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CynicAl -> (8/27/2001 6:02:00 AM)

US Planners developing War Plan Orange were considering writing off the PI at least as early as 1922. The "Through Ticket" plans were officially kaput in the 1934-35 version of WPO, which Mac signed off on as Army Chief of Staff. By 1941 the idea of the idea of the USN steaming west to relieve the PI at the outbreak of war with Japan was well and truly dead. The planners weren't anticipating taking a heavy shot like PH at the outset; but they recognized that the PI was just too far away from friends, too near to enemies. See Miller, War Plan Orange. FDR probably would *not* have forced the Navy to go against their better judgement on this, as he was mostly content to let the politicians do the politicking while the soldiers did the soldiering (unlike wartime political leaders in several other countries - Winnie, Uncle Joe, and the Austrian Corporal all come to mind).



TIMJOT -> (8/27/2001 12:40:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by CynicAl:
US Planners developing War Plan Orange were considering writing off the PI at least as early as 1922. The "Through Ticket" plans were officially kaput in the 1934-35 version of WPO, which Mac signed off on as Army Chief of Staff. By 1941 the idea of the idea of the USN steaming west to relieve the PI at the outbreak of war with Japan was well and truly dead. The planners weren't anticipating taking a heavy shot like PH at the outset; but they recognized that the PI was just too far away from friends, too near to enemies. See Miller, War Plan Orange. FDR probably would *not* have forced the Navy to go against their better judgement on this, as he was mostly content to let the politicians do the politicking while the soldiers did the soldiering (unlike wartime political leaders in several other countries - Winnie, Uncle Joe, and the Austrian Corporal all come to mind).
Not entirely true. Yes WPO3 as developed in the 1930's pretty much had written off the PI. However in early 1941 MacArthur had convinced FDR and Marshall that WPO3 was a defeatest strategy that did not take into account the 100,000 man 10 division Philipine army he was then in process of building. Nor did it take into account the enourmous potential of modern airpower; in particular the B-17. So by august 41 they did a complete about face and Made the defence of the PI a priority and began a massive build up that envisioned having over 300 B-17 and close to 400 P-40's by April 42. Had this build up occured it would be politically and strategically imppossible to just abandon the PI. The navy would have no choice but to try to break through. the Navy's honor would be at stake. Particularly if there was no Pearl Harbor and the Navy was intact.



byron13 -> (8/27/2001 8:45:00 PM)

Madman: See what you've done in starting this thread? It's all your fault! Glad to hear you've come around to my point of view on some things. The perspicacity of the insane. You must mean the production system, of course. Speaking of which, I wonder how many rubber, oil, and ore points the Philippines will be worth? In my alternative production system . . . . .
So where are we on this thread? Capturing the P.I. was a requirement IF the Japanese attacked the U.S., but now we're arguing over whether the Japanese could have captured their resources without attacking the U.S./having the U.S. attack them?



TIMJOT -> (8/27/2001 10:49:00 PM)

quote:


So where are we on this thread? Capturing the P.I. was a requirement IF the Japanese attacked the U.S., but now we're arguing over whether the Japanese could have captured their resources without attacking the U.S./having the U.S. attack them?

Well sort of, where I think you "should" take the PI if the Japanese attacked the US. I dont think it "must" be a requirement. I personally would not allow a ememy base did in my defense zone, but some players might legitamately think its worth the risk. RE; Japs attacking/not attacking US. I think it would be interesting if the game would incorparate the possiblility. ie give the Japanese player the choice. If the Japanese dont attack the US then this something like a 50% chance that the US retaliates. For every turn there after the chance increases. This would open up a whole lot of possibilities and make the game less predictable.



madflava13 -> (8/27/2001 10:56:00 PM)

TIMJOT, I also agree with you about not wanting the threat, or possibility of a threat in my rear. I will always take the Phillipines, or at least the main islands if I am the Japanese... I can understand the points of those of you who wouldn't, but I continue to disagree with them. ;-)
What does everyone think about the Indian Ocean? I never do more than leave some Air units to guard the approaches to Palembang/Singapore, as my focus is almost always on cutting Australia off and interdicting US TFs...



Doug Olenick -> (8/28/2001 12:12:00 AM)

When I first mentioned the PI operating under siege conditions last week sometime, I did not mean it could be considered a functional base. I don't think it would be possible to keep anything but a few PBYs flying from the area. Simply to hard to get parts in and out. My point was an-American occuppied PI would require a large Japanese air and surface force to maintain the siege. Also, if the US was able to open up a passage way from Australia to the islands they would instantly pose a direct threat against the supply lines leading to the Home Islands.



byron13 -> (8/28/2001 1:03:00 AM)

Skeets: That's not what you said earlier. You said, and I quote: "If you don't take the Philippines, the Americans would establish major bases and build factories to build war stuff there. They would base hundreds or thousands of B17s and fighters there to bomb Japan. They would also launch major invasions from the Philippines and probably try and kidnap Tojo . . . ." Or did I just imagine that? Madman: I think you need to have a discussion with Mr. Moore. He likes to go after India whole-hog to get it out of the way. I've tried that in PacWar once, and it seemed to work well. Whether it would work in real life is another question. You have to make sure the Americans are impotent for a good while to try that. I think the important thing is to really focus on one area and go after it, whether it be India, Australia, Hawaii, to gain some overwhelming strategic geographic advantage that would be difficult for the Allies to overcome. Trying to do a little bit everywhere is probably the worst thing you could do. China is probably just a black hole, though.



Chiteng -> (8/28/2001 6:09:00 AM)

I am sorry but I must assert that w/o the active
port of Manilla, and intact storehouses.
There is NO WAY that you could 'maintain'
a strategic bombing campaign. The 8th airforce computed for every 100 bombers
(B-17 B-24) a Minimum of 20,000 tons of supply
per month, with replacements being flown in.
For active operations. (I assume these are long tons) I dont doubt that for tactical use you can get by on less. I 'think' 20k tons is 4 liberty ship(not an expert) I am not saying that with effort you cant make the PI a pain, I am saying that you wont really hurt Japan PROPER w strategic bombing. However nothing would prevent say 3-4 squads
of SBD's setting up dispersed.
There is NO DENYING that an SBD would be very dangerous. But I will say this: isnt that what a wargame is supposed to explore?
In fact are we not learning even now?
The new York Times 'claims' that the New Jersey BB
tops off at a kool 1 million gallons of oil.
I dont see any major warship just hanging around
the PI. As for airlift, its not happeneing.
Not enough C-47. Even if you had the C-47
you would need to deliver the supplies to wherever
you had them based. I am just saying that its an intresting thought.
I would love to see McArthur sit out the war
in an internment camp of his own making.



moore4807 -> (8/28/2001 8:24:00 AM)

Byron,
Please Please PLEASE, stop calling me Mr Moore, I feel too old when you do that, (even jackass is better!)
Anyway Thanks for thinking of me, I didn't even have a point of view about PI except that I'd try to isolate it first, and take it at leisure with troops that need the experience points. (provided everything else was going OK) TIMJOT- I believe you are tweaking the tail of the tiger with the "boring production" commentary, VBG! watch out, we may find your weakness one day!!!!



Ringbolt -> (8/28/2001 9:41:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
However in early 1941 MacArthur had convinced FDR and Marshall that WPO3 was a defeatest strategy
Of course he changed their minds about PI because that is where HE was so it MUST be, by definition, the most important place on the planet strategicly. Everything Mac did was good for him first and good for the U.S. as a byproduct. Actually, what he did was make policial threats vowing to use Republican leaders in congress against them if they didnt let him play in the sandbox too. It seems like we did a lot of things that were not necessarly the most strategicly sound because Dougout Doug cried foul and wanted the spotlight on him.
Ringbolt (not a Mac fanclub member)



Doug Olenick -> (8/28/2001 8:49:00 PM)

Mr. Byron, You are a strange, yet odd and interesting fellow, with an active imagination.



Warpup -> (8/28/2001 9:04:00 PM)

Don't see anything wrong with what the Japanese did to take the PI. What was it they used anyway??? ...a few light ships and some transports and perhaps 3 divisions worth of troops??? (I really don't know, so help me out!) I'm not sure the Japanese could supply and transport those 3 divisions or so at the fringe areas of their push, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, the Solomons, without much greater escort and transport forces. PacWar makes it look almost easy to bypass the PI and send divisions to Midway or Alaska or Ceylon in January, 1942. But somehow I doubt it... What the Japanese used in the PI doesn't seem very uneconomical to me. But then again, maybe I'm guessing that too little force was used. It seems to me that Manila and Clark fell very fast. Those were what's important. It seems like a walkover took place everywhere else but Bataan and Corregidor. Why not just grab what they grabbed and let the US and PI forces just starve to death in their own internment camps at Bataan and Corregidor rather than use the whole PI for that? It's even a place where the Japanese could have rotated fresh forces in to act as guards and gain some experience skirmishing with the American and Philippino skeletons that would be left...



byron13 -> (8/29/2001 1:26:00 AM)

Somehow I'm getting a warped idea about this last idea. I chuckle and envision the following: "Major Toyoda, the mission of you battalion today is to take that hill over there. The OPFOR, believed to the A Co. of the First Marines, has gotten pretty good at defending that hill. This is, after all, the eighth week in a row we've used that hill for the assault phase here at the Philippine National Training Center. You will assault and take the hill, causing as few casualties as possible. Once secured, you will leave one week's rations for the Americans and then retreat off the hill, reforming here for your debriefs and evaluations. Any American prisoners taken will be taken to the infirmary where they will be given a medical check up and then tagged so that we can keep a record of the movements and habits of the OPFOR. Remember, safety is paramount. If you receive more than three rounds of mortar or artillery fire, call for cease fire, and our air force will pummel the other side until their artillery is sufficiently reduced to training levels. Good luck!"



byron13 -> (8/29/2001 4:53:00 AM)

quote:

Byron,
Please Please PLEASE, stop calling me Mr Moore, I feel too old when you do that, (even jackass is better!)
Sorry, guy. It's just sounds so impersonal to refer to you as Moore4857 or whatever. I don't like Mr. 4857 or jackass. I think Moore is your last name, and I don't like saying "talk to Smith." It's all too impersonal. How about I call you Bob? Skippy? Scooter?



moore4807 -> (8/29/2001 7:59:00 PM)

Byron,
Moore is the last name mate, and skippy is something I've never been called... Mr.Moore for some reason (probably it's my fathers name, lol) doesnt sound right to me - it's probably just my brain frying, so never mind, back to the PI conversation...



Blackhorse -> (8/30/2001 2:01:00 AM)

Great discussion on the Philippines! Re: Japanese strategies. The only strategy I can imagine that would be potentially war-winning, would be for the Japanese to attack Southeast Asia and the DEI for resources, don't start a war with the Americans, and attack the Russians in Siberia from Manchuria. This strategy assumes a big change in history: that Germany and Japan were allies in fact, not just in name. The Russians had bloodied the Japanese once already, but in the Winter of '41 their best troops were being railed West to counter-attack the Germans outside of Moscow. With the Germans camped outside of Moscow, a surprise Japanese attack arguably could lead to a Russian surrender sometime in 1942. With Russia out, the British position becomes precarious, especially in the Middle East and India. At some point the American people would become convinced of the threat of the Axis, and Roosevelt could declare war -- but in time? From the Japanese perspective the drawback of this approach is that it turns over the initiative of when and how to start a war to their largest potential foe, without any certainty of assistance from Germany when the war came. On the other hand, as dangerous as it would be to ignore America, a Japanese attack on Russia is the only strategy I have seen that suggests even an opportunity for the Axis powers to win the war.



byron13 -> (8/30/2001 4:12:00 AM)

Very interesting. You're probably right on the global scale: for the I know nothing about the Japanese troop strength or logistical abilities. For the Axis to win, Japan would have had to attack the Soviets. Too bad that really can't be factored into a game like this. Of course, that assumes that the Germans do no better than they did historically. If the Germans hadn't attacked Yugoslavia, they might have managed to beat the Soviets on their own. I'd have to question, though, the Japanese wherewithal to conduct a ground campaign in Siberia and China simultaneously. Or were you going to just draw primarily troops from China? And the timing is tough, too. Assuming it takes a year to fully evict the Commonwealth from India, when does Japan attack the Soviets? If it's after 1941, it may be too late to have a real effect. But I admit that I don't know much about Japanese capabilities. I fear I may have erred in mentioning Yugoslavia. I would recommend to everyone that we keep this thread focused on the Pacific and not wander off into German strategy and blunders.



moore4807 -> (8/30/2001 6:17:00 AM)

To question all this topic rolled into one- What scenarios would have to play out PRIOR to the start of the war?
If Japan doesnt attack PH, etc. Roosevelt cant bring apathetic Americans into the fray early enough to keep England from having a two ocean war by themselves, England folds, then what priority is USA going to use??? Fight OR negotiate England' freedom and repudiate the Versailles Treaty, making Hitler a conquoring hero to the Motherland? Then the Pacific war is truly a secondary fight and only becomes primary because Germany can now go for Russia and aid Japan at the same time (imagine Rommel of Arabia!!!!) Now Japan has a prayer regardless of how much the US builds because a defeated England stops everyone's hypothesis that Japan can't win.
Germany can move into Russia at will and the USA now has to make the Atlantic hers w/o the aid of England.... (no small undertaking and really not that farfetched if Britain's beaten in fall of 1940, all kinds of changes occur before Pacific War even begins for USA....)
Just some thoughts on Byrons post



Chiteng -> (8/30/2001 7:19:00 AM)

Well one obvious 'political effect' of
NOT attacking PH or PI, My parents have gone to great lengths to explain
that the US felt a moral outrage, all out of
proportion to reality. They hated the Japanese.
It was only after 1943 that the anti-japanese
vitrol started to get toned down. So not attacking the USA would at least NOT
have made 'conditional surrender' immpossible. It may well be that Japan could have avoided being nuked. Switch Topic:
I think MacArthur legthened the war at least a year.
The Hearst Press was crazy.



Doug Olenick -> (8/30/2001 8:32:00 PM)

It probably could never have happened in reality, luckily reality is left at the door when it comes to discussing these theories. Becoming totally embroiled in China was one of Japan's biggest pre-1941 errors. Grabbing Manchuria in the early '30s made sense because of the resources found there, but as the little guy Vizzini said in The Princess Bride "Ha-ha, you fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders, the most famous of which is "Never get involved in a land war in Asia", but only slightly less famous is this: Never go in against a Sicilian, when *death* is on the line!". Sorry this was just too perfect a time to bring up that quote. But I do believe it was correct. China was no place to be and the only reason Japan attacked was to placate the Imperial Army's ego. If all of the resources dedicated to taming Mao and Chiang were used in other theaters the war might have gone on a bit longer. Although the Japanese would still lose.



grumbler -> (9/8/2001 10:59:00 PM)

Back on the board after a considerable absence... I think that the gamble of not waging war on the USA was simply too great for the Japanese to consider. If the US declares war on Japan when japan attacks the Dutch and British (as the japanese certainly expected would be the case, and I think that history supports their fear), and the Japanese have done nothing to neutralize the US forces in Hawaii and the PI, then Japan is screwed. The amount of air power in particular that would be needed to keep the PI out of play would cripple the Japanese advances in the DEI and Burma. If it turned out that Japan needed to take the PI anyway, say in 1942, the task would be much more difficult as the US and Filipino troops in the islands would have had time to prepare better for action. I think that the IJA could still win the action, but how many of the 13 divisions available for action in the Southwest Pacific would it have taken? What offensive actions would have to be postponed until these troops (and the aircraft that supported them) were finished with their campaign? If their is going to be a battle in the PI (which was at least highly likely) then it was best for the Japanese to get it over with as early as possible. As a matter of fact, the Japanese DID withdraw a signficant number of troops and aircraft from the PI campaign once the initial battles were over, and the US/Filipino forces were bottled up on Battan. To that extent, the "bypass" strategy was adopted (although the blockade was a bit closer than Skeets' or Chiteng's scenario). I cannot honestly fault the Japanese use of their limited forces in the early battles, other than leaving Hiryu and Soryu to be potentially ambushed at Wake. In short, the downside to leaving the US the option of when to start the war (a potentially significant interdiction of japanese supply routes to Southeast Asia) simply outweighed the cost of taking the PI(especially as the forces used there could not be logistically supported in amphibious operations elsewhere in the first three weeks of the war - it took all the japanese had available to support the malaya campaign in those early days). Pages 72 and 73 of HP Wilmot's Empires in the Balance deal with this very topic. The book is, IMO, essential reading if you want to discuss the topic of Allied and Japanese strategic options in 1941 and early 1942.



Chiteng -> (9/9/2001 11:51:00 PM)

Well if you accept JFD's argument of 'surprise'
being a force multiplier: Japan would have been very foolish to bypass the
PI. They would never get that advantage again.



TIMJOT -> (9/12/2001 4:09:00 AM)

quote:

I think that the gamble of not waging war on the USA was simply too great for the Japanese to consider. If the US declares war on Japan when japan attacks the Dutch and British (as the japanese certainly expected would be the case, and I think that history supports their fear), and the Japanese have done nothing to neutralize the US forces in Hawaii and the PI, then Japan is screwed. The amount of air power in particular that would be needed to keep the PI out of play would cripple the Japanese advances in the DEI and Burma.
Where does history supports this claim? Yes they certainly had to expect that it could happen, but would it be any more of a risk than picking a fight with the worlds largest industrial powers? Furthermore why would it take more airpower than it historically did? They were able to simutaneously mount all those operations historically. Even if the US could have declared full scale war imediately (VERY UNLIKELY)the Japanese could held in reserve all the forces that they historically use to attack the PI and due to its rather isolated geographic position quickly isolate and blocade it. Then the USN would be forced to travel hundreds of miles across hostile seas to releive it. However like I stated before I dought FDR could get an imediate declaration of war. He probably would be limited to cutting off diplomatic relations, expanding the embargo and increasing lend/lease. You have to remember there was no formal treaty obligations between the USA and Britain or Holland. In fact Churchill had tried to get such a guarantee, FDR refused or was unable to give it.



Blackhorse -> (9/12/2001 11:05:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Where does history supports this claim? Yes they certainly had to expect that it could happen, but would it be any more of a risk than picking a fight with the worlds largest industrial powers? Furthermore why would it take more airpower than it historically did? They were able to simutaneously mount all those operations historically. Even if the US could have declared full scale war imediately (VERY UNLIKELY)the Japanese could held in reserve all the forces that they historically use to attack the PI and due to its rather isolated geographic position quickly isolate and blocade it. Then the USN would be forced to travel hundreds of miles across hostile seas to releive it. However like I stated before I dought FDR could get an imediate declaration of war. He probably would be limited to cutting off diplomatic relations, expanding the embargo and increasing lend/lease. You have to remember there was no formal treaty obligations between the USA and Britain or Holland. In fact Churchill had tried to get such a guarantee, FDR refused or was unable to give it.
I suspect Japan's fear was not an immediate declaration of war, but that after Japan attacked Singapore and the DEI, the U.S. would massively reinforce the Philippines and then declare war. Even if the Japanese beat us to the punch and declared war first, they could no longer expect to have the element of surprise. In either case, the Japanese land forces necessary to root out the Americans and Filipinos and neutralize the air and sea threat, would be much higher than it was historically.



TIMJOT -> (9/14/2001 3:10:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Blackhorse:
I suspect Japan's fear was not an immediate declaration of war, but that after Japan attacked Singapore and the DEI, the U.S. would massively reinforce the Philippines and then declare war. Even if the Japanese beat us to the punch and declared war first, they could no longer expect to have the element of surprise. In either case, the Japanese land forces necessary to root out the Americans and Filipinos and neutralize the air and sea threat, would be much higher than it was historically.
Well, I do agree with you, that the US would have massively reinforced the Philipines if the Japanese had attack SE Asia, but it would have taken months to accomplish this. By that time Japan would have conquered SE Asia. Those troops would then be available for operations in the Philipines if the US decides at that point to declare war. Yes it would definitely be much harder for the Japanese than it was historically, but they would also have the advantage of attacking with more force than was available historically. You must remember no matter how reinforced the PI is still geographically isolated and would be extremely difficult to maintain as a base in event of war. However again I think its highly unlikey the US declares war with out being directly attacked. Furthermore, regardless of popular revisionist history, FDR did not want a war with Japan. He was even quoted to have said war with Japan would be the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. Meaning he felt strongly that Germany was the real menace to the world.



grumbler -> (9/16/2001 9:44:00 PM)

TIMJOT, I think I have answered your question about where hisory supports my claim in the geopolitical thread, see here. Where does history support your contention that the japanese in 1941 seriously considered going to war on Britain and the Netherlands exclusively? Wilmott states categorically that this is not the case.



chanman -> (10/7/2001 7:52:00 PM)

Hi all, TIMJOT, remember it is not just the PI that would get reinforced, but also the islands along the way. IJN would be cramped if they had to deal with a reinforced Guam (a couple of additional airfields, shore defenses, put a couple of divisions there, some bombers, some fighters, etc.), a reinforced Wake (build out the airfields, more bombers, fighters, a Marine division, some real shore defenses, subs) and a reinforced Midway (see Wake just previous). One of the reasons that the PI campaign was "easy" for the Japanese to prosecute was the ease that they were able to isolate them. Guam has to be reduced, spam and all, before the Japanese can isolate PI and later turn their attention South towards Australia and New Guinea.



TIMJOT -> (10/8/2001 11:25:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by chanman:
Hi all, TIMJOT, remember it is not just the PI that would get reinforced, but also the islands along the way. IJN would be cramped if they had to deal with a reinforced Guam (a couple of additional airfields, shore defenses, put a couple of divisions there, some bombers, some fighters, etc.), a reinforced Wake (build out the airfields, more bombers, fighters, a Marine division, some real shore defenses, subs) and a reinforced Midway (see Wake just previous). One of the reasons that the PI campaign was "easy" for the Japanese to prosecute was the ease that they were able to isolate them. Guam has to be reduced, spam and all, before the Japanese can isolate PI and later turn their attention South towards Australia and New Guinea.
I admit that Guam would be also heavily reinforced, but one only has to look at a map and see that Guam is even more isolated and vulnerable than to PI. Its the only island in the Marianas not controlled by the Japanese. Its surrounded on all sides from major Japanese bases on Siapan, Tinian, Yap and Ulihti. There is a limit to how many planes that could operate there due to its relative small size. Likewise I think Guam would sink before you could cram 2 divisions on it. That being said, I agree it would be much more difficult operation, but there is simply no place to hide and in the end Guam is still a goner eventually. A reinforced Wake on the other hand, I agree would be too far away and too close to US bases on Midway and Hawaii for the Japanese mount a successful invasion. However Wakes main value is as a leg of the air bridge to the PI. Without Guam this is nullified. Regarding the other operations you speak of. Remeber we are talking about the US not being in the war up to then. So New Guinea is most likely already secured as part of DEI campaign. Austrailia was never seriously considered a realistic objective, but if you are talking about operations against Fiji and New Calendonia to cut off Austrailia from the US. Then you also have to consider that even any Jminor apanese advances in those areas would have the added effect of compelling the US to divert considerable resources to that area at the expense of the PI, becuase the US could ill afford the lifeline to Austrailia to be severed. Furthermore, who ever said the PI campaign was easy? Of all the operations undertook by the Japanese it turned out to be by far the most difficult. It took 5 months to do what it only took several weeks to do in Malaya,DEI and Burma. That being said I still think the Japanese eventually win a reinforce PI. Remember we are talking a USN cira 1942 that would be incabable of taking the IJN head on, on anything close to equal terms.



madflava13 -> (10/24/2001 10:41:00 PM)

Just wanted to say I'm back... I've been gone for quite some time and am now in the process of catching up on these two threads so I can begin annoying Byron and others once more...



chanman -> (11/18/2001 1:45:00 AM)

Hi TIMJOT, byron, Madflava and all the rest, my point wasn't that Guam could be held, but that a healthy Guam (for a while) extends the PI campaign, making it even longer. Combined with an intact Pacific Fleet, the IJN strategic position would be a bit tough. Reducing a reinforced Guam would take a while, and a healthy and reinforced Wake would make it difficult. You point out that Guam is in reach of several large Japanese bases, but the reverse is true too. Remember that the sooner the 'meat grinder' mentioned in other posts (on other threads?) wipes out the initial Japanese aircrew pool, the poor quality of the replacements means that the Allies can think more offensively. Others have commented on the Japanese sealift difficulties, allowing the USN to forward base its submarines out of Wake and Guam would further complicate the issue. One of the limiting factors facing the USN submarine war was the long trek the subs had to make to/from the Japanese shipping lanes. Not to mention the thought of the Black Cats operating in the heart of the Japanese shipping lanes instead of on the periphery as they historically did. The flip side of Guam being surrounded is that Kwajalein and Truk would be tough for the Japanese to reinforce until Guam is out of the picture and a healthy Wake would still be a problem. You don't have to hold them, just use them to occupy IJN attention and bloody them until the reinforcements of '43 and later start coming into play. Should Guam not fall until second quarter '42, and PI not until fourth quarter '42, Japan is in trouble. The perimeter has not been established, the resources have probably not been captured and here come the Essex's, P38's, F6F's and F4U's. I think that Japan loses in early '44 in such a scenario. That's just my opinion. I could be wrong. Chanman



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