Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

I didnt accidentally change

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

....Note the 2nd sentance is different.. Anyway my argument isnt about the 300 or 587 but merely that the IJN had its own AO which it converted from Merchant and was not part of the 49 - You subtracted this amount .

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

Mr. Robert Hackett is a military historian and researcher. Retired from the United States Air Force and later from the aerospace industry, he resides in the United States.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

Combined fleet is a respected site where many of the book writers publish articles. I dont count ratings very much because inaccurate books which are a good read get nice ratings.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: bklooste
While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldn't lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo.

I think if you check the wording closely you will find that the US Oil Embargo required the Japanese to withdraw from FRENCH INDO-CHINA, not China itself.

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But FDR did not want to cut off oil. As he told his Cabinet on July 18, an embargo meant war, for that would force oil-starved Japan to seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. But a State Department lawyer named Dean Acheson drew up the sanctions in such a way as to block any Japanese purchases of U.S. oil. By the time FDR found out, in September, he could not back down.

Tokyo was now split between a War Party and a Peace Party, with the latter in power. Prime Minister Konoye called in Ambassador Joseph Grew and secretly offered to meet FDR in Juneau or anywhere in the Pacific. According to Grew, Konoye was willing to give up Indochina and China, except a buffer region in the north to protect her from Stalin, in return for the U.S. brokering a peace with China and opening up the oil pipeline. Konoye told Grew that Emperor Hirohito knew of his initiative and was ready to give the order for Japan's retreat.

Fearful of a "second Munich," America spurned the offer. Konoye fell from power and was replaced by Hideki Tojo. Still, war was not inevitable. U.S. diplomats prepared to offer Japan a "modus vivendi." If Japan withdrew from southern Indochina, the United States would partially lift the oil embargo. But Chiang Kai-shek became "hysterical," and his American adviser, one Owen Lattimore, intervened to abort the proposal.

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In April, 1941, a triumphant Matsuoka returned to Japan, convinced that he had played the role of world statesman. But Prime Minister Konoe had a surprise for Matsuoka. Through Japan's ambassador to the United States, Kichisaburo Nomura, Konoe had in hand what he believed to be a promising peace proposal from the United States. The proposal included American recognition of Manchukuo, the merging of Chiang's government with the Japan-backed government of Wang, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and mutual respect for its independence, and even an agreement that Japanese immigration to the US shall proceed "on the basis of equality with other nationals and free from discrimination". A meeting for negotiation between Roosevelt and Konoe was proposed for Honolulu, to commence as early as May.

There was only one problem with the document. Each side believed that it represented the starting position of the other side, but in reality, it had been drawn up by two American Maryknoll priests and two mid-level Japanese officials. The Japanese Ambassador to the US Nomura Kichisaburo knew this, but managed to give each government the idea that the other had already agreed to the draft as the basis for negotiation. Konoe was elated by this development, and began to line up support for the idea of a summit conference in Hawaii. But Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Roosevelt had no intention of bargaining from this draft. Throughout the next six months, Konoe continued to hope that somehow he would convince Roosevelt to meet with him and settle differences—without having to give up Japanese hegemony in East Asia. He never succeeded.
... After the Embargo

Konoe made one more desperate attempt to avert war. He proposed a personal summit with Roosevelt–in the United States if necessary–to come to some understanding. Konoe secured backing from the Navy and the Emperor for this move. The Army reluctantly agreed, provided that Konoe adhere to the consensus foreign policy, and be prepared to go to war if his initiative failed. Konoe secretly confided to a friend that he intended to grant further concessions to the US, including withdrawal from China, using direct authority from the Emperor. His friend cautioned that he would be assassinated upon his return. Konoe agreed that this was likely, but felt that it was worth the personal risk.

Roosevelt and Hull played along, even though they felt that negotiations were probably a waste of time. They also doubted that Konoe could make an agreement that was both acceptable to the US and to the militarists at home. Time was what they wanted most. Time to build more airplanes and ships; time to manufacture munitions and train new soldiers; time to rush more supplies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt told Ambassador Nomura that he would like to see more details of Konoe's proposal, and he suggested that Juneau, Alaska, might be a good spot for a meeting.

On September 5, Konoe met the Emperor with chiefs of staff Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano. Alarmed, Emperor Showa asked what happened to the negotiations with Roosevelt. Konoe replied that, of course, negotiations were primary, and the military option was only a fall-back position if negotiations failed. The Emperor then questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with the Occident. After Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him, remembering that the Army had predicted that the invasion of China would be completed in only three months.[4]

The next day the policy about the preparation for war against "United States, England and Holland" was formally proposed at the Imperial Conference. Hara Yoshimichi, the Privy Council President, observed that the plan seemed to put military action ahead of diplomacy. Standing in for the Emperor, he asked if that was the case. The Navy Minister made a reply along the lines that Konoe had stated in his private conference. Then there was silence. No other figure, including Konoe, attempted to answer the question.

The Emperor then stunned the gathering by speaking out. He stated that Hara's question was an important one, and that it was "regrettable" that none of the senior leaders had addressed it. He then read a verse that had been composed by the Emperor Meiji:

Throughout the world
Everywhere we are all brothers
Why then do the winds and waves rage so turbulently?
He stated that he had often reflected on this verse, which represented the Emperor Meiji's desire for peace, a desire that he shared. Stung by this unexpected rebuke, Navy Chief of Staff Nagano rose to defend the policy, assuring the Emperor that this consensus document was not a decision to go to war and that priority would be given to negotiations.

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I will assume that it was merely poor attribution, all evidence to the contrary.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

....Note the 2nd sentance is different.. Anyway my argument isnt about the 300 or 587 but merely that the IJN had its own AO which it converted from Merchant and was not part of the 49 - You subtracted this amount .

did no such thing.

I cited a book where this claim was made. One reviewed by the author of your source quite favourably ... oh, and, btw, the author of your source actually provided the illustrations for said book. I think we can take it as read, given his favourable review of it and his active participation in aspects of its production that he thinks highly of it.

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"Although Japan had well over 300ktons of tanker capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Navy required 270,000 tons of that [having ceased to build AOs in the 1920s], leaving only about 30000 tons for nonoperational purposes ...

... Early in the Pacific War it became clear that ... Japan would have inadequate Tanker resources to transport the oil resources that were the chief object of its strategic ambitions in 1940-41 ..." -- Kaigun, pg. #405

In any case, the material I cited did not subtract the AO tonnage from the TK tonnage ... show where it says that anywhere in what I cited or in Kaigun as a whole ... it seems to have cited overall AO/TK tonnage less coastal tankers ... the sort of tankers useless for operational support of the IJN/IJA outside of the Home Islands and equally useless for transporting oil from the DEI to the Home Islands.

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So Combined Fleet is wonderful when you claim it supports your statements and piss poor awful when it doesn't.

Double standards?


Phil

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ORIGINAL: bklooste
1.No it said Japan had 30K tons available for non operational purposes..and seems a blanket unqualified statement. The economy couldnt live on that
2. Also the coastal tankers Japan uses many are around 6K which is not that small.
3. Is this speculation on the authors intent or is this written and quotable ? . This may be corrrect and for the first few weeks of the war Japan needed long range shipping ( due to the long reaching operations like PH and Ceylon) but not before Dec 1941 and not after mid 42.

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ORIGINAL: JWE

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ORIGINAL: bklooste
1.No it said Japan had 30K tons available for non operational purposes..and seems a blanket unqualified statement. The economy couldnt live on that
2. Also the coastal tankers Japan uses many are around 6K which is not that small.
3. Is this speculation on the authors intent or is this written and quotable ? . This may be corrrect and for the first few weeks of the war Japan needed long range shipping ( due to the long reaching operations like PH and Ceylon) but not before Dec 1941 and not after mid 42.

It is all a matter of context. Japan constructed 22 tankers in the 10,000 gross ton range, and 6 tankers in the 8,000 gross ton range, between 1935 and 1939. 30k tons is only 3 or 4 ships, so there is a contextual nuance that is missing.

The IJN “designated” many commercial tankers as auxiliary oilers and provided deck fittings to permit them to function is this regard, as necessary. They were a “shadow grouping” if you will, that that functioned mainly for the commercial sector, but could be called upon for Naval service. The game’s PH replenishment group is a prime example of this.

The remaining ships (and tonnage) were mostly so-called coastal vessels. The term “coastal” is a word of convenience and means nothing as to routes and capabilities. These were in the range of 1,900 down to about 800 tons. These vessels were the primary carriers by Japan, Holland, Britain, and the US, for traffic throughout the China Sea area for decades before the war and provided much of the Japanese liquid lift from ’43 onward. Heal has a nice description of a 17 ship “coastal tanker” convoy (ranging from 820 to 1,460 tons) that made its way from Borneo, with stops in the PI and Taiwan, to its destination in Japan.

This is not speculation on the part of the authors. Peattie, Evans, Parillo, Heal, Nakamura do not speculate. But they do put their data in context. But it does take some background knowledge to make the context clear; they are scholars who write for those who have more than just a passing interest in the subject matter and who will be expected to understand certain contextual references.

Btw, and apropos of nothing at all, Dr. Mark Parillo has reviewed and vetted the Japanese merchant fleet (including the tankers) for the base AE scenarios.

And yes, according to every single scholar there is, Japan had substantial and sufficient liquid lift tonnage available.

Ciao. John