RE: Good Book

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FrankHunter -> RE: Good Book (2/5/2005 10:03:09 PM)
Holger Herwig wrote a great book from the side of the Germans and Austrians. Mud, Blood and Poppycock by Corrigan is excellent. Paddy Griffiths book on the Western Front is also good. Personally I have little time for Mosier. His book was little more than a personal rant against the British and full of problems. He claims everything in english is tainted by a great myth, ok fine. But the German Official History doesn't back up the claims he makes either such as concerning August 8th 1918 or even the Brits' 1917 offensive in Flanders. Goes on to write off the entire effect of the blockade with one quote. Uh huh. His data doesn't match with any other sources such as the WW1 Databook. As for the British being equally responsible for WW1, I haven't found that argument persuasive at all. But then all the books from differing points of view is what makes the war fascinating. WW2 is pretty cut and dried. WW1 is a lot of shades of grey.

Los -> RE: Good Book (2/6/2005 4:57:52 AM)
One thing I think I agree with him on. Historians that don't take unit AARs with a grain of salt are asking for trouble since priority one of any AAR is to ensure you have mitigated any fault or blame that may have come your commander's way and to ensure you've put the rosiest possible view on your performance. There are some interesting claims in Mosier's book around teh German armies change in tactics as well as the intentions of various local offensives and how they were continuously misread but their enemies, for example stuff like neither the British nor the French had and enemy OB section doing analyis of enemy tactics in their intelligence for the first three years of the war. I have tried to find on in the sources avialable to me both on the net and in writing but haven't found one. It's clear that someone had finally sat up and taken notice of the new German tactics, which they had been using for years, by 1918 as there is an AEF pamphlet on German tactic published after the Spring offensives, and hopefully some or much of this information would have been passed on in cooperation from the british or the French. Who was anaylizing what the Germans were doing? What tactics they were employting? Whether what was assumed about their operations was true or just erroneous supposition. It's pretty telling if this was so. Fergesun and Mosier share similar conclusions as to German vs Allied caualties, though in some other areas they are at opposite ends. Los

FrankHunter -> RE: Good Book (2/6/2005 7:35:32 AM)
Mosier sort of shrugs off the view that Allied casualties were higher because they were usually on the offensive. Says the Germans launched offensives that were always successful. Well, the Spring 1918 offensives were useless exercises that broke the German army and failed to gain any strategic victory and incurred over 700,000 casualties, more than the Brits lost in Flanders in 1917, an offensive he attacks. Anything the Allies, and especially the British, did better Mosier finds a way to denigrate. He tends to use abrasive language to do it too. Tanks? Waste of metal. Black Day? No big deal. 1917 in Flandsrs? Germans lost only 4 guys. German spring 1918 offensive? Greatest offensive ever launched by mortal men. I admit I found the tone of the book to be the kind of rant I'd find on a chat site and found I was unable to find other works that supported his data and in fact more often found that even the Germans didn't back him up. The quotes reminded me of the kind you find listed when the movie was bad, ie. "...stunning..." Fred at KRock radio :) Mosier simply ignored anything and anyone that didn't back his point of view.

IronDuke_slith -> RE: Good Book (2/6/2005 4:52:19 PM)
I understand he wrote another rant about the Blitzkrieg, apparently discovering things that were a surprise (not bad for an English professor coming to the war for his first book, after 60 years of scholarship from others). It was mainly his attitude re American forces. There's ample evidence to show the Americans were brave but two years behind everyone else tactically when they got started, and there's plenty of evidence to show a learning curve amongst British Commanders that culminated in the series of successful bite and holds of 1918. The American's real impact in the war was to break German morale by convinving them that the war of attrition could not be won. His point on casualties is also poor. On the Somme, I thought Allied casualties were usually put in the 6-650 000 mark, whilst German casualties look to have been almost 600 000 if memory serves. There's a quote from some German Officer somewhere where he says the Somme was the muddy graveyard of the German field Army. There is some evidence to suggest the Germans were more innovative at a tactical level, and the work of Bruchmuller stands out as the war's finest artilleryman. However, the British Army learned much from Ypres and the Somme, at a time when the landscape for the attacking side had changed completely because of trenches, barbed wire, heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns. By 1918, those lessons were driving all before them. Regards, IronDuke

geozero -> RE: Good Book (2/6/2005 9:20:52 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke I understand he wrote another rant about the Blitzkrieg, apparently discovering things that were a surprise (not bad for an English professor coming to the war for his first book, after 60 years of scholarship from others). It was mainly his attitude re American forces. There's ample evidence to show the Americans were brave but two years behind everyone else tactically when they got started, and there's plenty of evidence to show a learning curve amongst British Commanders that culminated in the series of successful bite and holds of 1918. The American's real impact in the war was to break German morale by convinving them that the war of attrition could not be won. His point on casualties is also poor. On the Somme, I thought Allied casualties were usually put in the 6-650 000 mark, whilst German casualties look to have been almost 600 000 if memory serves. There's a quote from some German Officer somewhere where he says the Somme was the muddy graveyard of the German field Army. There is some evidence to suggest the Germans were more innovative at a tactical level, and the work of Bruchmuller stands out as the war's finest artilleryman. However, the British Army learned much from Ypres and the Somme, at a time when the landscape for the attacking side had changed completely because of trenches, barbed wire, heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns. By 1918, those lessons were driving all before them. Regards, IronDuke I agree that American intervention broke the German morale more than anything else. It also demonstrated to all European countries that the war would continue to "expand". But there were some U.S. commanders with some prior military experiance, though not on the scale seen in Eurpoe. I think that the technical achievements were a larger contributor to Allied victory (American production, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, etc). The British and French (and Germans) had a lot more battle experience. If U.S. had not intervened it is possible that Germany's 1918 offensive would have proven either successful or dragged the awr a few more years. IN any event, on final analysis, America's involvement was needed.

FrankHunter -> RE: Good Book (2/6/2005 10:59:47 PM)
Mosier's numbers are all over the place. He throws out casualty comparisons that even the Official German history doesn't claim. he also claims the British army was destroyed as an instrument of war at each of the battles of the Somme in 1916, Flanders in 1917 and defending against the Spring offensive of 1918. So being as the British army somehow got destroyed 3 times, how does he then explain the fact the British army did so well in 1918? Claims the Germans were basically retreating everywhere except against the US. Uh-huh. For a better treatment of the German home front than Mosier's single quote offers, I suggest the book "Victory Must Be Ours" as well as Holger. There's no question the potential that American forces represented was a factor in German morale. And by the end of the war the US had taken over a good portion of the front line. Losing Russia hurt the allied cause and America coming in helped make that up. I believe the 1918 Spring offensives were not going to win the war for Germany regardless of US involvement. That's a personal opinion of course, pretty hard to quantify that morale bonus. But there was no plan to win the war. Ludendorff just somehow hoped he would break through somewhere and the German army would somehow force the Allies to surrender. It was after the offensives had been stopped and the US army was formed and began to join in Foch's "Everyone into the battle" that I think US forces made a real contribution. I also believe the Russian army was not the backward misfit that its often characterized as with the exception of Brusilov. The Russians certainly made a real contribution. I really don't understand Mosier's point of making personal attacks on the fighting qualities of other nations. Circumstances were different year to year in different areas of the war and the numbers of casualties mean you can't even compare the 1914 German army with the one in 1917. Impossible to make error-free comparisons. As for my own bias, I've already stated before that my own opinion is that the Royal Navy blockade was the decisive factor. Tipped the balance so to speak. And that view comes from reading the German side, not Jellicoe's memoirs :)

anarchyintheuk -> RE: Good Book (2/11/2005 10:21:22 PM)
I liked reading Mosier, it was refreshing. It went against almost all of the opinions I had formed from previous reading like: the AEF was distinctly the third best allied fighting force on the western front, Verdun was a french victory, casualties were relatively equal in any offensive during the trench years, tanks were an effective weapon (if not mechanically reliable), Haig did not launch colossal offensives in order to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin (in the words of Blackadder), etc. Didn't change any of my opinions tho.

Los -> RE: Good Book (2/12/2005 2:28:41 AM)
You should read Niall Ferguson's Pity of War, similar to Mosier in someways. I also enjoyed Fussell's little shoot from the hip concise history of fighting on the Western Front he gives before launching into the social and literary aspects of the war. Los

Hanal -> RE: Good Book (2/14/2005 5:10:50 AM)
Well I picked up a 3 volume 1921 Grolier's edition about WWI on Ebay the other day...I do not know if it is a good book, but with 1000 pics, and maps, that will make it worthwhile for me... [image]local://upfiles/10580/Wg113600140.jpg[/image]

IronDuke_slith -> RE: Good Book (2/16/2005 12:53:27 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: geozero quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke I understand he wrote another rant about the Blitzkrieg, apparently discovering things that were a surprise (not bad for an English professor coming to the war for his first book, after 60 years of scholarship from others). It was mainly his attitude re American forces. There's ample evidence to show the Americans were brave but two years behind everyone else tactically when they got started, and there's plenty of evidence to show a learning curve amongst British Commanders that culminated in the series of successful bite and holds of 1918. The American's real impact in the war was to break German morale by convinving them that the war of attrition could not be won. His point on casualties is also poor. On the Somme, I thought Allied casualties were usually put in the 6-650 000 mark, whilst German casualties look to have been almost 600 000 if memory serves. There's a quote from some German Officer somewhere where he says the Somme was the muddy graveyard of the German field Army. There is some evidence to suggest the Germans were more innovative at a tactical level, and the work of Bruchmuller stands out as the war's finest artilleryman. However, the British Army learned much from Ypres and the Somme, at a time when the landscape for the attacking side had changed completely because of trenches, barbed wire, heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns. By 1918, those lessons were driving all before them. Regards, IronDuke I agree that American intervention broke the German morale more than anything else. It also demonstrated to all European countries that the war would continue to "expand". But there were some U.S. commanders with some prior military experiance, though not on the scale seen in Eurpoe. I think that the technical achievements were a larger contributor to Allied victory (American production, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, etc). The British and French (and Germans) had a lot more battle experience. If U.S. had not intervened it is possible that Germany's 1918 offensive would have proven either successful or dragged the awr a few more years. IN any event, on final analysis, America's involvement was needed. Geo, I'd agree in that it was required to end it in 1918, but I suspect the Gertmans were beaten when their Spring offensive failed. Frank's right to point to the blockade. Dissension at home and enemies becoming more efficient would have taken their toll eventually. I also think it was essentially American bodies, not production that won it. Tanks did not really have much of an impact (IMHO) and I don't think the Allied Armies were that badly off in terms of equipment. The artillery barrages before the Somme and then Passchendaele did not lack for ordinance. But the Germans knew their own casualty figures from defensive "successes" like the Somme. They knew that many more battles like that and they were finished, even if they won them. The American arrival in theatre held out that exact prospect to the demoralised Germans. Although (I'd argue) tactically more proficient than their enemies (a trait also displayed by their children 25 years later) the Germans were not blind to the numbers. American production was more a factor in WWII, I'd suggest. Indeed, probably the prime reason the Western Allies reached Germany at the same time the Soviets did (thankfully for western Europe). On the point of Americans with prior Military experience, I'm guessing most of that would have been against the Mexicans, the Spanish in Cuba and suppressing Native American uprisings. I don't think anything they would have previously encountered would have prepared them at all for what they found in France. regards, IronDuke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: Good Book (2/16/2005 1:00:18 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: FrankHunter I believe the 1918 Spring offensives were not going to win the war for Germany regardless of US involvement. That's a personal opinion of course, pretty hard to quantify that morale bonus. But there was no plan to win the war. Ludendorff just somehow hoped he would break through somewhere and the German army would somehow force the Allies to surrender. It was after the offensives had been stopped and the US army was formed and began to join in Foch's "Everyone into the battle" that I think US forces made a real contribution. A good point. For all its advances, you don't see too much (until towards the end) in the way of a grand strategic plan. It was the most surprising thing about the entire offensive. I'm more familiar with WWII, but you look at the offensive plans there and there are objectives, aims, some idea of an "exit" strategy for the attack if you like. This offensive is designed to do precisely this....etc. I'm not completely sure what the strategic objectives (precise objectives as opposed to the generic "win the war") actually were. Regards, IronDuke

anarchyintheuk -> RE: Good Book (2/18/2005 10:34:08 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: FrankHunter I believe the 1918 Spring offensives were not going to win the war for Germany regardless of US involvement. That's a personal opinion of course, pretty hard to quantify that morale bonus. But there was no plan to win the war. Ludendorff just somehow hoped he would break through somewhere and the German army would somehow force the Allies to surrender. It was after the offensives had been stopped and the US army was formed and began to join in Foch's "Everyone into the battle" that I think US forces made a real contribution. A good point. For all its advances, you don't see too much (until towards the end) in the way of a grand strategic plan. It was the most surprising thing about the entire offensive. I'm more familiar with WWII, but you look at the offensive plans there and there are objectives, aims, some idea of an "exit" strategy for the attack if you like. This offensive is designed to do precisely this....etc. I'm not completely sure what the strategic objectives (precise objectives as opposed to the generic "win the war") actually were. Regards, IronDuke Ludendorff could have looked at prior German successes in the Franco-Prussian and Six Weeks wars to see what had won in the past. The former was the age-old "I capture your capital I win", the latter was the "your army is no match for mine". The Spring Offensive didn't seem designed to concentrate entirely on one or the other, although both options were certainly available. Paris was close and new infiltrating tactics were available. How much Ludendorff personally relied on the new tactics to achieve success is something that I've never really seen written about. Probably, he looked at the general offensive pressure that eventually made Russia collapse (ignoring all the internal factors) and thought that that would win it. Whether or not it was realistic to believe that Germany could win by that stage is another issue. Your right about the lack of an objective. It does seem odd that products of a general staff system universally acknowledged as the finest of the time, overlooked something as basic as stating what the objectives of an offensive were. Maybe they are actually written into some operational orders in some archive somewhere. It would be interesting to read. Odder still that someone as maligned as Falkenhayn may have a clearer strategic vision, no matter how flawed in execution, than some as praised as Ludendorff.

tklemme -> RE: Good Book (2/19/2005 12:29:49 AM)
Anyone interested in WWI should definitely read The First World War by Hew Strachan (364 pp, Viking 2004). It's not a primer on the war but more of an analysis for those who already know the essential events. Great book. Strachan is also writing a multi-volume monster series on WWI but I haven't read any of it.

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