'll check this out.

mdiehl -> (3/5/2001 9:46:00 PM)
Thanks grumbler for the excerpts. Your post basically confirms what I read in Bergerud and mentioned before.. that Thach was working on the problem in 1940 and tried it out in exercises in 1941. From your post it is obvious that USN pilots were using the mvr prior to official acceptance of the tactics higher up, since it was used at Santa Cruz when, according to your post, it was officially not-sanctioned. When you consider the success of USN/USMC a/c on Guadalcanal and the loss ratios at Coral Sea it seems likely that the tactic was in widespread use by the USN/USMC before it receieved official approval from higher HQ. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 05, 2001).]

mdiehl -> (3/5/2001 10:00:00 PM)
The corollary, that one could not evaluate whether an a/c design was good until it entered combat, is false. Were it true, then 1) one would have to assume that a/c designers did (and do now) operate in a black box in which design success is essentially a random walk through the various characteristics from which a designer can choose, and, 2) that there should be no systematic similarities in the design characteristics of those WWII a/c that history judges to have been very successful, and 3) that any number of obsolete or obsolescent designs that were discontinued in 1940-41 might have been very successful against first line Axis a/c if only they had been used in combat. In that event luminary choices from the US reject pile might include the P35, P36, perhaps even the Curtiss Jenny, since none of these a/c saw widespread use in combat. (In GGPW the Jenny should be a great plane. Since it did not have to deal with, er, an excess of momentum, heheh, and had large control surfaces per unit of weight and lift, it was far more maneuverable than the A6M.)

grumbler -> (3/6/2001 8:04:00 AM)
mdiehl, I don't think I agree with your apparent contention that aircraft designers knew when they had a "winner" and that the production of losers was therefor mere criminal incompetance, since everyone knew they were losers. The fact of the matter is that aircraft are designed long before they are used. Many end up being used in completely different ways than was anticipated when their basic design was completed. The P-38 was originally a short-range-high-speed interceptor. When that mission was scrapped they looked at the (sometimes, but not alway unforseen) shortcomings of existing designs and adapted what they had based on combat experience. Even when the P-38 entered combat, it didn't start out as a great fighter because the doctrine for it wasn't fully developed. Later, of course, it became one of the great fighters of the war when married to a doctrine that utilized its strengths. I seem to recall Bong turning down transition to the P-47 and later the P-51 because he considered the P-38 to be superior. Now, you can cite extreme examples to show that my statements are not true under all circumstances. I suppose that I would have to admit that since a Yellow Peril was not ever tested in combat a literal reading of my correlary would indicate that it could have been the best combat plane of the war and we never knew it. I don't play these kinds of semantic games, though. I will gladly acknowledge that you can find extreme cases where the correlary isn't true. However, I am more interested in solving the problems we are actually facing than engaging in semantics. My point is that it takes, IMO, actual experience in combat (with the commensurate developent of doctrine) to actually establish which planes are the "winners" and which the "losers." Simply analyzing speed, armament, and turning radius doesn't cut it. This leads back to my main point. The Zero was the principal fighter of the IJN because it met their needs for a "knight's steed" and they were not inclined to trade it in for a more defensively-oriented aircraft even if they had had the choice. This may have been a Bad Decision, but it was so closely locked into the charactor of the Japanese warrier that changes to this decision were probably not possible. The game needs to note this sort of thing. If players want the power to over-ride such considerations, that is fine with me. The game should show why that is departing from history, though, and this should be a lessor priority than making the historical game work well. That's all I am saying.

mdiehl -> (3/6/2001 9:13:00 PM)
Grumbler, I think you and I are closer to agreement on this than we suspect. We seem to agree on the integration of Japanese a/c design characteristics with their industrial ability, pilot training, dogma, doctrine and the like. I will, however, never agree that a/c designers had no knowledge or even very limited of how their a/c would perform in combat. If you want to call my objections "semantic" that's okay. But the semantic objection highlights an established fact: that a/c speed, durability and firepower were the winning characteristics for a/c using gun combat, that a/c designers knew this in 1939, and that the western power a/c designs of 1939 all empahasize these characteristic ("high speed short range interceptor" describes pretty much the design goals all of the US/UK/German a/c on the boards in 1939). Can you find a western a/c design from 1939 in which the design goals were long range and high maneuverability at the expense of speed and durability? Were any such designs accepted? I can't recall any. One pilot's anecdotal recollections about his a/c preference is interesting but does not make the whole argument. Bong may have preferred the P38J over other a/c types, but we may never know why. He may have preferred the added reliability of that second engine, or perhaps the avoidance of the convergence problem. We do know that the P38D variant was less than successful in the ETO because it had compressibility problems in high speed dives, and because the early engines had inferior cooling and supercharger characteristics. This made it somewhat weak against later variants of the FW190. The problem with the early P38s was not a tactical/doctrinal one. It was a mechanical one. The subsequent P38J-variant simply outclassed everything with which the Japanese could oppose it, and it was also a very good performer in the ETO against high-end German designs. If Bong had been required to fly lots of ground attack missions, he might have preferred the P47 or F4U. Who knows. I suspect that, in game terms, I am talking about things that game designers would call inherent features of particular a/c designs. You seem to be talking about things more in the arena of pilot training and experience. If you want to say that IJN pilots were on the whole more experienced at using emphasizing the strengths of their a/c I'd agree. On the US side of the equation, the training and doctrine was just good enough to make the F4F-and-pilot combination the exact equal of Japanese a/c-pilot combination from April-December 1942. Therafter the US plane-pilot combination was better than the IJN/IJA plane-pilot combination, and the imbalance increased as the US/UK began mass deploying a/c that were inherently vastly superior to the Japanese ones. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 06, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/7/2001 9:04:00 AM)
I think you both (Grumbler and Mdiehl) are close in your positions. The chief difference appears to be that Grumbler seems to be saying only combat can truly pick a winner. Mdiehl seems to be saying that European and American designers had figured out that speed, durability and firepower were the winning characteristics. I don’t think the question can be settled. First of all, I don’t believe in technological determinism. I don’t think technology travels down one inevitable path. Too many technical decisions in the world get made for non-technical reasons and locked in at sub-optimal levels (starting with the layout of the letters on the keyboard I’m using). Second I don’t think the European aeronautical designers of the late ‘30s could be absolutely sure they had the right solution (although some may have believed it). They and their military customers were trying to deal with risk. They watched each other, experimented, and tried to make sense of the air combat in the limited wars of the period. The smart or lucky ones decided speed would trump maneuverability. Yet more than one country bought late model biplane fighters to hedge their bets. But that doesn’t mean I believe combat is the ultimate abiter of design, either. There are too many other factors involved, such as pilots (already mentioned), climate (did the P-40 perform better in North Africa than Northern Europe?), higher octane gasoline (Britain took its first delivery of 100 octane from the US in the summer of 1939), manufacture and maintenance (hanger queens don’t fight), and even numbers (who said quantity has a quality all its own?). Combat is not a lab experiment; too much depends on the situation. For example, there are documented cases of U.S. four engined bombers engaging Japanese and German four engined patrol aircraft. My favorite is a battle that took place on August 17, 1943 over the Bay of Biscay. A U.S. B-24 spotted and engaged two Fw-200 Condors. The B-24 managed to shoot down one Condor and damage the other before it had to ditch from battle damage. I suppose one could argue that proved the B-24 was a better “fighter” than the Fw-200. Even if one could accept a single combat as adequate evidence, most reasonable people would see such a claim as meaningless. Finally, we can’t always assume engineers really know what they’re doing. There is a book called “What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History,” by Walter Vincenti. It’s not an easy read, but one of the chapters is on the “Davis Wing,” which was used in the B-24 and was written up in Life magazine as “The Wing that Could Win the War.” Davis was a self-taught inventor, and he was working probably just at the end of the period in aeronautical history when a non-technically trained person could still make a design contribution. The Davis wing did seem to decrease drag and therefore increased range, at least for the B-24. Davis had an elaborate explanation using algebra and geometry to explain how it worked, but engineers couldn’t make sense of it. It wasn’t until later with more sophisticated analysis that engineers were able to understand what Davis apparently stumbled onto. Air moving over the curved top of a wing ends up in turbulence. His design moved the starting point of that turbulence further aft. Since the area of the top of the wing covered in turbulence was proportional to drag, moving it back reduced the turbulent area, and hence the drag. Davis had a good design, but he really didn’t have a clue as to how it worked. For awhile, at least, neither did the engineers. Both of you have good points, but for all the above reasons, I don’t think the question can be settled. But keep at it. I learn new things each time you each post. BTW, Amazon.com says a paperback edition of Bergerund’s Fire in the Sky will be coming out in May.

mdiehl -> (3/7/2001 9:28:00 PM)
I think the Western a/c designers of the late 1930s knew that they had the right solution in speed, firepower, and durability. The variation that you see in a/c designs from western powers from 1939-1944 simply reflects different approaches to achieving these characteristics, that were as Grumbler and I noted for the Japanese, also affected by industrial constraints (or opportunities), the pace of working out design bugs, and the like. Towards the end of that window, thrust became the obsession, although obviously innovations in aerfoils continued to improve a/c speed by reducing drag. But when you look at the designs and the a/c accepted after 1939, the common thread is speed, firpower, and strength. I do not think that is a coincidence, or the accidental convergence on the right solution. This is not to say wierd technical considerations did not affect designs. Only that the goals were commonly recognized and commonly pursued. You do not need to stop at the Davis wing to find experiments that produced good results. Sticking the R-R Merlin into P51A's was good fortune. (Although maybe the designers expected the happy result that was achieved before the actually mounted the new engine.) The last biplane fighter that the US accepted for service was, IIRC, designed in 1935 and received a couple of upgrades in 1936 and 1937 as power plants improved. This was the Grumman F3F. For those who are unfamiliar with it -- it looked alot like a biplane version of the F4F Wildcat, though it did not perform as well. Unlike the navy, the USAAF had, IRRC, completely converted to P36s and P35s for combat deployment by 1939... low wing monoplanes that were as durable and fast as they could be given that they too were designed in the early-mid 1930s. The F3F was deployed on US CVs in 1936-1939, and was phased out in the short run by the F2A in a couple cases, and by the F4F in all cases. The reason why the F3F was used on CVs when the USAAF had gone completely over to monoplane designs had to do with maximizing lift and durability for carrier ops, which were inevitably harder on a/c than operations from a land base. I'm sure that if the navy had access to a fast, durable monoplane that could have been used on CVs in 1936, they would have chosen the monoplane design over any biplane. I suppose the chief limitation in 1935-36 was that powerplants just could not produce the thrust to push a relative heavy fighter into the air in the short space available on a carrier deck. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 07, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/8/2001 5:40:00 AM)
Interesting comments on the F3F. What about the British Gladiator and the Italian CR.42? Were they also expedients? Also, how does Pacific War model speed, firepower and durability against maneuverability? Do those qualities usually prevail? I haven't played it enough to know.

grumbler -> (3/8/2001 9:45:00 AM)
mdiehl, I agree that we are not too far apart, but I think the philisophical differences in our positions are nontheless important. The "winners" in air-to-air combat were not determined by the charactoristics of the individual aircraft. They were determined by the INTERACTION between those charactoristics, which obviously was affected by the charactoristics themselves, the doctrines with which the planes were used, the training levels of the pilots, maintenance (we seem to forget that one reason the P-39 performed so poorly in the Canal was because their oxygen systems could not be charged with the equipment on hand), and the like. My argument is that no designer ever had access to the enemy's designs to the extent that he could know for sure that his design was the "winner." He could make the best plane that he could under the constraints he faced, but in the end combat was the final determinant. Thus, planes designed for conditions that no longer prevailed whan they entered service suffered from some significant problems, no matter how well they were designed for their no-obsolscent roles. I do not dispute that japan's aircraft designers, for a number of reasons that you have laid out, "missed the bus" when it came to modern air-air combat design. That pilot skill and superior doctrine on the part of the Japanese hid this for a while does not change your conclusion. I think we would agree that having these features modelled well in WitP would be a very nice thing to see. I would prefer to see a doctrinal lag that would delay the full effectiveness of new aircraft, but that is just my particular cut on the history of the period. It would be better to model the mechanics of a-a combat well than to model the impact of doctrine well, since the latter can be approximated with pilot skill but the former cannot be well approximated at all.

mdiehl -> (3/8/2001 8:43:00 PM)
Right. There is no doubt that a/c designers could not typically know the exact specs of the opposing a/c, at least not for the first several weeks of encounter, unless espionage tipped the hand. Grumbler I agree that tactics can evolve, that pilot ability can make a mediocre plane a competitor &c. I also think tactical innovation has a premium value when a/c are closely matched. When the differences become extreme, and the initial conditions of an engagement do not give some substantial edge to the inferior machine, there is not much that tactical innovation can do for the inferior machine. I looked up a few biplanes. Here's a quick summary from a handy paperback reference (S.Wilson, Aircraft of WWII, 1998, Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Aus.) Not a comprehensive list of bips, but then, not many were used during WWII. - Fiat CR32 221 mph designed 1933 - Fiat CR42 266 mph designed 1935. 1781 mfd into 1941/1942, of which a couple hundred were exported to Belgium & elsewhere in 1937-1939. Seems to have been used primarily for close air support in Africa and Greece. Production continued into 1942 (wierd!). Maybe they needed a short/unimproved runway plane for the Sudan? - Avia B534 (Czech) designed 1932, produced in 1933-1935. - Boeing-Stearman Kaydet. 124 mph. Designed 1933. Accepted by USAAF 1936 for use as a trainer. - Fokker C X. Designed 1934. 71 mfd 1937-1938. 199 mph. - Hawke Audax, designed 1931, discontinued 1937, 170 mph. Only saw combat in spring 1940 as a dive bomber. - Henschel HS 123. Designed 1934, discon. 1938, 212 mph. - Polikarpov U-2/Po-2. Designed 1927. The other joker in the deck. 33,000 approx built through 1948. Used primarily as a trainer, utility a/c, and for close support. Hahaha.. this one actually had a NATO code name... "Mule." - Polikarpov I-153. Designed 1934. Discontinued 1939. 227 mph. Polikarpov and his design bureau were purged shortly after this plane was discontinued. - Gloster Gladiator. Des 1934, discon 1938. Removed from RAAF front line service by 1939 although two squadrons were briefly deployed to France in spring 1940. 253 mph. 60 Sea Gladiators mfd for the RN in 1938. No wonder why they bought Martlets (F4Fs by another name) for their CVs. - Vickers Vildebeest/Vincent. Torpedo Bomber. Designed 1928, discontinued 1937. Used for ASW patrol around GB in 1939-1940 and around Ceylon. 2 squadrons annihiliated near Singapore by March 1942. - Fairy Swordfish. Torpedo bomber. Designed 1932, production ceased 1944. 2400 mfd. Max speed 138. - Fairy Albacore. Torpedo bomber. Max speed 161 mph. 800 mfd, designed 1938. Summary. As fighters, the bips were all pretty much removed from service by 1939, excepting the Fiat CR42, and a few Gladiators that stuck with the fleet air arm until better a/c could be purchased from the US. [This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 08, 2001).]

Greg Wilmoth -> (3/10/2001 8:16:00 AM)
Re: Pilot Ability Don't forget the passage in Fire In the Sky where Bergerud talks about how the length of the sick roster at Rabaul declined at the height of the air battles in 1943. A lot of Japanese pilots were climbing into the cockpit while suffering from malaria and never came back. Re: Biplanes It looks like the turning point for biplane fighters was 1934-35. I checked in the Pentagon Library over lunch, and according to William Green's Famous Fighters of the Second World War, the Gloster Gladiator was designed to a 1930 spec. And it only flew a few months before the Spitfire and Hurricane. Yet the RAF still put it into production. Go figure. As for the Italians, MacGregor Knox says in his new book, Hitler's Italian Allies, that the Fiat CR.42 was only one of a long list of dismal aircraft and tank designs. Italian industrialists often used the threat of labor unrest to keep the production lines busy, and the armed forces accepted sub-standard weapons out of fear they'd receive no weapons at all! Amazingly the Italian Air Force was still ordering CR.42s as late as March 1943! Imagine a game where you play the Italians and you aren't locked into making every decision wrong . . .

moore4807 -> (3/25/2001 11:02:00 AM)
mdiehl & grumbler, excellent posts! I liked the discussion with your pilot skill vs airframe vs production/engineering posts,(I do lean toward grumblers point -pilot making the plane than vice versa, but you have some pretty good points too, mdiehl) I liked /agreed with an earlier post about basic airframes and ship hulls and let us "add and upgrade" versions with our production points. although I cant remember the book, I read the Thatch Weave Army-Navy tests did occur while Thatch was training Fighter Three at Barbers Point NAS. It was something about a barroom disagreement between subordinates and ended up with Thatch and the Army Air Corps commander betting cases of whiskey over the outcome of a three day trial. Allegedly the A.A.C. commander paid up after the first morning's flights as he and his airgroup were soundly defeated by Thatch & Fighting 3. this legend was born and helped lead to the (eventual) strategy change. Also about the P-51A, wasnt it the British who made the change to the Merlins on thier export version (the Apache, I think they called it) and used it strictly as a tank buster ground support aircraft!!! Someone saw the light and got the Merlin engine licenced for US production for the Mustang... and the rest is history! (I had to laugh when Private Ryan at the end of the movie called the P-51 a tank buster- P-51's were MOSTLY used for escort and fighter interdiction by '44 and P-47's & A-20's were doing most of the close support work by then...)but in all fairness who would have a operational P-47 lying around in late 1999? Cactus Air Force does have P-51's and I'm sure there are others too. Just a thought ;)

chanman -> (3/26/2001 4:38:00 AM)
If you have a reference for the barroom brawl you referred to, I will add it to my "hunt in bookstore/read at first opportunity" list. There are a (very) few running p47's around. Watched one on a discovery wings show the other night. Far more p51's around, far more built, far more survive due to air racing, etc. As far as Private Ryan goes, during D-Day, any thing that flew was used to support the forces at Normandy. P51s carried rockets and 500# bombs, though they were not preferred by the USAAC for the ground attack role due to the fragility of the inline engine.

Warpup -> (3/26/2001 6:41:00 AM)
Somehow the talk of Thatch and his influence makes me wonder what you guys have found regarding the impact of Chennault on fighter tactics. What I've read about him says that he was working on and advocating team fighter tactics in the early '30s. Though he was essentially driven out of the service by the bomber school and the individual dogfight school (and his own inability to play politics), he must have come into contact with many other fighter pilots and had some influence through his teaching at the tactical school and through his articles. He had the opportunity to try his tactics in China and Burma beginning in December, '41. One book I read by a USAAF Airacobra pilot, "Nanette", by Edwards Park, indicates that his squadron was using the 2 plane element and 4 plane section in "finger four" formation (though they didn't call it that) in mid-'42. He wasn't writing a book about tactics, but he refered to what they were doing as the same tactic developed by Chennault in China.

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