Matrix Games Forums

 Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 2:31:01 AM   
Local Yokel


Posts: 1494
Joined: 2/4/2007
From: Somerset, U.K.
Status: offline 		For me the book was revelatory insofar as it debunked several myths that I, probably in common with most westerners, had been brought up to accept.

Foremost of these was the notion that the fatal US strike caught the Japanese carriers with their own strike groups spotted for launch. Apparently Fuchida's promotion of this version of events had long since been discredited amongst Japanese-speaking historians. Inevitably that begs the question of whether conventional wisdom in the West about other facets of the Great East Asian War is ripe for a re-examination in which greater attention is paid to what Asian sources have to say.

Another significant myth debunked is the notion that AL was some sort of adjunct to MI that was calculated to assist in luring US naval forces into an unfavourable position. Since AL was, in fact, the quid pro quo demanded by the Naval General Staff in return for acquiescence in Yamamoto's Midway operation, there is a case for saying that the dissipation of forces inherent in the Japanese plans was more the outcome of rivalries between feuding constituencies in the naval hierarchy than a product of victory disease.

The book also provides a healthy reminder that the balance of forces was not weighted heavily in favour of the Japanese, a belief that has been encouraged by those suffering from 'incredible victory disease'. It's salutory to remember not only that about 250 Japanese aircraft were opposed by about 350 US aircraft, but also that this inferiority was a self-inflicted handicap on the part of the Japanese.

I didn't find the book's style particularly pedantic or bombastic, but I have become increasingly uncomfortable with its analysis of defeat, not least because such analysis must inevitably tend towards reductionist conclusions about the folly of Japan opting for war in the first place - a trite assessment that does little to acknowledge the near-impossibility of what the Japanese were attempting: luring a fleet of inferior strength into an encounter in which it is likely to be crushed. I suspect that this game frequently provides a clear illustration of just how difficult that can be.

I'm also uncomfortable about the double standards on occasion exhibited by the authors. For example, I don't think they are entitled to pooh-pooh the Combined Fleet instruction that a reserve of aircraft armed for naval strike was to be maintained at all times whilst insisting that the Japanese CAP should have operated under equally rigid instructions to stick a range of pre-assigned altitude bands irrespective of the tactical exigencies that might arise.

So, a useful book but one flawed by an excess of analysis, perhaps at the expense of detailed factual reportage. Personally, I should have liked to see even more detail of equipment and operational doctrine, procedures and methods. This is also a criticism I would level at the other recent work, 'Midway Inquest' by Dallas Woodbury Isom. Isom took the trouble to interview a number of surviving Japanese aircrew and maintainer personnel. How I would love to be able to read transcripts of such interviews, since they constitute vital primary source material of greater long-term value than the interpretations placed upon them by historians who may have an agenda of their own to serve! Will such transcripts ever find their way into the public domain? I can but hope.

_____________________________




(in reply to Ellsid)
Post #: 31
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 9:48:35 AM   
rtrapasso


Posts: 22653
Joined: 9/3/2002
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs


quote:

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...


I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

i suppose it depends on what time zone you are observing from...

EDIT: Hiryu was in fact hit around 1700 local time on the 4th June... the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu were hit around 10:30 a.m., iirc. The actual time the ships SANK is in some dispute, iirc, but Hiryu and Akagi were scuttled on the 5th.

< Message edited by rtrapasso -- 3/6/2009 10:01:18 AM >

(in reply to witpqs)
Post #: 32
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 4:11:56 PM   
mlees


Posts: 2263
Joined: 9/20/2003
From: San Diego
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

So, a useful book but one flawed by an excess of analysis, perhaps at the expense of detailed factual reportage. Personally, I should have liked to see even more detail of equipment and operational doctrine, procedures and methods. This is also a criticism I would level at the other recent work, 'Midway Inquest' by Dallas Woodbury Isom. Isom took the trouble to interview a number of surviving Japanese aircrew and maintainer personnel. How I would love to be able to read transcripts of such interviews, since they constitute vital primary source material of greater long-term value than the interpretations placed upon them by historians who may have an agenda of their own to serve! Will such transcripts ever find their way into the public domain? I can but hope.


I think it was 'Midway Inquest' where the author discusses the rearming time of the torpedo carrying Kates, and says that Naguma had to have reordered the rearming by x time, or he would have had to wait hours longer (because of the returning Midway strike). Since he seemsed to have waited those extra couple hours, he must have not ordered the switch-er-oo in time. (Also, there was too few torpedo loading carts in the TOE of the carriers.)

(in reply to Local Yokel)
Post #: 33
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 5:39:14 PM   
Q-Ball


Posts: 7336
Joined: 6/25/2002
From: Chicago, Illinois
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: IndyShark

I LOVED Shattered Sword! It's a great book

Q-ball, please tell me more about Kaigun.


"Kaigun" is a complete pre-war history of the Japanese Navy, with a particular focus on how it's history formed it's doctrine, including decisions on weapons, ship construction, and attacking the United States.

It puts into an interesting perspective all the Japanese decisions that looked at through US eyes might seem short-sighted, but in reality were not. For example, sub doctrine. To paraphrase, some think the Japs were dumb to focus on warships and not merchant ships, when in fact this was entirely rational. Japan knew that the US was a 2-shore nation with railroads, so that Japan couldn't wage a war on commerce; the commerce could just go to a port on the Atlantic. In that context, focusing on warships is entirely reasonable. Now, Kaigun asks further questions, around a) why so many sub types and strategies, which hurt the IJN in practice and b) why, when they considered and rejected a war on commerce, they had a complete blind spot to how that strategy might be used on THEM.

Excellent book, a must-read.

_____________________________


(in reply to IndyShark)
Post #: 34
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 6:51:55 PM   
anarchyintheuk

 

Posts: 3921
Joined: 5/5/2004
From: Dallas
Status: offline 		Kaigun's explanation/rationale re the IJN's reluctance to use subs in commerce raiding never held water w/ me (assuming the author believed it). IMO it's entirely irrational to think that you can't use subs to interdict LoCs given the US has the capability to move it to a port on the other side. Whether the US has that capability is completely irrelevant, it's getting it to the endpoint that matters. They gave the Allies a free ride to that endpoint in the Pacific. Considering the amount of manpower and material the Allies had to use in the Atlantic, the IJN should have looked a little more closely at the matter. They should have realized that precisely because it was a two front war that Allied shipping would be the fundamental constraint on their ability to mount defensive/offensive operations. Short-sightedly, they were looking at a quick war. However, the point is moot considering what the IJN consigned its subs to.

(in reply to Q-Ball)
Post #: 35
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 9:26:35 PM   
bradfordkay

 

Posts: 8683
Joined: 3/24/2002
From: Olympia, WA
Status: offline 		The only thing that bothered me about Shattered Sword is the authors' insistence that they were debunking long-standing myths about Midway by proving that the Japanese strike was not on the deck being readied for launch, but was rather in the hangar being readied for a launch. In the long run, it doesn't matter whether they were on deck or in the hanger... the ordnance and fuel present still contributed heavily to the sinking of the ships. Indeed, being in the hangar may have made it all worse, since that internailzed many of the explosions.

Anyway, the allied strike arriving while the Japanese strike was being readied was the main cause of the cataclysm that struck the Japanese carriers - so the myth was not debunked, just proven to be slightly off...

As far as i am concerned, the myth they did debunk was the one that the land based strikes proved useless - the authors pointed out that the many piecemeal land based strikes were what prevented the Japanese carriers from getting their strike readied in time due to the constant need to defend against those LBA strikes.

< Message edited by bradfordkay -- 3/6/2009 9:29:59 PM >

_____________________________

fair winds,
Brad

(in reply to Ellsid)
Post #: 36
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 9:30:32 PM   
Tiornu

 

Posts: 1126
Joined: 4/1/2004
Status: offline 		The significance in correcting the mistake about planes on the flight deck is not so much about the location error but the foundation for the error, which is a lying source who has become a foundation in Western accounts of the battle. This is merely one of Fuchida's fables, though he has been regarded in the US as an unimpeachable reference.

(in reply to bradfordkay)
Post #: 37
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 10:40:43 PM   
Panther Bait


Posts: 654
Joined: 8/30/2006
Status: offline 		I would think a larger problem for the IJN waging a commerce war on the US with subs is that the West Coast is a loooong way from any realistic support base for the subs.  Kwajelein is even quite a distance away from Pearl Harbor.  So the embarkation ports were fairly safe.  The sea lanes are too vast to cover in the Pacific.  And even the destinations (other than the PI which they were planning to take early on) would be hard to patrol.  The various islands in the SLoC are fairly dispersed can all be approached from any compass direction for the final leg, so it takes a lot of subs to cover each one, unless you're willing to sit right on top of the island which is probably more dangerous than it appears in WitP.  Thinking about it that way, it almost makes sense to use your subs more tactically where you can concentrate for effect. 

_____________________________

When you shoot at a destroyer and miss, it's like hit'in a wildcat in the ass with a banjo.

Nathan Dogan, USS Gurnard

(in reply to Tiornu)
Post #: 38
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 10:48:29 PM   
paullus99


Posts: 1985
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline 		The myth was that the Japanese were only minutes away from launching a decisive strike against the American carriers & it was only the appearance of the Enterprise & Yorktown dive bombers at 10:20 that prevented the Japanese from winning.

In actuality, the Japanese were still perhaps an hour or more away from launching any sort of strike - they lost the battle as soon as the American carrier aircraft were in the air - at that point, nothing the Japanese could have done (as they did historically) would have changed the outcome.

_____________________________

Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...

(in reply to Panther Bait)
Post #: 39
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/6/2009 10:58:59 PM   
timtom


Posts: 2358
Joined: 1/29/2003
From: Aarhus, Denmark
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

The only thing that bothered me about Shattered Sword is the authors' insistence that they were debunking long-standing myths about Midway by proving that the Japanese strike was not on the deck being readied for launch, but was rather in the hangar being readied for a launch. In the long run, it doesn't matter whether they were on deck or in the hanger... the ordnance and fuel present still contributed heavily to the sinking of the ships. Indeed, being in the hangar may have made it all worse, since that internailzed many of the explosions.



The point is that, unlike what Fuchida would want us to believe, with the aircraft below the Japanese were nowhere near launching a counterattack on the US carriers.

...beat me to it

< Message edited by timtom -- 3/6/2009 10:59:53 PM >

_____________________________

Where's the Any key?


(in reply to bradfordkay)
Post #: 40
RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed - 3/7/2009 12:11:15 AM   
Joe D.


Posts: 4004
Joined: 8/31/2005
From: Stratford, Connecticut
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay
The only thing that bothered me about Shattered Sword is the authors' insistence that they were debunking long-standing myths about Midway by proving that the Japanese strike was not on the deck being readied for launch, but was rather in the hangar being readied for a launch. In the long run, it doesn't matter whether they were on deck or in the hanger... the ordnance and fuel present still contributed heavily to the sinking of the ships. Indeed, being in the hangar may have made it all worse, since that internailzed many of the explosions ...


In fact, Sword claimed exactly that; IJN CVs incorporated the design disadvantages of both Brit and US carrier configurations; enclosed hangers w/unarmoured flight decks, respectively (pp 245-8).

quote:

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay
As far as i am concerned, the myth they did debunk was the one that the land based strikes proved useless - the authors pointed out that the many piecemeal land based strikes were what prevented the Japanese carriers from getting their strike readied in time due to the constant need to defend against those LBA strikes.


Sword said these LBA attacks robbed Nagumo of time like a man bleeding to death.

_____________________________

Stratford, Connecticut, U.S.A.

"The Angel of Okinawa"

Home of the Chance-Vought Corsair, F4U
The best fighter-bomber of World War II

(in reply to bradfordkay)
Post #: 41
Page:   <<   < prev  1 [2]
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> RE: Shattered Sword book reviewed Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

1.250