Lesbaker
Posts: 170
Joined: 3/6/2007
From: Southampton, UK
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I can’t say much on the Organisation and use of Artillery for other nations but for the British over the period that JTCS covers it will be nearly impossible to replicate historically as the formations and the way they were used changed so much during the war years, Here’s a quick (Well really quite long ) summation of the Royal Artillery’s formations and use over the war years.
ORGANISATION AND GROUPING
Principles
The main concepts for the use of artillery were:
Cooperation with the supported arm.
Concentration of firepower.
Surprise.
Economy of firepower - particularly reflected in the use of neutralisation and the ability to concentrate.
Mobility of firepower - the ability to concentrate firepower when and where it was needed without re-deploying the guns.
It being a principle that artillery did not go into reserve, the firepower of the regiments or divisions in reserve was available to those in contact with the enemy. There were two principles governing artillery command and control:
that command was centralised under the highest commander 'who can exercise effective control without risk of failure', and
Formation, etc, commanders should not have to deal with more than one artillery commander (who was responsible for field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery).
This led to two command and control relationships:
'Under Command'; and
‘In Support’, which made firepower available, normally all guns within range, and enabled firing across divisional and higher formation boundaries.
The British Army did not recognise the principle of Unity of Command in the way that other armies did. The consequence of these simple arrangements was highly flexible mobile firepower that could be provided where and when it was needed. 'Under Command' meant that control was centralised under the commander, while 'In Support' meant decentralisation. From late 1942 there were in effect only two levels of command with organic guns - division (divisional field regiments) and army (all other field, medium and heavy regiments). Typically a regiment 'under command' of a division would be 'in support' to a particular brigade, but this did not prevent it firing in support of formations to its flanks. Corps became the primary level of artillery control for counter-battery action (as it was in WW1) and in the final year of the war for major offensive fire plans. Control was usually centralised for defensive and major attack operations and decentralised for an advance. However it was rare for command to be decentralised below divisional level and decentralisation mostly applied to the army artillery being assigned to corps or division level.
Organisation, Affiliation and Equipment
From early in the 20th century the basic organisation of the artillery was divisional artillery comprising 2 to 4 units, called 'field brigades'. These brigades had sub-units called 'batteries', which in turn were split into 'sections' each of 2 guns. After WW1 there were additional field, medium and heavy brigades above divisional level. However, in 1938 the field brigades were renamed regiments, lost their survey sections and reorganised in two batteries of guns, regimental HQ was significantly increased in size including gaining a second in command. The batteries were reorganised with sections being grouped into 'troops'. Each field battery of 12 guns was organised as three troops (except RHA batteries that had eight guns in two troops) and medium brigades became regiments of 2 batteries. The Commonwealth armies followed suit, in some cases not until early 1940. The field regiments changed again after 1940 as the lessons of the campaign in France were absorbed.
Regiment Pre 1938 1938 -1940 After 1940
Field 4 x 6 Guns 2 x 3 x 4 Guns 3 x 2 x 4 Guns
RHA 3 x 6 Guns 2 x 2 x 4 Guns 3 x 2 x 4 Guns
Medium 4 x 4 Guns 2 x 2 x 4 Guns 2 x 2 x 4 Guns
Heavy 4 x 4 Guns 4 x 4 Guns 4 x 4 Guns
Each troop had a command post (CP) as did the battery. Troops were sequentially lettered within a regiment and divided into two sections (left and right) each of two guns. Guns being called ‘sub-sections’ and sequentially lettered within the battery. In consequence guns were colloquially called ‘subs’.
In earlier times the battery commander (BC – a major) had been the battery's observer, although he often brought forward a junior officer from the gun position to act as an 'observing officer'. The 1938 organisation introduced troop commanders who were captains and became their battery's main observers, although the third (in the three troop organisation) was severely limited by poor communications facilities. They operated as either Observation Post Officers (OPO) if the battle was static or Forward Observation Officers (FOO) if they were moving with the infantry or armour. The BC remained in the forward area with his troop commanders. This highlights the distinguishing feature of the British artillery system, the more senior battery officers were forward. It reflected key lessons of 1917-18:
That artillery commanders and tactical commanders must be co-located at all levels of command.
That artillery command must be well forward.
That artillery command and control must be directly linked to the all-arms tactical plan.
It had many important consequences, not the least of which was that they spoke authoritatively to the supported commanders and gave orders, not requests, to the guns. It also eliminated the risk of the artillery conducting their own private war controlled from the rear. In 1941 General Montgomery, as chief umpire on Exercise BUMPER, stated 'the business of the Gunner Commanding Officer is first to train his regiment and then to train the infantry and armoured brigadiers to use it properly'.
The regiment's second-in-command was responsible for its gun area. Regimental HQ (RHQ) was there and operated by the adjutant. The senior officer on each battery position was the (battery) Captain (BK), who had particular responsibilities for administration. There was a command post officer (CPO) in the battery CP (BCP) and a gun position officer (GPO) at each troop CP (TCP) all with an officer assisting. The CPO was responsible for the overall gun position including its gunnery and local defence. Mid-war a new role - Section Commander (or section officer) - was introduced. This was an officer, warrant officer or NCO appointed by each GPO to supervise each section in the troop in addition to their other duties, it was a role and there was no change in establishment.
Medium regiments always had two medium batteries, each with eight guns. Heavy regiments had batteries of four guns, which were not organised into troops so they had only one CP. After Dunkirk they had four batteries with 7.2-inch howitzers as these became available. In 1943 155-mm M1 guns replaced 7.2-inch in two of these batteries and in early 1945 the 7.2-inch started converting to the longer range Mk 6 on the M1 carriage. Super heavy batteries had two guns, with three batteries in each mixed regiment. The various mountain and light batteries varied from four to eight howitzers, and mortar batteries generally had 16 tubes.
With the exception of the heavies, regiments usually had a single type of gun. However, in Burma after 1942 mixed equipment regiments were common and in other theatres some field regiments had both towed and SP batteries. In 1944 in Burma anti-tank regiments became dual equipped, each detachment had an anti-tank gun and a 3-inch mortar (12 per battery).
Most field regiments were under command of the divisional artillery commanders, the CRA, a brigadier. All divisions and corps had their own HQRA, with both command and control roles. At divisional level this small HQ had 3 staff officers as well as the CRA. Above corps level HQs had an artillery staff branch, usually headed by a brigadier (BRA) at army or command and major general (MGRA) at army group or major command level, with advisory and command roles to and through the Commander and general staff.
Initially there was a second HQRA at corps under command of the CCMA who commanded the corps medium artillery and any GHQ field, medium and heavy regiments allocated to the corps, this position was abolished for inexplicable reasons in 1941. The basic scale for corps artillery, not always achieved, being two army field regiments, two medium regiments and a survey regiment as corps troops. In France in 1940 GHQ had an additional 19 regiments, half of them medium. This gave the BEF (11 divisions in 3 corps) 60 regiments totalling 1280 guns. The British Liberation Army that returned to France in 1944 had 11 divisions (including 3 armoured plus many independent tank and armoured brigades, but excluding Canadian, Polish, Belgian and Dutch formations) in 4 corps with over 65 regiments, of which 30 were in divisional artilleries.
From September 1942 AGRAs were formed as 'army troops' with heavy, medium and field regiments, they provided organisation for the regiments under army command. An ad hoc medium artillery group was used at El Alamein under command of a regimental commander and several months previously at Bardia. The creation of AGRAs meant that corps field artillery was reduced to a survey regiment but an AGRA nominally comprised a corps' scale of army artillery. From late 1943 (after the conversion of some field regiments to medium) the scale of two field, one medium and one heavy regiment per corps increased to one field regiment, one medium regiment plus one medium regiment per division supported and one heavy regiment.
The AGRAs were under army command and assigned to corps as required, normally one to each corps. Nevertheless for major operations a corps might get additional AGRAs, and sometimes they were allocated to a division and sometimes additional field and medium regiments were allocated to a division for an extended period. However, it was not British practice to routinely distribute non-divisional artillery regiments among divisions because this conflicted with the principle of centralised control. Initially AGRAs were without a signal company. As the war progressed their roles increased, particularly in counter-battery. Survey regiments remained at one per corps and were not part of an AGRA.
Some army field regiments became semi-permanently attached to independent armoured and tank brigades. There were quite a lot of these. For example at El Alamein there were 3 armoured divisions, each established with a single armoured brigade. However, there were actually 8 tank and armoured brigades present. These independent tank and armoured brigades were assigned to infantry divisions as necessary, although sometimes they reinforced armoured divisions. In either case they often had to be provided with artillery.
Regiments that were not in corps or divisional artilleries or AGRAs were under theatre command and allocated to 'Under Command' of other formations as required. Some of these regiments were War Office Reserve or WO Pool. Reserve regiments were for emergencies and could not be allocated without WO authority, pool regiments were allocated as required by the theatre HQ but could revert to WO authority.
By early 1945 in NW Europe 21st Army Group (6 corps) had 7 British and 2 Canadian AGRAs. The largest AGRA was 1st Canadian in Italy that reached 10 regiments (mostly British), but most were about 6 regiments, while the smallest was a super-heavy AGRA with 2 regiments. Although AGRAs were formed in India, there were never any in Burma and only one in the final months of the North African campaign (1st AGRA, in action with 19 French Corps in January 1943). Some army field regiments were converted to medium and heavy regiments as guns became available, and HAA regiments in the ground role were also allocated to AGRAs as the air threat decreased.
The divisional artillery comprised field regiments. Three regiments in infantry divisions and eventually 2 (one self-propelled) in armoured divisions. However, forward infantry divisions in an advance were usually allocated a total of four field and two medium regiments, totalling 128 guns. The additional regiments usually came from AGRAs. In NW Europe heavy and HAA batteries were also routinely allocated to divisions for counter-mortar tasks.
The 1939 War Establishments were found to lack manpower and in May 1940 revisions were approved but never implemented. In October 1940 field regiments were reorganised into three batteries each with eight guns (two troops) and their survey sections re-formed. This change did not happen instantly everywhere and the new organisation for a battery was not finalised until well into 1941, although the proposed organisation and procedures were promulgated in January 1941. Minor changes continued throughout the war. The changeover took two forms, some regiments changed to 2 batteries of 8 guns while others changed to 3 batteries each with a single gun troop of 6 guns. The reorganisation to regiments of 24 guns was not completed until well into 1943 because it took some time to produce all the required NCOs and specialists, particularly for regiments overseas. At El Alamein in late 1942 10 of the 39 field regiments still had only 2 batteries. The new organisation increased the number of vehicles and signallers. In 1943 establishments were standardised army wide so that similar numbers and ranks were authorised for similar tasks.
By the end of 1943 a towed field battery's war establishment strength was 198 including 10 officers and an SP battery's was 186, again with 10 officers. Medium batteries (4.5/5.5-inch) were bigger, 252 (still 10 officers), because their gun detachments were larger. Heavy batteries were only 166 with 6 officers. These large batteries enabled sustained 24 hour operations. It also proved a boon in Burma for local defence against ground attack.
An RA regiment comprised several elements from the establishment perspective. By 1943 these were the regiment itself, mostly RA cap badge, but included attached cooks (from the new Army Catering Corps by this time), a medical officer, and tradesmen from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). Then there was the signal section from Royal Signals, with its own officer and finally the Light Aid Detachment (LAD) from REME, about 13 strong. The RA soldiers were divided into Tradesmen and Non-Tradesmen. The former included driver-operators (signallers), driver-mechanics, gun fitters, vehicle- mechanics, equipment repairers, clerks, store men and the 'Battery Surveyors' in the regimental survey section. By number the main non-tradesmen were gun numbers, drivers IC and signallers. The final element in the regiment was the 'First Reinforcements' who replaced RA battle casualties. They included officers, NCOs and gunners, including tradesmen, and in a field regiment totalled 54 including 5 officers.
The regimental headquarters was some 88 strong including 9 officers; this figure includes the regiment’s LAD and signal section as well as the 10 strong survey section with its officer.
The 8 gun field battery included four defence teams equipped with an AAMG (LMG) and ATk rifle. However, initially only about 30% of the battery had personal weapons, although this changed to 100% in early 1943. The official scale was a pistol per officer, a machine carbine for Warrant Officers, drivers and motor cyclists, and members of LMG detachments. The rest carried rifles. In mid 1943 20-mm AA guns were approved for all arms, with mountings capable of firing on the move and issued to towed artillery regiments, and PIATs started replacing ATk rifles. However, the extent to which 20-mm AA guns were issued is unclear. The totals for a field regiment were 25 × LMGs, 13 × PIATs and 8 × 20-mm.
A 1941 25-pdr field battery had 12 motorcycles and 38 other vehicles of which five were for cable laying. By 1944 the number of motor-cycles had decreased to 7 and 4 jeeps ('Car, 5-cwt, 4 × 4' in British terminology) had appeared, to total 46 vehicles and motor-cycles.
In August 1941 the first Air OP (AOP) Squadron formed, these had light aircraft (Austers) with artillery officers as observer-pilots, eventually there was a squadron per corps (except in Burma), normally providing a flight of four aircraft to each forward division and AGRA. These squadrons first flew operationally in Tunisia. Each aircraft ('section') with its RA pilot and mixed RA/RAF ground crew could deploy independently. The engagement of targets found by other RAF aircraft, the Arty/R procedure, and a subject of extensive planning and preparation in the years before the war, continued. AOPs could engage targets on clear moonlight nights and developed an air photo capability and also directed naval gunfire. In the SW Pacific Australia did not create an AOP organisation and relied entirely on 'army cooperation' aircraft of the RAAF. Canada (initially), New Zealand and South Africa did not create AOPs either and their formations were supported by British squadrons.
Just as, if not, more significant in 1941, was a ‘bottom up’ tactical innovation that emerged in the surrounded town of Tobruk on the Libyan coast between Australian infantry and British artillery – close affiliation between a battalion and its supporting battery. This relationship spread rapidly throughout the British and like-minded armies. It was the critical element for a harmonious and trusting relationship between artillery and the supported arm, and the forward presence of the battery's senior officers was probably its key. With it came guaranteed fire support because the observers could order targets to their battery. However, it did raise a problem in that the supported arm tended to view the battery as ‘theirs’, often failing to recognise that artillery fought at both the tactical and operational level, and the implications of ‘In Support’ and mobile firepower.
The main problem was four companies in a battalion but only two observers in a battery, so the latter often had to move between companies in battle. This could be a problem, particularly in Burma, where it was found that a battery had to deploy up to five observation parties. This was usually achieved by rotating gun-end officers and soldiers through the additional observation parties.
Close affiliations developed between brigades and their supporting regiments. The regimental commander (CO) increasingly accompanied the supported brigade commander wherever he went and by late 1943 this became official artillery policy, with the CO establishing a small HQ at brigade HQ (a policy first established in 1918). In regiments without a directly supporting role to, or under command of, a brigade the CO was based at regimental main HQ in the area of his battery gun positions. BCs mirrored this with the battalions and regiments they supported.
As the war wore on the field role of anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries increased because their specific targets decreased. The former often provided a significant component of major fire plans and HAA batteries (3.7-inch guns) were increasingly used against opportunity targets. The main reason that HAA were not used more extensively in the field role was that they were not officially authorised to have the necessary technical fire control equipment until late 1944.
Organisation and Equipment - Observers
From after the Fall of France each troop commander (and BC (Battery Commander)) had an OP assistant, usually a bombardier although the BC's might be a lance sergeant. By 1942 each party had three radios, one fully integrated in their vehicle, one FOO (Forward Observation Officer) man pack and one on the supported infantry or armour net. The last improved situational awareness and enabled the supported arm to indicate targets to a FOO/OPO. If the observer was unable to see the target then the supported arm directed fire via the observer using simplified procedures (giving either corrections or observations). A third observer party could be deployed from resources at the gun position if the battery was up strength. If a troop commander was required to act as an FOO or liaise with the supported arm then the OP assistant would takeover, inevitably this also happened when observers became casualties. In Burma additional observer parties were created often led by warrant officers or sergeants from the battery and it was general practice to rotate officers and soldiers through the battery's OPs when conditions were static, although signallers were rotated more often. In some cases in Burma OP deployment was planned regimentally to ensure optimum coverage in difficult terrain.
The observation officer's duties (whether operating as an OPO or FOO) were:
Observe and report the tactical situation.
Maintain close contact with the supported arm and give required support at the earliest moment.
Direct and control the fire of the allotted guns.
In most types of regiment BCs and troop commanders had an armoured tracked vehicle; the Universal Carrier (Lloyd or Windsor carrier) called an 'Armoured OP' in field batteries. COs in field regiments were equipped with Universal Carriers from mid 1943. However, these Armoured OPs were less than ideal so other armoured vehicles were adopted.
OP tanks were first introduced in 1942, by early 1943 batteries in armoured divisions had 2 OP tanks and one armoured OP, in infantry divisions it was the other way around. Army field regiments had no OP tanks but each tank 'battalion' in tank brigades held 2 tanks for OPs. Other types of vehicle were also adopted including light tanks, armoured cars and M14 half-tracks ('Truck, 15-cwt, half-track' in British terms). In early 1944 the official position was as follows:
SP regiments:- CO - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, BCs - Truck, 15-cwt, half-track with 2 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, GPOs - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (total 13 OP tanks).
Field or RHA Regiments:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets (INF Div), Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Armd OP 2 wireless sets (INF Div). A BCs Lt Tk OP could be a Tank OP as an alternative and in Italy one of the Armd OPs would be an armd car.
Medium regiments:- BCs - Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Armd OP 1 wireless set or Armd Car 1 wireless set.
Heavy regiment:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets or Armd Car, Subaltern - Armd OP 2 wireless sets.
In mid 1944 the policy changed again with the decision to remove all heavy AFVs from infantry divisions. SP regiments retained their 13 OP tanks and the other field regiment in an armoured division had 6 for its OPs. They were withdrawn from all other units although Armoured and Tank Brigades held 8 OP tanks.
The basic policy was that OP tanks should be the same type as used by the supported tank unit. However, the policy could not always be followed and in some cases Ram tanks were used (a Canadian design used as the carriage for Sexton SPs but not as a tank in armoured units). Radios were standardised as 2 × No 19 sets and 1 × No 38 set per OP tank and stowage modified for some artillery equipment. In some cases (eg Covenanter, Crusader and Ram) a dummy gun was fitted to permit space for the wirelesses. Apart from dummy guns, the differences between OP tanks and standard control tanks was an additional wireless and stowage for other OP equipment.
The tanks held by Armoured and Tank Brigade HQs were a pool for use by regiments in support (or allocated under command) of these formations. They had RAC crews who were joined by an OP officer and his OPA, unlike the tanks held by RA regiments that were fully crewed by RA (usually the OPO, his OPA, a driver-operator and a driver-mechanic). Armoured divisions also held an OP tank for their CRA. The tanks for GPOs also provided immediate replacements for OPs.
The observers’ basic equipment was binoculars, map, compass and protractor. Man pack OPs became important in some theatres, this was achieved by reinforcing the normal 4 man OP party with 6 'porters' to help carry the 2 wirelesses and associated equipment.
Batteries also held telescopes, tripod mounted stereoscopic binoculars, optical range finders, directors and artillery boards for their OPs, the last 3 to enable 'silent' or 'instrumental' registration. However, such equipment was not always conducive to a well concealed OP and certainly inappropriate for an FOO. The Telescope, Stereoscopic, was tripod mounted (full size or 16 inch) with azimuth and inclination scales and gave ×8 magnification, it was binocular and the binocular tubes could be either vertical to provide a short periscope or horizontal to give enhanced stereoscopic vision.
As can be seen the way that Artillery is perform by JTCS at the moment where every Manoeuvre unit can direct fire on to a target conforms well with the way British Artillery was setup near the end of the war; except that they should only be able to call on their Divisions assets, However for early war years most Infantry Divisions had very limited communication with their Artillery and relied on the BC's and FOO's attached to their unit HQs.
Les.
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RE: Artillery Spotting - 
Quite simply? 
And vice versa!
Quite the opposite! 
.
Pleasant thoughts! 
You da man! 
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