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RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure

 
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RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 9/28/2006 11:38:18 PM   
spruce

 

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I like the prestige idea - very much  - there's the talent on the one side and the result on the other side.

I think some negative penalties on some skills might be applied - but not too drastical. However this is not the bottomline...

The most important thing from "negative prestige" should be that the human player should decide to either keep a low prestige general and causing unrest in the general staff - or to demote him (resetting his prestige to zero) and give him a new chance at a lower tier level - and bring back some tranquillity.

F.e. general Jackson - skill 8 general - might be the right general to bring the South to victory, but what to do if his efforts are not "translated" into results. For sure - he's mathematical the best general *** we all know *** - but his situation is not sustainable ...

well it would be cool to stick with Jackson and ride out the storm until his prestige gets postive again, or to demote him - bring back rest and give another guy a chance.

< Message edited by spruce -- 9/28/2006 11:40:46 PM >

(in reply to andysomers)
Post #: 31
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 9/29/2006 3:51:27 PM   
dh76513


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quote:

ORIGINAL: andysomers
David - Check your research on Thomas. The "Rock of Chickamuaga" was nearly removed from command during the Nashville campaign. I'm with you - in that I am a Thomas fan, but I don't think he'd make my top 4 US generals, and definitely not an 8 out of 8. I'm still going to try and come up with a matirx on gnereals ratings from the other games that I have in my collection.


andysomers,
I appreciate your input and thanks for your points as I enjoy reading them. However, I will stick with my argument in keeping George H. Thomas on the “superb” list – definitely deserving of an “8” rating. Yes, he was nearly removed from command, but this speaks more to one's political prestige than to one’s skills as a battlefield commander. George Patton was relieved of command as well and “almost relieved” numerous times, but who did Eisenhower go to when he found himself in a jam? Patton!

My choice for George H. Thomas is based on his battlefield contributions not his likeability. Unfortunately, Lincoln treated him as a political liability and pawn and many Union leaders fundamentally distrusted him because of his Southern heritage and the South simply ignored his existence.

Most historians agree, without question, that Sherman's campaign through Georgia was made possible only through the battlefield skills of George H. Thomas at Chickamauga. And if this campaign would have been unsuccessful, Lincoln would have not been re-elected in 1864. In turn, this may have led to a truce between the North and South leaving us with a split nation today. In my opinion, that reason alone is enough to give George H. Thomas a “superb” rating.

Furthermore, this courageous warrior survives much political intrigue to not only save a complete Union army from annihilation, an army by the way that he did not personally command but could have, but also completely destroys the South's Army of Tennessee. In fact, I think he saved both Sherman and Grant’s careers with his victories at Nashville and Franklin. Military historians consider him one of the best defensive generals during the Civil War and many of his tactical skills were even implemented in Korea and in Vietnam (with Westmoreland’s modifications). Finally, and unlike many of those general officers, he was a decent man. Despite his superb command tactics and distinguished victories, he was unfortunately an easy competitive target for both sides both during and after the war.

So, with this being said, I will keep George H. Thomas on my list of “superb” commanders as noted below and argue his rightful standing for such a rating in this game.

quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513
USA

• George H. Thomas, MG, USA (William Sherman thought he was the best battlefield commander in the Union and defended Robert Anderson's choice of George Thomas to Abraham Lincoln)
• John Buford, MG, USA
• Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, BG, USA (Congressional Medal of Honor)
• Philip Henry Sheridan, MG, USA

CSA

• Patrick R. Cleburne, MG, CSA
• Nathan Bedford Forrest, LTG, CSA (Robert Lee thought Forrest the best battlefield commander in the Confederacy. It was William Sherman who coined the famous "That Devil Forrest" comment, as in "That devil Forrest is down making mischief about our gunboats." When asked after the war to identify the best general under his command, Robert E. Lee responded, " Nathan Bedford Forrest…a man I've never met.")
• William J. Hardee, LTG, CSA
• Albert Sidney Johnston, GEN, CSA (Jefferson Davis thought Johnson the best battlefield commander in the Confederacy)


As I stated before, I will likely have a great deal of criticism regarding my choices as this is certainly a passionate and controversial subject for most individuals who love American Civil War history, but I will stand by my list above.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
I agree with your selections, I just thought that was an interesting note.


Thanks, Oldguard for your support!

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Post #: 32
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 9/29/2006 7:55:52 PM   
andysomers

 

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That's fair enough - it's certainly a valid stance.  My only apprehension on Thomas was the speed with which he conducted the Nashville-Franklin operations, against a more qualified and staffed enemy (i.e. an 1862 AoT vs. a late 1864 AoT) the results could have been a lot different.  Grant had at one point began travelling to Nashville to personally relieve Thomas of command, and had already pegged Logan for the job.  At this point in the war, with Grant firmly in charge, I'd say this had little to do with politics.

Regardless, David, your points and opinions are 100% valid - no problem at all with your logic.  His record leading up to Nashville was without question nearly flawless, and even with his indecisiveness at Nashville, the end result of that campaign is certainly undeniable - destruction of the AoT as any sort of major fighting force.  I've got no big problems with him as an 8 - but I'd personally make him like a 6 or 7 out of 8 for Army command, and probably an 8 out of 8 at division or Corps level.

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Post #: 33
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/2/2006 9:04:44 PM   
dh76513


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I think Patrick Cleburne (CSA) is by far the most underrated general on both sides during the Civil War and certainly deserves an “8” or superb rating in this game. This warrior repeatedly withstood vastly superior forces under some of “the best” generals to earning him the nickname, "Stonewall Jackson of the West." At Billy Goat Hill during the Battle of Missionary Ridge he repeatedly repulsed Union forces under William Sherman (USA) in spite of being outnumbered 10-to-1 forcing Ulysses S. Grant to order a desperate frontal assault on Missionary Ridge. Ulysess Grant gave William Sherman a plush assignment at Chattanooga. The red-haired Ohioan was to attack Braxton Bragg's flank on the northeast end of Missionary Ridge, the last of a series of battles in the Tennessee city of Chattanooga. After taking most of the morning to gain control a hill from Pat Cleburne's men, Sherman realized he had taken Billy Goat Hill instead of Missionary Ridge. Cleburne's men held the right flank on Missionary Ridge, repelling General Sherman's attack in spite of being outnumbered 10 to 1, forcing a dangerous frontal assault on the mountain from Orchard Knob. Unfortunately, Bragg (CSA; should be rated poor) had not placed his men to defend against such an assault and the attack pierced the Confederate line at the center of the mountain.

Performing rear guard duties at Ringgold, Georgia, Cleburne positioned his men himself and his division withstood an attack by Joe Hooker's XX Corps (USA). At Pickett's Mill he spread his line east and absorbed an attack by General George Thomas (USA; should also be rated superb), at Kennesaw Mountain he and Benjamin Cheatham (CSA) again repulsed Thomas in an area today known as Cheatham Hill. During the Battle of Atlanta he advanced to Leggett's Hill, where brutal hand-to-hand combat at the top of the hill and a late-day charge by John "Blackjack" Logan (USA) turned his men back. At Jonesboro, Georgia, Cleburne's 5,000 men held a line against 50,000 of Sherman's warriors.

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Post #: 34
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 12:00:38 AM   
tevans6220

 

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I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. Hood is a very good example. At brigade or division command he was a very good leader but as commander of the Army of Tennessee he left a lot to be desired. Hooker is another example. As commander of the Army of the Potomac he was a failure but as a corps commander at Lookout Mountain he was very good. My point is that it's going to be very difficult to rate these leaders unless you keep it in the context of army, corps, division and brigade commands. As my two examples point out not all leaders were capable at every command level. Joe Hooker at corps command will not be the same Joe Hooker at army command. I think it's important to put the ratings in their proper context. 

(in reply to dh76513)
Post #: 35
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 12:14:03 AM   
spruce

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: tevans6220

I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. Hood is a very good example. At brigade or division command he was a very good leader but as commander of the Army of Tennessee he left a lot to be desired. Hooker is another example. As commander of the Army of the Potomac he was a failure but as a corps commander at Lookout Mountain he was very good. My point is that it's going to be very difficult to rate these leaders unless you keep it in the context of army, corps, division and brigade commands. As my two examples point out not all leaders were capable at every command level. Joe Hooker at corps command will not be the same Joe Hooker at army command. I think it's important to put the ratings in their proper context. 


I think that's a very correct approach. We should avoid trying to recreate a historical simulator only to find out it's not working 75% of time. We have to say what we expect from the whole matter in a game setting so we can have fun with it. The prestige thingy was something I really liked ! Also see Frank Hunters game ...

< Message edited by spruce -- 10/3/2006 12:15:22 AM >

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Post #: 36
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 12:19:57 AM   
mlees


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quote:

ORIGINAL: tevans6220

I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. I think it's important to put the ratings in their proper context. 


I am gonna guess that the areas of rating these Generals are used for different functions, and not all Generals' ratings in each category are used all the time...

Let me ask those who know just when and by who are these categories are used:

quote:

Initiative: Adds to the movement of brigades in detailed combat; affects the movement initiative of the division/corps/army on the main map


Determined by the sole Army Commanders, not each individual brigade commanders, right? If so, then the brigade commanders "Initiative" values aren't looked at (and you can have a bad "Initiative" rating and still be a good brigade commander due to "Tactics" or "Command"...).

quote:

Leadership: helps disorganized units regain order; gives morale boost for rallying; has chance of negating effects of fatigue from forced march


I'm gonna guess that this is driven at the Brigade commanders level...

Or is it where the Brigade commander has the greatest effect (positive or negative), followed by Division/Corps commander, then distantly by the Army commander

quote:

Tactics: Increases damage done by brigades in combat


Solely a Brigade commanders function, I am guessing...

quote:

Command: Determines the chance of bringing out-of-command units back into command; helps brigades change formation; helps units resist charges; enables units to enter dangerous zones (i.e., certain hexes where they ordinarily would be at a penalty because of terrain type and/or proximity to enemy units)


Brigade commander funtion only?

quote:

Cavalry: Increases damage done by charging cavalry in combat


Is "Command" for Infantry units, and "Cavalry" for horsie units?

(in reply to tevans6220)
Post #: 37
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 6:06:31 PM   
dh76513


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quote:

ORIGINAL: tevans6220
I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. Hood is a very good example. At brigade or division command he was a very good leader but as commander of the Army of Tennessee he left a lot to be desired. Hooker is another example. As commander of the Army of the Potomac he was a failure but as a corps commander at Lookout Mountain he was very good. My point is that it's going to be very difficult to rate these leaders unless you keep it in the context of army, corps, division and brigade commands. As my two examples point out not all leaders were capable at every command level. Joe Hooker at corps command will not be the same Joe Hooker at army command. I think it's important to put the ratings in their proper context.


Tevan,
I agree with your points and I have often said that your better commanders during the civil war were on the field.

As for “Fighting Joe Hooker” I think he is a very interesting study, but a very poor commander. Furthermore, he did not demonstrate a good example for the conduct of generals and their staffs and subordinates. I am not condemning him on grounds of morality, but Hooker appears to have been a man unable or unwilling to separate his private life from his military responsibilities. And for this, I will judge his command skills as poor. His headquarters in Falmouth, Virginia, was described as being nothing more than a bar brothel. Where ever General Hooker’s army could be found, one would certainly find prostitutes to fill one’s lust with plenty of booze to fuel one’s taste. In fact, his name has been permanently associated and synonymous with prostitutes – known as “Hookers” today.

Some historians report his personal actions as interfering with his military tactics.
After a brilliantly executed maneuver around Lee's flank and the crossing of two rivers, Hooker coward and withdrew his forces back into the Wilderness to await reinforcements from John Sedgewick's command coming from Fredericksburg. Here his forces lost their momentum as Hooker was convinced that Lee was in a full retreat. Instead, his forces were surprised by Jackson's flank attack which completely routed Oliver 0. Howard's 11th Corps into a disorganized flee. According to some and to make matters worse Hooker was stupefied by the effects of an artillery round striking the very pillar on the porch of his headquarters where he was standing. Although this account is accurate, historian John Bachelder asserts on that day he was in an alcoholic daze and so involved with the “Hookers” in his headquarters he would close down shop demanding not to be disturbed. As such, he lost control of the army and then in the “spur of the moment” ordered a disastrous and foolish withdrawal.

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Post #: 38
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 6:17:36 PM   
andysomers

 

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Morals aside, I'd give Hooker good marks as a Corps commander, but obviously in over his head at Army level.  He did wonders to reorganize the AoP following Burnside, and I credit him for seeing the value in cavalry and having the foresight to develop the cavalry of the AoP into a respectable force (of course with great help from Stoneman).

AS

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Post #: 39
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 6:24:14 PM   
anarchyintheuk

 

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Hooker being the source of "hookers" is apocryphal. The term was used in print prior to the civil war.

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Post #: 40
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 8:10:34 PM   
dh76513


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I too have heard this is legendary, but the word “hookers” are mainly a slang for prostitutes in the United States and the word was very rarely used before the Civil War. However, after the civil war in our country and even today most adults know that a “Hooker” is synonymous with a prostitute. So, I agree with historian Bruce Catton who writes:

[Although] the term 'hooker' did not originate during the Civil War, it certainly became popular then. During these war years, Washington developed a large [red-light district] somewhere south of Constitution Avenue. This became known as Hooker's Division in tribute to the proclivities of General Joseph Hooker and the name has stuck ever since.

So like Thomas Crapper, Joe Hooker became associated with a word. No doubt, his actions undoubtedly helped popularize the word in the United States, but the origin is not eponymous.

< Message edited by dh76513 -- 10/3/2006 8:14:42 PM >


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Post #: 41
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 11:28:00 PM   
ericbabe


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quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees
Determined by the sole Army Commanders, not each individual brigade commanders, right? If so, then the brigade commanders "Initiative" values aren't looked at (and you can have a bad "Initiative" rating and still be a good brigade commander due to "Tactics" or "Command"...).


At the strategic level, initiative is almost entirely a matter of the commanding general of whatever military group is trying to move. During detailed battles, the bonus is from both the brigade's general (if there's one assigned) and the general commanding the military group to which the brigade is attached (usually a division.)


quote:

Leadership: helps disorganized units regain order; gives morale boost for rallying; has chance of negating effects of fatigue from forced march

quote:


I'm gonna guess that this is driven at the Brigade commanders level...

Or is it where the Brigade commander has the greatest effect (positive or negative), followed by Division/Corps commander, then distantly by the Army commander


Yes, similarly brigade commander has most of the effect, but generals can also periodically try to rally any unit under their command.

quote:

quote:

Tactics: Increases damage done by brigades in combat


Solely a Brigade commanders function, I am guessing...


Yes.


quote:

quote:

Command: Determines the chance of bringing out-of-command units back into command; helps brigades change formation; helps units resist charges; enables units to enter dangerous zones (i.e., certain hexes where they ordinarily would be at a penalty because of terrain type and/or proximity to enemy units)


Brigade commander funtion only?


THe restoring out-of-command units function is greater a function of generals commanding higher military groups (armies/corps), but many of the others are solely for brigadier generals.


quote:

quote:

Cavalry: Increases damage done by charging cavalry in combat


Is "Command" for Infantry units, and "Cavalry" for horsie units?


Cavalry still use some Command, but the only combat bonus cavalry get to combat damage is from the Cavalry rating.


(in reply to mlees)
Post #: 42
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/3/2006 11:41:03 PM   
anarchyintheuk

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513

I too have heard this is legendary, but the word “hookers” are mainly a slang for prostitutes in the United States and the word was very rarely used before the Civil War. However, after the civil war in our country and even today most adults know that a “Hooker” is synonymous with a prostitute. So, I agree with historian Bruce Catton who writes:

[Although] the term 'hooker' did not originate during the Civil War, it certainly became popular then. During these war years, Washington developed a large [red-light district] somewhere south of Constitution Avenue. This became known as Hooker's Division in tribute to the proclivities of General Joseph Hooker and the name has stuck ever since.

So like Thomas Crapper, Joe Hooker became associated with a word. No doubt, his actions undoubtedly helped popularize the word in the United States, but the origin is not eponymous.


I agree that he, or rather his actions, tended to popularize the term.

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Post #: 43
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/4/2006 12:43:55 AM   
mlees


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Thanks, ericbabe. I was speculating, in an attempt to reassure tevans6220, that some thought had gone into the stats, in relation to the command they are assigned. I see some of my assumptions/hunches were fairly close.

< Message edited by mlees -- 10/4/2006 12:48:41 AM >

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Post #: 44
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/4/2006 4:30:32 PM   
dh76513


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As I closely follow the polls it becomes evident that the cavalry rating may be skewing the results. I am impressed with the historical knowledge of those who have voted illustrating some familiarity with the cavalry backgrounds of those general officers polled. However, this rating seems to be unfair in that it increases or decreases the officers according to their cavalry command and experience.

While I can understand any general officer having a bonus for the presence of cavalry units on the battlefield as this would afford any command greater speed, more flexible flanking movements, and increased tactical diversity, I cannot understand rating a general officer on any branch specialty. Furthermore, why is this specific branch [cavalry] elevated above the others [i.e., infantry, artillery, engineering] or for that matter even included in the overall rating system for general officers?

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Post #: 45
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/4/2006 7:33:07 PM   
Gil R.


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quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513

As I closely follow the polls it becomes evident that the cavalry rating may be skewing the results. I am impressed with the historical knowledge of those who have voted illustrating some familiarity with the cavalry backgrounds of those general officers polled. However, this rating seems to be unfair in that it increases or decreases the officers according to their cavalry command and experience.

While I can understand any general officer having a bonus for the presence of cavalry units on the battlefield as this would afford any command greater speed, more flexible flanking movements, and increased tactical diversity, I cannot understand rating a general officer on any branch specialty. Furthermore, why is this specific branch [cavalry] elevated above the others [i.e., infantry, artillery, engineering] or for that matter even included in the overall rating system for general officers?



Please see the responses Eric and I wrote in the "Overview" thread in the generals sub-forum.

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Post #: 46
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/4/2006 11:49:41 PM   
Oldguard


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quote:

ORIGINAL: tevans6220

I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. Hood is a very good example. At brigade or division command he was a very good leader but as commander of the Army of Tennessee he left a lot to be desired.

Coming to this thread late, but I'd add Jubal Early to that list. A good brigade and division commander, but less effective at Corps level.

(in reply to tevans6220)
Post #: 47
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 5:35:14 PM   
dh76513


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quote:

ORIGINAL: tevans6220
I do think one thing you guys are forgetting is that some leaders were not very good at handling armies but may have been excellent corps or division commanders. Hood is a very good example. At brigade or division command he was a very good leader but as commander of the Army of Tennessee he left a lot to be desired.


quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
…..I'd add Jubal Early to that list. A good brigade and division commander, but less effective at Corps level.


quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine
Hood was a much better divisional commander than he was leading the army around Atlanta. The same could be said for a lot of generals.


Gentlemen,
Level of command (e.g., brigade, division, corps, army) is not necessarily representative of a general officer’s tactics or strategic genius and success as much as it is their political ties. As such and in all fairness, I do not think one can rightfully judge the tactical skills and battlefield abilities of a commander because of his functioning at different levels or after they are promoted.

Remember the higher the rank, the more political involvement in the position. For the most part, if commanders are “great” at the brigade and division level they are “great” at the corps and army levels. A general officer does not lose his tactical skills or forget his battlefield capabilities or knowledge following a promotion.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine
I was intrigued by some of the generals listed as potential zeros. Personally, I would reserve a '0' rating for generals who were never successful at any point. Burnside and McClellan certainly had moments of success.


I was one of those who brought intrigue in your life as I gave Burnside and McClellan both zeros. However, I would like to point out that of 1008 general officers of the Civil War, I only rated seven at the zero level. As for my reasoning to include these two on my list, look at their record of “blunders” and these certainly outweigh their greatest successes. For McClellan, I will quote historian Brian C. Pohanka:

With Sherman’s overestimations of the South’s abilities and McClellan’s reluctance to confront the enemy, the Civil War would continue with a far greater cost of men, economic devastation, and social havoc.

Sherman’s successes greatly outweighed his mistakes. And as for McClellan, I stated in another post:

quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513
George Brinton McClellan (USA) – The master of over-estimation and slow movement, he constantly proclaimed himself the Savior of the Union, yet seemed unwilling to fight. At Antietam, he had the opponent's game plan and still could not win. Tommy Franks [speaking to U.S. soldiers], “I will avoid the McClellan strategy of sit and wait here and will employ those tactics of Cleburne repulsing the enemy from the heart of Iraq [Baghdad].


And for Burnside the blunders were far more serious sending many of his soldiers to a foolish death:

quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513
Ambrose Burnside (USA) – Named for the "Burnside's Bridge" fiasco at Antietam; chief architect of the futile, murderous assaults at Fredericksburg; leader of Mud March; arrested for "seditious sentiments" and let’s not forget about his obvious failure at Petersburg.


Nonetheless, returning to my argument, I think most historians would agree that Germany boasted the better lot of generals at the start of World War II. For example, one would not judge the brilliant tactical skills or question the battlefield capabilities of Heinz Guderian, who is considered to be the father of Blitzkrieg. However, with rank came more political pressure and despite his proven battlefield genius, Guderian followed the orders of Hitler? The same happened to Patton. One cannot fairly say that Patten was less effective as an army commander. Both these commanders had greater limitations placed on them with higher commander responsibilities due directly to their promotions.

The same is true for Hood. Let’s not forget that Johnston failed to attack Sherman as ordered by Davis which eventually led to his replacement by Hood. As such, let’s not forget that Hood was following “Presidential” orders to attack. Also, I think it is important to note that Sherman’s force was very overwhelming against a much smaller, tired, hungry, sick, and already beaten army that was under siege during most of the Atlanta campaign.

Generally at the brigade and division levels, commanders are encouraged to bring their honest thoughts and strategies to the command table while at the Corps, Army, and Theater levels such actions are discouraged and highly politically influenced. And this case is well illustrated with Patton, Guderian, Rommel, and many, many more generals throughout history. So as I am certain that few if any with any knowledge of history would say that Patton’s battlefield effectiveness or “rating” (for this game’s sake) as a general officer declined when he was placed in command of a fictitious army for the Normandy invasion. However, his abilities were limited politically.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine
I'm going to toss this out there for consideration. At what level is a general officer being considered? The highest level the achieved or their best level?


With the forgoing being said, I think this is a mute point.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gil R
The ratings are fixed, but the ratings themselves are used in randomized calculations. So even McClellan with the "Terrible" initiative rating he seems destined to have can beat Lee in an initiative check.


Furthermore, I think the foregoing argument validates Gill’s rating system for general officers to remain being fixed.


< Message edited by dh76513 -- 10/6/2006 5:49:52 PM >


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Post #: 48
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 7:03:38 PM   
Oldguard


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quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513

Gentlemen,
Level of command (e.g., brigade, division, corps, army) is not necessarily representative of a general officer’s tactics or strategic genius and success as much as it is their political ties. As such and in all fairness, I do not think one can rightfully judge the tactical skills and battlefield abilities of a commander because of his functioning at different levels or after they are promoted.

Remember the higher the rank, the more political involvement in the position. For the most part, if commanders are “great” at the brigade and division level they are “great” at the corps and army levels. A general officer does not lose his tactical skills or forget his battlefield capabilities or knowledge following a promotion.

I disagree. I think different personalities function better/worse at differing levels of detail and organization. Commanding a corps involves less tactics than it does operational decisions (routes of march, designation of reserves and timing of their committment, authority over quartermaster priorities and &etc). Once past the division level you are not a tactical commander any longer.

Commanding a corps would also involve a far greater number of conflicting demands on your time. It would be analogous to a promotion from an office manager to a VP. You're less hands-on with daily details and more concerned with larger issues and long-range general strategy and, due to the power you now have, more subject to the demands of more people who want something (thus your point about politics, although it's not the whole picture by any means).

So, yes, a good brigade or division commander does not automatically make a good corps or army commander. We can cite countless examples from about any war in history since Napoleon, when the corps structure was really first implemented. Some commanders were good no matter what they did - others made better tacticians than they did higher-level executives.


< Message edited by Oldguard -- 10/6/2006 7:06:38 PM >

(in reply to dh76513)
Post #: 49
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 7:15:49 PM   
andysomers

 

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This is a good discussion.  I've always thought that a military commander is inherently inefficient if he has more than 10 people that he is responsible for.  At Corps level this would be several staff, plus the 2-3 division commanders assigned to the Corps, plus the occasional unattached brigade commander.  I would tend to agree that Corps level command is more of an exercise in resource management.

And I would tend to agree that the jump from division to corps level command is a good break from tactical to strategic level decisions.  Although, I would say that Corps and Army level command has a great deal to do with terrain selection (where to form defenses, etc.)  We could argue quite a bit on whether these are tactical or strategic level decisions.  But the point is a clear line of where to jump from tactical to strategic level command, and I would say that occurs between division and corps level.

AS


(in reply to Oldguard)
Post #: 50
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 8:56:24 PM   
genie144

 

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Not to sound uninterested - but I really don't care what you guys think...  I just want the game to be released...  :)  No offense of course, I thought I was a civil war buff, but you guys clearly blow away my knowledge.  And as interesting as how each of you think the game should be - I really want to know how the game is.  And the only way I will find that out is to play it :)  Alright I am done...

Sam

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Post #: 51
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 9:06:55 PM   
andysomers

 

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I think we're in the same boat.  The discussions tend to get detailed until the game comes out - then people get too busy playing!!! 

This is a good thought - along the lines of "archiving discussion" and things to revisit after the release of the game.  With that in mind, I would like to agree to several topics that we would like to revisit upon release to assist with the new patch.  Can we start a separate thread for items of post-release discussion, with some verbage to ease Gil's justified concerns?  I can head up the project and revisit threads if all of you are willing to assist and contirbute.  Is this a worthwhile consideration?

AS

(in reply to genie144)
Post #: 52
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 9:41:51 PM   
dh76513


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Great discussion and perhaps it is the debate that adds to the value of the threads!

quote:

ORIGINAL: andysomers
I would tend to agree that Corps level command is more of an exercise in resource management… jump from division to corps level command is a good break from tactical to strategic level decisions..


I agree with both points, but the management systems in the military (personnel, equipment, supply, and maintenance) remains the same systems – they just grow in proportion to rank from a platoon (2LT) to a theater (GEN). And the responsibility is a slow, methodological progress.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
I think different personalities function better/worse at differing levels of detail and organization. Commanding a corps involves less tactics than it does operational decisions (routes of march, designation of reserves and timing of their committment, authority over quartermaster priorities and &etc). Once past the division level you are not a tactical commander any longer.


I totally agree and I also feel that personality plays a vital role in these positions.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
Commanding a corps would also involve a far greater number of conflicting demands on your time [and corps commanders have a far great number of staff to oversee these demands].** It would be analogous to a promotion from an office manager to a VP. You're less hands-on with daily details and more concerned with larger issues and long-range general strategy and, due to the power you now have, more subject to the demands of more people who want something (thus your point about politics, although it's not the whole picture by any means). [And promotions as such do not generally occur in the military – especially the modern military – the responsibility is a slow progressive, methodological progress].


**My points are noted in brackets.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
So, yes, a good brigade or division commander does not automatically make a good corps or army commander.


While this may be true is some cases, for the most part, I would say that a damn good division commander is likely to make a good corps commander.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
We can cite countless examples from about any war in history since Napoleon, when the corps structure was really first implemented. Some commanders were good no matter what they did - others made better tacticians than they did higher-level executives.


Please read my post above again. I am not saying a commander cannot go downhill following a promotion but at this moment, I am unaware of any examples you claim. So, please do provide us with a few of these examples. On the other hand, I can name countless examples since the Rome empire where commanders (generally army and theater) who had absolutely brilliant battlefield records at the division level were later at the corps, army, and theater levels directed by their superiors to carry out missions that were not their plan. All I am saying is at those positions – the commander is generally representing his superior’s plan (or following orders) – and not his own. As such should the following generals have low command “ratings” or be viewed as bad corps, theater or army generals for following orders or the failures of their leadership? Here are a few examples:

General Ivan Pavloskiy (an excellent division commander), commander of Soviet ground forces in Afghanistan, was ordered to invade Afghanistan by Leonid Brezhnev. Since the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, should General Pavloskiy now be viewed as a poor theater commander?

General Hood (an excellent division commander) be blame for his failure when was only following “Presidential” orders to attack Union forces by “President” Jefferson Davis. So, in the Atlanta campaign should Hood’s defeat be viewed on his command record?

Despite General Datus (an excellent commander) recommendations and vast knowledge of tactics, he followed the orders of Darius the Great. Should Datus be seen as a poor commander due to his defeat at the Battle of Marathon?

Should General Friedrich Paulus commander of the German 6th Army in Stalingrad be blamed for the worst military disasters in world military history but viewed as a great divisional commander but poor army commander because he was following the orders of Hitler?

.....and I can go on and on, but I hope these few examples illustrate my point.


quote:

ORIGINAL: genie144
….but I really don't care what you guys think... I just want the game to be released...


Sam, I think we can all agree on that point!

< Message edited by dh76513 -- 10/6/2006 9:43:53 PM >


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Post #: 53
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/6/2006 11:56:53 PM   
Oldguard


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quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513
I agree with both points, but the management systems in the military (personnel, equipment, supply, and maintenance) remains the same systems – they just grow in proportion to rank from a platoon (2LT) to a theater (GEN). And the responsibility is a slow, methodological progress.

I served at both division level and Corps level in Vietnam and I didn't see it as a linear progression at all. At division level we were counting bullets (basically) and trying to anticipate the supply needs for coming operations. At Corps level we were more concerned with making sure the supply convoys were running between ports and divisional HQ, and that theft and ambush didn't leave us short. We issued operational orders to divisions, usually in loose terms like "go to area X and sweep the enemy between point A and point B". At divisional level we were more concerned with the details of actually getting the battalions into helicopters and finding the LZs so they didn't end up scattered all over hell. It was not the same view of the battlefield, IMO.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
Commanding a corps would also involve a far greater number of conflicting demands on your time [and corps commanders have a far great number of staff to oversee these demands].**

They do, yes, out of sheer necessity. But they also have responsibility for many times the lives that a division or battalion commander has.

quote:

[And promotions as such do not generally occur in the military – especially the modern military – the responsibility is a slow progressive, methodological progress].

We're talking about the Civil War, though, where brevet promotions were commonplace due to the high attrition rate among officers.

quote:

While this may be true is some cases, for the most part, I would say that a damn good division commander is likely to make a good corps commander.

I'd rather trust a damn good division commander with the promotion than a poor one :) But there are still no guarantees.

quote:

Please read my post above again. I am not saying a commander cannot go downhill following a promotion but at this moment, I am unaware of any examples you claim. So, please do provide us with a few of these examples.

I would be happy to, but I don't feel like it's something I can answer off the cuff and would need some time to gather sources. Most evaluations of an officers' performance are passed to us from their superiors in the history books, or from a historian's point of view. It's not a numerical exercise that allows us to give one commander an 8 and another a 4 :)

And the more I think of it, the more it strikes me that the two most likely sources are going to have to come from the ACW and the Napoleonic wars. Both began at or after a period of great social/cultural upheaval where the existing military aristocracy did not have a guarantee of position. There are several good Napoleonic generals who made mediocre Corps commanders, and I'm sure I can find a number of both Union and Confederates who fit the bill as well. I mentioned Jubal Early but he was only one among several.

Your other examples weren't really germaine to the issue - we're not talking about blaming generals for being given impossible assignments. We're talking about generals who performed well at one level of command but were not quite as good at handling a larger command.


(in reply to dh76513)
Post #: 54
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/7/2006 12:00:03 AM   
Gil R.


Posts: 10821
Joined: 4/1/2005
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: andysomers

I think we're in the same boat. The discussions tend to get detailed until the game comes out - then people get too busy playing!!!

This is a good thought - along the lines of "archiving discussion" and things to revisit after the release of the game. With that in mind, I would like to agree to several topics that we would like to revisit upon release to assist with the new patch. Can we start a separate thread for items of post-release discussion, with some verbage to ease Gil's justified concerns? I can head up the project and revisit threads if all of you are willing to assist and contirbute. Is this a worthwhile consideration?

AS


That seems like a good idea, so long as people don't write "This game will absolutely suck unless they add X, Y and Z!!!" Of course, I don't think any of us will be forgetting this thread exists -- the great concern would be losing track of ideas or issues raised in the more rarely visited threads.

By the way, I'm also finding this discussion (and the related ones elsewhere) fascinating. Even though I've just spent the past year or so working on this game, I'm still learning a lot.

(in reply to andysomers)
Post #: 55
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/7/2006 12:04:11 AM   
Gil R.


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You know, one aspect of the game that is relevant here -- and that I might not have described on this forum yet -- is that all divisions, corps and armies function as container units into which one puts the brigades, and these container units themselves have Logistics and Command ratings which represent the quality of the non-general officers attached to them. These ratings are very close to the ones for generals, ranging from "terrible" to "superb." Logistics determines movement and supply bonuses or penalties, while command affects how the brigades in that container function in battle.

So the bullet-counting at the divisional level mentioned by Oldguard is handled by containers, rather than generals.

(in reply to Gil R.)
Post #: 56
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/7/2006 7:05:10 AM   
TexHorns

 

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In regard to the Napoleonic generals (Marshalls); in a biography of Napoleon I read it asserted that Napoleon micro-managed his generals to the point that they became ineffective when acting independently. Even the ones we consider to have been good. So while they may have been effective initially, or had the potential to be good, Napoleon ruined them with his micro-managing.

In contrast, Lee was the opposite. He gave his Corps commanders orders in terms of objectives, but left it up to the them to decide how to achieve the objective, thus encouraging the development of initiative and decision making.

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Post #: 57
RE: Civil War Generals & Leadership Structure - 10/10/2006 3:49:31 PM   
dh76513


Posts: 131
Joined: 9/19/2006
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
Your other examples weren't really germaine to the issue…We're talking about generals who performed well at one level of command but were not quite as good at handling a larger command.


I would like to make a few points before putting this issue to rest. All I am saying is that judging a general on tactics, command, leadership, and initiative (i.e., the ratings in the game) should be fixed and not change. I am claiming that a general with high marks at the division level who is promoted to corps, theater or army level commands will be more influence by political leadership than he was at the division and brigade levels. And my examples below illustrate this point perfectly.

quote:

ORIGINAL: dh76513
General Ivan Pavloskiy (an excellent division commander), commander of Soviet ground forces in Afghanistan, was ordered to invade Afghanistan by Leonid Brezhnev. Since the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, should General Pavloskiy now be viewed as a poor theater commander?

General Hood (an excellent division commander) be blame for his failure when was only following “Presidential” orders to attack Union forces by “President” Jefferson Davis. So, in the Atlanta campaign should Hood’s defeat be viewed on his command record?

Despite General Datus (an excellent commander) recommendations and vast knowledge of tactics, he followed the orders of Darius the Great. Should Datus be seen as a poor commander due to his defeat at the Battle of Marathon?

Should General Friedrich Paulus commander of the German 6th Army in Stalingrad be blamed for the worst military disasters in world military history but viewed as a great divisional commander but poor army commander because he was following the orders of Hitler?


If anyone believes that with higher command responsibility (corps, army, theater) comes greater political influence as with the examples above, then one must also agree that commanders at these levels are in a position in which they are less likely to be measured on their own tactics, initiative, leadership and command as they are on carrying out the wishes of their leaders. All of the above examples illustrate this point as these commanders were carrying out the strategy of their leadership, and I must add, even against their own military wisdom, training, and instinct.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
…we're not talking about blaming generals for being given impossible assignments.


The opposite was true for Generals Datus, Pavloskiy, and Paulus who all had superior forces and equipment compared to their enemies. With the exception of General Hood, these assignments were not impossible. In fact, most historians will agree that all three of these leaders were poised to win. However, these generals were not allowed to use their skills, knowledge, initiative, and experience as their recommendations, tactics, ideas, and strategies were all secondary to the political leadership.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
I served at both division level and Corps level in Vietnam…


Thanks for your service. I too served at the company level as commander B Company 75th Rangers, divisional level with the 101st Airborne, and Corps level with III Corps at Fort Hood. And yes, speaking of Vietnam, we can even add General Westmoreland to my above list of Generals. Branched in artillery his tactics, initiative, leadership and command were in full swing and went unhampered as he supported the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II. However, in Vietnam, these characteristics and his battle plans would never seen the light of day as he did nothing more than adapt with each administration that occupied the White House and simply followed orders. Finally, we can also add Patton to this list as an Army commander (3rd and 9th Army) because his battle plans as well as initiative, tactics, leadership, and command would seldom be seen much less allowed by political scrutiny.

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