LargeSlowTarget -> RE: CV strike composition (12/29/2004 2:07:35 PM)
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ORIGINAL: jwilkerson (...) Again, look at Midway, where TF17 ( Yorktown ) planes effectively joined the TF16 stirke. (...) I vote for even treatment for launching. (...) Sorry, but even treatment for carrier ops is nonsense in 1942 and 1943. The USN carrier strikes at Midway have been a totally screwed-up affair with strike groups proceeding independently, some to be shot down in uncoordinated attacks (TBDs not waiting for SBDs), one not finding the enemy at all and heading for Midway (one of Hornet's strike groups), escorts becoming seperated from the groups they were assigned to protect or joining the wrong ones. Yorktown planes catched up on TF 16 strikes only because they took a straighter course than the planes of TF 16, which had been launched earlier but spent more time searching for the enemy. This can hardly be labeled 'effectively' in terms of planned coordination. And like TIMJOT put it, USN carrier strike coordination at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz was FUBAR. Yes, the USN might have had advantages in plane handling on deck, but once aloft, USN strikes tended to arrive piecemeal, while JN strike groups in 1942 usually were better coordinated and arrived in compact waves. Regarding TF organization - JN used big CV-TFS from Day 1 and only grew wise of the 'all eggs'-hazard at Midway and later seperated their remaining carriers in vanguard / bait and main striking force. The USN started with single-carrier-TFs, and when the question of coordinating multi-carrier-ops came up, opinions were long divided whether to group CVs together in order to concentrate punch and defense, or to seperate them even further so a patrol plane could only spot one CV at a time and a strike would have to split or to concentrate on one CV, leaving the other for counterstrikes. In practice, they kept them seperated but inconsequently not far enough. Due to severe CV-losses in 1942, the USN had to wait for the arrival of Essex and Independence class CVs before it could even start experiementing with multi-CV-TFs. So, in WitP, you can simulated the TF-organization: set-up single-carrier-TFs and make one follow the other, so in case of attack, they share CAP, do not share AA and only one CV is at the mercy of each strike - or combine the CVs, share CAP and AA and may lose all CVs in the process. But we also need to model the 'attack coordination disadvantage' of the USN as well as the 'defense advantage' enjoyed by USN fighter control. Coordination of strikes and CAP improved with time, so I think the early war penalty for the USN is justified. Raises the question whether there is a penalty for absence of JN fighter direction throughout the war. EDIT: It just hit me - if three CVs are split in three TFs but in the same hex, will they attack seperately or will the strikes combine? I have never tested this, as I always concentrate my carriers and live with the early war penalty. If they strike seperately, then we have 'perfect uncoordination' and all we need to do in order to simulate USN coordination problems is to contrain ourselves from forming multi-CV-TFs until late 1943. Though we would still need a penalty for 'early war botched fighter direction'...
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