LTCMTS -> RE: Dumb and Dumber (10/21/2004 1:28:08 AM)
|
OK, this should really be over in scenario thread, but I'm going to make some final comments and then leave it alone. 1) By 1918, most pre-dreadnoughts and armored cruisers were removed from first line service. By 1920, most had been striken and scrapped. Some of the newer armored cruisers stuck around as flagships for detached squadrons, like the China Squadron in the RN. The Falklands, Dogger Bank and Jutland proved that there was no place in a modern naval battle for such anachronisms. 2) By 1920, most of the RN's 12in gun dreadnoughts were reduced to second line duties or even being hulked or scrapped. The IJN's and USN's would soon follow, (except Utah, Florida, Arkansas and Wyoming, which were saved by the Washington Treaty). There was good reason for this. At a time when the current generation of battleships and battlecruisers carried 16" guns and expected to enage at 18,000 yds and more, the 12" gun battleship and battle cruiser were no more than "death traps". The cost of improving their fire controls, turrets and horizontal armor would have been prohibitive, while even with higher elevation allowing greater range, their 850lbs and 870lbs AP shells would have been far less effective against modern "all or nothing" protective schemes. 3) And the reason driving this was gunpower. 12" dreadnoughts were designed when maximum engagement ranges were seen as no more than 8,000 yds, where most shells would hit the belt or would richochet off the lightly armored decks. The ships of the USN's 1916 program were designed to engage at 18,000 yds, where most hits would be on and through the deck. By 1926, this had increased to 24,000 yds and all three Great Power navies had successfully experimented with OTH targeting and engagement aided by spotter a/c. Of the USN's dreadnoughts built or building by 1920, only the class from the "California" on were considered as carrying sufficient horizontal armor to be secure from long range hits. 4) As far as the "G3" and "N3" classes were concerned, the first four ships were ordered 26 Oct 1921. The orders were suspended and there is some thought that they would not have been built, even if the Washington Treaty negotiations had fallen through, but the RN in the end had no choice. Of all its 13.5" and 15" armed battleships and battlecruisers extant in 1922, only "Hood" had a maximum range exceeding 25,000 yds. The three near-sisters had been broken up from Oct 1918. This is compared to 18 built or building for the USN and eight built or building for the IJN. The cost of modifications to its battleline would have equaled the cost of new construction. As it was, the British Empire sought and received permission to build the "Nelsons" under the Treaty to resolve this issue. Under the Washington Treaty, the two "Nelsons" plus the "Hood" gave the RN three Capital ships with guns exceeding 25,000 yds, when the USN had five and the IJN had two. 5) While the "Kiis" were not laid down, they were ordered on 12 Oct 1921, as programmed under the "8-8-8" program as approved by the Government and after funding had been appropriated by the Diet. Only the Washington Treaty prevented their being laid down. Given the constraints of the Japanese industrial complex, they would have been completed between 1928 and 1931. In 1922, the USN had 18 new capital ships completed or building, compared with 8 for Japan. The IJN sought a 70% strength level of the USN to ensure a successful defense of the western Pacific. The Japanese could not have avoided building the "Kiis" without some means of restricting the USN's programs. 6) By 1930, the RN would have had as carriers, the "Argus", "Eagle", "Hermes", "Furious", "Glorious" and "Courageous" with possibly "Vindictive". The RN was planning to convert the two "large light cruisers" regardless of the Washington Treaty. As far as the USN, they had requested carriers from Congress (and been denied) in FY20 and FY21. In July 1921, the General Board made the request for three carriers its highest priority. Carriers were seen as important enough that thought was given to converting two "Lexingtons" (or more) even before the Washington Treaty, especially given the superior number of 16" ships vis a vis the IJN. Purpose built carriers would have resembled the "Saratoga" and "Lexington" in size, speed and armament, but with less armor, coming in at ~30,000 tons standard displacement. These could have expected to be finished around 1929. In addition, from 1924, the USN planned a carrier conversion program of large liners, the first to be available some 90 to 360 days after M-Day. The IJN, of course, constrained by its industrial capacity, would have had to trade capital ship, auxiliary or cruiser hulls to get carriers or gone the merchant conversion route. "Historically", the entire scenario is fantasy. The US didn't have the willpower, the British Empire the money or the Japanese the industrial capacity to engage in another arms race. The Washington Treaty or something similar was the most liely outcome, even unilateral self-constraint imposed by the respective governments. A more interesting scenario would be the resumption of capital ship building after the Treaty "building holiday" ended in 1930, with the naval powers seeing government spending as a means of jump starting the economies and creating jobs for social stability. Then you add the USN's BB 1928, BB 1932 and BB 1934 designs or the Hiraga/Fujimoto designs. Also, you wouldn't have an entire generation of super-dreadnoughts making everything else before them obsolete, thanks to the Treaty restrictions.
|
|
|
|