1275psi
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Joined: 4/17/2005 Status: offline
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Extract from “Shattering the sword” –a Cantona publication …By late April it was obvious from the highest Admiral to the lowest seaman that the empires eyes were focussed on Port Moresby. The daily army bombing, the recon flights, the vast weight of intelligence all spoke plainly of the forthcoming attack Since the start of the month the troops of the invasion fleet – 48th division,65th brigade,56th brigade and numerous engineering troops , had been sweating in their holds of the invasion fleet as it crawled south from soerabaya. The Japanese plans were 3 phased – first the occupation of Meruke, then that of Thursday island, followed by the invasion itself. ADM Yamaguchi was under no illusions –he knew the Allies knew he was coming –so could he turn this to his advantage ? His orders were clear – The Allied Carriers were expected to appear for this battle – and that had precedence –the invasion would have to manage with what ever cover Thursday island and meruke good give Battle was joined on the 20th –and all doubts that the Allies were not prepared as well as they could be were quickly dispelled From Dawn Yamaguchi had led KB into Torres straight –and began to spot as heavy a CAP as possible. By 0900 over 145 Zeros were reported in the air, spread at 3 levels, 5000, 10000, 15000 feet. The hangers of the CVs were packed with bombers –all loaded AP bombs, or torpedoes . Debate over this had occurred all night – would it not be better to have at least 2 of the 4 Hulls ready to go immediately if the allies turned up –and use the other 4 for CAP –or even better have a 4/2 ratio –attack/defence/ Yamaguchi however can be defended for his decision on 3 fronts. First - CV doctrine in the Japanese navy –attack with all –all at once And second – the night had been very rough –moving loaded planes to the deck that may not be needed in rough weather entailed its own risks. Finaly Yamaguchi must have weighed the risks – since I-26 reported Cvs nearly a week ago, none had been sighted in the coral sea – but the B17’s were very active –they then were the big risk. And he feared the B17 very much. Thus KB greets the dawn with a heavy, heavy CAP. At 0902 his decision is justified as the Tone fires her guns on the formation perimeter –air attack coming in! The first attack composes of just 3 b17’s at 15000 feet –and the zeros swarm into intercept. It’s a long battle –and some 14 fighters take damage before all 3 bombers go down. But its only the beginning. Again the Tone opens fire –this time she is the target –and the CAP cannot assist -4 B26 race in -1 downed by Tones own guns –and she is bracketed in bombs –but is missed. 1020 – Another 3 B17 come in – and again the battle is desperate –but one sided 1036 – 3 more B-26 attack the Haranua – and miss By Midday KB is entering Torres straight proper –and Yamaguchi orders the 2 CVL to strike Thursday island – a seaplane tender is reported there –but he is taking no chances At 1500 20 Val and 20 kate duly sink the unidentified ship at Thursday island, and Yamaguchi impliments the next stage of the plan BB’s Nagato and Mutsu are detached with escorts - ordered to flatten the PM fields –and if there ARE CVs about –to lure them out KB returns west towards the transports –and marks time for the night –awaiting developments 21st The 21st, 22nd are pivotal days for Japan in the war. Pivotal in that so many future plans are going to be derailed. Pivotal that such small allied forces can inflict these changes The day starts the same as yesterday –but this time 4 Cvs are ready to strike –Kaga, Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu have full strikes on deck ready to go –Shokakau and Zuikaku and the 2 CVL are providing the CAP -100 plus zeros in all – surely more than sufficient for the expected task. But today Japans lack of radar, lack of radios, lack of a co ordinated CAP - reaps a bitter harvest A mere 21 medium bombers come in, and another 3 B17s. 15 A-24 are pounced upon –and this squadron is decimated The 3 B17s are turned away But 6 B-26 come in from the opposite direction – and none are engaged by the fighters. Two 500lb bombs strike the Akagi Both slice into the ship in the area immediately under the island –and the destruction is horrific. The vast majority of it simply disappears, along with most of the curving smoke stack –and 2 of the main AA mounts. The blast penetrates both hangers, and lifts the flight deck upwards some 6 feet in places – several planes are damaged badly as they bounce on their spots. Half the propulsion plant is snuffed out instantly –the blast travelling down the uptakes –blowing out the furnaces. It could –it should have been worse – by some miracle the firemain remains functional, and only a single small fire breaks out in the hanger deck –fortunately empty of planes now –and these are extinguished. Another fire however burns well in the No2 boiler room – and although contained –it will take 2 days to extinguish it. Akagi is Hors de combat –and will eventually be detached home –she will not be repaired until at least November/December of 42 – eventually requiring repairs to 67% of her hull
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