Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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And if you are going to be combat ineffective -

LOL! Never, ever in my life has anyone who has made such an assumption about my future forces in a strategy game been around to see it become reality.


Then please explain how you have managed not to disabuse yourself of the romance of heavy bombers? They are not cost-justified for strategic bombing for UK and US - how on earth might they be for a tiny power like Japan? Unless you change this attitude you simply must be far less effective than you would be if you had

1) A much larger and more modern fighter force (made from the same resources that built the excessive number of bombers);
2) A much more robust supply depot system feeding air operations because you have not invested those points in bombing non-military targets (which is my definition of a strategic target: not a military unit);
3) A much greater ability to invest bombs (with the more modest bomber force) in real military operations (because you didn't invest them in non-military targets).

Wether you are combat effective or not is partly up to the enemy: you MUST be LESS combat effective in any case with such a policy. In the long run - you MUST become combat ineffective - due to the sheer size of opposing forces. The goal is to DELAY that day - and investing in heavy bombers and their use on non military targets is certainly not a way to achieve that goal.

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I think you are not compromising much at all. You really want to control everything but 4th Fleet and SE Fleet - I guess. 

No, not that at all. I simply don't trust you to create a hard enough defence of Java.


Aha! And in fact that is exactly what I don't trust you to do. Since you are NOT listening to me (or even Monter) about strategic bombing - you won't have the resources to do so. Since you don't understand how naval power requires basing - you won't have the operational capability either. Regretfully, it appears my concern is more valid than yours is. But this is WONDERFUL simulation of the tensions between those services!


I think that forces under my command would hold longer ( not necessarily fight better, but hold these important resource areas for longer) and thus protect Malaysia for longer ( which is why I wanted these areas).

Impossible to know - since you cannot run it both ways and compare. The only good indicator you are wrong is your focus on strategic bombing. It won't help you do that job - and it will prevent you haveing the numbers of new fighters you will need to do that job well - and it will prevent you having as many supply points for military ops as you would have if they were invested in operations - or even expanding the economy. The indications are you have not made the strategic connection - which interestingly historians of almost all nations have done - about the gross economic inefficiency of the strategic bombing concept. I am a combined arms theorist: I believe in air power - in a strictly military sense. And I believe in logistics - so I will have the planes and the supplies to use on naval threats first of all - and on land units if they get to the point they are on land. I intend to cut his SLOC - and to deny him air bases. Forcing him to defend a long SLOC is the most efficient way to reduce what is at the front. Forcing him to operate far from air bases is the best way to have a shot at hurting him badly - when/if he tries a Guadalcanal like op (too far from air support).


Ok, let me give you my final position... I'll trade you Java and Borneo ( in total) in return for having eastern Ceylon and Sumatra... I think that's pretty fair... You get that non-malarial base you've been lusting for and full control of Borneo - which you can fit into your Grand Escort Command etc - while I get to have Sumatra ( which is directly beside Singapore and Malaysia and an essential first line of defence for Malaysia) and control over how the forces in eastern Ceylon are utilised... since Ceylon is essential to IJA plans in India . Obviously the IJN can stage what it wants out of western ceylon and use the repair yards at eastern ceylon for whatever they want. At this stage I will stipulate that the IJA is the senior service and that if you can't agree to cede control of this one area (Sumatra) and one base ( the one in eastern Ceylon) which impinge directly on vital army theatres of operation that the Army will assert this seniority. I would, however, prefer to do this by compromise and, by compromise, you've probably close to doubled the number of bases and useful territory you will be responsible for - not a bad result at all. Once I've accomplished my strategic bombing goals in India I will cede eastern Ceylon to you also... I will no longer need it at that time and will be happy to let your IJN forces occupy it. I just don't want to have to be reliant on IJN good graces in order to conduct what I feel is an essential IJA goal ( the removal of India as a source of supply to Allied forces) by continuously requesting permission to fly what I feel are essential missions from your bases.

I see you are making an effort of a sort. But it is devoid of military principles. You are not addressing Ceylon for what it is - in military terms: an island; more than that a distant island; more than that an island that will never fall without a tricky and dangerous to coordinate naval operation; more than that an island on the front certain to be involved in enemy naval counteroffensives. Not one phrase in that long list fails to focus on the germane point: this is a naval location. If you won't go for that - then we don't go for Ceylon. Pure and simple. It is as if I demanded control of the wing of Kwantung Army headed for Lake Baikal. [Something I am not interested in by the way - lake or not]. And your are "offering" Sumatra as if it is a concession - when it was not asked for. Sumatra is so close to Malaya that it makes sense to treat it as a vital part of the defense of Malaya. I never asked for Sumatra (except in the generic form of saying "everything not on the mainland ought to be naval" - which was meant for attention - not because I intended to apply it to Sumatra). So you are asking for what you already have on the one hand, but for what you can not have on the other hand. If you fear my defense of Java - how much more must I fear your defense of Ceylon? The POINT of going to Ceylon is to change the sea frontier of the Bay of Bengal - in our favor - to render the defense of Burma and Malaya a second string operation - because the enemy dare not approach them. It is to be a forward patrol point and a lightning rod - a predictable point they will engage - a battle we can afford to lose (because we don't need it). [That is my favorite battle - one I don't have to win. I get to decide when the cost of defending it is worth the exchange rate ?] I hear no such remarks from you: so do I trust you with such trade offs? Not a chance. If Ceylon is not mainly for such a purpose - the risk of going there is too great to dare. I must be out of position in the East to cover it - and while that may be practical - it is risky. The major naval forces are MOBILE ones. Kiddo Butai - in a single sweep - cover 120 degrees of longitude - from Hawaii to Ceylon - winning every battle along the route. Divide up that broad expanse of ocean - presumably you must divide up the major naval forces which contest it. IF you don't - and also do not let the navy control ops - then you will be moving uncovered - a truly dangerous concept. Doing this right is very hard indeed - because there is more than one enemy out there. There is a true fleet in the Indian Ocean - one with carriers as well as capital ships.




So, in the bargaining you've gained Northern Oz, the Phillipines, Borneo, Java, Kendari ( and the island it is on), [you must refer to Celebes] Amboina as well as undiluted control over all of Papua New Guinea AND western ceylon. HOWEVER Ceylon is facing North-west AND impinges on a mainland area ( India) and thus I want control over its eastern base

[IF India was an IJA territory this would be logical. Since it is not - or did you change strategy without telling me?
- it isn't. We lack the ability to simulate a major land campaign in Western India - and the economic structure to simulate a major occupation of India and not be de facto cheating - getting way too much supply]
 ( and Sumatra... again because it is simply essential to holding Singapore). So, you've got everything from about 2 o'clock on the dial down to about 8:30pm on the dial. That's an awful, awful lot.

IF we were measuring things in radians - perhaps. But I am thinking in terms of units. I don't see how to get anywhere near a balance in units? Am I missing something? Make a list. Figure it out.

And the germane thing is neither area nor radius nor unit counts: the germane thing is open ocean operations.
IJA is not equipped or trained to do this, and dividing the marginally adequate long range forces of the Navy too much insures only defeat.


One last thing, I think you should agree to re-negotiate this IF I can subdue China and the Soviet Union. Since you think this will never happen you shouldn't have anything to fear by agreeing to this IF it were to happen.

There is a point. You can't so it isn't much of a deal. But you are still not describing what you have in mind?
Sounds to me like another way to carve up the compass - and divide those very rare strategic naval assets.
We have ten battleships - and two building - most of them obsolescent. We have 6 CV - and we will get about 2 a year more. There are a dozen good CA - and four poor ones - and no modern CL at all. These vessels are supposed to last 30 years (some are already older than that) and they can't be replaced during this war. There are not enough patrol planes for this immense area - nor even as many as it takes just to defend Hawaii (or Ceylon) alone! There are not many bomber units - and they will not remain combat effective long enough to defeat a mid or late war force (just to hurt it). By mid war I need MOST of your bombers for patrol work - or enemy submarines will destroy our economy.
Just how do you propose to divide up this fragile and inadequate force and still have me be effective? Japan's greatest historical mistake was NOT to keep the Kiddo Butai together. Its land based air force MIGHT be effective IF it is NOT divided to any great extent. Forgive me for being skeptical that you have something constructive in mind here. This is a marginal force - by what fraction do you intend to make it more marginal?

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And you really do not grasp the essence of "victory" either in China or Russia

I believe it is highly fortunate for you that you won't be facing me as an opponent. Such a gross misappreciation of the situation is the sort of thing I would punish ruthlessly in-game.

Well - I can read a map - and an OB. You are not going to do anything much to Krasnyarsk - so it is going to feed an enemy force - forever. And I don't think you understand there are other supply sources? Anyway - you are talking like an Axis army officer (role playing I admit) - with too much arrogance by half. It never hurts to assume the enemy might be dangerous - if you are wrong you just win sooner. Only the unwise depend on the enemy being easy to beat.


Again I just ask that IF I can subdue the Chinese and Soviets that you agree to renegotiate some army control of some theatres so that army forces have a chance to have a bit of fun in 1944 ( and take the pressure off the navy). Since you don't think it will ever happen it shouldn't be a problem for you.

I don't think you think naval. My capital ships are mobile. It is not a "theater" either. It is just an "operating area" - a very different concept. My ships may be in Japan itself - but their strategic significance is that they can move to another place. But ONLY if they are of a sufficient mass - and as time passes 100% of the fleet is just a task force to the enemy - will they have a chance. Air power is even more fragile. And the one thing it cannot be is combat effective for naval ops and exhausted (and out of supplies) due to strategic bombing. Once again - if you have something in mind - tell me what it is? It better be a whole lot better than ANYTHING I have heard yet - or I will have big concerns.



As to how much of the navy I want... Give me a few CVEs and CVLs as well 2 Zero daitai and a few Betty daitai to

I don't think you understand naval talk. A daitai is a sort of squadron or small group. Naval air does not usually come that way. Usually it comes in larger formations that contain daitai. IJN air power is divided by function and / or location. When you negotiate for an area, you tend to get the assoicated parts of it. Thus - you will have an entire Air Flotilla based on Saigon. This has many bomber "daitai" - but only one fighter one - an ad hoc one in fact so it has any. It also has other kinds of planes. Ships come with their air groups.

One thing you don't seem to understand is that I plan to outfit JAAF with Zeros, Betty's, Nells, Kates and Vals, to the degree they are not required - so you have this power INHERANT in own forces. On top of that the entire 22nd Air Flotilla will be part of the Malaya op - and then I expect it to face the Indian Ocean. I do not think it will come back - except in a crisis - and it is the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas that will have to do the main work (supplimented by the 24th - which must also cover the North) in the South. In effect - in 1942- we will be lucky to have one air flotilla per major area - and these probably will be split (24th - if Home and North - is yours; so is 22nd - which is Burma/Southern Western Sector; 21st and 23rd are my offensive land based arm - and I don't see how to divide them further? - and cover such a vast area - they won't be enough - and I will need planes from the 24th I am sure).


So, that's the deal. If necessary I will assert the seniority of my service ( something you alluded to in email in the early stages of discussing this when you said words to the effect that in the final reckoning the IJA was the senior service and would have the final say) and say that the IJA simply refuses to cede Sumatra or eastern Ceylon to the IJN.

Say it all you like. It is reckless to go without the Navy - and the Navy isn't going for such a distant naval objective unless it is clear who is in charge in a naval op? It is truly amazing your fixation on the West - when it is not your real problem - and when you lack either the kind of forces or the expertise to pull it off well. It is not part of the Asian mainland - it is very hard to reach by sea (because of the problem of the Malay / Sumatra barrier ) - and dangerous to go there - too many enemy bases nearby - too long a SLOC - too distant from other points so forces involved cannot return quickly enough no matter how needed they are? This is a very iffy concept from the get go - it is one that is impossible in every repsonsible sense without naval assets - and it certainly will have to be coordinated with other naval issues in other naval operating areas. Do YOU have either the expertise or the operational courage to delay or call off a ceylon op because of impacts in the SRA? Or in the East? I didn't think so.

(in reply to Nemo121)

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Well Sid, look on the bright side, at least my strategic bombing campaign will let you see if this side of the mod is broken.


Monter,
Good idea. The problem is that the aerial defence of Malaysia begins in Sumatra and Burma. I KNOW I will turn Burma into a hellhole for any Allied naval force which attempts to invade but I don't trust the IJN to do the same for Sumatra, hence I want to garrison those bases AND be able to run whatever air recon and naval strikes I think suitable from those bases.

Nemo is correct. Sumatra is too thin - and too devoid of bases - to properly be a separate command. The heart of naval ops in that area is Singapore - and in another sense Saigon - both on the mainland - both Army. Note I have always stipulated Army control of Sumatra. Nemo was somewhat disingenuious to pretend I had not. But one interpretation of this material here is that he still does not understand that I agree with him in this matter. I do.


Sid may disagree but when push comes to shove he is getting the entire Pacific from just south of the Northern Aleutians clockwise to Batavia ( including the Phillipines, Borneo, Java and New Guinea) as well as the western side of Ceylon...

One wonders what the "Southern Aleutians" may be? Or why I control them? Or with what? He has the Northern Command - and the Aleutians and a good deal below it (patrol belt) are his. Below that is NOTHING - neither one of us - nor the enemy. So maybe his "clock" should start at 3 pm? I have NOTHING to contest north of that - like it or not. Everything that contests north of that must come from Japan, the Kurils, Kamchatka, the Komandorskies or the Aleutians - and it is all his.



That's a hell of a lot of territory


Empty territory. I can see it now: we are trading sq km for sq km? He just gets all the bases and resources. and units associated with them - or needed by them.


and he'll get the eastern side of Ceylon too once I'm satisfied either:
a) with the results of strategic bombing vs India or
b) the strategic bombing offensive proves not to be worth it.


So much for "consulting on strategy." Never mind it is a waste of resources we cannot afford to waste - that is apparently not a strategic consideration. Never mind it means we cannot replace fighters and small bombers and recond planes as fast as possible. That isn't a strategic consideration either. Only what Nemo wants - you see it is a matter of definition: strategic priority = what Nemo thinks is fun to do.

The only thing the IJA demands to hold onto until the Allies take it away is Sumatra. It is essential in the defence of Malaysia and I don't trust the IJN to hold onto it for long enough.

Since I also want the IJA to defend Sumatra, this seems a bit of a bogus issue! But perhaps IJA does not speak (what language is this ? English? No wonder they have trouble!]

Compromise Sid. I've given way on not taking all of India, on training, on about 90% of the territory you wanted, the Ki-36 etc. Now it is, IMO, your turn to give way.

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In my conception:

It is the Job of the IJA to defend Japan from the USSR - which is big enough to badly mess up the vital Northern Resource Area.

It is the Job of the IJA to defeat China - otherwise why are we in this war?

It is the Job of the IJN to spread itself between the Empire and its naval enemies - and to engage and defeat the various fleets that may come from the Pacific and Indian ocean areas.

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IF India was an IJA territory this would be logical. Since it is not - or did you change strategy without telling me? - it isn't. 

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We have ten battleships - and two building - most of them obsolescent. We have 6 CV - and we will get about 2 a year more. There are a dozen good CA - and four poor ones - and no modern CL at all. These vessels are supposed to last 30 years (some are already older than that) and they can't be replaced during this war. There are not enough patrol planes for this immense area - nor even as many as it takes just to defend Hawaii (or Ceylon) alone! There are not many bomber units - and they will not remain combat effective long enough to defeat a mid or late war force (just to hurt it). By mid war I need MOST of your bombers for patrol work - or enemy submarines will destroy our economy.  Just how do you propose to divide up this fragile and inadequate force and still have me be effective?

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If you won't go for that - then we don't go for Ceylon. Pure and simple.

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Did you give way on India? Or is Ceylon your jump off point to do it anyway? I must confess I wonder? You sure don't seem to see it as a NAVAL base - not even a naval air base.

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This is hard - and acting like it isn't does not generate any confidence you have a clue.

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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In my conception:

It is the Job of the IJA to defend Japan from the USSR - which is big enough to badly mess up the vital Northern Resource Area.

It is the Job of the IJA to defeat China - otherwise why are we in this war?

It is the Job of the IJN to spread itself between the Empire and its naval enemies - and to engage and defeat the various fleets that may come from the Pacific and Indian ocean areas.

Yes, it is your conception. Mine differs, hence my desire to hold a part of Ceylon and Sumatra. Compromise means not always getting your way all of the time Sid. This is one of those times you need to give way. I've respected your views on many things even when I've disagreed with them and, eventually, given way on a lot of those issues. This is one of those occasions you need to agree to disagree and give way. You cannot always get your way.


Speechless. If I were that kind of sailor, explitives undeleted!

You do NOT agree with EVERY syllable of the above?

How not?

The closest I can come to compromise is to say: give me an alternate strategic concept. Then advocate how it could be better than mine? This thread was supposed to be about "negotiation" of a "common strategy." Your reaction here seems to indicate you are more into "rejection" of a logical common strategy. And I see no trace of advocating one to replace it. Short of "build bombers, bomb things" I dont' see much of a strategic concept at all in what you write. There is no sense of balance - of combined arms - of logistic cores - of insuring the defeat of submarines that must come to harm our vital shipping. I see no sense that "the navy is outnumbered and needs to have flexability and concentration of force" either. I hear proposals to divide up the inhabited and resource rich areas - but I get to have the whole empty ocean - sort of a gigantic bathtub in which to play. I hear alarm I won't try to hold the whole sea for a long time: proof you do not understand generations of naval ship design in Japan. We DEPEND on SHORTER ranges - and BUILD THEM into our ships - to obtain tactical advantages. Trying to act as if our ranges are NOT shorter will only defeat us - even if it were the right idea we can't change it now. [And it isn't the right idea: the USN estimates it needs 2 ships to our one to be even steven because it is the right idea. The problem is that they have MORE THAN 6 ships to our one. So we need to be more efficient than just avoiding distant combat implies. We go distant just enough to force them to waste resources patrolling and defending - a force multiplier.] What on earth can you be thinking if you are NOT going to have the IJA do the jobs outlined above? And how on earth do you think naval enemies are to be defeated if IJN is not to defeat them?

(in reply to Nemo121)

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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IF India was an IJA territory this would be logical. Since it is not - or did you change strategy without telling me? - it isn't. 

LOL! This is absurd. The IJA should focus on the mainland when you want to kick it out of the DEI but when you want to keep it out of Ceylon the Indian MAINLAND suddenly becomes an IJN concern... Wow!!! Talk about internally inconsistent reasoning.

I will be kind: you misunderstand. You are not reading carefully either. India is NOT part of the mainland. Never mind the obvious land connection to Burma - there is not a single proper land line of communication between South Asia and East Asia. You are NOT proposing to go to India by land - but by sea. That makes it a NAVAL location. We can link Singapore and Vladivostok by rail - but not Bombay and Vladivostok. Major movements to or from India can only happen by sea - a long curved route longer than a direct line on the map - and the length is probably longer than Imperial Japan's effective logistic reach. It is probably irresponsible (in a technical logistic sense) to contemplate going there - but IF it isn't irresponsible - it is NAVAL logistics that will make it feasible - not land logistics. It is not very different from Australia - except it is FARTHER AWAY than Australia is. It may be a lot of land - but you get there by sea. That makes it a naval theater.

More germane - if we are not going to take the place - it is neither of our theater.
I will now call for an Imperial Conference: you do not get a "common strategy" by imposing an unstated vision on everyone in sight. Lets tear this all up and start over. You don't like my strategic conception. What is yours?
And what if I don't like it? Going to fight the Pacific War without the navy? I think not. We need each other - so take your own medicine and actually compromise. Starting at the top - on strategy. IF we have a common conception of strategy we have a chance. If not - not. Both interms of agreement - and of winning.

no navy fighting the enemy navy mutter mutter mutter (walks away)...

(in reply to Nemo121)

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I see no sense that "the navy is outnumbered and needs to have flexability and concentration of force" either.

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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In my conception:


Sid, let me be clear. You SAID the IJA was the senior service and that when push came to shove its word would carry the day. I took the IJA on the basis that I would always try for consensus ( in the Japanese manner) BUT if it wasn't possible the IJA word would carry the day. Now you need to be either a man of your word and let the IJA word carry the day as regards Sumatra or tell me that what you really want is a partner who just agrees with everything you say in which case I will walk.


Well - theoretically speaking - we are supposed to divide up the commands and the assets - and then focus on our command areas. But - forgive my analogy - you seem to be engaged in "communist negotiation." That is, I must agree in advance to let you win every point, then you proceed to ask for everything except I get to sit on a body that rubber stamps your decisions. [In communist China there are NINE legal political parties! And EIGHT of them get formally consulted one day a year - for which privilage they have to agree never to seek to actually rule anything!]
Stupid me - I thought the IJA would be focused on IJA things - China first of all (else why are we at war - news it was it is only a "third rate" theater) - Russia second - because it is our old enemy - we took most of our Empire from its sphere of influence - and no other power has the position or forces to hurt us badly - Burma because it cuts off China from supply out of India and is a buffer state better than anything farther east - Malaya because it is on the mainland and permits a secure rail LOC to all the rest of East Asia - Thailand because of the same reasons - Sumatra to guard the Left Flank - Northern Command to guard the right flank. I note you argue even over Sumatra - which NEVER was a point of contention at all! So no wonder you feel opposed - you won't even accept agreement where it exists.

No where on that long list is there any reference to Ceylon. There is barely a reference to India. India is a problem - and a big one - I grant you. It is the place the British bomber offensive will come from. It is the place an invasion of Burma and/or SE Asia will come from as well. If you don't like those things - we are not in disagreement about them. If you think taking Ceylon materially changes the vulnerability of Malaya and Burma- we are not in disagreement about that either. So what is all this squabbling about? Control I guess. You must be in total control.

Well - you are in control of our country. You are in countrol of our policy - give in on China and we have no war to fight. But you cannot be in control of naval operations. First of all - you don't value naval assets enough. They are way too expensive and rare and irreplacable. Second - you don't understand the naval version of concentration of force well enough. Take a navy outnumbered 6 to 1 by one opponent - and as much again by all the allies - and divide it too badly - it won't be in the game very long as an effective force. Ultimately Adm Yamamoto could always get his way - by threatening to resign if he didn't. No matter what senior ministers or generals wanted. Some say he should have resigned if IJA would not reverse the policy on China. But he never tried that - and neither have I.
What he did insist on is exactly what I insist on: control of naval operations in distant seas; control of long range naval vessels and aircraft (with possible designated exceptions); control of vital naval bases key to operational areas.

I don't know where you think you can go with this? But what you need to do is advocate some sort of logical strategy. If you don't the Emperor will not back you up. If you want a "team" you need to do more than say "this is what I am doing - compromise so I can." There ARE broad areas of agreement. Instead of acting like they are nothing - admit it - and either settle for it or advocate adding to the list - for some REASON - not just you want to.
I want something to do - and the most logical something is naval operations on the broad seas. What do you have in mind?

(in reply to Nemo121)

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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We have ten battleships - and two building - most of them obsolescent. We have 6 CV - and we will get about 2 a year more. There are a dozen good CA - and four poor ones - and no modern CL at all. These vessels are supposed to last 30 years (some are already older than that) and they can't be replaced during this war. There are not enough patrol planes for this immense area - nor even as many as it takes just to defend Hawaii (or Ceylon) alone! There are not many bomber units - and they will not remain combat effective long enough to defeat a mid or late war force (just to hurt it). By mid war I need MOST of your bombers for patrol work - or enemy submarines will destroy our economy.  Just how do you propose to divide up this fragile and inadequate force and still have me be effective?

Simple, in December 41 I want all of the CVEs ( + any CVLs you are happy to give... if u don't want to give any then that's fine), 2 BBs, the 4 old CAs and about 4 DD TFs ( 1 CL and 5 DDs per TF) for TWO MONTHS. Once February 1942 arrives I will give up the CVEs, the BBs and 2 of the DD TFs. I'd like to keep the CAs and 2 DD TFs as a ready reaction force. That's it. So, do you REALLY think 4 OLD CAs, 2 CLs and 10 DDs will so greatly weaken the IJN that you will be crippled? No, I didn't think so. Quit being hyperbolic Sid.  You get every CV, CVE and CVL, EVERY BB and all but the oldest 4 CAs as well as the vast majority of the CLs and DDs.


And I thought I was in charge of Grand Escort Command. Turns out - the grossly inadequate CVE force - we have kind of sort of one proper one and Hosho - which should be a training ship - isn't going to escort anything. It is going somewhere to get sunk - never to do its job.

Battleships are different. I think you need 4 to do Malaya properly. And to support operations in that part of the world. On top of that I think it may be important to support with 2 more on occasion - that is to detach and move from somewhat farther East (but not so far it takes very long). So battleships are not going to be an issue. The cruiser forces can be worked out - but because battleships need cruisers and destroyers - and because I don't intend to take them back (except on some sort of operational contingency basis - perhaps if we invade Ceylon) - you get to keep more than you seem to want. Not having enough is a problem. Part of the difficulty is that you don't think in terms of how the fleet is divided up - and already spread around the map. Mostly for good reasons. When you want DEI you mean (to me) I want associated naval units. USN teaches in basic training "bases need ships" - and "IJN made the mistake of not supporting its bases with ships." Now some of these vessels are not exactly "destroyers" - but you are going to control a great deal more than 10 escorts - first to protect the battleships - second to protect the transport ships - and third for independent operations. The big problem is - as areas are secured - you must lose some escorts to Grand Escort Command. Same with transports. But you will probably always control significant naval forces - and since you can cover them from land - that includes battleships. I figure 4 means you always have 2 undamaged for ops - until midwar when we start losing a lot to subs and air attacks.

(in reply to Nemo121)

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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It was supposed to be in character banter.

(in reply to Nemo121)

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

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This is hard - and acting like it isn't does not generate any confidence you have a clue.

All part of the game Sid. However that doesn't give you the right to veto IJA operations in the same way as my feeling that you can't accomplish certain things doesn't let me veto YOUR operations.


I see it as very basic. IJA claims eastern Ceylon and Sumatra. It gives way on every other bit of territory you wanted . You told me before the game began that IJA is the senior service and in the presence of intractable disagreement the IJA view would prevail. I've tried to compromise as much as possible. Now I assert that seniority as per our pre-game agreement.

You can either keep your word from the pre-game discussions or not. This is now the only decision I believe you have to make.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

OOC: I think this is turning into a REALLY interesting command simulation.

We have major strategic disagreements ( even if they are different than the ones which occurred in 1941... we aren't clones of the 2 general staffs and so that variance is only to be expected) and there is a lot of distrust and pulling of rank.

agreed

Also the IJN seems to think the IJA is headed by idiots who don't know what they are doing and seems to feel free to call the IJA leadership's competence into question freely and often...


Well - mostly you bring that on yourself by not thinking in terms that make sense in naval-strategic professional ways.
You also bring it on yourself by not listening - just pretending that my germane points are unworthy of attention.
I note a distinct lack of taking the risk of advocating a strategy in your own right. You just say you have "different' concepts - never what they are.

( don't worry, I could get upset over it and enter into a fight with you but far better to just let you say whatever you feel like saying and then let results speak for me)... I think it was pretty much the other way around in the war but having that sort of contempt for the other service is also somewhat realistic.


So long as we can get past this unwillingness to cede even the smallest of points I think we'll be fine... You agree with the IJA having Sumatra so it all comes down to 1 base Sid, that's all I'm asking for, 1 base. If you can't give even that much then there really isn't anything else to talk about. I've compromised. Now it is your turn.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

Cid: another two questions:

1) Why you need Ceylon at all? I am not asking why you don't want Nemo have it. As I understand IJN is to fight navies, and IJA is to fight armies. So, what opposition do you suspect from RN? What purpose is in IJN having such a base? After Ceylon in Japanese hands, with strong airforce there (In EOS Nemo can have its own Zeros and Betties), RN will surely retreat to Karachi (less probable) or Aden. Also fighting with British convoys to Australia is not possible (as I understand channels at the borders of the map are off limits for Japanese. Ceylon only purpose is to fight with Indian land force (but not strategic bombing - look at the bottom of my post).

OK - Naval thinkers are not local area oriented - but strategic oriented. And for me that means economically oriented. The POINT of taking the SRA is to get resources. That means resource centers undamaged by bombing, ships undamaged by subs, mines, air attacks. That means keep the enemy FAR from the resource areas as long as possible. Ceylon changes the focus of the game from attacking ships in the Bay of Bengal and resources and bases in Burma and Malaya to attacks on - Ceylon! Ceylon ALSO permits us to patrol the Indian Ocean - and probably cut off shipping to Australia in the Northern part of it. I am trying to make ships cargo to Australia take long routes - and be inefficient. Ultimately I want the enemy fighting over something we can lose - Ceylon - instead over what we want to keep - Burma/Malaya. As long as possible.


2) Why you dont want Northern Command late in war? In correct cooperation between IJA and IJN (in RL probably wasnt possible but EOS assumes that cooperation possible) in spite of danger, consolidation is the only choice. You can easily throw reinforcements from south. Nemo could not. Not from Kwantung (I assume most of it would be busy blocked Soviets from counterattacking after beating them - If beating fails its even worse), not from China busy with occupation duties. Closest Nemo theater would be SRA - and it's too far. So after Nemo finishes it's unsucessful strategic bombing campaign you should take US response on your shoulders, just for the good of Empire. From 1943 you should definetely take responsibility of defence of all Eastern part of Empire.

Actually - I will not be able to help all the time. IJN is fragile - and every time it gets hurt it takes time to rebuild to effective levels again. He better be able to send over planes from Japan and Korea and Manchuria. It is his flank - his strategic risk - and properly his choice how much to put there. There are also OFFENSIVE reasons- he wants to go there for other reasons- and giving him some things he wants is good politics. [If he notices - which is not always clear?]


About Strat bombing. As I understand while commands are divide, the one thing you must share is Home Islands supply production. And even if not precisely stated which part of it he can take, definetely big part of it is your supply.
If he insist for strat bombing, OK, let him go. But he asks for a more supply from your pile you will simply refuse. If he still wants to do it, he will have to use its own supply. He will quickly discover that it is not enough. He will wake up with hundreds 4E bombers without bombs to arm it. I think you should let him do such mistakes - it's just historical I think. Look at the allies: DEI will be defended by someone tottaly green - his probable errors will not start the wave of anger. But remember: when he asks for more supplies - say NO! And he won't be able to do anything with that (I wouldn't accusse Nemo of being able to simply steal it).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

I restate a very simple thing... Before the game you said the IJA was the senior service and would prevail if deadlock occurred. Deadlock has occurred. I am IJA commander and am now calling on that seniority.

Your only choices now are to stand by what you told me pre-game or ignore it.

It did not occur to me IJA could be MORE than historically obstinate. It would never have dared call the Navy on a naval operation. Just as I will not dare to call you on a (blankety blankity) policy in china (which I regard bombing as)>
I even think strategic bombing in China is tantamount to cheating. IF it works we should not do it BECAUSE it works - since it really would not have done. [where is that "reason" you appeal to now it isn't agreeing with you?]


Sid, it comes down to one thing: You undertook, pre-game, that in these situations when compromise wasn't working the IJA was the senior service. I chose the IJA over the IJN precisely because I feel you have issues as regards your willingness to compromise.


What compromise? Give up control of naval operations in distant seas? Further - and here is the rub -
because you have an unstated - and (meaning this coldly and professionally) reckless- strategic concept -
you cannot be trusted in a naval op with naval assets - not even the merchants. I bet you would send CVEs to face an enemy fleet - (naval mumbling !!!) - not needing cover from Kiddo Butai in your mind. Not grasping the grave damage to the Empire losing the transports and CVEs implies. Again - a more reasoned approach - a logical strategy articulated for all to see - might engender some confidence (he could handle that). But - no - undefined strategy NOT in common with the other service - not one word about coording naval operations with other operating areas -
you creating a situation in which what compromise might be possible to be out of the question. Once again - you have - did you add them up ? 5/6 of the assets total - and I need to compromise. Worse - to compromise NAVAL COMMAND - on a dangerous flank in which enemy capital ships and carriers roam - one that can be managed - if at all only with my focused attention and help at timely moments. Vital forces cannot be risked on a whim - or risked uncovered in the proper naval sense of that term. Not even IJA forces can be so risked. Again - take it to the Imperial Palace - you yourself cannot possibly rationalize they will support you over the Naval General staff on a naval matter. They won't and you know it. I cannot demand - and I almost have to demand - you NOT do strategic bombing on a large scale anywhere - because it will prevent either of us having what we need. But that sort of thing you can decide to ignore = and force us to lose the war because you are so silly about it. But if you press this we need a new player. there is no team. You are not trying for a common strategy and you are not respecting naval priorities that are not mine - but universal.

Now that the issue has arisen and you won't compromise on Ceylon


Because of your attitude I cannot even consider it. I even tried - and you did not notice. If you have command over Ceylon and India ops, you will go at the wrong time - and say you overrule me - and lose ships- and the war probably. This is insane and if it must end - better end it now. If you get there over water - you need my agreement.
I actually DID agree to go to Ceylon. I now withdraw that agreement. You are using uncompromising language. You want compromise - then compromise. IF I am in control of distant naval operations THEN I can AGREE to them. If not - I do not. [Reminds me of the IJA submarine proposal - they would not even allow the navy to help with design! There is some controversy, but it appears most of these vessels sank - just sank - without being attacked! Three survived the war - all sunk in harbor.] Ceylon is - at best - a brilliant flank operation. It is not a core idea - and it is hardly the basis of a proper dispute between services. If you cannot focus on Imperial interests - well time to call the triumverate. [ Japan was ruled by three generals - the Army Chief of Staff - the Southern Area Command boss -
and one other. IF the cabinet went too banannas, these guys would pull the papers, fire most or all of the ministers,
and get someone else who was acceptable but also able to get along with the others in the cabinet.] One thing never attempted was to tell the navy about fighting enemy fleets in distant seas. After the way the Army said the Navy should have said - flat "we cannot beat these people" - wholly ignoring Adm Yamamotos words "what do they think? we would have to dictate peace terms in the White House" - meant to say "we can't beat those people."

Ceylon might be a JOINT strategy. But only IF you are not taking over the navy. In which case it isn't a team and you don't need me.



I am invoking the IJA's seniority. When the only issue which still remains open is a SINGLE BASE there is little point in renegotiation ( especially when I've compromised on Ki-36s, on-map training, the whole idea of invading India etc). What remains is for you to say whether you will stand by what you said pre-game OR if you will ignore it in an attempt to get your way.

That's the issue and I do not wish to be sidetracked into other issues until it is settled.



As to the balderdash below:

quote:

I see no sense that "the navy is outnumbered and needs to have flexability and concentration of force" either.

Hmm, I accept that you should get EVERY CV, CVL and CVE, EVERY BB, all but 4 CAs and all but 12 CLs and DDs and that is somehow a failure to understand that you need a large flexible navy you can concentrate at the decisive point? LOL! I ask for 16 ships, just counting CVs, CVLs, CVE and BBs you have pretty much double that number of ships... and many multiples of that combat power.  Thus you have flexibility and the ability to concentrate the vast majority of the IJN against any force you want.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Too bad it does not work that way. Japan is unified by rail - and so there is no separate supply. It is horrible - but also the way it works. Which is why we must get him not to waste supply points - because he really can. And also because we need his points on fighters - HIS fighters matter to me - wether he knows it or not.

quote:


OK - Naval thinkers are not local area oriented - but strategic oriented. And for me that means economically oriented. The POINT of taking the SRA is to get resources. That means resource centers undamaged by bombing, ships undamaged by subs, mines, air attacks. That means keep the enemy FAR from the resource areas as long as possible. Ceylon changes the focus of the game from attacking ships in the Bay of Bengal and resources and bases in Burma and Malaya to attacks on - Ceylon! Ceylon ALSO permits us to patrol the Indian Ocean - and probably cut off shipping to Australia in the Northern part of it. I am trying to make ships cargo to Australia take long routes - and be inefficient. Ultimately I want the enemy fighting over something we can lose - Ceylon - instead over what we want to keep - Burma/Malaya. As long as possible.

quote:


Actually - I will not be able to help all the time. IJN is fragile - and every time it gets hurt it takes time to rebuild to effective levels again. He better be able to send over planes from Japan and Korea and Manchuria. It is his flank - his strategic risk - and properly his choice how much to put there. There are also OFFENSIVE reasons- he wants to go there for other reasons- and giving him some things he wants is good politics. [If he notices - which is not always clear?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,


As to the balderdash below:

quote:

I see no sense that "the navy is outnumbered and needs to have flexability and concentration of force" either.

Hmm, I accept that you should get EVERY CV, CVL and CVE, EVERY BB, all but 4 CAs and all but 12 CLs and DDs and that is somehow a failure to understand that you need a large flexible navy you can concentrate at the decisive point? LOL! I ask for 16 ships, just counting CVs, CVLs, CVE and BBs you have pretty much double that number of ships... and many multiples of that combat power.  Thus you have flexibility and the ability to concentrate the vast majority of the IJN against any force you want.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

Sid give him Ceylon! You have no bases near by to reinforce it when needed! Also you should give him those 4 oldest CAs - you won't need them (and you better not use them against US Cleveland/Brooklyn class cruisers) Aobas are really piece of crack. They are to obsolete to form a battleline.

You are seem to just a keep another luxurious hotels for incompetent admirals (no offence Sid - this was historical opinion of IJA about Yamato class BBs)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

Cid, can you tell me how are you going to screen your convoys against enemy surface attacks without your own surface forces?

What happened to my surface forces? Nemo take them?

Why do you want to waste so precious destroyers and CVEs for ASW?

I am a destroyer sailor. I don't think one can properly say this in English: a destroyer has only three possible jobs - and none more important than ASW. Waste is the wrong word - and a fast force cannot be escored by anything else - can't keep up. But mostly I prefer other vessels for ASW - and my secret weapon is airplanes. Lots of them. I want Nemo running air patrols when not doing anything else. Everybody - hunt subs for fun and profit - and IJN will pay you a reward for every one.


Why do you want to make your CAs into hotels for your admirals? Intact CAs won't change anything during capitulation talks in 1945.

I do not see CAs as hotels for admirals. Nor do I expect many to survive the war. I use warships - and risk results in their loss. I see CAs as mainly killers of small ships.

Biggest advantage Japan has is their naval force training. Why you want to waste another advantage IJN has?

What are you reading? I don't remember saying "waste" anything. I don't want to waste naval force training. I am a veteran of naval combat - and I can tell you this: it isn't a survival activity. In a war like this one, we will get more than we can handle, seek it or not.

Seem that you are aircraft fanboy. Why are you forgetting that aircraft can be easily outmaneuvered(sp?)?

By ships? I don't think so

I am very sad that aggressive Yamamoto was relieved of command, with ultraconservative Minelcidi Koga taken his place. Do you think that fleet in being will be a good tactic? Keep your forces when you are stronger - for what gains? Those surface TFs won't change anything later.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Too bad it does not work that way. Japan is unified by rail - and so there is no separate supply. It is horrible - but also the way it works. Which is why we must get him not to waste supply points - because he really can. And also because we need his points on fighters - HIS fighters matter to me - wether he knows it or not.

Is it Japan connected with rail Korea/China etc? How????

No. We cut it - and I won't say where. CHS and RHS cut the connection. But you miss the point. He can pull a supply point from any part of Japan - and AI will try to give it back to that point.

quote:


OK - Naval thinkers are not local area oriented - but strategic oriented. And for me that means economically oriented. The POINT of taking the SRA is to get resources. That means resource centers undamaged by bombing, ships undamaged by subs, mines, air attacks. That means keep the enemy FAR from the resource areas as long as possible. Ceylon changes the focus of the game from attacking ships in the Bay of Bengal and resources and bases in Burma and Malaya to attacks on - Ceylon! Ceylon ALSO permits us to patrol the Indian Ocean - and probably cut off shipping to Australia in the Northern part of it. I am trying to make ships cargo to Australia take long routes - and be inefficient. Ultimately I want the enemy fighting over something we can lose - Ceylon - instead over what we want to keep - Burma/Malaya. As long as possible.

But you wont commit any naval assets - everything else Nemo has. So again why?


No- if we go somewhere we ALWAYS commit naval assets. This whole argument may be because Nemo does not undeerstand that place imply assets to take, defend and feed. The argument probably is about control of those assets. I don't think he trusts me to take Ceylon. I don't trust him with the ships to try - much less feed it. He has no sense of "2 CV plus 1 CVL plus 5 BB backed by land based air are dangerous."

quote:


Actually - I will not be able to help all the time. IJN is fragile - and every time it gets hurt it takes time to rebuild to effective levels again. He better be able to send over planes from Japan and Korea and Manchuria. It is his flank - his strategic risk - and properly his choice how much to put there. There are also OFFENSIVE reasons- he wants to go there for other reasons- and giving him some things he wants is good politics. [If he notices - which is not always clear?

Which planes? Those which are not busy defending Manchuria from impressive Soviet Airforce? He has no spares there. But you have. Much closer.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos
Cid, can you tell me how are you going to screen your convoys against enemy surface attacks without your own surface forces?

What happened to my surface forces? Nemo take them?

quote:

1) Carrier based air forces;
2) Land Based air forces;
3) Escort and transport forces;
4) Land units;
5) Submarines

quote:

I am a destroyer sailor. I don't think one can properly say this in English: a destroyer has only three possible jobs - and none more important than ASW. Waste is the wrong word - and a fast force cannot be escored by anything else - can't keep up.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again
No. We cut it - and I won't say where. CHS and RHS cut the connection. But you miss the point. He can pull a supply point from any part of Japan [AND HERE YOU SHOULD INTERVENE, NOT LATER]- and AI will try to give it back to that point.

quote:

The argument probably is about control of those assets.