Mike Scholl
Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003 From: Kansas City, MO Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: RERomine quote:
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously... I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon. Confederate strength estimates before Antietam: Stanton 100,000 Ft. Monroe commander 75,000 " 30,000-50,000 New York Herald 150,000 Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD " 250,000 in VA Gen. Banks 150,000 Pinkerton 100,000 McClellan 100,000 Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bullseye. It wasn't exactly a "science", but professional military men could get reasonably close. The "Fortress Monroe Commander" is certainly pretty accurate. Lee had about 75,000 going into the fighting with Pope that ended at Second Manassas. But in Maryland he could muster only around 40,000 because of massive straggling and a certain reluctance among some of the troops to "invade" the North. Banks, of course, is one of the War's more complete idiots...., the New York Herald was trying to sell newspapers..., and the Governor of Pennsylvania obviously knew more about stuffing ballot boxes than estimating military strength. Everybody else just seems to like "round numbers". quote:
Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South. Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. No arguement. But he wasn't much of a Field Commander either. Which is why Pope was eventually brought East to command the forces that had made such a mess facing Jackson in May. When was Jackson reinforced when? In early May, while McClellan was still putzing around at the base of the Penninsula. His entire command was brought south in early June and participated in the Seven Days Battles. If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not. quote:
Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure". If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. How was it General Patton put it? "I favor a good plan executed violently RIGHT NOW over a perfect plan next week!" McClellan had a number of exellent plans, and did fine as long as he didn't have to execute them at all. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans. Depends on when you quote the figures. MacDowell had the largest Corps in the Army at the Campaign's start..., over 50,000 men. McClellan demanded and recieved Franklin's Division (12,000) very early on...., and later (after Seven Pines) recieved McCall's Division (12,000) as well.
|