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RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

 
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RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 2:26:28 AM   
RERomine

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Riva Ridge

It is as you said, he should have withdrawn at the end of the second day.  He had taken a sharp knock that day and the Federals had won the Battle by that point, but not decisively so.  Longstreet advised him to disengage and head for Washington where he felt they would have to abandon their strong position and they could bring the Federal Army to battle at a position of their choosing.  Lee pushing the issue at that point over the advice of the General that he had come to rely on after Jackson dying was very unwise.  It was essentially Fredricksburg in reverse and he paid for it.  I don't think Lee was a fool or a horrible General (that would be Johnston).  I mean, the man was the CG for over three years and he was bound to lose a battle and make a mistake at some point, I just believe knowing what he did at the point he did it, he really made a terrible call.


I agree withdrawing at the end of the 2nd day probably was the most sound option. It seems sliding past the Union right needed to happen on the 2nd day, while the AoP was still concentrating. After that, any such move might invite getting hit in the flank, if Meade had was quick enough. Hindsight indicates Meade probably wasn't quick enough, but Lee wouldn't have known that then.

There probably was a lot going on it Lee's head we don't know about. His reasoning for attacking the center (as opposed to either flank) is pretty well documented, but we can only guess why he felt he had to attack at all. The AoNV feed well off of Pennsylvannia and gave Virginia a break for a while. Lee certainly wanted a victory in the North, but for lack of ammunition, he didn't have time to sit and wait for weeks on end. He should have quit while he was ahead. I don't think the Confederate troops lost the 3rd day of Gettysburg shortened the war by one day. In the end, they couldn't feed the ones they had. However many more that were lost would have just made that situation worse.

< Message edited by RERomine -- 11/25/2006 2:31:33 AM >

(in reply to Riva Ridge)
Post #: 91
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 7:46:08 PM   
Texican

 

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Years ago, I sat down and spent half a day reading a condensed history of the Civil War (which I had not really studied this topic up until then). Sometimes it takes a fresh look at the "20,000 foot level" to sort things out.

I came to one conclusion: the South lost the war mostly in the West and at sea.

The South's victories in the East were mostly tactical in nature and while they boosted morale, had little outcome on the war. With half their nation (the Western portion) in disarray and ports blockaded, there was not much the South could do.

Maybe Lee should have sent Stonewall Jackson westward to take control of the situation. Maybe the South should have sent their first ironclad on a death mission to trash as many Union ships in port as possible (instead of retreating after a few engagements). Maybe, maybe, maybe....

< Message edited by Texican -- 11/25/2006 7:50:58 PM >

(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 92
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 7:56:23 PM   
Williamb

 

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How much of Grants good comand statis have to do that Bragg was the west commander and not another Lee ? Lincoln could afford to give grant time as thee was no Lee howling at the outskirts of Chicago.

To say that McClellan got a rough ride while Grant was left alone is more in the nature that Lincoln saw Lee as a far greater danger than he had distrust in McClellan. One has to wonder if it wasnt Lee in command in the east if McClellan would have been in such dire straights as a commander

_____________________________


(in reply to Riva Ridge)
Post #: 93
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 8:33:25 PM   
chris0827

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: William Amos

How much of Grants good comand statis have to do that Bragg was the west commander and not another Lee ? Lincoln could afford to give grant time as thee was no Lee howling at the outskirts of Chicago.

To say that McClellan got a rough ride while Grant was left alone is more in the nature that Lincoln saw Lee as a far greater danger than he had distrust in McClellan. One has to wonder if it wasnt Lee in command in the east if McClellan would have been in such dire straights as a commander


Grant didn't make his reputation against Bragg. They only faced each other as army commanders once. At Chattanooga.

(in reply to Williamb)
Post #: 94
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 11:33:52 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine

quote:



ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

This is just plain wrong. Lincoln DID allow McClellan not just to "manuever", but to load up the Army of the Potomac and sail it around to the Penninsula..., effectively placing Richmond BETWEEN the Army and Washington! Of COURSE he was required to leave some troops to "cover" the nation's capitol! But he was promised that those 40,000 men would be moving to join him overland as soon as he had closed up to Richmond. And he still had more men with him than the Rebs had in the Virginia theatre. Lincoln not only didn't "have McClellan on a leash", he was often reduced to "begging" Mac to tell him what he and the Army were doing.


McClellan's army moved to the Peninsula in pieces, so Washington had troops in and was thus covered. Plus, while farther from Washington than the Confederate army, it could get there quicker via transports. This was proven by the fact some of the McClellan's troops withdrawn from the Peninsula participated in 2nd Bull Run. Still, Lincoln didn't allow the move until the Confederate forces withdrew from Manassas Junction. And Lincoln intervened, preventing some troops from being moved to the Peninsula. McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.
quote:



What happened? McClellan was so increadable slow that the Confederates were able to send more men to Jackson in the Valley and raise a huge stink while bluffing "Mac" with "smoke and mirrors". He had no-one to blame but himself that MacDowell's corps wound up being sent West to deal with Jackson instead of South to join him. All he had to do was get up off his ass and move and the Rebels would have had no choice but to unite to meet him---ending Jackson's campaign and allowing the rest of the Union Armies to join "Mac". Instead he spent weeks doing nothing, bawling for more of everything, and blaiming Lincoln and the Government for all his imagined problems. Show me a single instance of Grant pulling such a bunch of B.S. and I'll shut up. Grant took what he was given, and set out to do his job. No wonder Lincoln loved him..., he might get beat, but he usually won. And he never wasted a minute bitching and moaning about what he didn't have!


Yes, smoke and mirrors kept McClellan from moving when he should have, and a ship named the CSS Virginia, but he did end up moving. There was a series of major battles where the casualties were fairly equal on both sides, but Lee didn't have as many men and consequently the troop differential was greater. McClellan wanted to move against Petersburg but wasn't permitted to do so. Pope, with fewer troops than he had at 2nd Bull Run could have still proceded South. The could have accomplished in 1862 what Grant accomplished in '64-65, if he was allowed to execute the plan. Maybe Lincoln wasn't holding the leash all the time, but McClellan was on one. Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Grant usually won? I will say he was certainly tenacious, but I would hardly say he usually won when you look at his battles against Lee. He managed to get the siege that he was after, but was only able to after getting pummelled at Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotsylvannia Court House. The AoP suffered casualties almost double that of the AoNV with estimates of Union loses being over 50,000. This is little more than a month! These were tolerable in 1864 considering the Mississippi was under Union control and Sherman was moving on Atlanta. In what world would those casualties have been acceptable in 1862? The war was ready for Grant in 1864, but not in 1862. It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

I can't argue the personality differences between Grant and McClellan. Grant was a no nonsense type of person, which is what you need as an army commander. McClellan might have been given more latitude if he had checked his savior of the Union act at the door. Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"



(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 95
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/25/2006 11:54:09 PM   
chris0827

 

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quote:

Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"


Lincoln said that in response to Hooker, not McClellan. Hooker has suggested that the country needed a dictator. Lincoln said "I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it,that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators.What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship."

That Lincoln sure had a way with words.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 96
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/26/2006 1:11:33 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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I stand corrected. Thank you. Should have looked it up..... Sure sounded like one of "Little Mac's" fantasies. Maybe he was holding out for "Emperor"....

(in reply to chris0827)
Post #: 97
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/26/2006 9:23:16 PM   
RERomine

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.


Yes, McClellan did eventually have all but McDowell's Corps available. The point is they didn't all get there instantly. I believe you pointed out there was a limited number of Union transports. While the move was in progress, it could have been countermanded if a threat to Washington developed. Most of the Confederate troops at this time were south of the Rappahannock, while the rest were in the Shenandoah Valley. And Johnston wasn't Lee.

quote:


Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.


Pope was moving forward by August 7, 1862 with 54,000 men (McDowell, 33,000; Sigel, 13,000 from the Valley; Banks, 11,000 near Culpeper, VA). The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, 1862, before any of McClellan's army had reached Pope. The order to begin the withdraw was issued August 3. Part of the Confederate force near McClellan started moving north once the Union stated withdrawing from Harrison's Landing. Had movements of McClellan and Pope been coordinated by Halleck, the Confederacy would have had problems. There wasn't much available to stop Pope if McClellan had been allowed to move against Petersburg.

quote:


It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!


The casualties of the Union and Confederacy during Grant's drive to Richmond are subject to debate, even amoung historians. I've seen numbers that list Union casualties as high as 52,000 and Confederate casualties as high as 33,000. Taking Antietam out of the mix because it has nothing to do with McClellan being allowed to move against Petersburg during the Peninsula Campaign, Union casualties approximately 22,000 and Confederate casualties 25,000. Halleck should coordinated the move of Pope and McClellan because such a move would have forced the Confederates to split their army. Lee could have been pushed back to Petersburg in 1862 and McClellan would have had something to show for his move. This wasn't allowed. Grant had the luxery of having control over all of the Union forces, everywhere. If McClellan didn't have anything to show for the Peninsula Campaign, it was because someone called it to an end before the payoff could be reaped.

I know this is speculation on my part. Lee could have cobbered both Pope and McClellan, but it seems like a sound strategy to me. Halleck was a weak commander for all the Union forces in the field. He should have seen the situation for what it was. Halleck tended to offer strongly worded suggestions and not orders. There was no proper control at the highest levels.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 98
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 12:25:16 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.


Yes, McClellan did eventually have all but McDowell's Corps available. The point is they didn't all get there instantly. I believe you pointed out there was a limited number of Union transports. While the move was in progress, it could have been countermanded if a threat to Washington developed. Most of the Confederate troops at this time were south of the Rappahannock, while the rest were in the Shenandoah Valley. And Johnston wasn't Lee. Are you reading what I'm writing? I said that Mac had ALL THE FORCES his own plan called for to be moved by sea..., and he still "crawled" up the Penninsula at the pace of a dead snail. Which allowed the Confederates to detach forces from Richmond to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, making it possible for "Stonewall" to raise merry Hell and "suck" MacDowell's forces West toward the Shenandoah. The point being McClellan had no-one to blaim but himself for MacDowell not joining him. All he had to do was push towards Richmond with even modest speed and Jackson couldn't have been reinforced.

quote:


Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.


Pope was moving forward by August 7, 1862 with 54,000 men (McDowell, 33,000; Sigel, 13,000 from the Valley; Banks, 11,000 near Culpeper, VA). The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, 1862, before any of McClellan's army had reached Pope. The order to begin the withdraw was issued August 3. Part of the Confederate force near McClellan started moving north once the Union stated withdrawing from Harrison's Landing. Had movements of McClellan and Pope been coordinated by Halleck, the Confederacy would have had problems. There wasn't much available to stop Pope if McClellan had been allowed to move against Petersburg. Which as I said was LONG AFTER the Seven Days Battle in June. "Little Mac" had been sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing for over a month DOING NOTHING! Meanwhile Lee, ever bold, had split his army at Richmond and sent Jackson's wing North towards Washington again. McClellan was called back because he wouldn't move forward. McClellan "moving to Petersburg" would only put him farther away from Washington and make his Army harder to supply. And as shown in 1864, Lee and Longstreet would have been there to meet him if he ACTUALLY did move and not just come up with another excuse. How could Halleck "coordinate" anything when McClellan ignored every order he recieved?

quote:


It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!


The casualties of the Union and Confederacy during Grant's drive to Richmond are subject to debate, even amoung historians. I've seen numbers that list Union casualties as high as 52,000 and Confederate casualties as high as 33,000. Taking Antietam out of the mix because it has nothing to do with McClellan being allowed to move against Petersburg during the Peninsula Campaign, Union casualties approximately 22,000 and Confederate casualties 25,000. Halleck should coordinated the move of Pope and McClellan because such a move would have forced the Confederates to split their army. Lee could have been pushed back to Petersburg in 1862 and McClellan would have had something to show for his move. This wasn't allowed. Grant had the luxery of having control over all of the Union forces, everywhere. If McClellan didn't have anything to show for the Peninsula Campaign, it was because someone called it to an end before the payoff could be reaped. And as I pointed out above, that SOMEONE was George B. McClellan. He sat on the James for FIVE WEEKS with his thumb up his butt doing absolutely NOTHING but complaining and screaming for every soldier in a blue coat on the Continent to be shipped to him. If he wanted to move against Petersburg or Richmond or anyplace else all he had to do was pull his thumb out and do it. He wouldn't. So Lincoln told him to bring the Army back to Washington.

I know this is speculation on my part. Lee could have cobbered both Pope and McClellan, but it seems like a sound strategy to me. Halleck was a weak commander for all the Union forces in the field. He should have seen the situation for what it was. Halleck tended to offer strongly worded suggestions and not orders. There was no proper control at the highest levels. All McClellan EVER had to do to have Lincoln's full backing, support, and confidence was move forward, find the Confederate Army, and attack it. Lincoln had given him "Supreme Command" in hopes that might get him moving, but he took it back when it was obvious that no matter what or how much McClellan had, the only thing he did was demand MORE.


(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 99
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 9:29:10 PM   
jjjanos

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine

Be that as it may, Washington was covered due to the staggered arrival.


Your implication that this was a consequence of micromanagement on the part of the War Department.

quote:


We know that now. Did McClellan? Obviously, the Confederates did an outstanding job of making it look like they were stronger than they were. How about a hurrah for an outstanding deception? While there were roughly 13K around Ft. Monroe, Johnston wasn't far away. McClellan probably didn't realize Johnston was as slow at moving as he was.


Failure to properly estimate the CSA force rests with McClellan who discounted any evidence or indications that the CSA force was smaller than the size McClellan already determined. It was McClellan's job to understand the strengths/weaknesses of his opponent - Lee did it very easily regarding McClellan. Whether Johnston was near or far does not excuse the one month delay in beginning siege operations.


quote:

This is still interference. Grant stripped all the defenses around Washington and almost got burned by Early's Campaign.


You say interference. I call it enforcing the agreed upon deployment of troops. Grant let it be known he was stripping the Washington defenses.

quote:

re:Virginia
This still effected the planning. To me, the threat of the CSS Virginia was probably given more credence then than it should have been given. It was going to cruise up the Potomac and bombard Washington, when the reality was a strong tide probably would have carried it out to sea.


Virginia's ability to steam up the Potomac was neutralized the day after the vessel first engaged Union forces by the Monitor. I believe the 'phib operation was cancelled because, while the Monitor could keep the Virginia from steaming to Washington, there was no guarantee the Monitor could stop the Virginia before it raised holy heck with any 'phibs trying the by-sea flanking movement.

quote:

After how many months delay getting things to his satisfaction?

quote:

Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.


Siege of Petersburg lasted 9 months. Inactivity lasted from November 1864 through end of March 1865 - months in which both armies would have been inactive due to mud.

(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 100
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 9:58:53 PM   
RERomine

 

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Since you said basically the same thing over and over again (maybe I did too ) I'll just respond without the quotes.

Yes, McClellan did seem a touch on the slow side. Keep in mind he was constantly being told he was badly out numbered by Allan Pinkerton. I know McClellan wasn't, you know he wasn't and the spider in the corner of the room knows he wasn't, but McClellan thought he was. The information was coming from someone (Pinkerton) who had some credibility with the White House and thought to be an expert. At the same time, the Confederates are acting like they have all the men McClellan has been told they had. Maybe they were getting information from somewhere (newspapers?) and knew what to do. The end result, McClellan sat and waited for reinforcements he felt he needed. I can't say McClellan would have moved any faster if he had gotten his reinforcements (McDowell) or accurate information. There is just no way to know. One way or the other is just speculation.

Jackson's Valley campaign should have been squashed. This had nothing to do with McClellan (other than inactivity allowing them to temporarily detach from Johnston's force) and everything to do with Halleck. With the troops previously mentioned availible, Halleck should have cooridinated the action against Jackson, but failed to do so. Halleck rarely gave orders, but more strongly worded suggestions. The situation should have been a strategic disaster for the Confederacy.

As far as supplies for a move by McClellan to Petersburg, the James river would have done nicely. Unless trains are used, ships are much faster than overland routes. Also, shipping routes are safe from cavalry raids. Although I haven't checked, Grant's supplies probably came up the James river as well.


(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 101
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 10:15:59 PM   
RERomine

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: jjjanos
Failure to properly estimate the CSA force rests with McClellan who discounted any evidence or indications that the CSA force was smaller than the size McClellan already determined. It was McClellan's job to understand the strengths/weaknesses of his opponent - Lee did it very easily regarding McClellan. Whether Johnston was near or far does not excuse the one month delay in beginning siege operations.


I could argue this point, but I won't because I agree with you. McClellan should have been able to figure the Confederate numbers out for himself. Why he placed so much credence in what he got from Allan Pinkerton is beyond me, but I believe McClellan reacted to what he believed to be correct information.

quote:


You say interference. I call it enforcing the agreed upon deployment of troops. Grant let it be known he was stripping the Washington defenses.


That might be a miscommunication between McClellan and Lincoln and/or Halleck. Obviously, McClellan believed the troops were coming, didn't get them and was in no position to really discuss the issue. In reality, McDowell's men weren't needed in Washington. There were still enough troops around and the Confederacy was just as concerned about losing Richmond as the Union was to losing Washington. We know that now, but Lincoln and Halleck probably didn't at the time.

quote:


Virginia's ability to steam up the Potomac was neutralized the day after the vessel first engaged Union forces by the Monitor. I believe the 'phib operation was cancelled because, while the Monitor could keep the Virginia from steaming to Washington, there was no guarantee the Monitor could stop the Virginia before it raised holy heck with any 'phibs trying the by-sea flanking movement.


The CSS Virginia messed with the planning, but it's level of success was due to surprise more than anything. It should have been easy to deal with once the shock wore off. There were many events during the war that got more attention than they really deserved. The Virginia's threat to Washington was one.

quote:


quote:

Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.


Siege of Petersburg lasted 9 months. Inactivity lasted from November 1864 through end of March 1865 - months in which both armies would have been inactive due to mud.



I'm not talking about how long the siege was, but the fact McClellan might have been able to get there in September, 1862, as opposed to Grant in November, 1864.

(in reply to jjjanos)
Post #: 102
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 10:40:07 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine

Since you said basically the same thing over and over again (maybe I did too ) I'll just respond without the quotes.

Yes, McClellan did seem a touch on the slow side. Keep in mind he was constantly being told he was badly out numbered by Allan Pinkerton. I know McClellan wasn't, you know he wasn't and the spider in the corner of the room knows he wasn't, but McClellan thought he was. The information was coming from someone (Pinkerton) who had some credibility with the White House and thought to be an expert. At the same time, the Confederates are acting like they have all the men McClellan has been told they had. Maybe they were getting information from somewhere (newspapers?) and knew what to do. The end result, McClellan sat and waited for reinforcements he felt he needed. I can't say McClellan would have moved any faster if he had gotten his reinforcements (McDowell) or accurate information. There is just no way to know. One way or the other is just speculation. Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Jackson's Valley campaign should have been squashed. This had nothing to do with McClellan (other than inactivity allowing them to temporarily detach from Johnston's force) and everything to do with Halleck. With the troops previously mentioned availible, Halleck should have cooridinated the action against Jackson, but failed to do so. Halleck rarely gave orders, but more strongly worded suggestions. The situation should have been a strategic disaster for the Confederacy. Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

As far as supplies for a move by McClellan to Petersburg, the James river would have done nicely. Unless trains are used, ships are much faster than overland routes. Also, shipping routes are safe from cavalry raids. Although I haven't checked, Grant's supplies probably came up the James river as well.
I know all this. Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".


(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 103
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/27/2006 10:55:19 PM   
regularbird

 

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Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 104
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 12:25:56 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.



I'm not suprised the Ranger at Antietam didn't mention it..., that's a later Campaign. The "numbers inflation" began in November of 1861 when McClellan insisted on sitting in Washington giving his 175,000+ troops additional training and parades even though he himself had described them as "largest, best-trained, and best-equipped Army in the world." After he had opened his mouth, the press and the politicians began wondering why he didn't take this wonderful military machine out to Manassas and beat the stuffing out of the 50,000 ragged Rebs known to be there. So he hired his old friend Alan Pinkerton as his new "Chief of Intelligence", and "lo and behold" there were soon 200,000 Rebels at Manassas! Which gave "Little Mac" the perfect excuse to sit around and do nothing. Then in early March of 1862 when Johnson abandon his works at Manassas and everyone could "go and have a look", it became obvious that the numbers as well as the guns had been "quaker". Which didn't prevent McClellan from taking Pinkerton with him to the Penninsula..., where the numbers were soon growing again.

You've caught me out. I can't say for sure where I got that data from. I'd thought it was in Cullen's THE PENNINSULA CAMPAIGN, but I don't see it there. Might have been in a class or seminar (I studied Military History under Allen R Millett at Mizzou in the 60's before he left for Ohio State.) or in something I read in the 40 years since. Give me a week to root through books and notes and I can probably turn it up for you.

(in reply to regularbird)
Post #: 105
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 2:03:10 AM   
RERomine

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon.

Confederate strength estimates before Antietam:

Stanton 100,000
Ft. Monroe commander 75,000
" 30,000-50,000
New York Herald 150,000
Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD
" 250,000 in VA
Gen. Banks 150,000
Pinkerton 100,000
McClellan 100,000

Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bulleye.

quote:


Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.


Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. When was Jackson reinforced when? If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not.

quote:


Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".


If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 106
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 2:43:46 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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From: Kansas City, MO
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quote:

ORIGINAL: RERomine


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon.

Confederate strength estimates before Antietam:

Stanton 100,000
Ft. Monroe commander 75,000
" 30,000-50,000
New York Herald 150,000
Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD
" 250,000 in VA
Gen. Banks 150,000
Pinkerton 100,000
McClellan 100,000

Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bullseye. It wasn't exactly a "science", but professional military men could get reasonably close. The "Fortress Monroe Commander" is certainly pretty accurate. Lee had about 75,000 going into the fighting with Pope that ended at Second Manassas. But in Maryland he could muster only around 40,000 because of massive straggling and a certain reluctance among some of the troops to "invade" the North. Banks, of course, is one of the War's more complete idiots...., the New York Herald was trying to sell newspapers..., and the Governor of Pennsylvania obviously knew more about stuffing ballot boxes than estimating military strength. Everybody else just seems to like "round numbers".
quote:


Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.


Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. No arguement. But he wasn't much of a Field Commander either. Which is why Pope was eventually brought East to command the forces that had made such a mess facing Jackson in May. When was Jackson reinforced when? In early May, while McClellan was still putzing around at the base of the Penninsula. His entire command was brought south in early June and participated in the Seven Days Battles. If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not.

quote:


Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".


If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. How was it General Patton put it? "I favor a good plan executed violently RIGHT NOW over a perfect plan next week!" McClellan had a number of exellent plans, and did fine as long as he didn't have to execute them at all. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans. Depends on when you quote the figures. MacDowell had the largest Corps in the Army at the Campaign's start..., over 50,000 men. McClellan demanded and recieved Franklin's Division (12,000) very early on...., and later (after Seven Pines) recieved McCall's Division (12,000) as well.


(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 107
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 5:01:42 AM   
regularbird

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Don't worry about it I was just curious. If you stumble across I would like to know though.


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.



I'm not suprised the Ranger at Antietam didn't mention it..., that's a later Campaign. The "numbers inflation" began in November of 1861 when McClellan insisted on sitting in Washington giving his 175,000+ troops additional training and parades even though he himself had described them as "largest, best-trained, and best-equipped Army in the world." After he had opened his mouth, the press and the politicians began wondering why he didn't take this wonderful military machine out to Manassas and beat the stuffing out of the 50,000 ragged Rebs known to be there. So he hired his old friend Alan Pinkerton as his new "Chief of Intelligence", and "lo and behold" there were soon 200,000 Rebels at Manassas! Which gave "Little Mac" the perfect excuse to sit around and do nothing. Then in early March of 1862 when Johnson abandon his works at Manassas and everyone could "go and have a look", it became obvious that the numbers as well as the guns had been "quaker". Which didn't prevent McClellan from taking Pinkerton with him to the Penninsula..., where the numbers were soon growing again.

You've caught me out. I can't say for sure where I got that data from. I'd thought it was in Cullen's THE PENNINSULA CAMPAIGN, but I don't see it there. Might have been in a class or seminar (I studied Military History under Allen R Millett at Mizzou in the 60's before he left for Ohio State.) or in something I read in the 40 years since. Give me a week to root through books and notes and I can probably turn it up for you.



(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 108
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 6:26:11 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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From: Kansas City, MO
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"Don't worry about it I was just curious. If you stumble across I would like to know though."


I almost missed this in all the rest of the post. I'll try and see if I can hunt up the source. Sure hope it wasn't in my College Notes..., after a lifetime of moves they'll be a "bear" just to find. The books are at least on one of the shelves somewhere. The problem with a good memory is that you know you "know" something..., but your not always sure why you know it.

(in reply to regularbird)
Post #: 109
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 8:31:14 AM   
keystone

 

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If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. Estimates were tabulated according to Regiment and Brigade strengths. An up to strength Regiment would have 10 companies of 100 men each. OOB would be in the papers all the time, it was not hard to come up with a number pretty easily. The regiments were not up to strength though. Union kept raising new Regiments and not filling the ranks of the old. The Confederacy would recruit into the same units and Pinkerton thought that they were keeping their units up to strength. The South just didn't have the manpower to do so. That's where he went wrong. Also unless you study the Civil War you will be shoulda, coulda, woulda all day long. McClellen was not a great Genl, he was not a bad Genl either. With the dearth of brain power in the North he rose pretty quickly because of prior experience, training and connections. His personality would not allow him to think outside the lines. One would call him today a concrete-sequential. He was not a thinker he was a do'er. He was always trying not to lose instead of trying to win. Also his plans on the future weighed on his plans in the present. If he lost a battle his future plans might be compromised. That's why during the Pen. campaign he was found on a gunboat scared #$%%less and not knowing what to do. His world was crumbling around him and he didn't have a clue what to do.

_____________________________

praying for civilian

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 110
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 1:36:54 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
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From: Kansas City, MO
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"If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. "


It certainly would be. And that's not what I said. I said his "first estimates" of Rebel Strength at Manassas WERE accurate and gave Johnson's strength around Manassas as approximately 50,000..., the same thing everyone else was estimating. And his "employer" wasn't happy. And when those "estimates" were revised upward, his employer's contentment with them rose as well. Pinkerton was selling a service, and the first rule of "sales" is "Keep the customer happy". He was also an old friend of McClellan's from "Little Mac's" RR days, and knew him well; so it wouldn't take him long to figure out what he had been "hired to provide". The "story" is in the "numbers".

(in reply to keystone)
Post #: 111
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 4:47:38 PM   
RERomine

 

Posts: 280
Joined: 7/19/2006
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. "


It certainly would be. And that's not what I said. I said his "first estimates" of Rebel Strength at Manassas WERE accurate and gave Johnson's strength around Manassas as approximately 50,000..., the same thing everyone else was estimating. And his "employer" wasn't happy. And when those "estimates" were revised upward, his employer's contentment with them rose as well. Pinkerton was selling a service, and the first rule of "sales" is "Keep the customer happy". He was also an old friend of McClellan's from "Little Mac's" RR days, and knew him well; so it wouldn't take him long to figure out what he had been "hired to provide". The "story" is in the "numbers".


Finding any of his Civil War notes at all probably would be a find, unless someone else had them. Pinkerton lost most of his personal notes in a fire in 1871.

Mike, has nothing to do with the numbers, but just a general side note to history. Where did you get the information about Pinkerton. I know there is a book out that evaluates the estimates he provided. Can't remember what it was called, but it wasn't by Pinkerton. All the sources I find say Pinkerton inflated his numbers, something you say also, but you further point out that he did so because that was what McClellan expected. It makes logical sense, but I haven't found any source that confirms that. Is there any such source other than Pinkerton? Obviously, he had a business to run after the war and would want to protect his reputation.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 112
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 8:50:30 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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From: Kansas City, MO
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"Mike, has nothing to do with the numbers, but just a general side note to history. Where did you get the information about Pinkerton. I know there is a book out that evaluates the estimates he provided. Can't remember what it was called, but it wasn't by Pinkerton. All the sources I find say Pinkerton inflated his numbers, something you say also, but you further point out that he did so because that was what McClellan expected. It makes logical sense, but I haven't found any source that confirms that. Is there any such source other than Pinkerton? Obviously, he had a business to run after the war and would want to protect his reputation.


I wish I could tell you. If I could remember where I picked up this information it would be a lot easier to find it for others. Frustraiting part is I can almost remember/visualize the wording..., but not where I was reading it.

(in reply to RERomine)
Post #: 113
RE: The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread - 11/28/2006 10:34:44 PM   
RERomine

 

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Joined: 7/19/2006
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
I wish I could tell you. If I could remember where I picked up this information it would be a lot easier to find it for others. Frustraiting part is I can almost remember/visualize the wording..., but not where I was reading it.


Like I said, everything says Pinkerton inflated the numbers and stops there. What you've said makes sense about Pinkerton. All the more reason such estimates needed to be provided by the military because they are the ones who have to put their lives on the line. I've got a lot of books I read, but often have to consider the source as to whether or not it's valid. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War is interesting because it comes from participants of the war, but I always think each one has an agenda. They seemed to be rewriting history just 20 years after the war ended.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 114
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