Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: borner

my personal favorite is waiting on the last two Nell sqd's to arrive at Truk, and they are empty instead of having 18 bombers each. So much for late game reinforcements. 

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Funnily enough, there was a lack of feedback from barges who had been attacked & shot up, whether good or bad. In fact, I don't think there were any barges left to make feedback...

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ORIGINAL: borner

The sooner you hang them on the side after you drink them empty, the better the crews thought they would work! 

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Is there the chance/possibility built into the encouter tables that the fleets will miss one another? Particularly if one fleet, eg here the Japanese, is one small solitary and fast ship trying to do some 'blockade running' and doesnt' particularly want to be found

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Is there the chance/possibility built into the encouter tables that the fleets will miss one another? Particularly if one fleet, eg here the Japanese, is one small solitary and fast ship trying to do some 'blockade running' and doesnt' particularly want to be found

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk
IMHO Yamamoto was a strategic genius, there was nothing wrong with his idea to engage the USN in a 'decisive battle', although I grant you his complex plans and strategy were often too much that - ie too complex and inflexible. Also they assumed to a high degree the US doing exactly as predicted (which they usually didn't) and the IJN commanders on teh ground (which wasn't actually Yamamoto's fault but rather the prodcut of poor training at IJN staff college which tended to mould officers in a particular way & rigid line of thinking and discouraged 'thinking off the cuff') being able to carry them out exactly as planned.

and

Nagumo, on the other hand, was a wiley opponent, but he characterised many of the Japanese admirals (in interesting contest to the foot-soldiers and actual pilots, who were full of the Banzai spirit) by being overtly cautious, almost timid. He was over-cautious at Pearl Harbour by not sending out the 3rd strike (either to hit the shore installations, docks or search for the US carriers one of which he could have found and sunk, having virtually no defensive CAP), and at Midway (admittedly aided by faulty reconissance) he dithered and dallied too long at the wrong time before deciding not to send out any strikes against the Yorktown (which had finaly been spotted) but rather waiting for his initial Midway strikes to return & turn around. Thus the IJN were always off-balance (and genuinely unlucky) in a battle they should have walked

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk


HOwever,  Yamamoto made one serious error during his career, and that was to get the IJN sucked into a war of attrition over Guadacanal.  THe Japs should have either gone in in strength at the very beginning, or else cut their losses & pulled out. The IJN (partly through faulty intelligence) at first committed troops piece-meal and failed to fully inform (as usual) the Army of what was going on. After that both sides took horrendous losses in the campaign,  but the US could afford & replace them (with difficulty) and the IJN couldn't.  Also after Santa Cruz he stripped the carriers of their remaining air-groups, virtually every last experienced pilot off them, and sent them to Rabaul in c. late November to reinforce air operations SE down the Solomons slot.  They accomplished little and lost heavily, mainly through non-combat operational losses (the weather at that time of year was bad, with loads of storms).  Thus the depleted carriers were forced to start training new air groups basically from scratch, with only a handful of experienced pilots (mainly those returning from injury) to assist with the advanced training (which the Japs always carried out near the front lines).
The results,  by the time of hte Marianas Turkey shoot in mid-'44,  were obvious for all to see, with the new IJN pilots not being a patch on the old and thus the USN could shoot them down in droves (which they did).  I honestly believe this strategic error can be firmly laid at Yamamoto's door.

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Yamamoto was actually advised to relieve him of command (possibly to be replaced by the commander of the Hiryu who went down pointlessly with his ship at Midway, can't remember his name at the moment but he was certainly less cautious and served as Nagumo's 2nd-in-command during the battle) and after toying with the idea decided against it, as it would almost certainly dent the fleets morale somewhat

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Thanks, I'd 4gotten his name.
There's an interesting note to the battle which has been largely overlooked, and Yamaguchi oddly enough could actually have rescued it for the Japanese before they'd thrown it away. The moment the third signal from the Jap spotter plane circling above TF 17 reached the bridge which caused so much consternation and confusion "Unidentified force appears to be accompanied by an aircraft carrier, bringing up the rear", it was also flashed across to Yamaguchi in the Hiryu (being 2nd in command, he also got all the important signals after they'd been received in the Akagi).

He immediately flashed back to Nagumo 'Permission to launch strike against unidentified target immediately' and was refused. At that time the Hiryu still had it's second strike of about 18 Vals and a dozen or so Kates sitting on the deck waiting to go and armed with torpedo's and anti-shipping bombs (they'd been unable to strike down because of landing/rotating CAP planes, which is why they'd been slow to obey Nagumo's order half an hour before to send down the 2nd strike to the hanger & re-arm with GP bombs to hit Midway again). Also Kaga still had a good number of planes equipped with torpedo's and anti-ship bombs on deck as it too had had to delay because of rotating CAP.
If Nagumo had said 'yes, go' at that time, Hiryu could have launched 30 strike planes and Kaga at least 20 for the Yorktown. At that time the US were still in the process of launching their strike at maximum range, but the Japs could have got something away to hit them just after 8.15, and if the Hiryu and Kaga had had empty decks then in theory the returning Midway strike could have been turned around quicker at least on those two carriers.

But Nagumo said 'no', because there were very few escorts that could be spared to accompany it. Also the Japs had just beaten off several heavy attacks from Midway island and inflicted heavy losses on the undescorted US bombers & torpedo planes, so Nagumo felt he was justifying in refusing Yamaguchi's request to launch a strike until escorts could be available to accompany it. This feelign of justification was probably compounded less than an hour later when the three US TBD squadrons hoved into view and were decimated, in fact at that time until the SBD's winged down from overhead the Japs were probably quite justified in thinking they had won the battle of Midway.

Still, makes a fascinating question - what if Nagumo had agreed to Yamaguchi's request to launch early the moment a carrier was identified. As always though the cagey Nagumo played safe.
Incidentally, Yamaguchi did not survive the battle of Midway, he chose to go down with teh Hiryu despite the pleas of his officers and a huge sumo-wrestling champion petty officer threatening to bodily lift him up and carry him off the bridge, so popular he was with his men. He was last seen alone at the bow of the Hiryu just after it had been torpedo/scuttled by a Jap destroyer in the process of lashing himself to the anchor.