RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (Full Version)

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Nikademus -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:15:23 PM)

Ya nitpicker you [;)]. Yes eventually repositioning allowed land based aircraft to close the gap but it was tenuous at first due to the range and CVE's helped fill the gaps.



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:19:04 PM)

quote:

Hedgehogs weren't so great because as mentioned...they were contact only which required a direct hit to do anything vs. depth charges which only needed a near miss. As part of an overall arsenal of course....it was one more piece of the puzzle


Hedgehogs were very good because they could cover the arc ahead of the ship and submarine and in effect make an attack before the sub knew it was being attacked. The usual tactic for a submerged submarine undergoing attack was to listen for the position of the attacking escort as it revved up and overran the sub. When the escorts screws were heard to be passing over the sub, the boat would then usually turn very hard to evade the attack. Adding k guns to escorts helped a little, but a DC almost had to hit a submarine at shallow depth (less than 100') in order to do significant damage, and at that depth it usually required several hits close abroad to bring a submarine to surface or to sink it out right. With hedghogs, the submarine often did not know that it was being attacked, and was travelling straight ahead in anticipation of a DC run.

The advantage to Hedghogs were numerous. They could cover a large area with one bomblet per 15 feet of arc. Not much room for a sub to get through (although of course the coverage was not perfect owing to stochastic variation in projectile flight). Also, a hedghog did not f*ck up the Sonar the way a DC did. An unsuccessful DC run would burble the water and create sound echoes that gave the attacked submarine about 15 minutes of time to run like hell when SONAR would be useless near the point of the DC attack. An unsuccessful hedgehog attack, however, let the attacking escorts continue to use SONAR to set up another attack.

Finally of course 1 hedgehog hit was usually enough to bring a sub to surface. Two hits usually killed the submarine outright.

It was an excellent ASW weapon. A key component in a multi-component profile that virtually eliminated the submarine threat after May 1943.



Nikademus -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:20:35 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

It was an excellent ASW weapon. .


Didn't say otherwise. What i said was that it was no "wonder weapon". [:)]



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:22:48 PM)

quote:

Didn't say otherwise. What i said was that it was no "wonder weapon".


Right you are maybe. Some escort commanders viewed it as a wonder weapon. It is certain that kill rates climbed dramatically as ships were fitted with it. Perhaps you're thinking of "mousetrap" -- the earlier ahead-thrown weapon. It had the same merit in re attack profile but had much poorer area coverage.



Nikademus -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:26:06 PM)

Clay Blair didn't think all that much of it, but i agree as part of an overall improved ASW package it made life pretty miserable for Uboat commanders. Less options, less avenues etc etc. The #1 killer though remained aircraft. Even before they started actually "killing" uboats (late war) they made life difficult just by forcing Uboats to submerge hindering their movement/escape/ability to charge weapons. Starting in 43 they began to be better at killing as well as spotting, utilizing low level DC attacks not to mention a cute little nugget called FIDO.



Twotribes -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:28:15 PM)

Yet Ron on this thread said the complaint that asw was to good was because of games in 1944, when IT should be good.



Nikademus -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:29:15 PM)

1944ish i dont have as much of a problem with though tests showed it was pretty lethal, probably a little too lethal but not by all that much.

1942 is a different story of course.



Twotribes -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:35:14 PM)

1942, I am in, and it isnt leathal at all, I have lost more DD and MSW and an AVD on ASW then Submarines sank. I seldom detect subs and when I do I seldom hit them. And every attack starts with the sub FIRST firing at one of my platforms, usually hitting and sinking it.



Nikademus -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:41:10 PM)

interesting. what test parameters are you using?



strawbuk -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 7:41:18 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

1942, I am in, and it isnt leathal at all, I have lost more DD and MSW and an AVD on ASW then Submarines sank. I seldom detect subs and when I do I seldom hit them. And every attack starts with the sub FIRST firing at one of my platforms, usually hitting and sinking it.


Which in 1942, whether the ASW ship is in a 'HK' or an e3scort to a convoy or warship TF, is how it should. Glad the game is working well for you. [:D]

Reflects sequence that a moves into or finds itself in a good position to start and attack run(usulay , out of decent asdic range. Sub tries an attack, in doing so either a sinking ship or a torp track alerts defence, or fact the sub moved into asdic range (I WILL keep calling it asdic...) allowed chance for escorts to find it and attack back. The allied reponse should get better and better over three years and in SOME cases in late war ASWs will get drop on sub.



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/22/2004 9:36:01 PM)

quote:

Which in 1942, whether the ASW ship is in a 'HK' or an e3scort to a convoy or warship TF, is how it should. Glad the game is working well for you.


That is incorrect. In 1942 a TF assigned the mission ASW should have a much better chance of sinking any submarine that it encounters than of losing a ship to the sub. That said, the most likely result of such an encounter in 1942 should be that the submarine escapes without hitting a target and with slight to no damage. There is a *huge* difference between the mission, disposition, and tactics of escorts assigned to protect a convoy vs. a TF dedicated to anti-submarine warfare. And of course when the escorts are working as convoy escorts, the most likely result of any successful torpedo attack is a hit on one of the escorted ships, not on one of the escorts.

Of course the notion of a dedicated "ASW TF" in 1942 is an aberration with respect to history of he PTO campaign. But since players are not being scripted to historical operations that does not particularly violate the basic intentions of the game.

quote:

Reflects sequence that a moves into or finds itself in a good position to start and attack run(usulay , out of decent asdic range. Sub tries an attack, in doing so either a sinking ship or a torp track alerts defence, or fact the sub moved into asdic range (I WILL keep calling it asdic...) allowed chance for escorts to find it and attack back. The allied reponse should get better and better over three years and in SOME cases in late war ASWs will get drop on sub.


That is not correct. The submarine in daylight may attempt to skirt a TF by circumnavigating it on the edge of the visual horizon. And it might get away with it if the convoy contains merchant ships. A submarine will have a challenging time running around a convoy comprised solely of escorts or ships capable of sustained cruising speeds of 13 knots or more. The sub would have to pretty much firewall the throttle -- which means lots of smoke, sub spotted.

At night time the advantage is neutral if all vessels lack radar. If the submarine sends a contact report (sop in most navies) or if any of the escorts are equipped with radar, the advantage lies with the escorts. An alert sub will still likely escape, but there is vanishingly slim to nothing chance that a submarine is going to hit an escort. Frankly, the notion of a submarine stalking and sneaking up on a TF comprised of escorts out looking for submarines and getting away with it is pretty uninformed. You might do that with a modern SSN attack submarine, but a WW2 boat isn't going to succeed nearly as often as it will be sunk. Frankly, most WW2 sub skippers would simply try to avoid or evade such a TF.

Different story for TFs with merchant ships moving at 10 knots. But then of course the risk is to the merchantmen, not to the escorts.



Ron Saueracker -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 2:45:02 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Yet Ron on this thread said the complaint that asw was to good was because of games in 1944, when IT should be good.


Not exactly what I said...or was trying to convey. Have you tried the Mariannas scenario yet? Try it, set it up as I said, and you will conclude there is a problem. Even the IJN sink all the US subs. It is an extreme example of why the Allied ASW is too good and that the model is the problem. DCs are TOO accurate and may be doing TOO MUCH DAMAGE. All the escorts get a crack when this was not possible in reality, further accentuating the problem.



Nomad -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 4:16:38 AM)

I'm playing Japan in the Marianas senario. I have one RO sub left with no torpedeos. The rest on on the bottom of the ocean. Except in one case, all attacks by the IJn subs resulted in their being sunk. But, I did get one magazine explosion on a BB. [:D] Just a bit overdone.



Twotribes -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 4:37:04 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
But the allies are something else...they are deadly in 42 but jeez, they never miss in1944...period.


I quote



Ron Saueracker -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 4:43:28 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
But the allies are something else...they are deadly in 42 but jeez, they never miss in1944...period.


I quote


What's your beef here? ASW is whacked in 42 and by 44, it's so far out of whack that it's 1964.

Nomad just said he has lost all but one sub. I wonder if any USN ship missed.

Whydon't you try it?[8|]



Twotribes -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 4:49:07 AM)

I am playing in 1942 and my ships seldom hit submarines, in fact they usually lose a DD or MSW to the sub to start the fight, and then cant find the sub to attack it.

I have lost something like 6 DD, 5 MSW and an AVD to the loss of around 6 Japanese Submarines (and thats from all sources) I dont mind the missing the sub part since the ASW being used sucks, but the Submarines shouldnt be sinking my escorts and getting first shot on an ASW task Force.



Ron Saueracker -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 5:05:50 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

I am playing in 1942 and my ships seldom hit submarines, in fact they usually lose a DD or MSW to the sub to start the fight, and then cant find the sub to attack it.

I have lost something like 6 DD, 5 MSW and an AVD to the loss of around 6 Japanese Submarines (and thats from all sources) I dont mind the missing the sub part since the ASW being used sucks, but the Submarines shouldnt be sinking my escorts and getting first shot on an ASW task Force.


Odd...have not seen this since UV and early Alpha days. They can should at anything and hit anything, it just looks likeyou've had some bad luck so far.



Twotribes -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 5:12:03 AM)

Every encounter the submarine fires first against my ASW task force, even though the rules clearly state that shouldnt happen. And 7 out of 10 times they hit, and it only takes one torp to sink most of these ships, though DD can survive one if your close to a port. And his buddys dont torpedo it again as it limps to port.



Nomad -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 5:26:20 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Every encounter the submarine fires first against my ASW task force, even though the rules clearly state that shouldnt happen. And 7 out of 10 times they hit, and it only takes one torp to sink most of these ships, though DD can survive one if your close to a port. And his buddys dont torpedo it again as it limps to port.


Can you point out the rule that says a sub can not fire first at an ASW TF?

Basically, if the subs are firing first then the ASW TF is failing its detection die roll. You will need to have better trained crews and better TF commanders.



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 6:18:53 AM)

quote:

You will need to have better trained crews and better TF commanders.


The flaw is in the assumption that a USN TF on an ASW mission would need better training. By 1940, any US or UK escort would under all circumstances have been more likely to detect a submarine than be both detected and torpedoed by a submarine. The overwhelming majority of torp shots fired at escorts by submarines missed at all times during the war and under all circumstances. Very very few sub skippers made a successful habit of it and precious fewer of those skippers survived the war.

The most likely result in 1941-42 of a Japanese submarine attack on an escort should be as follows:

Case 1: ASW asset fails to detect, submarine detects.
Sub shoots. Sub misses. Escort counterattacks. Sub runs away.

Case 1b: Conditions as above.
Sub shoots. Sub misses. Escort counterattacks. Sub stays for another shot. Sub sunk.

Case 2: Both sub and ASW detect each other.
Sub dives. Escort attacks. Submarine evades and runs away.

Case 2b: As above.
Sub dives. Escort attacks. Submarine stays for a shot. Sub sunk.

Case 3: ASW assets detect submarine, submarine fails to detect ASW.
ASW asset attacks. Sub dives to evade but is intermittently badly damaged or sunk before it can get away.

Case 3b: As above.
ASW asset attacks. Sub stays to duke it out. Sub sunk.

Case 4: Neither side detects each other.

Once in an eclipsed blue moon should a submarine actually nail an ASW asset when that ASW asset is not escorting some other kind of ship. Even then it should only occur if there is some hyper aggressive submarine skipper faced by a hyper aggressive or talentless DD skipper. Wahoo got away with it several times only because IJN escorts used some rather stupid shiphandling tactics when attacking subs.



Nomad -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 6:36:41 AM)

That may be, I freely admit that I have little knowledge of these things. But, within the WitP game, he will have to train his crews and make sure he has good commanders. To reflect the reality you talk about will require a large change in the game mechanics and data. I do not think that will happen, but you never know. The reverse side is as stated above, by 1944 it is almost impossible for an IJN sub to make any kind of attack on a TF that has any ASW capability and survive. That is the reality of the game.



Mike Scholl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 9:02:43 AM)

Mdieha. Think you missed the most likely result in case 1. Sub detects, and
slipps quietly away. This was the common practice for the U-Boats off the Atlantic
coast when Ernie King had the US navy sailing DD flotillas up and down trying
to "hunt" U-Boats in early 1942. Why make the ASW folks jobs easier? You can
hear them coming miles away blasting the ocean with their sonar..., so why not
just step quietly aside and go after the unescorted Tanker coming later in the day?



Mike Scholl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 9:04:17 AM)

My fingers are exceptionally stupid tonight. That should read "Mdiehl" and "slips".



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 6:35:36 PM)

quote:

. But, within the WitP game, he will have to train his crews and make sure he has good commanders. To reflect the reality you talk about will require a large change in the game mechanics and data. I do not think that will happen, but you never know.


I think the fix would be rather easy. Reduce the accuracy of DCs across the board. Increase the EXP levels of USN and UK DD, DE, and subchasers across the board. USN DD crews were as talented as their Japanese DD counterparts. They simply lacked a decent surface torpedo, and when subordinated to a CA gun line they were usually ordered to do things (like wait for the gun line to open fire) that they were vocally disinclined to do (by 1941 most DD skippers advocated opening an engagement with torpedoes if they were undetected and in torpedo range ... but in the two most frequently cited engagements they were prevented from doing so by senior officers on gun-line ships).

So one could change the DD/DE/subchaser exp levels with no unrealistic effects.



Ron Saueracker -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 6:58:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

. But, within the WitP game, he will have to train his crews and make sure he has good commanders. To reflect the reality you talk about will require a large change in the game mechanics and data. I do not think that will happen, but you never know.


I think the fix would be rather easy. Reduce the accuracy of DCs across the board. Increase the EXP levels of USN and UK DD, DE, and subchasers across the board. USN DD crews were as talented as their Japanese DD counterparts. They simply lacked a decent surface torpedo, and when subordinated to a CA gun line they were usually ordered to do things (like wait for the gun line to open fire) that they were vocally disinclined to do (by 1941 most DD skippers advocated opening an engagement with torpedoes if they were undetected and in torpedo range ... but in the two most frequently cited engagements they were prevented from doing so by senior officers on gun-line ships).

So one could change the DD/DE/subchaser exp levels with no unrealistic effects.


I don't know about increasing exp levels anywhere in this game, they are all rather too high to begin with (look at the AVG Hollywood stats for eg).

You make a good point about surface combat doctrine with regard to American naval forces. NOW THIS is a case for a doctrine toggle. The USN TFs basically operated in line ahead (DDs tied to CAs/CLs) and had restrictive fire discipline SOPs which were in place BECAUSE of the inexperience of USN vessels in night combat. They did not want to have friendly vessels operating independently because inevitable confusion would result in friendly fire incidents (Bagley torpedoeing Canberra at Savo, Farenholt hit by friendly fire at Cape Esperance, San Francisco blasting Atlanta at 1st Guadalcanal etc.)

USN surface combat doctrine would make an excellent toggle. In effect until mid 1943. (I would have instituted a national naval force experience level, not just individual ships as crews were constantly transferred into new construction etc. Once this national naval force level reached various experience benchmarks, doctrinal restrictions or enhancements kick in.)

This would not be an universal Allied doctrine. Commonwealth had over two years of intense combat experience so they would not be affected, only USN and Dutch. However, if units of different nationalities are intermixed like in ABDA, the doctrine used would be that of the least experience Navy. This would keep players from mixing nationalities so often.

Of course, the naval combat model would need some major tweaking with regards to ship types and their respective roles. The current arbitrary mish mash model does not cut it.



Feinder -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 7:11:53 PM)

"mish mash" is almost as fun to read, as it is to say...!

mish mash!

mish MASH!

MISH MASH!

mIsh MasH!

[:'(]

-F-



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 7:16:58 PM)

quote:

don't know about increasing exp levels anywhere in this game, they are all rather too high to begin with (look at the AVG Hollywood stats for eg).


I don't think the AVG stats are wrong.

quote:

You make a good point about surface combat doctrine with regard to American naval forces. NOW THIS is a case for a doctrine toggle. The USN TFs basically operated in line ahead (DDs tied to CAs/CLs) and had restrictive fire discipline SOPs which were in place BECAUSE of the inexperience of USN vessels in night combat. They did not want to have friendly vessels operating independently because inevitable confusion would result in friendly fire incidents (Bagley torpedoeing Canberra at Savo, Farenholt hit by friendly fire at Cape Esperance, San Francisco blasting Atlanta at 1st Guadalcanal etc.)


Inexperience had nothing to do with it. Doctrine did. The USN's finding was that torpedoes in general were a secondary weapon to larger caliber guns (which was reasonable in either the USN or the IJN because guns had the longer range and under good visual circumstances a better chance of hitting an alerted foe). The rest of that (hitting friendlies) again had nothing to do with inexperience and everything to do with doctrine; the USN took a dim view of sinking friendly ships. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced a number of friendly-ship collisions in the actions in the Solomons, and their own torpedoing of their transports in the invasion of Java was a blunder of legendary proportions that would have resulted in prison time had a US skipper done the same.

The doctrine toggel is a good idea but should be tied first to ship class. If the Allied TF contains only US DDs or is in a multinational force flagged under a UK skipper, the US DDs should opt for a torpedo attack every time. The problem wasn't lack of desire. The problem was subordination to the gun line when a gun line was present.



Ron Saueracker -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 7:36:39 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

don't know about increasing exp levels anywhere in this game, they are all rather too high to begin with (look at the AVG Hollywood stats for eg).


I don't think the AVG stats are wrong.

quote:

You make a good point about surface combat doctrine with regard to American naval forces. NOW THIS is a case for a doctrine toggle. The USN TFs basically operated in line ahead (DDs tied to CAs/CLs) and had restrictive fire discipline SOPs which were in place BECAUSE of the inexperience of USN vessels in night combat. They did not want to have friendly vessels operating independently because inevitable confusion would result in friendly fire incidents (Bagley torpedoeing Canberra at Savo, Farenholt hit by friendly fire at Cape Esperance, San Francisco blasting Atlanta at 1st Guadalcanal etc.)


Inexperience had nothing to do with it. Doctrine did. The USN's finding was that torpedoes in general were a secondary weapon to larger caliber guns (which was reasonable in either the USN or the IJN because guns had the longer range and under good visual circumstances a better chance of hitting an alerted foe). The rest of that (hitting friendlies) again had nothing to do with inexperience and everything to do with doctrine; the USN took a dim view of sinking friendly ships. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced a number of friendly-ship collisions in the actions in the Solomons, and their own torpedoing of their transports in the invasion of Java was a blunder of legendary proportions that would have resulted in prison time had a US skipper done the same.

The doctrine toggel is a good idea but should be tied first to ship class. If the Allied TF contains only US DDs or is in a multinational force flagged under a UK skipper, the US DDs should opt for a torpedo attack every time. The problem wasn't lack of desire. The problem was subordination to the gun line when a gun line was present.


Why should all the starting AVG guys be in the 80s? Crop dusting, wing walking, drinking and brawling, cash incentives for kills etc does not necessarily equate to skilled COMBAT pilots. All the Brits are in the 60s for the most part and they had core vets with ACTUAL combat experience. Bit of a romantic nationalistic bias here I suspect.[:D]Getting off topic a bit...[;)]

"The doctrine toggel is a good idea but should be tied first to ship class. If the Allied TF contains only US DDs or is in a multinational force flagged under a UK skipper, the US DDs should opt for a torpedo attack every time. The problem wasn't lack of desire. The problem was subordination to the gun line when a gun line was present."

I attempted to convey this when I mentioned some sort of distinction be made regarding vessel type and primary role.

"Inexperience had nothing to do with it. Doctrine did. The USN's finding was that torpedoes in general were a secondary weapon to larger caliber guns (which was reasonable in either the USN or the IJN because guns had the longer range and under good visual circumstances a better chance of hitting an alerted foe). The rest of that (hitting friendlies) again had nothing to do with inexperience and everything to do with doctrine; the USN took a dim view of sinking friendly ships. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced a number of friendly-ship collisions in the actions in the Solomons, and their own torpedoing of their transports in the invasion of Java was a blunder of legendary proportions that would have resulted in prison time had a US skipper done the same."

Experience and doctrine are tied closely. Take Cape Esperance for example. Scott trained his TF in night fighting (as far as he could in the time he had and based on lessons learned from earlier night combat fiascos). Still he chose to tie Tobins DDs to the cruisers to protect the DDs from freindly fire of inexperienced gun bosses...USN had little experience with multiple divisions and recognition methods. Training and experience are two different beasts. Despite this, the DDs screwed up a turn in succession (lack of training), some raced in front of cruisers line of sight and got mauled by friendly fire anyway, and Duncan just took off alone and got riddled by friendly and enemy fire. This is not simply doctrine but doctrine governed by inexperience.



mdiehl -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/23/2004 7:49:00 PM)

quote:

Why should all the starting AVG guys be in the 80s? Crop dusting, wing walking, drinking and brawling, cash incentives for kills etc does not necessarily equate to skilled COMBAT pilots. All the Brits are in the 60s for the most part and they had core vets with ACTUAL combat experience. Bit of a romantic nationalistic bias here I suspect. Getting off topic a bit...


Because even discounting 60% of the AVG kills as erroneous they still shot down some 170 Japanese a/c. In several well-described engagements they downed numerous Japanese fighters and bombers and these incidents are confirmed by IJA accounts. In others they were very effective shooting up airfields. The AVG records in 1942 aren't matched by comparable performance from RAF pilots flying hurricrates stationed in Singapore or Burma. Since the combat model has reduced a number of complicated factors into something quite simple, the key ratings seem to stress mvr and experience. The mvr of the P40 should arguably be consierably higher, but that would result in too many kills in the New Guinea/SOPAC/SWPAC areas to satisfy Japanese fanboys who think the A6M was a match for a well-flown P40.

So, the AVG has higher exp to produce historical results in the China-Burma-India area, and the P40 is underrated to produce quasihistorical results in the SWPAC/SOPAC area.

quote:

Experience and doctrine are tied closely. Take Cape Esperance for example. Scott trained his TF in night fighting (as far as he could in the time he had and based on lessons learned from earlier night combat fiascos). Still he chose to tie Tobins DDs to the cruisers to protect the DDs from freindly fire of inexperienced gun bosses...USN had little experience with multiple divisions and recognition methods. Training and experience are two different beasts. Despite this, the DDs screwed up a turn in succession (lack of training), some raced in front of cruisers line of sight and got mauled by friendly fire anyway, and Duncan just took off alone and got riddled by friendly and enemy fire. This is not simply doctrine but doctrine governed by inexperience.


Scott had DD skippers yelling into their TBS demanding permission to shoot when they had ideal setups at an ideal range. Scott screwed the pooch. As to the rest... *everybody* screwed up turns in quick succession. Japanese as well as USN despite their training. The IJN sure made friendly collisions an interesting factor in night combat. It had little to do with training or doctrine and lots to do with visibility.

USN DDs were tied to the gun line when a gun line existed primarily because it was supposed that guns were substantially superior to torpedoes. Had the USN suspected that the enemy had a torp with an effective range of 8-10k yards, they might have emphasized torpedo doctrine as an integral part of the overall initial battle plan. One could argue that the USN *should* have suspected the same. The US had field tested an Oxy driven torpedo in the 1920s that had similar speed and only slighlty inferior range properties to the IJN ones. The buord decided not to go wit hthese because they were a fire hazard.



byron13 -> RE: ASW TFs -- floating targets? (9/24/2004 1:59:19 AM)

My experience in one run through 1942 was that I had about a 1:1 kill ration in the Battle for Australia. I used primarily DDs, and tried to use ones with the highest day and night skill level and then loaded them up with a capable TF commander. I also note (cheating perhaps) that the kill board shows more subs sunk than what I believe I was told about on the after action reports.



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