Nemo121
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Joined: 2/6/2004
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Mental Schema - rules of thumb which cut down on the processing time a human requires to reach a decision. If food is brownish and smelly it is probably bad. Best to throw it away without wasting time and processing power on examining it carefully to be sure. Schema work well in situations where previous assumptions are valid. Once situations begin changing rapidly mental schema are simply good ways for old, inappropriate assumptions, to lead us astray. My contention is that the conventional wisdom of the forum, combined with the lack of rigorous independent analysis leads to inappropriate orientation by opinion formers and a slavish adherence to the conventional wisdom which actually runs in the face of what unbiased analysis reveals.
Schema are invalidated by OODA loops and an opponent who clings to schema is more easily manoeuvred into errors by a quickening in the pace of OODA loops. Why? Well, because as has been said by some rather famous philosophers, " We see things not as they are but as we are or would like them to be". It takes pretty good self-control and self-awareness to realise that just because you want something doesn't mean that's the way it will be. I point anyone who disbelieves that statement to the current pre-CAP FlAK discussion ( and various other discussions ) in which several individuals seem to be incapable of understanding that merely because something doesn't conform to their desires/bias/pre-conceptions is no proof that that thing is in error. Why is this? Simple, they insist on seeing what they wish to see and not what is truly there. They are failing to orient properly. However since they see what they want anyone arguing against them isn't arguing facts but is arguing for them to not only accept a fact BUT also to accept that the world doesn't work the way they want it to work. That's an argument of beliefs and feelings and is why those individuals are so shrill and unwilling to brook compromise. They are not concerned, in the final analysis, with being correct but are more concerned with being "right" and justifying their current reality filters.
Marshalls Operation:
So this operation was designed to take away the strategic initiative etc from the Japanese, get Mike reacting to me and get him into a situation where he reacts increasingly inappropriate but it was also designed to destroy a significant portion of the IJN forces committed both to ensure it could be done and as part of a strategy to draw down the IJN.
The outcome has been almost complete strategic success with all enemy bases targetted taken except for Eniwetok and the sinking of 4 IJN CAs, 4 IJN BBs and a whole gaggle ( about 15 or 16 DDs ). I am taking this as verification of the practicability of the next phase of the strategic plan to write down the IJN throughout 1942 - said writing down to occur in the DEI and nearby environs.
Assumptions for the next phase:
1. At present the RN and USN combined are at least as strong as the IJN - Given that the IJN is down by 4 BBs, 4 CAs and about 20 DDs by this stage in the war I believe that to be a reasonable assumption, especially since any paucity in CAs on the Allied side can be compensated for by the Allied superiority in BBs ( I can mass about 12 BBs at present in the Pacific ).
2. I am assuming 1:1 parity in terms of quality. So, an RN BB = a USN BB = an IJN BB etc. I'm fudging a little by saying that since IJN BBs are actually worth a bit more than a USN BB but I am assuming cross-compensation where the excess USN BBs overmatch a the smaller number of IJN BBs and some of the IJN CAs I don't have CA numbers to match up with RN and USN CAs.
3. My land-based air in Sumatra and the DEI in general should be able to fend off his land-based air easily and withstand KB for a couple of days. If the planning is right a few days is all I'll need once the metal starts clashing and rending. Even if I'm a little wrong with that observant readers will remember the multiple operations I conducted in the waters of the DEI in late December and early January with SC TFs operating within strike range of KB for days at a time using avoidant routing and weather to get away without being struck. Those operations were designed to be effective but also to act as testbeds for my ability to sustain SC TFs in the presence of enemy aerial superiority should the need arise.
4. He has to invade Sumatra and is unlikely to come ashore at Palembang as that's rather heavily defended ( 1300 AV, Level 5 forts and swamps - which should equate to about 3500 adjusted AV ). He should arrive at either Benkoenen or Oosthaven and that's what my planning will favour. Obviously I'll have a plan in place should he opt for Palembang instead.
5. Allied replacement rates for naval vessels are much greater than the replacement rates the IJN can manage through 1942/43 and, indeed, so much greater than if both navies were completely annihilated in mid-42 it would serve the Allied cause much better than the IJN cause... Why? Simple, when a force is annihilated in combat or rendered ineffective through an advance in technology both opponents start afresh with neither side having a numerical advantage, irrespective of whatever numerical advantage before the battle/tech advance. For a very interesting exploration of the effects of this I'd suggest people read about the introduction of the HMS Dreadnought and how the British had to balance its introduction making the rest of their fleet obsolete and giving the Germans a level playing field with the ability to have first adopter benefits through being the first to introduce it and rebuild their numerical superiority in the Dreadnought class. Anyone interested in the rather fascinating story behind the economic, political and military considerations inherent in such a step change would do well to read Massie's excellent "Dreadnought".
Ok, so what's the overall concept:
The basic idea is that a 1:1 exchange of forces when both forces are numerically/ACP equal in early to mid-42 will, by virtue of the greater Allied naval replacement rates, result in an ever-increasing dyscorrelation of forces favourable to the Allies.
E.g. If both sides lose 80% of their combat power by the end of 1942 but the Allies get reinforce by 40% and the IJN by 10% the IJN will end up with 30% of their starting strength while the Allies end up with 60%. That correlates into a 4:1 advantage under Lanchester Laws for the Allies at the beginning of 1943 ( I'm picking dates purely for illustrative purposes ).
The Lanchester Laws really don't take into account replacements usually but when you do you get some very interesting results where replacement rates can create changing correlations even if the loss rates and initial matchip are identical.
Interestingly when a force has superior replacement rates over its opponents it is actually in that force's interest to engage in even greater annihilation. Let us use the above example and assume that the Allies follow two different approaches, the first will be no contact, the second will be 100% annihilation
1. 0% loss in 1942. By the beginning of 1943 the Allies will get 40% reinforcements while the IJN will have 10%. So, in 1943 the force correlation will b 140% of pre-war force vs 110% of pre-war force for a force correlation of 1.96 : 1.21, far, far inferior to the 4:1 advantage which would accrue with 80% losses to both sides.
2. 100% losses to both sides in 1942. By the beginning of 1943 the Allies will have received 40% reinforcements while the IJN will have 10%. This will mean that the Allied fleets will be at 40% of pre-war levels while the IJN will be only at 10%. This will give a force correlation of 16:1, far far superior to the 4:1 advantage gained from 80% mutually annihilation.
Obviously wags will point out that it is possible the IJN would kill at better than a 1:1 ratio but I would point you to the underlying assumptions ( 1:1 exchange rate and equal forces as of today). I would also point you to the fact that 9 times out of 10 despite the fact that I might seem to take heavy losses in an operation my opponent takes more AND takes the strategic loss. So, assumptions and a bit of good play should, I think, take care of that point.
Basically the mathematics of the Lanchester Laws combined with replacement rates and equal skill levels mean that the Allied strategy of running away in 1942 merely results in much, much more difficult naval combat in 1943.
Further implications of the 1.96 : 1.21 ( 1.6 to 1 ) correlation of forces if no combat occurs vs the 16:1 correlation if 100% annihilation of pre-war fleets occurs in 1942 is that it is MUCH easier for the Japanese player to achieve a local superiority of forces which makes the Lanchester Laws work in their favour if strategically they are only outnumbered 1.6 : 1 ( I have, for example, carried out successful invasions with significant local superiority when strategically I've been overmassed by much more than 1.6 : 1 ) than if they are outnumbered 16 : 1 in ACP.
In essence the difference between a 1.6 : 1 ACP and a 16 : 1 ACP is that at 1.6 : 1 Allied operations in 1943 need to be very well covered with naval forces and cannot take full advantage of simultaneity, thus slowing down the advance while with a 16: 1 ACP the Allies should be able to cover multiple operations simultaneously safe in the knowledge that the IJN cannot achieve local superiority. Actually with a 16:1 ACP the Allies could run 4 simultaneous ops in the certainty that each op will be as escorted by a force as strong as the entire IJN. With a 1.6 : 1 ACP this would not be possible.
This speaks to the naval force correlation. The aerial force correlation is quite different and the most interesting strategic problem posed by Scenario 2 in AE is actually tieing the dyssynchronous strategies for aerial forces ( where the Allies should avoid confrontation until they have 65+ A2A Exp pilots and a steady and reliable stream of replacements --- something most AARers simply haven't done and thus they find themselves blaming the game when they can't go toe to toe with Japan. In reality the problem lies in their poor strategic appreciation and inability to re-orient when faced with clear evidence that their initial conclusions were incorrect. I won't name the most egregious examples of this as it seems people on this forum react very badly to any negative commentary, even if the commentary is factually correct. They are more concerned with being seen to be "right" than with being correct, a most regrettable situation.) and naval forces ( where mutual annihilation is very much in the Allies favour ).
Normal disclaimer: Mathematics are pretty and theoretical and I use the mathematics there to illustrate the example clearly. In the real world all of this stuff is inestimably messy, confused and inter-related and with even the worst force correlation a nice it of operational art and strategic deception can cnacel everything out. The above is theoretical and designed to be a relatively simple ( in fact deeply over-simplified ) explanation of the basic thinking underlying my desire for a mutually annihilatory battle around Sumatra --- something which flies in direct contravention of the conventional wisdom of the forum... which is, to put it simply, flawed and based on a rush to conformity and the acceptance of the perceived without ever conducting independent analysis.
It wouldn't be so bad if the opinion formers actually conducted the individual analysis themselves and could be relied upon to arrive at the appropriate conclusions but from what I've read of their posts they either:
a) haven't done the analysis and have just relied on their mental schema ( inappropriate ) or
b) have conducted the analysis but have not had the orientation necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.
In effect when AE came out they didn't observe or orient properly and thus their decisions and in-game actions are inappropriate. Since most of the forum doesn't engage in significant levels of independent analysis or if it does engage in independent analysis doesn't do so in any rigorous, reliable and unbiased manner most of the forum has then adopted these inappropriate views. Essentially their mental schema, which serve them well in the real world where situations are largely unchanging have failed them now in AE because the crowd's opinion formers have failed to orient appropriately.
P.s. I trust that the clear implication of dyssynchronous naval and aerial strategic stances is clear and thus the apposite and converse aerial approach is clearly seen to be necessary. As such the initial Allied strategy promulgated in most AARs actually plays directly into Japan's hands. One reason I so enjoy the Aussies vs Amis AAR is that they've pretty much taken a sub-optimal approach to the naval war but optimal approach to the air war ( based on the assumptions outlined above ) but have, through good play and some outfoxing of their opponents, created a major win out of it. I believe the underlying lesson from Aussies vs Amis is that, as Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as three is to one". A partially wrong strategy applied consistently, aided by a few enemy mistakes and with the right logistical backing will tend to succceed once the enemy's nerve breaks - as we are seeing in that AAR.
< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 5/1/2010 2:28:45 AM >
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So what's going on ? - 
) will it be possible to show the underpinning of the next phase of my strategy. Simply put my strategy will be the antithesis of what Montgomery had to adopt because of National Policy Issues in the United Kingdom relying on the Lanchester Laws and Operational Art to achieve synchronous loss numbers which, by their very nature will be dyssynchronous loss rates for the Allied Navies vs IJN and will, combined with dyssynchronous and unfavourable relative replacement rates for the IJN result in increasingly favourable Lanchester Correlations along and at any point in the front ( and that's the key since low-grade attritional losses may yield a favourable Lanchester correlate along the front but don't prevent enemy concentration of force overmassing friendly forces at a particular point ) which should yield significantly increased opportunities for simultaneous or phased operations in motion at a tempo which helps the enemy experience "paralysis by over-analysis" and a gradually worsening Boyd cycle in which the decision to intervene and oppose an operation will be as unfavourable as the decision to not intervene. 
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