Anthropoid
Posts: 3107
Joined: 2/22/2005 From: Secret Underground Lair Status: offline
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I really find this whole topic very fascinating: how many soldiers per geographic area, or per enemy solider, or civilian in an area you are invading "does it take" to win. As I said previously, one of the realizations that this game with its brilliant LOS and range and cover simulation affords is that 'more is not necessarily better.' In fact, I first encountered this concept in TOAWIII which uses the more traditional hex-chit style, but represents the cost of excessive density by simply increasing the vulnerbility of units in a hex to enemy fire the more you stack in there. I have to admit I was a bit skeptical of that until playing this game, but now it TOTALLY makes sense: all else being equal (range, cover, accuracy, number of enemies, formation) if you increase your density of troops in a given area, you will increase their vulnerability of fire so that even frontal fire becomes more like enfilading fire! So I got to looking this morning and found this pretty neat analysis of troop densities vis a vis the question of "was there 'not enough' troops deployed in Iraq to begin with?" He looks at five different successful U.S./Ango conflicts over the last 100 years: Phillipines, Post-War Germany, British Malayan counter-Communist, Post-War Japan, and Bosnia/Kosovo. With respect to PH he says quote:
As can be seen from table 2, US soldiers were spread thin throughout the archipelago, averaging slightly more than one soldier for every two square miles of territory, and 1 soldier for a little over 100 Filipino But notes that the overall density in the archipelago was highly heterogeneous quote:
northern Luzon area, where the troop density averaged more than 1.5 soldiers per two square miles and about 10 soldiers per 1000 residents. Not enough time to pour over this in detail, but thought you guys might like it. In conclusion on PH he says quote:
While operating with minimal indigenous support over a period of less than three years, American forces subdued insurrection in the Philippines by employing an area troop density of 0.59 soldiers per square mile throughout the archipelago and a population troop density of 9.8 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants. In the sections of Luzon where insurgent activity was most intense, US forces were more concentrated, and the troop density ratio for the area equated to 0.83 soldiers per square mile and a population to troop density ratio of 12.5 soldiers per 1000 Northern Luzon inhabitants. For post war Germany he doesn't really mention geographic density in his conclusion (and not enough time to scour it for that info) quote:
Initial occupation planning estimates for one year following the German surrender projected a force of 21.28 soldiers per 1000 German inhabitants. The large army-type occupation plan was never fully implemented due to the adoption and implementation of the smaller, police-type occupation plan. At its maximum, the total force size of the police-type occupation was projected to be 203,000, or a ratio of 10.68 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants, roughly half the size of the army-type occupation. At the heart of the police-type occupation was the US Constabulary, whose projected strength of 38,000 was based on a rough estimate of 1 soldier-policeman per 450 German residents, a ratio that would deploy 2.2 troopers per 1000 residents. For post-war Japan . . . quote:
When considering the population of Japan, the occupation there was the largest ever executed by the military forces of the United States and the largest such operation analyzed in this work. However, despite the large Japanese population, the troop density was proportionally the lowest of any of the operations examined. For British counter-Communist insurgency operations in Malaya quote:
The British operated in Malaya with extensive indigenous support and executed counterinsurgency operations for 12 years, defeating the communist insurgency while granting Malaya independence. The period from 1952-54 was the most decisive for British operations in Malaya. It was at this time that a unified, systematic approach to counterinsurgency operations broke the back of the insurgency. For military forces, at the maximum, the British employed an area troop density of 0.59 soldiers per square mile throughout the country and a population troop density of 6.18 soldiers for every 1000 Malayan inhabitants (or 1 soldier per every 161.9 inhabitants). While the insurgency existed nationwide, most counterinsurgency operations were conducted in remote, underpopulated areas, and, over time, indigenous forces became available to provide local security for the populated areas. And the Balkans he concludes quote:
Balkans Conclusion The two peacekeeping missions in the Balkans share certain characteristics. The concept of multinational place-keeper organizations where a unit has responsibility for a specific, geographical area of responsibility and through which a series of units rotate over time was developed in Bosnia and applied on a smaller scale in Kosovo. In both cases, indigenous support was practically nonexistent at the beginning of the mission, requiring the deployment of large forces in proportion to the population and area. In Bosnia NATO deployed a maximum area troop density of three soldiers per square mile, while in the more compact Kosovo, there were 10 soldiers per square mile. Clearly, however, the deployment size of the force was determined based primarily on demographics rather than geography. The force deployed to Bosnia at its maximum had a population troop density of 15 soldiers for every 1000 inhabitants (or 1 soldier for every 67 inhabitants). The ratio in Kosovo, with a population density almost two and a half times higher than that of Bosnia, was 21.13 soldiers per 1000 residents (or 48 residents per soldier). Table 6 displays the density statistics for the Balkans’ deployments.
< Message edited by Anthropoid -- 4/23/2009 2:02:30 PM >
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