Paul Vebber
Posts: 11430
Joined: 3/29/2000
From: Portsmouth RI
Status: offline
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Well this thread has frankly come to represent the antithesis of the whole reason I take the time to participate in these forums. The number of times a thing is posted tends to lend credence to it as people see it over and over again. A tactic used to good effect in our political system. Say something enough times and it must be true. Outlasting any opposition leaves you the last man standing and by implication "correct".
Everybody is certainly entitled to their opinions and we don't censor posts here to let people have their say. But the incredible range of lack of understanding now running the gamut from "why can't I mine everything I want to" to "nobody should be able to mine anything" leaves me scratching my head.
I had hoped to help folks understand some of the differences between Strategic and Operational level decision making in the context of the campaign and the case of mine warfare. That means that the complexity or ease with which a task can be accomplished does not put it within the span of command of operational decision makers because of manning, sustainment, and sometimes just plain "who your boss is". The imposition of doctrinal issues on a game is a tough call to make. Some games are structured to require "Hitler idiocy" rules. Players often hate them. Others LOVE them. Players have taken US armament planners to task for "how come Sherman's have such a lousy gun - how could anyone be so stupid". Yet we still managed to win...
A transition in mine warfare occured, at least for the US during the course of the campaign, but one that was not fully implemented until after the campaign was over. Many high ranking officers vehemenly opposed the use of mines at all. The road to minings success at the end of the war was an arduous one and I had hoped to provide some insight in to why and the strategic and operational limitations that the campaign was conducted under. That has utterly failed...
Each major mining operation took up to several weeks to plan, something that the game gives the nod to the players and occurs "in the background" this advantage of mining missions being automatcially planned and ready to go instantly to me more than compensates for the lack of Mcpherson as a single mine support ship. A player who really wants to include her effect can triple the mine capacity of 4 DM's and them keep them together in a task force. That is pretty much the role she played - an extra mine magazine for a single minelaying task force.
The mine depot at Guadalcanal was not operational until Nov 43, when the game is basically over. That construction was driven not by how long it took to actually build the site, but by the strategc process of convincing senior officers of the valid logistical concerns Mike Peck raises (Though his assessment that mines should have been completely left out of the game seems even more extreme than the calls for "operational flexibility"). The bottom line is that assuming that the operational commanders ability to build mine depots is SOLELY a function of the ability of the Seabees to contruct Quonset huts and dig bunkers ignores the doctrinal baggage mine warfare had, and in that regard is a fundamentally flawed argument in the overal context of the campaign.
Its the same reason today we essentially have ZERO mining capability except for shallow water (<200ft) and our MCM capability is eroding almost daily. The Navy now as then, lacks strategic direction for mine warfare efforts, beyond the hopes for a few "band -aid" systems and new technology that is constantly being zeroed out of teh funding line. Yet we have many "Mobile Mine Assemply Groups" that deploy anywhere in the world on short notice, giving a paper capability that looks impressive, despite the fact they little in the way of mines to actually assembly... No matter how much an operational commander can wish for it, these limitations CAN NOT BE OVERCOME by any number of MOMAGS or SEABEE construction TODAY let alone back in WWII.
One can keep claiming that it was, but that is wrong plain and simple. If people who know better can't tell people who mistate facts in no uncertain terms they are wrong then I guess there is no point in developers engaging the public on these forums, as there is no basis with which to defend any design decision other than "the designer by definition is right becasue its his game".
Any other response can be shot down by anyone with enough time on their hands to keep saying the game is wrong.
The line a game designer draws when it comes to what doctrinal and strategic decision making issues they deal with probably cause more arguments than any other decision, because every player has their own take on what "they would have done if they were king". Yet Patton, an operational commander if ever there was one, often couldn't even pick the roads he got to use...something any gamer would throw there hands up in disgust at if forced on him by "arbitrary" rules.
So I guess the bottom line is that this point represents one of those philosophical arguments beyond the "jist" of whether mine assemble depots should be "mobile" or not. To what extent game developers should be "taken to task" for their game design decisions. So far in UV there are two "design decisions" that the tema has been taken to task for, the changes to the mining rules and the way surface combats are initiated (being checked for at the end of each of the two movement phases, night and day).
I have tried in vain apparently to explain the rational and justification for teh mining rules (which whether you care to believe it or not STILL offers the player far more "operational flexibility" than their histroical counterparts had, but to me, the design team and playtesters, being "within the errors bars" of fidelity the game is founded upon - I can understand where Mike Peck is coming form in his "bar mines" response, though to me its extreme).
Folks can disagree with that, can argue why, and can post to your hearts content in hopes of "being the last man standing" and the implication of correctness that brings. I think everyone has been more than patient with the way the repeated arguments have circled round and round.
But the bottom line is that both of the issues (mine warfare and surface combat initiation) are still on the table for WITP, the exact disposition of which being up to Gary, and may be addressed (or may not be - again not my call) in future UV patches.
The arguments are made, the trial is over and now the jury (Gary) will deliberate...
I too apologize that this has dragged on as it has, but as long as I'm an admin on this forum, I'll not hesitate to raise the BS flag on statements I feel need to be responded to and I'll do it in no uncertain terms. You can take what I say with whatever grain of salt you wish, but to let statements go unchallenged when they need to be is a disservice to the forum and those that come here to understand how to play the games, thier historical background and why they are designed the way they are.
I won't close tehe thread, but as this has gone far beyond MIW in the game to a phisophical argument on game design and how doctrine should be represented in game design, a new topic related to that should be started by anyone wishing to continue that discussion. I'm done mutilating the poor horse...
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