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Worst Military Alliance? - 5/10/2002 9:28:07 PM

AbsntMndedProf

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I would say the Axis Aliance was among, if not the, worst. Among the reasons:

1. When Germany attacked the USSR, Japan refused to make a coordinated invasion from the South East through China. Such a coordinated attack might have tied up the forces led by Marshal Zhukov which were moved West, allowing the Whermacht to roll over the Soviet forces there, and, perhaps, giving Germany and Japan the chance to defeat the Soviets.

2. Even though Germany followed through on its treaty obligation to declare war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declaration of war on Japan, Japan failed to do the same when Germany invaded the USSR.

3. Benito Mussolini kept writing strategic checks which his military was ill equipped to cash. This resulted in the Germans having to deploy forces to Greece and North Africa to pull Il Duce's chestnuts out of the fire, and widening the war and stretching Germany's forces to what would become the breaking point.

4. In spite of being 'allies', the Axis powers failed to coordinate their attacks and intel. (As far as I know from what I've read over the years.)

Eric Maietta

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- 5/10/2002 11:29:04 PM

Belisarius

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You're absolutely right, prof.

In my eyes the Axis "alliance" was more like an agreement of common interest - no efforts whatsoever were made to coordinate the war effort. I, too, believe that if Japan had moved their forces from Manchuria into Russia, it would have tied up large amounts of Soviet troops. When it became evident to Moscow that the Japanese Army wasn't preparing for such an operation, lots of divisions were transferred to the Moscow front, just in time for making the final push impossible for the Germans. (IIRC the Soviets had, what, 15 divisions in reserve east of Moscow?)

Mussolini had the same lack of realism as G�ring - promising alot without even bother to check if delivery was possible.

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Mussolini - 5/11/2002 4:13:51 PM

El_Peco

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About Mussolini, he said when Italy started war that the country had 8 million of bayonets.
Sure, it was a pity that he didn't realize that in second world war more that number of men was important the weapons technology & training!
Italians lacked both (almost in large part).

Regards.

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Re: Worst Military Alliance? - 5/12/2002 3:04:49 AM

RolandRahn_MatrixForum

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by AbsntMndedProf
[B]I would say the Axis Aliance was among, if not the, worst. Among the reasons:

1. When Germany attacked the USSR, Japan refused to make a coordinated invasion from the South East through China. Such a coordinated attack might have tied up the forces led by Marshal Zhukov which were moved West, allowing the Whermacht to roll over the Soviet forces there, and, perhaps, giving Germany and Japan the chance to defeat the Soviets.

2. Even though Germany followed through on its treaty obligation to declare war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declaration of war on Japan, Japan failed to do the same when Germany invaded the USSR.

3. Benito Mussolini kept writing strategic checks which his military was ill equipped to cash. This resulted in the Germans having to deploy forces to Greece and North Africa to pull Il Duce's chestnuts out of the fire, and widening the war and stretching Germany's forces to what would become the breaking point.

4. In spite of being 'allies', the Axis powers failed to coordinate their attacks and intel. (As far as I know from what I've read over the years.)

Eric Maietta [/B][/QUOTE]

I do not disagree that the Axis was one of the worst alliances. But I disagree with some of the details.

To points 1 and 2:
The Anti-Comnintern-Pact of 1936 was not a real military alliance.
Germany tried to forge a real alliance with Japan in early 1939, but Japan declined.
Then, in September 1940, the Tripatite Treaty was made between Germany, Italy and Japan.
Citation from Dunnigan/Nofi: The Pacific war encyclopedia, p.59:
"This was a defensive alliance. Japan was pledged to assist Germany and Italy if a third party became involved in their war with Britain, while Germany and Italy pledged to assist Japan if a third party intervened in their war wit China."

Japan was not informed about the German intentions to invade the Soviet Union.
After the Hitler/Stalin pact of 1939, Japan signed an non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1941 (in April *before* Barbarossa).
I don't think that Japan had to declare war on the USSR after the German invasion.
If the USSR would have attacked Germany, it would have been another matter.
I do also not think that Germany and Italy had to declare war on the US.
If Japan would only have invaded NEI (and not attacked any US target) and the US would have declared war on Japan, it might have been another matter.
But, as it was, the German and Italian DOWs against the United States were a very weird and senseless act of suicide that was done voluntary.

Point 3:
Agreed, but there was also a big portion of German stupidity involved in the North African campaign.
Helping the Italians to defend Tripopli was one thing.
Sending lots of motorized troops and, more important, lots of trucks (for logistics) badly needed for Barbarossa to waste them in offensives in North Africa was simply mad.

Point 4:
Agreed one hundred per cent.
Japan wasn't informed about the German intentions to invade the USSR.
They returned the favor on Dec 7, 1941, when Germany and Italy weren't informed about Pearl Harbor.
And, before this, Japan did not inform the Germans about their defeat at Nomonhan in 1939.
Wiht the Knowlege about Nomonhan it would have been obvious to the Germans that Japan wasn't keen on another round of fighting with the Soviets.

Kind regards,
Roland

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- 5/13/2002 5:49:34 PM

Brutto-Bob

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Ciao,

>Point 3:
>Agreed, but there was also a big portion of German stupidity >involved in the North African campaign.
>Helping the Italians to defend Tripopli was one thing.
>Sending lots of motorized troops and, more important, lots of >trucks (for logistics) badly needed for Barbarossa to waste them >in offensives in North Africa was simply mad.

I don't think that it was a silly move: the north african theatre was very important with strategical oil resources and the suez channel.

As a matter of fact Germany propose to Italy two motorized divisions to help the Egypt invasion in mid-1940, but Italy refuse the help.

When Graziani's army was defeat Italy was forced to accept german help and Rommel was dispatched only to defend Libya (Axis must keep a portion of north Africa to avoid Allied possibility od landings in Italy or South France).

The only wrong Germany move was the offensive against Russia without clearing British resistance in north Africa, Rommel was very close to this but Hitler don't send him the needed reinforcements.

And the Afrikakorps was not so big as you think, the most part of truks,infantry and armours in africa was italian.

Bye.

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- 5/13/2002 11:46:31 PM

RolandRahn_MatrixForum

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Hi,

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Brutto-Bob
[B]Ciao,

>Point 3:
>Agreed, but there was also a big portion of German stupidity >involved in the North African campaign.
>Helping the Italians to defend Tripopli was one thing.
>Sending lots of motorized troops and, more important, lots of >trucks (for logistics) badly needed for Barbarossa to waste them >in offensives in North Africa was simply mad.

I don't think that it was a silly move: the north african theatre was very important with strategical oil resources and the suez channel.

As a matter of fact Germany propose to Italy two motorized divisions to help the Egypt invasion in mid-1940, but Italy refuse the help.

When Graziani's army was defeat Italy was forced to accept german help and Rommel was dispatched only to defend Libya (Axis must keep a portion of north Africa to avoid Allied possibility od landings in Italy or South France).

The only wrong Germany move was the offensive against Russia without clearing British resistance in north Africa, Rommel was very close to this but Hitler don't send him the needed reinforcements.

And the Afrikakorps was not so big as you think, the most part of truks,infantry and armours in africa was italian.

Bye. [/B][/QUOTE]

I disagree.
The attack against the Soviet Union, as such, was a very stupid move.
Not attacking the USSR and fighting the UK with all available resources would have been wiser.
But, if there was to be an attack against the Soviet Union, June 1941 was the best date to do so.
The red Army was slowly recovering from the purges.
Since an attack later in 1941 would have left even fewer time until the outbreak of the autuum (with General mud making logistics in the USSR a nightmare), an attack would have to be delayed until 1942 - with a reorganised red Army, more modern soviet tanks e.t.c..
As a result, the Germans would very likely not have come so close to moscow in 1942 as they did in 1941.
The Afrika Korps was small, but it was completely motorized.
And it wasted much more trucks than a comparable force in the USSR would have used.
The German engines weren't build for the desert. Their attrition rate was increased due to the desert conditions.
And how much oil was in north africa in 1941? Most Libyan oil resources were, IIRC, discovered after WWII (but I could be wrong on this).
The Suez Channel wasn't that important. Closing the Suez channel would have been horrible for the allied forces ion the mediterran theater, but it would not have effected the British ability to continue the war.
And it was next to impossible.
The Axis had serious difficulties supplying their trrops at north Africa.
The deeper they advanced into Egypt, the more desperate became their situation.
An interesting and worth while reading on this is van Creveld's "Supplying War".
If there was a chance for Germany to win the war on the eastern front, it would have needed all available resources on that theater.
The decision to intervene in North Africa might have been necessary, but going into offensive in April 1941 was a luxury the Germany were unable to afford (at least in my opinion).

Kind regards,
Roland

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- 5/14/2002 11:24:13 AM

Marse Robert

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The Afrika Korps only contained 3 divisions, 2 panzer of around 80 tanks each and one motorized division. The Barbarrosa attack was made by around 180 divisions. A couple of panzer divisions and a motorized division weren't going to make much of a difference in the grand scheme of things on the eastern front. However, threatening the Suez, Egypt, and the Middle East with 3 German divisions and all the Italians seems even in hindsight to be a pretty good idea... Who knows what would have happened if the Brits were cut off from Egypt. The majority of lend-lease material to the Soviets ran through British controlled Iran and with a German presence in the Suez/Mid-East things might have been a bit different.

JBS

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- 5/14/2002 2:59:40 PM

Brutto-Bob

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by RolandRahn
[B]
...And how much oil was in north africa in 1941? Most Libyan oil resources were, IIRC, discovered after WWII (but I could be wrong on this).
[/B][/QUOTE]
You are right: oil was descovered after WWII, for Italy the Libyan colony was useful as a 'sand box'.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by RolandRahn
[B]
The Suez Channel wasn't that important. Closing the Suez channel would have been horrible for the allied forces ion the mediterran theater, but it would not have effected the British ability to continue the war.
[/B][/QUOTE]
In 1941 England used big forces from his empire, in North-Africa there are Indians, Australians, New Zealand, many armours were assembled by South African factories and so on.
England east colony are under Japanese threat, India in a forced loyalty, and many supplies to 8th army came from the mediterranean sea. What could be happen if the critical link between west England empire and the east one collapse?

[QUOTE]Originally posted by RolandRahn
[B]
And it was next to impossible.
The Axis had serious difficulties supplying their troops at north Africa.
[/B][/QUOTE]
The problems came when Germany move the luftwaffe from Sicily to the east front at the end of 1942 spring. So Malta returns to breath and sink italian transports.

Ciao.

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- 5/15/2002 2:11:42 AM

RolandRahn_MatrixForum

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Marse Robert
[B]The Afrika Korps only contained 3 divisions, 2 panzer of around 80 tanks each and one motorized division. The Barbarrosa attack was made by around 180 divisions. A couple of panzer divisions and a motorized division weren't going to make much of a difference in the grand scheme of things on the eastern front. However, threatening the Suez, Egypt, and the Middle East with 3 German divisions and all the Italians seems even in hindsight to be a pretty good idea... Who knows what would have happened if the Brits were cut off from Egypt. The majority of lend-lease material to the Soviets ran through British controlled Iran and with a German presence in the Suez/Mid-East things might have been a bit different.

JBS [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi!

I think that it is very eassy to underestimate the significancy of the resources Germany spend on the Africa corps.

You are correct, 3 Divisions doesn't sound like much.
If we look closer into the matter, the situation changes:
Most Divisions of the German Army were Infantry Divisions.
On June 22nd, 1941 there were 17 Panzer (Tank) on the eastern Front.
2 additional tank Divisions would have been a great help in a campaign that was a very close thing....

I think that the Afrika Corps, as such, was a significant distraction of resources (tank divisions) from the eastern front.
Rommels decision to go to the offensive in April 1941 was a further distraction of resources.
The trucks wasted in north Africa were bitterly needed in Russia - to motorize some Infantry divisions and for moving supplies.

And I have big difficulties seeing Germany and Italy reaching the Suez channel...
The axis lines of communication were overextended at El Alamain. I see no way how the Axis could have supported the force that fought at El Alamain during a possible advance into the nile delta.
They would have to capture Alexandria.
And then, how much troops could be supplied reaching the Suez channel?
And how much troops would the allies need to defeat the Axis force that reaches Port Said?
And, remember, the allied lines of communication would be much shorter in these battles than they were at El Alamain.

Kind regards,
Roland

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- 5/15/2002 2:24:30 AM

RolandRahn_MatrixForum

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Brutto-Bob
[B]
You are right: oil was descovered after WWII, for Italy the Libyan colony was useful as a 'sand box'.

In 1941 England used big forces from his empire, in North-Africa there are Indians, Australians, New Zealand, many armours were assembled by South African factories and so on.
England east colony are under Japanese threat, India in a forced loyalty, and many supplies to 8th army came from the mediterranean sea. What could be happen if the critical link between west England empire and the east one collapse?

The problems came when Germany move the luftwaffe from Sicily to the east front at the end of 1942 spring. So Malta returns to breath and sink italian transports.

Ciao. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi!

My main attention focuses on 1941.
If there was any chance for a victory on the eastern front, the performance of the Axis forces invading the USSR had to be increased in 1941.
And the best way to increase it (in 1941) would be to spend lesser resources in the north african theatre.

If the Suez Channel is threatened by the Axis, the Allies would have been forced to spend more resources to defend it.
And if the Suez channel would fall (something I have serious difficulties to imagine - see my previous post), that would be a disadvantage for the Allies.
But what would happen on the eastern front in that time, were the additional resources Germany would spend on the NA theatre would have to come from?

Kind regards,
Roland

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- 5/15/2002 2:26:50 AM

RolandRahn_MatrixForum

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Buy the way:

I enjoy discussing alternate history while waiting for UV :D

Once UV has arrived, I will admit that I am wrong and everyone else is right.... :D :D

Kind regards,
Roland

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- 5/15/2002 6:00:19 AM

Grumble

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"Amateurs study tactics; ;professionals study logistics"...
Regardless of who the famous dead guy who said this originally, it's nonetheless a truism. LOGISTICS, not necessarily tactical or operational brilliance was going to win in NA.
A OKH study commissioned in 1940, stated that a German mech/motor force would have to consist of at least 4 division equivalents, and the existing logistical structure could not handle the requirements these formations would need to conduct ops, let alone simple administrative movements.
The Italians, contrary to accepted wisdom, DID try to ensure that supplies were flowing into Libya. However, insufficient thought was given to exactly HOW any German/Italo force was going to sustain ops all the way from Tobruk to Alexandria. Finally, with Suez closed, the Brits would simply reroute around Africa-inconvenient but certainly not a war loser; not with the USA about to enter the fray (in all likelyhood mid-1942 even without a Pearl Harbor).

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- 5/15/2002 8:50:01 AM

Drex

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David Downing in his alternative history"the Moscow Option" has Rommel driving all the way to Palestine and the South Army Group driving toward Iraq to meet him. The capture of Iraq would have deprived Britain of her source of oil. Only the US could have supplied her across the Atlantic fighting Doernitz's subs all the way. The strategy was sound but when the US enters the war, the outlook changes.

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- 5/16/2002 12:30:00 AM

WhiteRook

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Any way you want to look at it - Germany was foolish to fight a two-front war! :)

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- 5/16/2002 2:01:29 AM

Belisarius

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Ofcourse :D

But, then again, there was no front at all in June '41. And since Germany wasn't informed of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, they wouldn't know that there'd be a western front backed by U.S. three years later. By then the Soviet Union was planned to be defeated anyway. Once the two fronts became a reality, it was too late to do anything about it, since the Three Leaders had agreed upon nothing but an unconditional surrender.

I'm such a wise-guy today. Somebody shoot me :p

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- 5/19/2002 3:41:06 AM

Fabs

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It is wrong to say that in 1941 there were no fronts. Although Britain had been badly beaten back on a number of fronts, it had not been vanquished.

Any enemy left standing is bound to make trouble at some point, which is exactly what the British eventually did, in spades.

However, the most important theater by far was always going to be the Eastern Front. Hitler's blunders on the Eastern Front in 1941, 1942 and 1943 would have eaten up the comparatively puny forces that he sent to North Africa instead. Their presence in Russia in 1941 would not have made a blind bit of difference to the final outcome.

Bear in mind that the Allied landings in Sicily prompted Hitler to suspend Citadel in Summer 1943. If the Italians would have been left to their own devices in North Africa, that would have happened earlier, knocking Italy out of the war sooner and anticipating the creation of the Second Front in North West Europe.

Italy would probably not have sent its 8th Army to fight in Russia either. I would also not underestimate the psychological effect of Rommel's victories in the Western Desert in establishing German invincibility in everyone's mind. In the sort of scrap that Hitler got Germany into, every bit helps.

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