(Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific



Message

Lex Morton -> (2/11/2002 5:30:00 AM)

As someone has pointed out even Yamamoto was over-ruled in his efforts to send in the 'big boys' AKA Yamato and Mushashi.Therefor it follows to me that supply should NOT be unlimited as it would depend on Supreme HQ in Tokyo (or where-ever) to decide to allocate alot of very scarce fuel for a 'big push'.This permission should come and go in irregular 'waves' during a campaign and should be linked,relatively loosely tho,to such things as objectives(hidden ones preferably),total amount of forces committed in theatre,desparation (and size) of infantry forces cut off from supplies.The Japanese should know in advance (maybe a week?) when the fuel supply (and how much)is first released down the pipeline to his sector(in this case Truk).He can plan based on that but some of his tankers may well be intercepted by US subs etc before it arrives so that should be randomised in too.I would like to see (but wont) off map holding areas or boxes where a player could chose to send his subs or DDs or cruisers or whatever as either offensivly positioned 'raiders' or as passive escorts.Supply not reaching Chuuk?Re-task 10 DD's and a couple of CLs as escorts to the Java Sea box for example. If you want to skip ALL these admittedly too late in the design concepts then an easy workaround is that fuel usage (and underusage) should count,just as presumably sinking a CV does,in the victory conditions and determination. Hope some of that made some sense! Lex Morton PS Great work on the oil breakdown Mogami! [ February 13, 2002: Message edited by: Lex Morton ]



Paul Goodman -> (2/11/2002 5:34:00 AM)

Well, I'm not so sure. Why would they have done that. Why would you do that? The only time we see the major elements of the Combined Fleet sortie is when a major reinforcement by the Imperial Army is going to happen. Perhaps fuel was a consideration, but I've never seen that stated, whereas later, nearly every move the Combined Fleet (Mobil Fleet) makes reflects the necessity of accessing fuel from Borneo. If the Japanese are going to have a regular capital ship run from Truk to Guadalcanal, soon or later the U.S. is going to find a couple of torpedoes that work. My question, previously asked, is why, when Henderson Field had been decimated by night action, major units didn't just stay around, executing a leisurely bombardment of the airfield, making it impossible for air reinforcement and field repair to occur. It does not appear that aircraft carrier inteference would be likely. Only the Enterprise was left and she was damaged. GO GOLD! GO GOLD! Paul



Ludovic Coval -> (2/11/2002 5:52:00 AM)

Paul, Did you have source stating that Japenese were aware of Henderson state after the bombing ? Regards, Ludovic Coval
Battleline Designer/Developer



Supervisor -> (2/11/2002 1:45:00 PM)

Posted by Adnan Meshuggi:
quote:

posted February 10, 2002 08:24 AM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hm, well the starving island.. yep but why ? Because the japs couldn´t support their troops... why couldn´t they support their troops ? Because of allied air supramacy...
if the japs sunk the allied carriers and kill many crusiers and battleships, they can supply the troops with large slow ships. We should think about the game handling, if someone only want to replay the guadalcanar scenario, fine... Maybe we could use a switch, one with limited fuel and one without....

Actually, Guadacanal was only my example. Japanese operational tempo through out the entire regional campain certainly doesn't reflect unlimited logistics capability even where they had air superiority. They had supply problems in New Guinea even before the Allies built up overwhelming air superiority. And as someone else posted they failed to deliver enough beans, bullets, fuel and reinforcements to Guadacanal even before it's airfield was a significant threat. Or to use their superiority in suface naval assets when they could have been decisive. The why is the question.



Paul Goodman -> (2/11/2002 8:32:00 PM)

Good point, Ludovic. One thing I seem to see over and over again is Japanese commands guaranteeing something would be done; then claiming it was done, even if it was not. So, having "guaranteed" that the Combined Fleet would knock out Henderson, I would certainly think that the Combined Fleet would presume that the field was rendered unusable after a full nights bombardment by two battleships and several heavy cruisers. This same line might be applied to the aircraft carrier situation. It seems to me that the Japanese command MUST have thought that the U.S. had no more carriers in the area and would base their actions on that. Throughout the entire campaign, I think the Combined Fleet plans are conservative in the extreme. Even if the night bombardment was not totally successful, it is hard to imagine that Henderson could have launched aircraft while under heavy cruiser bombardment. Paul



elmo3 -> (2/11/2002 8:41:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by Ludovic Coval:
Paul, Did you have source stating that Japenese were aware of Henderson state after the bombing ? Regards, Ludovic Coval
Battleline Designer/Developer
Ludovic There is a specific reference in McGee's book to the Japanese intercepting a message from Guadalcanal after the first battleship bombardment. The US message stated that the airfield had been pounded. elmo3



mogami -> (2/11/2002 9:26:00 PM)

Greetings, If the game mechanics only allot a certain amout of fuel to the Japanese player per day/week/month I still do not see it being a problem. The player has one enormous advantage over the actual Japanese, he knows what lies ahead. He knows in advance how long the game will be and has a clear knowledge of what he has to do to achive victory. If starting from turn 1 he develops a plan to move/store/conserve fuel he should at some point be able to mount some kind of serios sustained offensive at whatever target he chooses. The timing of this offensive being detirmined by when he has the required supply built up. Meanwhile he can keep the Allied player/AI guessing by fients and light units. (It would not hurt if he could engage US Carriers during the build up phase.) Unlimited fuel at Truk does present the problem of the Japanese using mass amounts they would not actually have available. If half the total monthy production is given to the player (107k tons) he could send the 2 monsters down 6 times before running out of fuel. The rest of his fleet would remain immobile.
So even if he is alloted as high as half I don't see where he could over whelm the Allies.
I think one good solution would be to allow Truk and Rabaul unlimited storage (there were over 360 miles of tunnel facilites at Rabaul by wars end-fuel storage is not complex and could be quickly/cheaply increased as needed) Then decided what the allotment is to be and how often it arrives in Truk (example if monthy allotment is 100k tons per month then have 25k tons arrive per week or 10k tons every third day does not matter as long as the Japanese player has something to plan with. Then he must use his on board assets to move it where he wants (would not have to be Rabaul) but I would set storage limits else where to what he builds. The US player will no doubt have unlimited fuel someplace on the map and have to move supplies forward. The forward fuel depots of both sides would be important targets. [ February 11, 2002: Message edited by: Mogami ]



Ron Saueracker -> (2/13/2002 2:12:00 AM)

Any decisions made on the fuel question? If the Japanese didn't send down the Yamato and friends there was probably a few good reasons; fuel, doctrine, warnings from on high. I always thought fuel was of great import, but I call upon as well the Japanese fleet in being doctrine that emphasised saving the battleline for the still envisioned classic Jutland engagement. For some reason, the battleship was still viewed as the premier arbiter of sea power by many high ranking Japanese officers, and they did not want these ships squandered off Guadalcanal. When reading up on prewar Japanese strategy, the Kongo, Haruna, Hiei, and Kirishima, along with other fast torpedo armed light forces, were to whittle down the US Battle Fleet in order to equalize the odds for a classic engagement. They were viewed as somewhat expendable. This, to me, is more the reason why the slower BBs were not used. But...was it not Raizo Tanaka who stated that Guadalcanal was the "fork in the road" for Japanese fortunes and that it was here that the ultimate naval battle should be fought? He stated this as it was Japan's last crack at bringing the Allies to the peace table due to the still relative parity between the two forces, thanks of course to Midway. This statement obviously benefited from hindsight and reflection, but is that not what wargames are about...revionist history? Fuel should be an issue, but so should doctrine. Why not have different doctrines for strategic reinforcements, just as you have various doctrines for Japanese sub performance. Let it alter the pipeline depending upon whatever results are achieved by players in this theatre.



Ron Saueracker -> (2/13/2002 3:35:00 AM)

Revisionist history is what I meant More thoughts along the theatre aspects of the game. How do you propose to deal with the Midway issue as regards this theatre for the full campaign game? I think that if the Japanese suffer a tactical as well as a strategic defeat during the Coral Sea phase, I think that a: The Japanese should alter their plans and commit Nagumo to another attempt in this theatre, or b: The Japanese strike at Midway in the Central Pacific theatre and suffer the historical consequences thereby instigating the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal (or wherever) on or near the historical date. The reinforement/withdrawl pipeline will ensure the South Pacific theatre remains a backwater until the need arrises for a surprise invasion (ie. Guadalcanal airfield or some other threat to Australia's lifeline or a change towards offensive doctrine by the allies by threatening Rabaul or with their own airfield). This can be affected by altering the reinforements pipeline to reflect changes in strategic doctrine, potentially abstractly solving the fuel issue. If one starts the game on Aug 7th, we are without the problem of "Midway" and can rewrite history. Let our accomplishments dictate the strategic doctrine of our superiors in this theatre, and they can worry about allotting us enough fuel to get the job done (by allocating the reinforcements in the pipeline...let fuel only be more of a tactical issue)



ratster -> (2/13/2002 3:59:00 AM)

Yeah, Joel Billings stated earlier(in this thread) that they'll probably leave it the way it is; Unlimited fuel at Truk, but it's up to the player to move it everywhere else from there.



Supervisor -> (2/13/2002 10:55:00 AM)

I think the question of how to limit global resources in this game should be added, if at all, as a player option on the Game Options Menu. I have yet to find a single reference in secondary sources to Japanese Fuel stocks beyond the usual brief mentions about the tanker campaign in 1944 which is beyond the scope of the game. Dunnigan's and Nofi's "Pacific War Encyclopedia" has annual figures for the Japanese Strategic Reserve, production and consumpion which show that the Japanese consumed the Reserve and all of their production in 42 and 43; then the entire system crashed in 44 when the allies sank their tankers in 44 and began capturing or destroying the oil production and refining facilities in the South Pacific. There are references to existing fuel stocks at Japanese bases. A series of monographs written by surviving Japanese participants and translated into English exists but only the ones pertaining to the outbreak of war have been posted on the net. Several monographs deal with different aspects of the campaign in the South Pacific but I don't know without seeing them if there is any hard statistical information. I think we're talking about the National Archives, Library of Congress or somewhere with a real research library if real numbers exist. Do you want to know that bad?



Bulldog61 -> (2/13/2002 3:38:00 PM)

Just found a passage in Richard B. Frank's Guadalcanal that collaborates some data provided by Mogami. Of the imminent clash between US and IJN Carrier forces in Oct 42, Page 370 2nd Paragraph states ”Of two immediate concerns looming over Kondo’s Support Force, fuel came first. The operational design called for by the Combined Fleet to cover both the reinforcement convoy and, one week later, the land assault during one excursion from Truk. Colonel Tsuji had been warned in late September that the Support Force could remain at sea for only about two weeks because of fuel considerations. Even this period strained the meager supplies available; oil had to be siphoned from battleships Yamato and Mutsu at Truk into tankers for transfer to vessels at sea. Moreover, the oil problem compelled Kondo to abruptly abandon his bid for a fleet action in mid-October, and concomitant interdiction of the supply lines to Guadalcanal, to conduct refueling between October 16 and 18.” Mike



Supervisor -> (2/16/2002 9:58:00 AM)

Mogami, meant to ask you earlier and just to back to this question: Did you find any hard numbers anywhere on fuel storage capacity at Truk or fuel inventories on any given dates? Or even any indicators on source on that data?



babyseal7 -> (2/17/2002 3:41:00 AM)

Fuel was the number 1 concern for the Japanese throughout the war. At no point did they have "fuel to burn"...all operations planned with fuel considerations in mind. Giving the IJN player "unlimited" fuel ANYWHERE would distort "reality" (whatever that is). For this campaign fuel shouldn't be the axis it revolves around, but it definitely should be limited to the point that it's a constant nagging low grade worry for the IJN player.



mogami -> (2/17/2002 5:53:00 AM)

Hi, ED I hope to have that sort of detailed data in a week or so. If IJN TF's composed of 4 BB 4 CA and 1 CL 9 DD can be sent down the slot on a sustained basis (even with ships available) While at the same time a CV TF is out to sea, and subs prowling about. etc etc then I'd would say from what data I have seen so far, something would be 'rotten in Denmark'



Supervisor -> (2/17/2002 1:50:00 PM)

Thanks, for the feedback. I'm glad some one has found some hard data.



Chiteng -> (2/21/2002 11:42:00 AM)

I must interject that what the Japanese in the Solomans needed were merchant ships that did NOT
get located and bombed. That isnt quite the same thing as neutralizing the airbase. Nor was it immpossible to achieve. We tend to focus on the
convoys that did get intercepted. Not all of them did.



Marc -> (2/23/2002 6:02:00 AM)

I found the following information in the book "Kaigun, Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941" http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0870211927/qid=1014416079/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_3_1/103-1800113-2863859 I hope it helps a little. All numers are millions of kiloliters
First year of the war:
1. Reserves at the start of the year: 8.4
2. Japanese domestic production: 0.26
3. Synthetic production: 0.24
4. Imports from S.E. Asia: 1.49
5. Total supply: 10.39
6. Consumption: 8.25
7. Navy's consumption: 4.85
8. Remainder at year's end: 2.14 Second year:
1. 2.14
2. 0.27
3. 0.27
4. 2.65
5. 5.33
6. 6.62
7. 4.28
8. -1.29 Third year:
1. -1.29
2. 0.25
3. 0.22
4. 1.06
5. 0.24
6. 4.68
7. 3.18
8. -4.44 A note to the negative numbers in point 8.:
A large quantity of Southeast Asian petroleum was fueled to navy vessels at Palembang, Sumatra and this probably accounted for the difference between supply and consumption. Another passage:
"The navy calculated that after the start of hostilities, on average, it would consume about 233,000 tons of fuel monthly, ..., for an average annual expenditure rate of not quite 2,800,000 tons. In fact, during the Pacific War, despite extreme economy measures, the navy consumed well over 12,000,000 tons of petroleum. This was about 4,400,000 tons more than anticipated...
In all, it amounted to a staggering 60 percent of Japan's total consumption of petroleum during the war, by one estimate."



Marc -> (2/23/2002 7:23:00 AM)

I found another interesting source.
The diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki. http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exchange-glance/Y02Y3839817Y7148420/qid=1014423133/sr=1-1/103-1800113-2863859 Friday, 14 August 1942 (he is onboard Yamato in homewaters)
"Staff officers Miwa and Watanabe returned from Tokyo last night. They reported there will be a shortage of fuel in November this year. I hope the Munitions Bureau will preapre so that operations might not be affected by it."
Sunday, 30 August 1942 (onboard Yamato at Truk)
"The tanker Tatekawa Maru arrived, so the Eleventh Division started its belated refueling. Another Third Fleet tanker also arrived from home waters. As fleet activities in this area increased, fuel consumption reached a huge amount, so the arrangement of fleet tankers reinforced by those belonging to the navy minister was strained to the utmost. This place [Truk] is supposed to be an advanced naval base for this area, yet installations were exceedingly poor. Not even a fuel tank has been completed ashore." Sunday, 20 September 1942 (still Truk)
"The fleet's daily fuel consumption amounts to ten thousand tons lately, and the shortage of tankers was acute in the Rabaul area, as before. The fuel stock at Kure is said to have decreased to 650,000 tons, which is extremely discouraging. I hope it won't hamper the fleet's operational movements. It's also essential for the fleet to economize on fuel by refraining from unnecessary movements." Sunday, 18 October 1942 (still Truk)
"The tanker Kenyo Maru, attached to the advance force, arrived with an empty stomach. As she had no time to go back to the homeland to fill up with fuel, she took forty-five hundred tons each from Yamato and Mutsu and some from Nissho Maru. She will leave here tomorrow morning, heading for the rendezvous point with the advance force.
In the afternoon two more ships came alongside Yamato. Battleships turned into floating tanks! The oil consumption was so much that even the full operation of tankers was not enough. The fuel storage at the homeland is also running short, and a strict order to produce fuel oil has been issued to the oil-producing area in the south. The fact that we now possess those resource-rich districts is our strong point anyway. And because of this we will not be beaten down."



mogami -> (2/23/2002 12:31:00 PM)

Hi, very good excellent . only I think the Navy stock at Kure was 65000 not 650000 (650000 is more then a years supply)



Marc -> (2/23/2002 9:11:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by Mogami:
Hi, very good excellent . only I think the Navy stock at Kure was 65000 not 650000 (650000 is more then a years supply)
Hi Mogami, no. The book says 650,000 tons. At least that is what Ugaki heard. Not a number we should rely on. Marc



Bulldog61 -> (2/24/2002 12:16:00 AM)

Hi Marc!
The 65,000 number is mentioned in a couple of other sources. It could have been a misprint in the book. I think the point here is that the IJN was severly restricted by fuel in there ops even in mid to late 42.
Mike



Marc -> (2/24/2002 12:20:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Mike Kraemer:
I think the point here is that the IJN was severly restricted by fuel in there ops even in mid to late 42.
Mike
Right. My opinion. Marc



Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
1.875