Dragoon 45 -> RE: Marines at Omaha (10/21/2005 12:51:06 PM)
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I believe I originally got the information on Eisenhower's request for Marines in Europe from Rick Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn", which deals with North Africa, but I will have to go back and check. Eisenhower requested two Marine Divisions to spearhead landings in the European Theater prior to Torch. In particular he wanted them for any invasion of France. The Navy denied the request as they wanted all available Marine Units in the Pacific. I was both a Marine and a Soldier. Went to Ranger school as a Marine while assigned to Force Recon. I attended what they called the Ranger Critical Leaders Course, which taught all the tactics and techniques but without the attendent harassment and sleep deprivation. Good Course! But from watching Ranger School and attending USMC Basic there was not a lot of difference between the two that I saw (late 70's). I meant no disparagement on the Rangers as they are a very good organization. But reading a biography of William Darby, the author stated that what tipped the balance for the formation of the Rangers in WW II was the unavailability of Marines for assault troops for the ETO. Army Commanders saw a need for assault troops in various types of operations especially amphibious operations and realized that they would have to supply their own in lieu of the Marines. "Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory" by Adrian Lewis also backs up the Eisenhower request for Marines and the lack of assault troops in the Army prior to the formation of the Rangers. Lewis also in the book takes great pains in comparing amphibious operations in Europe and the Pacific. His contention is that the planning for Overlord was greatly flawed especially in the Naval Gunfire Plan and also in the CAS plan. Use of boat teams (about a platoon and a half in strength) because of landing craft shortages instead of organic platoons caused unnecessary confusion and led to breakdowns in the chain of command especially on Omaha. He also touches on the fact that the troops in the initial landings were not trained for anything after they had fought their way off the beaches, hence all the trouble they had with the bocage country. He dings Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, and others hard for what he terms unrealistic planning and training. Although he does not come out and say so in the book I got the impression that he believes that the Marines would not have had as much trouble on Omaha as the 1st and 29th did taking the beach and continuing inland. This in no way is a criticism of the individual soldiers, but is a criticism of the commanders involved, which he believes poorly planned the Overlord Assault. He also points out that up till mid May Eisenhower had reservations in using the 29th for the initial assaults. He wanted to pull an experienced division from Italy to replace them, but in the end didn't. As far as my original post I am postulating a what if scenario with Marine Units replacing Army Units on D-Day as if Eisenhower's request had been granted by the Joint Chiefs. quote:
ORIGINAL: m10bob Hi Dragoon.............. I have never heard of this before. I have had a lifetime to study this particular battle, as my father was a career officer, assigned to HHC 116th RCT, on Omaha, early that morning. It is possible this item may have been mentioned in a history book (which I may have missed seeing), but as for the Rangers, well, we all know they were an active component of the Army in late 1942. (In fact, a component of the 29th ID was called the 29th Rangers, and they had some men participate in landings with Brit commandoes in 1942 on France !) This would certainly preclude the notion of the "lack of Gyrenes" being considered a catalyst for a yet to be formulated Operation Overlord ?? I was a Ranger myself, and we try to be cognizant of Ranger history.[;)]
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