IronDuke_slith
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quote:
ORIGINAL: ColinWright
quote:
ORIGINAL: OTZ
Glantz argues that Hitler's decision to divert Guderian to Kiev actually made the eventual drive on Moscow easier. He covincingly shows that the Red Army squandered itself in fruitless attacks against the stalled AGC. By the time the Germans continued their advance on the capital, there were far fewer Russian troops to contend with.
I think this ignores (1) the enormous additional wear on German armor imposed by the Kiev campaign, and (2) the considerable delay that campaign entailed.
The Germans had the Russians reeling in July/August 1941, and that Summer was the one period in which they enjoyed overwhelming superiority over Red Army forces -- and it was their best window of opportunity.
to be fair, the one time they had overall numerical superiority was immediately after the Kiev Kesselschact so it's difficult to be too critical.
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Their one best chance to win the campaign was to take advantage of that window, drive quickly through to Moscow, and bring about the collapse of the Soviet state with its early capture.
Arguable. If memory serves, the Soviets had selected an alternative site, moved out most of the beaurocracy and industry and were prepared. Stalin may have been list had he stayed to the end and it was clearly an important communications hub, but it by no means guaranteed German victory.
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I've always been impressed by the panic that broke out in Moscow when it seemed about to fall in October. Had it actually fallen by that point or earlier, I think Stalin's empire might well have broken up. The failure to offer creditable resistance would have been politically crippling.
Given how badly the Soviets did in 1941 until December, if they did not collapse politically then, Moscow wouldn't have tipped the balance. Stalin was playing the patriotism Mother Russia card, not the Communist state card and I don;t see it would have finished them off.
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Later on, of course, the Russians could theoretically have been hammered into submission, but with time, they were inevitably going to recover confidence and build an increasingly competent army. Inevitably and increasingly, their superior numbers and industrial output was going to make Russian rather than German victory the likely outcome.
Yes, but the whole point of Kiev was to start to counter this issue. the German war economy lacked all sorts. Most of what it needed for the eastern and other fronts could be found in Southern, not central or northern Russia. Kiev removed 600 000 men who might threaten the newly captured Ukraine with it's food stocks. It removed the only significant obstacle to AGS crossing the Dniepr and moving into the Donbas where there was lots of coal and strategically significant metal mining. Beyond the Donbas was the Caucasus and further food resources in the Kuban and oil reserves (best of all) around Maykop, Grozny and Baku.
The Germans backed their operational method, but it needed feeding and the Southern thrust was designed to take the raw materials she needed to fight the coalition forming against her.
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It's like if I decide to attack an NFL lineman on the street. Well, if I catch him unawares and work fast, I might stand a chance. However, the longer I take about it, the worse the odds become for me.
But this whole concept ignores German method. German operational method deemed the destruction of the enemy's main field force as the chief object of the campaign. It was less interested in geographical objectives except where possession or otherwise of some place aided the destruction of the enemy.
Hitler added to this basic concept the economic angle which essentially pointed out that the whole point of destroying the Soviet union was to take the food in the ukraine, the coal in the Donbas and the oil in the Caucasus.
The battle of Kiev was sound German thinking in that it encircled and destroyed 600000 men, a huge number by any standards. Additionally, as above, it opened up the Ukraine, Donbas and Casasus to AGs, even if most of these would prove beyond them in 1941.
operationally, it further removed an Army Group from the southern flank of any thrust on Moscow. Guderian had enough issues pushing forward as the southern thrust of the assault on Moscow without worrying about 600 000 men in his southern rear.
Add in Glant'z point that whilst guderian was swanning around the Ukraine, the Soviet centre was attriting itself with unending assaults against the static AGC, and the whole thing becomes fairly understandable. the Germans did Kiev because it suited their operational method and because it suited their geographical intentions.
regards,
IronDuke
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