Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

quote:

The argument probably is about control of those assets.

How many times do I need to say "No, I don't care about controlling the naval assets defending Ceylon, you can have that control" before you get it?

I want 4 old CAs, 2 CLs and 10 DDs from February 42. That's it. Anything else you give me is a bonus that YOU gift me. I don't demand it and I certainly don't demand control of greater naval forces committed to the defence of ceylon or DEI etc etc.

I keep saying it but you don't seem to be able to accept it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: grunt6971

I think you two should settle your differences they way the Samuri would - with swords - the first one beheaded loses.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

You reading lots of requests for fleets into my call for bases for my bombers is YOUR PROBLEM man. If I wanted those fleets I would have asked for them. You completely misunderstood the situation, didn't ask for clarification and have misrepresented my position on the basis of your misunderstanding.

REPLY: You have said you wanted appropriate forces. Forgive me for - first of all - believing that means the historical ones associated with ops. Unless we redefine task forces - you get what the troops start loaded on - right?
In any case - I don't want you not to be able to function in a naval sense. If it is your area - you better not be operating in a naval desert. If you don't understand Naval ops - say so. Otherwise -asking for an area IS asking for the naval forces associated with it. It better be your problem too.



I am not asking for ANY more ships than the CVEs, 2 BBs, 4 old CAs and 2 CLs and 10 DDs. If you want to give me more then fine, I'll accept them BUT asking for the eastern base in Ceylon does NOT mean I want to take over the role of defending the island from the Royal Navy and it does NOT mean I want to command fleets operating out of there. ALL it means is that I want to have a base so I can base the bombers I want and attack the targets I want when I want in support of other IJA actions against India.

I am perfectly happy to let the IJN defend Ceylon and command the fleets involved in same.

REPLY: Never read that into your language. Something about "I want control" or "I want command" of Ceylon got in the way. As I said long ago - on the telephone - we can do this. Not a problem.

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

quote:

ORIGINAL: grunt6971

I think you two should settle your differences they way the Samuri would - with swords - the first one beheaded loses.

But no screenshots please - this is a respectable forum!

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


So, I think that by the 3rd or 4th month of 42 you should have the vast majority of the army ships and should be able to use them as part of the civil fleet. I'm not interested in the details. It is your command. What I ask for is the same level of autonomy in running IJA matters - and I'm not getting it.


What I am asking for is a common strategy - and I am not getting it. I have no idea what your strategy is?
It is impossible to implement a strategy - or to decide what priorities should be to implement one? - when it is not defined. It is perfectly possible to advocate doing things that HURT the strategy if one does not understand it.
And one cannot understand it unarticulated.

Strategy does not begin with Go Here - Go There. Those should be concepts that implement a strategy. But the strategy itself needs to cover vital national interests - including defense. Not all is offense. We need to protect Manchuria from Russia - Hokkaido from Russian and Aleutian bomber bases - shipping from submarines - the SRA from bombing out of Australia (or wherever) - etc. And to fight such a war without conquest of China - when we went to war over China - makes no sense to me. So what I want to know is what strategy do you advocate? When I advocate establishing an autarky - then defending it - or that IJA focus on China and Russia- and you say I have it wrong - it does not give me warm cuddly feelings - nor any clue what you have in mind? You might try saying what you have in mind? And to the extent you believe in autonomy for major command areas - you might consider leading by example - which would not seem to logically include setting strategic goals about distant over water destinations - and then insisting on them. It was that - more than that we disagree about the destination - that led to trouble. You seemed to be saying "I demand - or I will quit - and I must have it just so - never mind it is NOT an IJA area in the middle of Asia" - grossly and impolitely summerized. I no longer think that is the case - I think you just create that impression by style of writing. But you are still not writing completely - not saying what you know about your own ideas - and often being defensive and negative when it is not required.

I am shifting gears. Are you? I am trying to be positive. Are you? If you are - start at what should be the beginning - define the strategy. If we are not to establish an autarky - why not? If we are - say "I agree" instead of "your concept, not mine." Etc.



< Message edited by el cid again -- 11/8/2006 6:57:03 AM >

(in reply to Nemo121)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

I'm not going to get into the specifics of exactly what sails where when. That's a detail point.

There is a GENERAL point wherein you need to realise that part of a team game means being able to disagree with what someone is doing but still letting them do it ... and then either being able to say "I told you so" OR being pleasantly surprised when their plan works.

REPLY: There are many points on which that should be the case. There are some it cannot be. I think you have missed this. You theoretically can say "I demand Shokaku do xyz under my command: I am senior and you must do that." I see almost no difference between that and demanding "control" of operations for a distant over water island.
It is entirely naval in character - and involves major naval assets - and it can not be directed or ordered - nor would the imperial system back up an Army administration that attemped to do that. I don't think you are operating inside that principle. I can't get my back up - except with logic - about strategic bombing - howver surely it will defeat us.
But I can over Shokaku - or naval invasions. That is my job - as it were. On the other hand - I think the problem is much more communications style than substance. I don't want to say more than that here.

At present we are at a place where you need to either accept a general principle that others can do things you disagree with OR you need to ask for another player who will agree with everything you say and conform completely to your operational plan.

Nope. There is another choice: we might negotiate a strategy - your words - and THEN do operational plans. You wrongly proceeded to ops without doing what you said. I am forced to operate on the basis of MY strategy because WE don't have one. Unless you find a yes man - you will NEVER form a team unless you actually do this. You must have a common goal - or of course you will be in conflict about getting to different goals.




After all of this hassle I really amn't interested in hassling over endless details at every turn. I think you need to just accept, in general, that we divide theatres geographically as we were doing and then let the other person conduct their operations as they see fit.

If that means detail implementation - fine. If that means they can have a different goal - not fine. a TEAM means we are on the SAME side with the SAME objective! And so far you only said you don't like my ideas - army deal with Russia, China; set up autarky; defend it; Navy deal with naval threats. Do you think it is ALL wrong? What is better?
Nary a word. Unless it be buy bombers and bomb, bomb, bomb. Surely we never agreed to do that. Surely we cannot afford to focus only on that. I now believe I have misread you - and that you were not asking for things you MUST have if you control an area. So lets start where we should have started. I have no problem believing you might do what you agreed to do - but I think with NO agreement you will do whatever you dream up - even if it costs us dearly in HI points, supply points, military targets not damaged, etc.

Slate is clean. I have no assumptions. What should we do? what is in the national interests to do? Why? How?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Oh one thing I do want to discuss is whether or not Hawaii is going to be invaded.

I am strongly in favour of KB creating an impenetrable cordon around Hawaii, bringing in a reinforced regiment of troops to Hilo/Kona as soon after December 7th as possible +  250+ AV support, several hundred engineer squads and basing bombers out of Hilo to bomb Pearl Harbour into submission before conducting an amphibious assault sometime in February after operations in the Phillipines wind down and you can free 2 or 3 army divisions from there for the job.

I'll even lend you a respectable number of Sallys for port attack duties ( the 250Kg bombs won't sink the BBs but they will cause incremental system damage AND you can't order port attacks with bettys as the AAA at PH will destroy too many of them to make it worthwhile).


What do you think? It'd be nice to kill all of the BBs there, we don't need Hawaii and its multiple airfields give us a great opportunity to create a hornet's nest which could shred any Allied counter-attack, costing them CVs and transports which they are going to find hard to replace in a timely fashion.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

Four points:

1. You do not need to fear IJA demanding control of assets often. I would be quite happy if this was the only time that the veto was used. Ceylon was important enough for me to walk away from the game and therefore important enough to use the IJA's seniority. ( which from your response I am taking as you accepting, yes?)

No longer germane as an issue.


2. Part of strategy is determining where a given force will go. Until it is known where it will go it is pretty difficult to determine if one needs to write a plan covering its going there.

Backwards: the strategy determines where you should go, when, why and with what. Determing to go here with that UNRELATED to strategy makes no sense to me.

3. With ceylon settled I am prepared to spend the time necessary to write a bare bones strategy document. I will try to post it tonight.

great

4. As far as controlling other assets in order to defend Ceylon... If you wish to give me naval forces to defend Ceylon then, obviously, I will do my best to use them to hurt the enemy... s).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Ok, it looks like some sort of stating of what my strategic plans are is now in order.

The assumptions underlying this are that the IJA has control over the Northern Area comman, the Home Islands, the Soviet Union, Korea, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Sumatra and India.

Valid assumptions.

Some of what follows is subject to change depending on what house rules ( or lack thereof) are ageed to.
I am assuming that we will be operating under 2 day turns and free movement for all Allied forces from Day 1...

I won't ever play with 2 day turns. IF they worked, I would prefer 3 day turns - or week turns. But they do not work.
They are horribly dangerous in a running fight with carriers and outrageously inefficient in terms of tieing up loading/unloading ops - and coordinating landings/air support/follow up.

I am also assuming that while most of the CVLs will go to the navy the CVEs and, perhaps, one CVL will be available to cover landings in Malaysia.

We probably need to worry about covering valuable transports loaded with assault troops. I think that probably means long range fighters, forward airfields and/or CVLs in some combination. You are probably right - but we were able to get rid of the need for CVs off the Philippines by use of long range land based fighters. We will look at it - and in no case leave the vital forces uncovered - either of them if there are two.


1. December 7th 1941.

With the ports likely to be free of Allied shipping I think port attacks in the DEI and Malaysia are unlikely to be worth it. As such I would rather keep any Bettys and Nells on naval attack to try to kill fleeing ships.

There will be two landings on the Malaysian peninsula on 7th December. One landing of 1.5 divisions + AV support will take place at Singora to cut off any escape route northward while another landing of 5+ divisions will take place at Johore Bahru ( I am assuming that the Allied forces saw this invasion fleet coming and this is the reason for their fleeing the ports).

While the bottle of the neck is blocked at Singora ( + the airbase rapidly built up with multiple construction Bns) the forces at Johore Bahru will shatter the bottom of the bottle and attempt to take Singapore as quickly as possible. From that time onward efforts will be concentrated on reducing the emaining Allied forces in Singapore as quickly as possible.


Possible subsidiary operation:
I want to examine the possibility of landing a single Brigade at Teloekboetang in order to help cut Palembang off from reinforcement with a smaller force at Palembang to begin the process of starving the supply sink.



Manchuria & China.
AAA forces from China will move to Manchuria. Artillery units in Manchuria will move to China as will Manchuria's tank formations. Apart from that Manchuria will mostly be left alone with a small amount of redeployment towards defensive positions on the Soviet border occurring.

I will move the replenishment units to China to take up garrison duties freeing several combat divisions for front-line duties. With the tank regiments clearing the rear areas of enemy troops and several garrison divisision being freed up for front-line use the stage will be set to for further operations in China which will involve drawing enemy forces into strenuous conflict as far east and north as possible. This will set the stage for the second phase of operations in China.


Burma & Ceylon... Not in this phase. Later targets.
Exception. Tavoy to be taken by IJA Raiding Brigade airlift on December 7th.


January to March 1942.
With the fall of most of Malaysia by the end of December 1941 the stage will be set for the speedy capture of Sumatra by seaborne assault, the building of Betty bases at Sabang and Andaman island (within torpedo range of ceylon) and the cutting off of Burma from Allied maritime support.

It will then be time to invade Ceylon before Ceylon can be too strongly reinforced. Near the end of this second phase of expansion I would expect to use aerial forces operating out of Ceylon to cover one of the following:
a) the invasion of Pangim with a view to creating another Betty/Nell base within easy range of the Aden/karachi merchant route. Will be abandoned once enemy ground forces redeploy but it will also give them something else to garrison.

b) a raid against southern or south-eastern India designed to grab a few bomber bases north of Burma in order to help any strategic bombing efforts which occur and to gain the supplies necessary to support such efforts.

As opportunities allow Burma will be invaded. I expect the Allied player to focus on withdrawing forces into India and so Burma should not prove strongly garrisoned.


Once Malaysia, Sumatra, Ceylon, Burma +/- a few bases in south-eastern India are taken the IJA's entire efforts will turn to China where the conditions for a rapid victory ( deception, misdirection and drawing the enemy out of position) will have been created. I would expect that when the blow is struck the Chinese forces will relatively quickly have to surrender about half of their territory and will suffer great loss of men and material.


Once China is pushed back to the region of Changsha/Chengtu I will endeavour to hold them with the minimum force possible, bomb the resources of those areas which cannot be taken and transfer the rest to the Soviet Union.

I expect to be at war with the Soviet Union sometime around the end of 42/beginning of 43.


Once the Soviet Union has been subdued ( something I don't think will actually prove all that difficult given the decisive advantage in trained pilots I expect to have by that time) I will turn my attention to Alaska... Until then the northern area command will simply try to gain the Aleutian islands cheaply and then focus on garrisoning them. I don't expect a great deal to come of any bombing offensive from Alaska BUT it will tie down a large number of enemy fighters and force them to think of re-invading Alaska... territory we don't nee and can trade for both time and Allied casualties. The key is to fight enough to hurt them but to withdraw before they get to hurt us.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Ok, it looks like some sort of stating of what my strategic plans are is now in order.

The assumptions underlying this are that the IJA has control over the Northern Area comman, the Home Islands, the Soviet Union, Korea, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Sumatra and India.


Some of what follows is subject to change depending on what house rules ( or lack thereof) are ageed to.
I am assuming that we will be operating under 2 day turns and free movement for all Allied forces from Day 1...
I am also assuming that while most of the CVLs will go to the navy the CVEs and, perhaps, one CVL will be available to cover landings in Malaysia.


1. December 7th 1941.

With the ports likely to be free of Allied shipping I think port attacks in the DEI and Malaysia are unlikely to be worth it. As such I would rather keep any Bettys and Nells on naval attack to try to kill fleeing ships.


REPLY: This isnt strategy. However, we are in harmony on your technical point. I don't like port attacks anyway - I find escort sometimes fails to go in - and then the bombers get badly cut up. Even if not - it demoralizes and damages these fragile planes. They are more effective at sea. I HOPE the ports are empty - suits me fine to hunt them down if they don't run for the edge of the map - or if they are not around they can't hurt us much. All the planes in your area are G3Ms. I tentatively propose to transfer MORE than the pool of G3s to JAAF - this by the method of upgrading some G3 units to G4s - dumping their G3s into the pool. I propose that you upgade a number of units (for discussion without research I think about 3 regiments or equilivants) to G3s immediately. I have problems elsewhere - and I would prefer not to have to lose 22nd air flotilla. "Concentration" is not the word for the initial IJN ops - and density is horribly low.


There will be two landings on the Malaysian peninsula on 7th December. One landing of 1.5 divisions + AV support will take place at Singora to cut off any escape route northward while another landing of 5+ divisions will take place at Johore Bahru ( I am assuming that the Allied forces saw this invasion fleet coming and this is the reason for their fleeing the ports).

REPLY This is logical. And it is "self covering." Air transfer a regiment of Ki-27 in to provide CAP in the hex. Immediately land a ground support unit - or failing that fly one in. Surprisingly few fighters will be disabled by this and then you have no cover problem for the Singora transports. Take a look at the new map locations - you might want to use other bases in Thailand (e.g. Trang - which for some reason is a "trap" for supplies).

While the bottle of the neck is blocked at Singora ( + the airbase rapidly built up with multiple construction Bns) the forces at Johore Bahru will shatter the bottom of the bottle and attempt to take Singapore as quickly as possible. From that time onward efforts will be concentrated on reducing the emaining Allied forces in Singapore as quickly as possible.

REPLY: This is certainly bold. Too bold for me - but perhaps Mac might like it? Wether you land at Khota Bahru - for which you are planned up and which is in proper covering range for our bases - or here - this is a point at which long range air cover is required UNTIL you capture the field. There is almost no long range air cover available in this area - historically only a scratch detachment (22nd Air Flotilla DHD - D meaning "detachment" - composed of a few planes from 21 and 23 air flotilla fighter units). But while I have critical problems with Claude units that must be upgraded, I am willing to upgrade a JAAF squadron day 1 - so you can have your own Zero unit for this critical mission.


Possible subsidiary operation:
I want to examine the possibility of landing a single Brigade at Teloekboetang in order to help cut Palembang off from reinforcement with a smaller force at Palembang to begin the process of starving the supply sink.

REPLY: This is certainly too bold for me. Operations that far South on day 1 should not be contemplated. You cannot cover and support the troops in such positions yet. Now if you don't mean day 1 - that is a different story. This is a good plan.



Manchuria & China.
AAA forces from China will move to Manchuria.

WHAT AAA forces in China?

Artillery units in Manchuria will move to China as will Manchuria's tank formations.


REPLY: Surely not as a body? This is a violation of the very principle that Kwangtung army must be the strongest of all IJA armies. IJA is an artillery happy army - artillery is its strong arm. And its bane is the Soviet Army. I cannot believe you believe Kwangtung Army would stand for this. And it matters: that army started the wars with Russia and China. It has unseated governments. And it would hardly be unsupported in a matter where it was actually right.

Once again - this isn't a strategy. It is just "I plan to move here." IF we have a strategy that includes defending Manchuria - or fighting the Red Army in certain contingencies - or deterring the Red Army from invading - I could refer to that strategy as a reason we must have armor and artillery in Manchuria. Since we have NO strategy yet- I can just say it WILL be required to support the strategy WHEN we get one!

Apart from that Manchuria will mostly be left alone with a small amount of redeployment towards defensive positions on the Soviet border occurring.

I will move the replenishment units to China to take up garrison duties freeing several combat divisions for front-line duties.

REPLY: Too bad. These units have a mission at home. And probably are much more valuable as garrison in my area. You USED to advocate "taking the entire Pacific"- even if we take only half of it- surely we need garrison troops - and not full high quality units. These units come in annual crops - and it might be smart to leave the most critical ones until the 2 unit appears at that location? But - again - this isn't strategy. I cannot refer to a defense mission in the home islands or an offense mission in the Pacific - until we agree to do that? P erhaps we have just decided we don't need to defend Japan? OR take the Pacific? If not - what goes where needs to be a function of the missions - not just "i feel like sending them all there."


With the tank regiments clearing the rear areas of enemy troops and several garrison divisision being freed up for front-line use the stage will be set to for further operations in China which will involve drawing enemy forces into strenuous conflict as far east and north as possible. This will set the stage for the second phase of operations in China.

REPLY: Sounds like you want to do something in China. THAT would be a strategy. Care to state it as an objective? You are once again IMPLEMENTING a strategy BEFORE stating what it is.


Burma & Ceylon... Not in this phase. Later targets.
Exception. Tavoy to be taken by IJA Raiding Brigade airlift on December 7th.

REPLY: Might be smart. Not what I do with it. And it is not then available for other jobs. But it might be smart. Too bad you have not stated ANY strategy yet - cannot evaluate ANY movement OUTSIDE a mission context. Note this unit is not ideally used on Dec 7. Its transport unit either has the wrong planes - and too few - or it will be down for some days.


January to March 1942.
With the fall of most of Malaysia by the end of December 1941 the stage will be set for the speedy capture of Sumatra by seaborne assault, the building of Betty bases at Sabang and Andaman island (within torpedo range of ceylon) and the cutting off of Burma from Allied maritime support.


REPLY: Not bad I think. But when will you propose a strategy? These are operations - to implement an unstated strategic objective.

It will then be time to invade Ceylon before Ceylon can be too strongly reinforced. Near the end of this second phase of expansion I would expect to use aerial forces operating out of Ceylon to cover one of the following:
a) the invasion of Pangim with a view to creating another Betty/Nell base within easy range of the Aden/karachi merchant route. Will be abandoned once enemy ground forces redeploy but it will also give them something else to garrison.

REPLY: Too bad you are not privy to the revised map. But I don't think this is germane to say at this point. Anyway - since we have not a single stated strategic objective yet - still no basis to evaluate any operation.

b) a raid against southern or south-eastern India designed to grab a few bomber bases north of Burma in order to help any strategic bombing efforts which occur and to gain the supplies necessary to support such efforts.

As opportunities allow Burma will be invaded. I expect the Allied player to focus on withdrawing forces into India and so Burma should not prove strongly garrisoned.


Once Malaysia, Sumatra, Ceylon, Burma +/- a few bases in south-eastern India are taken the IJA's entire efforts will turn to China where the conditions for a rapid victory ( deception, misdirection and drawing the enemy out of position) will have been created. I would expect that when the blow is struck the Chinese forces will relatively quickly have to surrender about half of their territory and will suffer great loss of men and material.


Once China is pushed back to the region of Changsha/Chengtu I will endeavour to hold them with the minimum force possible, bomb the resources of those areas which cannot be taken and transfer the rest to the Soviet Union.

I expect to be at war with the Soviet Union sometime around the end of 42/beginning of 43.


Once the Soviet Union has been subdued ( something I don't think will actually prove all that difficult given the decisive advantage in trained pilots I expect to have by that time) I will turn my attention to Alaska... Until then the northern area command will simply try to gain the Aleutian islands cheaply and then focus on garrisoning them. I don't expect a great deal to come of any bombing offensive from Alaska BUT it will tie down a large number of enemy fighters and force them to think of re-invading Alaska... territory we don't nee and can trade for both time and Allied casualties. The key is to fight enough to hurt them but to withdraw before they get to hurt us.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Oh one thing I do want to discuss is whether or not Hawaii is going to be invaded.

I am strongly in favour of KB creating an impenetrable cordon around Hawaii, bringing in a reinforced regiment of troops to Hilo/Kona as soon after December 7th as possible +  250+ AV support, several hundred engineer squads and basing bombers out of Hilo to bomb Pearl Harbour into submission before conducting an amphibious assault sometime in February after operations in the Phillipines wind down and you can free 2 or 3 army divisions from there for the job.


REPLY: It is a possiblility. What would I use for bombers? Putting long range bombers in that close to Oahu seems dangerous - and also they are more likely to be useful if based on more distant points - making the approaches (and fleeing ships) gravely at risk. Also - Dec 7 is too soon. It takes time to appraoch - and there is the tiny matter of enemy carrier forces to deal with. But it may be possible to do this relatively quickly. On the other hand, the army divisions in the Philippines (historically and logically) are not the ones to use: they need either to move on to Indonesia or they need to garrison the Philippines. [I do not contemplate leaving vital areas like Japan or Philippines undefended. But then, I have a strategic mission in mind - and you appear not to think about these at all. You just sort of assume strategic missions and think about implementing operations.] It is way too dangerous to contemplate an attack on Hawaii without committed, fresh forces, and these substantially en route (i.e. most of the way there).
The time to move is weeks - not days - and the cover for the move needs to be a fresh Kiddo Butai. It is a fragile hammer and waiting - even a week - may fatally prevent major troop movements. I am not sure about the amount of troops, but it is clear an armored regiment will be required in addition to some divisions and brigades. The real problem is the pp cost to do this. NO troops in the empire are commited to this op - and unless the op is done right away it is not feasible. Committing troops that are to fight in another theater - might be hurt doing that - are weeks away - and which probably are much more needed in still a different theater - is not a realistic way to do this op. IF it is a priority - it is a priority. Otherwise, it isn't. No second fiddle for this - it will take all my attention and power to pull it off - and help. As in Ki-27s and some sort of light bombers. My bombers are way too fraglie to sustain ops - so are my fighters - and only if they can phase in and out can they truly be effective. Committed because we are desperate only means losses will rise - they probably won't be effective when not in good condition - no matter how much we need them to be.


I'll even lend you a respectable number of Sallys for port attack duties ( the 250Kg bombs won't sink the BBs but they will cause incremental system damage AND you can't order port attacks with bettys as the AAA at PH will destroy too many of them to make it worthwhile).

REPLY: Well - I am encouraged by your attitude. Probably cannot feed many at that distance. But I like the Sally - and it is more effective than any other bomber we have for pounding just now. Maybe two regiments.


What do you think? It'd be nice to kill all of the BBs there, we don't need Hawaii and its multiple airfields give us a great opportunity to create a hornet's nest which could shred any Allied counter-attack, costing them CVs and transports which they are going to find hard to replace in a timely fashion.

quote:

ORIGINAL: grunt6971

You might want to consider a couple of things about this:

1. Your KB should attempt to engage and destroy the 2 USN CV TFs west of Hawaii ASAP. I'm not convinced that an initial use of the KB on Pearl Harbor is that productive with respect to sinking BBs. The loss of his two CV groups at sea seems to have greater benefit. The US Player will have a more challenging time in running the "gauntlet".


REPLY: Probably correct.

2. If you are able to destroy the 2 CV TFs, then you may be able to chase the BBs out of Pearl and sink them in deeper water [or keep them there to placed into the mud of Pearl]. The US Player has to make a decision and with no naval air cover - it will be a difficult choice.


REPLY: I expect to catch them at sea. They seem to believe leaving port is a good idea. It isn't.

3. You may want to take Lahania - its port and airbase are near the size you need to immediately carry out effective raids and naval air strikes - the other two need some time to build-up.

REPLY: I think we take all the islands - Johnston - Midway - all the entire chain except Oahu - and then Oahu later.

I do believe that the IJN will have to commit significant forces to this effort - for we all know who the 800 pound gorilla is in this game .

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Grunt,

Good points... I suppose my view is tempered by the fact that I've only once managed to sink Allied CVs around PH. Most of the time they just run like hell and aren't worth chasing down IMO. I suppose if I caught them often enough my views would change but any USN commander worth his salt in this game is going to run like hell on December 7th IMO.

REPLY: IF we are going for Hawaii I need convoys with ground units and air units - and I need to protect them.
The real advantage we have in EOS is the recon Kate - we should find them - unless they run. I think we will find everything of significance running for US West Coast - Panama - or French Polynesia. And I think sinking them mid ocean is fine. But the carriers, the cruisers and the battle line (separately or combined) are dangerous to both carriers and transports. We need to sink any that are in the area. I plan to do that by combining land based air with Kiddo Butai. Then setting up army land based air locally in Hawaii. I am an air ops guy.


As to the 800lb gorilla... Absolutely, the Soviets ;). Those efete capitalists will quit once we sink the Pacific Fleet. The Soviets are made of sterner stuff.

Seriously though, given equal tech levels and economies I'd always prefer facing Americans than Soviets or Chinese... Fortunately for the IJA the Soviets and Chinese don't have the technology and productive capacity to leverage themselves into the US Navy and Army league in this game. Although, to be fair I don't recall a single instance of a Japanese player taking either China or the Soviet Union out of the game under CHS or RHS so they are by no means pushovers.

quote:

REPLY: I expect to catch them at sea. They seem to believe leaving port is a good idea. It isn't. 

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Overall strategy:

1. Aid in the recovery of the resource and oil-producing areas of the DEI & Malaysia as well as those portions of China and the Soviet Union which are resource and oil-producing.

REPLY: "Recovery"? Were these once Japanese? "Conquest" might be a better term. I agree in principle. I think it should be broken into parts - DEI/Malaysia (SRA?) is priority one. China priority medium (some number lower than one). Russia priority medium below China.

2. Create a situation in which the enemy will find it difficult to project his power in any counter-offensive.

REPLY: Is this directed at US/UK/CW? If so, we should say so. Is this more or less "reduce the combat power of the Anglo enemies in areas of Japanese vital strategic interests (e.g. Home Islands, SRA)?"


This is to be accomplished in three ways:
a) The denial of bomber bases within range of our resource and oil-producing regions ( thus necessitating the capture of Burma +/- a bit of south-eastern India)

REPLY: concur

b) The destruction of enemy resource and industrial centres which will create the material and manpower which will be used to support enemy bomber, naval and ground offensives. ( thus requiring the strategic bombing of India)


REPLY: There is no legitimate in game way to simulate resource destruction - other than capture. Destruction of industry seems legitimate but uneconomic. The same effort expended against shipping will pay vastly more dividends.

c) the establishment of Ceylon as a forward base which the enemy MUST take... and the making of every effort to make sure that such an attempt will cost the British greatly.

REPLY: concur

3. Once Malaysia/DEI/Burma and Ceylon are taken IJA will focus all of its strength, except for that required for garrison duties and the strategic bomber offensive against India, against China in an effort to take most of China and confine Chinese forces to a bombed out, unproductive hinterlan where small blocking forces ( relatively speaking small obviously) can keep them hemmed back.

REPLY: concur

4. Once China is take care of then the IJA will turn its attention to the Soviet Union.


REPLY: concur

5. If all of the above can be achieved then, yeah, I would like to invade Alaska and see about diverting the Allies during 1944 but that's such a pipe-dream that there's little point going into detail on it.

REPLY: Probably this needs to be higher than the op on Russia. But concur.

A word on strategic bombing and the Indian theatre:

If I damage 1 point of a resource centre on 1st June 1942 and it is IMMEDIATELY repaired the 1000 tons of supply used in so doing will result in a break-even point occuring 1000 days later ( that point in time when the supplies produced by the resource centre equal the supplies used in repairing it)... or to put it another way mid-February 1945.

CORRECT - and probably not a valid model. Anyway - you really cannot bomb resources very effectively IRL - so we should not try this in the game. But if that were to become our view - we probably should parlay it into a house rule - so they don't do it in reverse. IF we could get that - we win big time. They get LOTS of bombers!

So, for the British player it just doesn't make sense to repair resources damaged by Japan unless he is swimming in supply. By its very action strategic bombing of resources slowly brings supply levels down to a subsistence level and then, eventually, drops them below it... making repair of damaged resources a luxury the British in India can no longer afford.

CORRECT - and therefore wrong. This is not meaningful in operational or strategic terms IRL.

(in reply to Nemo121)