Chickenboy
Posts: 24520
Joined: 6/29/2002 From: San Antonio, TX Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: SqzMyLemon What is the biggest strategic threat to the Empire? I believe that is, and remains, the Burma and China theatres. The Allies are posed to breakout in Burma, and if they establish a direct supply route to China, everything I've accomplished there will be undone. The Allied landings in the Gilberts and Solomons are worrisome, but they do not constitute a collapse of the Empire if lost. Well, yes. I guess. But you've already indicated that-in your opinion-you've already committed 'too many troops' to Burma and China. So you're now going to reinforce your surfeit of strength in these two theatres? I'm puzzled. quote:
I'm therefore contemplating something rather...unconventional. Considering I lack the strength to defend the outer rim of the Empire, and I will not be able to adequately garrison my Pacific MLR until substantial reinforcements are available near the end of 1943, I'm proposing I don't defend anything with more than the smaller LCU's I have available, freeing up the larger LCU's for redeployment. I see this as a high risk, modest reward tradeoff. If Bart gets wind that you've established your CentPac MLR with a thin crust of SNLF troops, you can bet that will accelerate his plans for conquest. Will you have a ready mobile reserve to respond to his expedited timetable? quote:
The effective combat strength I currently have in the Pacific is spread thin and amounts to five divisions and one infantry brigade. The remainder of the units are Naval Guard, SNLF and Garrison units. These units can only delay an Allied advance at best and need to be deployed with larger LCU's to be effective. There are just too many options for the Allies, and they can always choose to bypass any stronghold deemed too tough a nut to crack. I do not have the strength anywhere to stop an Allied lodgement of their choosing. Yes, this is as true in your game as it was IRL. Had the Japanese not eviscerated themselves with ineffectual defense of Guadalcanal (from extensive distance) and defended in depth, it would have been a more difficult road for the Allies. True-the Allies can choose different places to land and build. But until they reduce potential Japanese resistance through attrition, they stand a good chance at being messily repulsed. Do you think the Allies can successfully go from Lunga to Ontong Java now? No? When could they do so? Maybe 4-6 months? OK. Then what? Up to the Admiralties? Another 4-6 months? Now we're in 1944 and they're still way too far South from their long-term objectives. Sticking an IJA ID, some CDs and other nasty surprises on key Pacific islands is *the* thing to do with your PPs in 1943, IMO. Delay, delay, delay in the SoPac. Bleed 'em as much as you can while you build up your true pacific MLR. You have sufficient strength in place in Burma and China to hold the line for now. You must build your strength in critical Pacific bastions. quote:
I therefore propose to withdraw the five divisions and infantry brigade for duty in Burma or China in order to perform either of two operations. If committed to China, they will mount an offensive north of Hanoi with the aim of capturing Kunming and Tsuyung to effectively close the Burma Road, then moving on Chungking. If you hold Rangoon or any point along the road to China, the Burma road is closed. If this is your goal, closure can be maintained inexpensively. 5 divisions put into the extreme SW of China as you're proposing may capture some cities in this quadrant of China. It will take many months to be in a position to threaten Chungking, however. Do you think some 2000 AV will be able to effectively reduce Chinese positions around Chungking in mid-1943? quote:
If committed to Burma, the plan is to delay the Allies from capturing Lashio and Bhamo until the current forces in China can defeat the Chinese themselves. Supply in China must be critical, and if I can rout the Chinese arrayed against me at Tuyun and Kweiyang, I can then block any attempt to link up with Commonwealth forces in Burma and continue to strangle the remaining Chinese. Either way, the goal is to knock China out of the war and allow a strategic redeployment of forces into the Pacific before my situation in Burma and China is permanently reversed. I believe another 3000 AV committed to either Burma or China will allow me to accomplish this. I figure I'll need to hold Lashio and Bhamo for at least the next 3-5 weeks. I don't know if you can accomplish this in Scenario 1, PDU off, early 1943 offensive. I'd yield to others' experience, but I think this may be too little, too late to effect a difference in China in your game. quote:
Combined Fleet and LBA will be tasked with slowing the Allied advance in the Pacific until June, when reinforcements begin arriving that can then flesh out my MLR and protect the DEI and the flow of fuel/oil to the Home Islands. I'll continue to fortify and expand bases awaiting garrisons. The Combined Fleet will never be stronger. Well...I'm not sure. I agree with your interest in confronting the Allied PacFlt in decisive battle. Provided, of course, that it goes to your advantage. Sooner would be better than later. Depending on your ship production schedule, you should reach peak carrier strength in mid-late 1943, assuming you've accelerated the Unryu class CVs. True, they're no match 1:1 for an Essex, but you'll have more than 9 carriers available to you in mid-year. I guess I see the SWPac and SoPac theatres as a way of attritting Allied strength for some time: kind of the same way the Allies viewed this theatre IRL. Make 'em take it back from you. Make 'em pay for every rotten little malarial airstrip that they get. It will be harder for you to make them pay 'premium' prices if you don't have sufficient LCUs and IJAAF involvement, but rely instead on IJN and IJNAF interdiction. This was a mistake borne IRL by the Japanese. quote:
As it stands right now, my defences can achieve nothing without the troops to man them. Agreed. Which is why you should give them the troops to man them. quote:
As long as I prevent the Allies from establishing a foothold in the DEI and Mariannas until June 43 With all due respect, if your opponent cracks your defenses and establishes a foothold in the Marianas in July 1943, you're toast. That would be a major setback for your defense of the SoPac. quote:
I think I could pull it off. If not, I'm that much better prepared for my next game and I at least tried to think outside the box and try something different. It may be too late, and not the brightest idea, but everything else will just lead to defeat as well. It's just a question of time. Can this buy me the time I need to mount a proper defence of the Pacific? OK. From a game perspective, I think this is a reasonable thing to attempt. I just don't think it's a realistic risk that would be accepted IRL. Keeping in mind how disaffected you have been with your opponent's play, I understand your interest in trying novel strategies that are very risky. It's just that I believe this risk would not be judicious IRL. Probably for good reason. quote:
Right now my divisions in the Pacific and the DEI are accomplishing nothing, and haven't been for the last 6 months. Nonsense! Their presence has set back the Allied timetable by at least 6 months in this theatre. quote:
Awaiting the turn from Bart, so I haven't done anything stupid...yet! I want to go down fighting, not simply wait to be overrun. OK. I get this. I'm more of a mid-war Japanese 'grinder', I guess. Your proposition is a high risk one. Have fun and do it for spice and flavor. I just question its strategic impact and wisdom, even if everything goes well.
< Message edited by Chickenboy -- 3/3/2012 4:48:45 PM >
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