Matrix Games Forums

 Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

Careless A 10s

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Careless A 10s Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
Careless A 10s - 7/14/2002 12:57:29 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		During an exercise in Grayling, Michigan in 1982, 2 A 10s accidently fired 20mm near my OP. Holyyyyyyyyyyyy ****e!!!:eek:

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 31
Re: Careless A 10s - 7/14/2002 1:40:07 PM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
[B]During an exercise in Grayling, Michigan in 1982, 2 A 10s accidently fired 20mm near my OP. Holyyyyyyyyyyyy ****e!!!:eek: [/B][/QUOTE]


ouch.....talk about UNfriendly fire :eek:

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 32
- 7/14/2002 1:45:06 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		SOME GENERAL HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS

1) Airpower in general was critical to the campaign and was a key factor in the planning of vitually all operations. Airpower consisted of both land and sea components. Each had unique strengths and weaknesses. Both were important. Both had roles to play.

2) LBA level bomber units were generally raised and trained for the primary role of attacking stationary land targets. To change doctrine effectively would necessarily require the development of new tactics and then retraining to impliment those tactics. This would take time. Time spent being retrained should mean those air assets were unavailable for combat operations. IJN level bombers began the campaign period trained to support naval operations. The IJA had some capability. The USAAF had very little.

3) The objectives of many of the major WWII pacific operations was to take control of a location that contained or could contain a viable base for LBA (either for offensive/defensive operations or to deny the enemy the same capability). The importance of land bases to operations in the Pacific was two fold. They could be damaged but never destroyed(sunk) and they were vastly more effective in sustaining air operations (assuming supplyability) than CAG's remaining on station for long period's of time.

4) The presence of land based level bombers in an area would always be acknowledged as a threat by naval commanders in planning their operations. They were well aware that operating naval forces within range of level bombers would and could result in losses. It should not be taken as meaning that total annihilation was expected.

A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ON THE GAME

I purchased this game as I have a great interest in those simulations which cover operations in WWII where both sides are fairly well matched and both hold the initiative at one stage or another. I have read widely on WWII but I have not concentrated on any one area beyond getting a solid understanding of the operation then moving on to another.
I began playing the game with several expectations, the main one being that the game would reflect the historical strengths/weaknesses/weapons/doctrines/tactics of both sides and that victory would come from making best use of these. I think UV is a superb game but even against the AI, I find personally that, in several key areas, "historical" use of forces do not, in general, result in outcomes that have an "historical" feel to them.
This may be because I have drawn the wrong conclusions from my readings. In terms of the effectiveness of USAAF LBA level bombers, most general texts gave me the impression that that they were not the most effective way to engage naval and merchant vessels at sea in this theatre of operations at this time. The only exceptions were those where the pilots were trained and experienced in the use of specialised tactics (such as skip bombing) and often flying specific types of "level" bombers best suited to the role. On my understanding, their targets were normally slow moving merchant ships protected by a few 2nd Class escorts, neither of which types were equiped with the level of AA necessary to deter this style of attack (if there was such a level).
I have no major problems with the AI use of LBA level bombers as they tend to be used at a default altitude that result in shipping casualties that match my understanding of what historical losses would expect to be for a "normal" level bombing attack. My concern is with the way players can freely use regular level bombers at low or near sea level to deliver attacks that can devestate even the best protected CAG's. The concern comes from two areas. Firstly, it never happened historically and therefore it should be treated as conjecture not facts to shove down the throats of the uniformed. Secondly, there appear to be no real penalties for these types of attacks (ie need for specialist training and heavier casualties to larger aircraft). As to casualties, as these attacks never occurred, an educated guess is all it could be.
To avoid boring all the experts with an amateur's opinion, I will make a few final points in summary.
a) The best wargames allow you to try different approaches to the same problem to see if you can produce a different outcome. UV certainly gives you this ability. No one wants to refight the same battle over and over without the ability to be flexible. Correspondingly, that flexiblilty should always be based what was reasonable historically, otherwise you enter the realms of fantasy.
b) I would have thought that most people who purchase this game are wargamers who wish to play a game that allows them to refight the 42-43 campaign for the South Pacific and that the priority of the game designers would be to deliver a game that ACCURATELY models all the key elements of the campaign, including what could have been done with them (ie large scale use of LBA level bombers for low level attacks on shipping).
c) It is just possible that the game designers never intended for level bombers to have the impact in low level shipping attacks that they do. From visiting the forum, it would appear LBA is now the dominant factor in player vs player games. Some players agree with this and justify it by referring to specific actions. They are entitled to their opinion. All I can say is that it does not have the right feel to me. That is my opinion.
d) The final arbitor's are Matrix and 2x3. I may have missed threads here and there but the designers do seem to be silent on justifying/explaining why certain results are occurring in the game. I for one would be happy to be enlightened on the thinking behind low level LBA vs ships.
e) Half the fun of this forum is watching the debates unfold between obviously knowledgeable participants. As I stated previously, I am not an expert on any matters relating to WWII but, wrong or right, I did have expectations about how certain key elements would be handled in UV. I feel a large portion of the market for this game would come in with similar expectations (certainly the ones I know do). We pay our money and play the game. If we like it, we recommend it to others. If our opinions differ with the way the game handles a specific element, we can raise the question in this forum. Discussions occur with other players and in the end even the designers may enlighten us. If these discussions change my opinion, it just means I would enjoy the game more. If I dont, being told that I'm wrong, your right and thats it does not help. I've watched newbies like myself legitimately post their opinions and then be squashed by 'veterans' with an air of 'oh, not that stupid arguement again'. A word of caution to all the vets out there, be gentle with the virgins (can I say that here?). If they feel aggrieved enough, they may well give up on a game they do not feel is historical based, not recommend it others, reduce the market, make future releases less viable and leave all you vets sitting around talking about past glories.
Oops, I just fell off my soapbox.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 33
- 7/14/2002 5:16:39 PM   
Raverdave


Posts: 6520
Joined: 2/8/2002
From: Melb. Australia
Status: offline 		Hey Drongo

That is a big post for your first one...lots of pertinant points....good to see another "Mexican" here.

Welcome.

_____________________________




Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 34
- 7/14/2002 7:28:20 PM   
Sabre21


Posts: 8231
Joined: 4/27/2001
From: on a mountain in Idaho
Status: offline 		This has definitly got entertaining...maybe a bit off track...but entertaining none the less.

Dgaad...you sure have a one track mind. You make it sound as if everyone was a major proponent of air power..heheh...we all know better than that. At least one thing for certain, we can all agree to disagree:)

I will have to disagree that the purpose of taking Leyte was to secure airfields for future Philipine operations...although I will not discount the fact that airfields were built there after its capture. It was selected because that was one of the weak links of the Japanese defense in the Philipines that would allow us to gain a foothold. And as for Saipan..it was taken to place B29's there for the boming of Japan...not to support operations in the Philipines...that's what Pelilieu was originally for...although later it was determined an unnecessary fight. Going back to the Philipines...there were many ppl that didn't want to waste the effort on taking back the islands...but it was primarily a political choice and not tactical.

Now for Guadacanal...sure..the Japanese took it as a staging point for future operations to NC (not N Carolina:) and to disrupt the Aussie-US supply line. But the US choice to take it was to deny them that capability not to mention the psychological impact it would have had on the Allies, having the airfield was a side benefit.

You have to realize that there were many leaders that did not consider airpower the key factor for operations, especialy in the early part of the war and that the vast majority of the Japanese operations was economical in nature...securing their Co-Prosperity empire...air played a supporting role just as did the ground and naval forces in achieving this goal.

In reality...there were only a few operations on either side that the main objective was to secure a place for LBA. Saipan and some of the operations in China comes to mind (I am sure there are a few more examples). Guam was taken by the US as a political move while Tinian was taken to prevent operations from interfering with the effort on Saipan.

Good discussion though...the ball is in your court Dgaad:)

Andy

PS: Ron...I was on a night operation in Germany many years back when one of the Cobra's inadvertently put a burst of 20mm into the FARP. heheh...them poor boys down in the FARP had to have been doing some fancy footwork cuz nobody was hurt and nothin of significance was hit. We had about 30,000 gallons of JP4 there not to mention several hundred 2.75 rockets, 30-40k of 20mm, and 40-50 TOW missiles all spread out among a half dozen landing pads...how nothin got hit is beyond me.

PSS: Drongo...very good post..I agree..it's a game and I for one have got my money's worth in playing against the AI:) I can't say the same for many games I have purchased over the years.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 35
- 7/15/2002 1:28:24 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Sabre21
[B]This has definitly got entertaining...maybe a bit off track...but entertaining none the less.

Dgaad...you sure have a one track mind. You make it sound as if everyone was a major proponent of air power..heheh...we all know better than that. At least one thing for certain, we can all agree to disagree:)

[/QUOTE][/B]

Keeping up with responses on the threads is becoming a full time job. I have greater sympathy for Matrix moderators now. However, I post more than they do.

I am fully aware of the disagreement in naval circles on the efficacy of air power. Amazingly, this debate continues.

[QUOTE][B]


I will have to disagree that the purpose of taking Leyte was to secure airfields for future Philipine operations...although I will not discount the fact that airfields were built there after its capture. It was selected because that was one of the weak links of the Japanese defense in the Philipines that would allow us to gain a foothold. And as for Saipan..it was taken to place B29's there for the boming of Japan...not to support operations in the Philipines...that's what Pelilieu was originally for...although later it was determined an unnecessary fight. Going back to the Philipines...there were many ppl that didn't want to waste the effort on taking back the islands...but it was primarily a political choice and not tactical.

[/QUOTE][/B]

Need to be real clear on the basic premise : The capture, use or denial of land airbases was the dominant tactical consideration in all major operations in the Pacific War. Caveats : when we say "Pacific War" we are not talking, say, about China-Burma-India theaters. We are talking about the US-Japan struggle in the Central and South Pacific which lasted all the way to 1945.

The premise DOES NOT stand for the proposition that the ONLY goal of ALL operations was the capture, use, or denial of airbases. It was the "dominant tactical consideration". Big difference.

The Leyte campaign is a good example. The overarching goal of the Leyte campaign was to set the stage for Liberation of the Phillipenes, which would in turn contribute (in the opinion of MacArthur and others) to the defeat of Japan. Capturing Leytey would do an number of things. The most important thing it would do, tactically, is provide a staging and air base from which to launch the main invasion at Lingayen Gulf, and protect that effort, and support all other minor operations throughout the PI with air and other support.

Every phase and aspect of the Leyte operation prior to the landing was dominated by (although it was not the EXCLUSIVE concern) land airbase concerns. The most important initial tactical goal was to wipe out Japanese air capability which could interefere with the Leyte landings. This was accomplished by numerous carrier raids and some sorties from US long range LBA further south. Once this primary tactical goal was accomplished, all the other fell into place.

I should note that Phillipenes area army commander General Homma estimated that he had a total of 100 operational aircraft just around the time the Japanese began to figure that the next target of US operations was going to be the Philipenes. US carrier task forces at this time could put over 1000 aircraft into the air in a single operation. (The US had planned to build up to 500 Carrier Escort and Light Carriers if they had to. They didn't have to).

The destruction of Japanese LBA capability on Leyte and Luzon prior to the invasion of Leyte had a number of fallout effects, not the least of which was the utter destruction of most of the rest of the Japanese fleet in the naval battles which followed the Leyte invasion. Had the Japanese retained even a moderate LBA threat, these naval battles would have had different characters certainly, and different outcomes probably.

[QUOTE][B]


Now for Guadacanal...sure..the Japanese took it as a staging point for future operations to NC (not N Carolina:) and to disrupt the Aussie-US supply line. But the US choice to take it was to deny them that capability not to mention the psychological impact it would have had on the Allies, having the airfield was a side benefit.

[/QUOTE][/B]

As I said the premise is the capture use or *denial* of bases. Guadalcanal was *capture and use* for the Japanese, and *denial* for the Americans. After the Marines landed, the roles reversed.

[QUOTE][B]


You have to realize that there were many leaders that did not consider airpower the key factor for operations, especialy in the early part of the war and that the vast majority of the Japanese operations was economical in nature...securing their Co-Prosperity empire...air played a supporting role just as did the ground and naval forces in achieving this goal.


[/QUOTE][/B]

You are going higher up on the tactical / strategic chain. The goal of all operations in the Pacific War was to win. Winning is a political term. The dominant tactical consideration throughout the war was ownership and capabilities of airbases, these largely determined who would have the dominant military position.

[QUOTE][B]


In reality...there were only a few operations on either side that the main objective was to secure a place for LBA. Saipan and some of the operations in China comes to mind (I am sure there are a few more examples). Guam was taken by the US as a political move while Tinian was taken to prevent operations from interfering with the effort on Saipan.

Good discussion though...the ball is in your court Dgaad:)

Andy

PS: Ron...I was on a night operation in Germany many years back when one of the Cobra's inadvertently put a burst of 20mm into the FARP. heheh...them poor boys down in the FARP had to have been doing some fancy footwork cuz nobody was hurt and nothin of significance was hit. We had about 30,000 gallons of JP4 there not to mention several hundred 2.75 rockets, 30-40k of 20mm, and 40-50 TOW missiles all spread out among a half dozen landing pads...how nothin got hit is beyond me.

PSS: Drongo...very good post..I agree..it's a game and I for one have got my money's worth in playing against the AI:) I can't say the same for many games I have purchased over the years. [/B][/QUOTE]

Well, aside from my little field exercise, we also had a semi truck hit one of our tanks as it was crossing a hardball road. The semi truck was completely f***** up, driver dead, etc. The tank had a few sponson boxes bent, and would have continued the exercise except for things like stupid reports and investigations and such.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 36
- 7/15/2002 7:07:55 PM   
Sabre21


Posts: 8231
Joined: 4/27/2001
From: on a mountain in Idaho
Status: offline 		Hi again Dgaad

I'm not really arguing the fact that airfields played a crucial role in determing some if not many of the Pacific operations...the header of this thread "Capturing Land Airbases was the central strategy of the Pacific War" by itself is not true...and is what I first brought up. Further in your threads you indicate that it is the dominant tactical consideration...and not really central strategy as the title indicates. Also the general term Pacific war includes CBI until you further defined your threads.

Besides...taking an island or enemy stronghold whether it has an airfield or not is not a tactical decision...that is a strategic and operational one. Once given the mission to take an objective, the landing force must then decide how best to tactically achieve the mission.

Now as for it being the dominant TACTICAL consideration...or even an Operational/Strategic one..I would agree to this in many of the operations...but not all. Again...there were many operations that took place that had other motives...such as the Raider operations, or taking Ulithi for a naval base. Another operation to consider is the Bouganvile landings...going in at Empress Bay threw the Japs off...the DOMINANT tactical/operational consideration there was surprise...as was the Leyte landings. It goes without saying that airfields are going to be built to support further operations...but if this was the DOMINANT tactical consideration...they wouldn't have gone in at Empress Bay. So if you were to either drop dominant or add "some" to your "dominant tactical consideration" statement..I would agree. But it was not the case in ALL operations. I would even go as far as saying it was one of several dominating factors...tactical and operational surprise imo is and was far more important.

Andy

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 37
- 7/15/2002 7:21:48 PM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		If capturing islands and extending ones air cover was NOT the central strategic consideration during the Pacific War can someone explain to me what was cos I'm completely stumped.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 38
- 7/15/2002 8:00:22 PM   
Sabre21


Posts: 8231
Joined: 4/27/2001
From: on a mountain in Idaho
Status: offline 		Simple....win the war:) That is the central STRATEGIC consideration.

There are factors that play into the conduct of the war...strategic ones usually involve economic (taking and securing oil and raw materials), political (retaking the Philipines by US for instance), reducing the enemies capability to wage war (strategic bombing/unrestricted sub warfare), but the number 1 strategic would be to win.

Operational ones would include the specific island or base to attack or defend for whatever reason (airfields / ports / diversions / raids), operational surprise, size and composition of enemy forces, available friendly forces, time available to conduct the operation, the terrain over which it is to be fought (obviously taking Attu has different implications than taking PM), and of course the logistics needed to conduct the operation.

Then of course there are the tactical considerations...surprise, securing the objective, tactics to be used, this list can go on and on....and by no means did I list all the considerations in the other 2 levels.

Andy

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 39
- 7/15/2002 8:34:48 PM   
Didz


Posts: 728
Joined: 10/2/2001
From: UK
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Sabre21
[B]Simple....win the war:) That is the central STRATEGIC consideration.
Andy [/B][/QUOTE]

Oh! very Funny:D

However, I was hoping for something a little more specific.

_____________________________

Didz
Fortis balore et armis

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 40
- 7/15/2002 9:43:45 PM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		1. Japanese central strategy was to create a perimeter, dploy air and submarine assets supported by flying boat bases, to dtetcec and attrit the US fleet on its way to the "Big Battle" that the Japanese would win.

2. US stategy, from December 1941 to about November 1942 was to stop the Japanese advance and secure the LOC/LOS to Australia.

3. After November 1942, both sides realized things had changed.

US strategy became a mix of pushing them back and moving to isolate Japanese bases to defeat them in detail, and later, to isolate ones like Rabaul.

The Japanese strategy became one of huddle down and inflict as many casualties as possible to break the American will to fight, a "spiritual' war.

The US strategy, with the well needed support if its Allies, was a 'business' approach to warfare. The goal was to deploy in such a manner as to isolate Japanese bases to defat them AND to develop staging areas both for fleet logisitics and strike advances.

The need for bases was obvious, so it became the focus of the operations; to secure bases for ease of logistics and to gain air/naval superiority in a region to cover the next offensive, while the Japanese strategy became one of prevention and infliction.

The Americans had no interest in running shoestring operations. It took 7 months to secure Guadalcanal, an operation that was an even match and resulted in it taking too long to complete. That just would not do.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 41
- 7/15/2002 10:15:39 PM   
byron13


Posts: 1589
Joined: 7/27/2001
Status: offline 		I'm waiting for Ron to fetch more ammunition for the fight.

Ron? Hello . . .? Ron . . . .?

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 42
Great Discussion - 7/16/2002 12:22:42 AM   
IChristie

 

Posts: 673
Joined: 3/26/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada
Status: offline 		First of all, interesting thread. I've only skimmed the details so forgive me if I have missed some major points. Also, you'll have to excuse me for going right back to the start of the thread but I only picked it up this morning and it applies nicely to the game I was playing last night. Which I think fits nicely with Dgaad's three rules (which I endorse fully)

[Quote]
1. Overwhelming CAP
2. Overwhelming FLAK
3. Action to nullify or reduce LBA effectivness (air attack on airbases, naval bombardment attacks, ground attacks).
[/Quote]

The situation is US scenario 17. AI set to very hard. I also took a conservative approach and did not go after the IJN carriers early on. My strategy was to lure them into a confrontation with some LBA to try and wear them out somewhat before seeking an all out CV to CV battle - wasn't entirely successful (that's another story).

At any rate, in Mid August the AI has captured Lunga and has it up to level 2. I had retained Gili Gili early on with a little luck. It's up to size 5. I have also built a fighter strip at Rennell I. Because I have been conservative I have lots of LCU and lots of shipping. I have two objectives - occupy Dobadura so that I can build a bomber base in range of Rabaul. Try to retake Lunga before it gets any bigger.

I decided that a massive two pronged assault as follows
1. Convoy Aussie troops, engineers and supplies to Dobadura. These convoys to be protected by strong surface force to provide AA. And covered by LR CAP from Gili and Buna (also operating as a fighter base)

2. Invade Lunga. Invasion fleet covered by strong escort to provide AA and a bombardment force. US CV's (all 5 of them) to provide CAP as well as fighters from Rennell

The whole thing to be preceded by CV's attacking the base at Lunga and all B-25's, B-17's and Hudsons operating against Rabaul for a few days prior to the fleets coming in range.

Sounds just like what Dr. Dgaad ordered. Right.

I'll spare you the gory details, but the plan started to come off the rails when the IJN CV's put in an appearance (they had been conspicuous by their absence for several weeks). There ensued a large, entertaining, and largely indecisive carrier battle that left the IJN carriers licking their wounds and heading north, and the US with two CV's (Lex and big E) still operating a/c (although much reduced complements). Several of the aircraft from the other carriers ended up on Rennell.

On the other side of the map, the bombing offensive was delayed a little as Rabaul decided to have a go at putting Gili out of action. Fair enough, instead of bombing Rabaul into submission I move every available fighter to Gili and try to wear them down that way. Eventually I also move the bombers back in and start a series of daily 60 bomber raids on Rabaul.

The upshot of all that, is that the invasions are delayed for a few days while the "wrinkles" are dealt with. In the end I end up with
- A invasion fleet headed for Lunga protected by CA's and DD's with about a CAP of about 25 provided by CV's and Rennell I. After pounding Lunga for three days with carrier strikes and a naval bombardment
- A troop convoy headed for Dobadura protected by CA's and DD's with a CAP of about 40 provided by Gili and Buna. After the Rabaul bombers have been in action for over a week against my strong defenses at Gili and have had their runways smacked for a couple days running by 60 Medium and heavy bombers.

In short, I managed to go some distance to fulfilling all three of the aforementioned conditions. The results:
Actaully not bad, after one lucky day where Rabaul was grounded by weather :) the raids started. By and large the AI concentrated on the Lunga force. During the first day when the CAP was strong and Lunga was out of action, I think I only suffered a single DD torpedoed out of 5 strikes against the various forces.

On succeeding days things unravelled at little bit - fatigue due to LR CAP, other attrition, a surface combat group that decided to run for it and left the CAP umbrella (the usual stuff) and losses rose a little but I would say I averaged far less than 1 hit per air strike for five days running (the battle is actually still in progress).

Overall, I would say that it is proof of the positive side of the argument - that the LBA threat can be managed (using the approach recommended by Dgaad).

As to the negative argument - that LBA is too effective to begin with - I have much less to contribute there. I do not pretend to be an expert on the subject of how effective various tactics were or were not historically. I think it is valid to remember that the apparent ineffectiveness of LBA against shipping early in the war may have been due to tactical considerations other than just the effectiveness of the weapon (control of the air, availability of supply, flak, doctrine constraining attacks to certain altitudes etc).

It is also worth pointing out that we may (as war gamers) achieve ahistorical results simply because we have the benefit of hindsight and years of tactical analysis that commanders at the time did not. This is probably especially true for new tactics and weapons such as airpower vs shipping. Like it or not, we know what eventually worked and what didn't and we are more likely to adopt the eventually effective tactical approach from the beginning rather than by trial and error as the commanders of the time were forced to do. (For instance would commanders of the time committed their limited LBA resources FULLY to attacking any naval TF in range? Would they have implemented a doctrine of low level attacks irrespective of flak? etc.)

Perhaps the best argument in favour of this reasoning is that I tend to find that if I think and react along fairly historical lines, I tend to get fairly historical results. The game, does not, however force me to use these tactics and does not necessarily penalize me for not doing so. I

t is therefore possible to generate results which are "ahistorical" by trying "ahistorical" tactics. Does that mean the results are ahistorical? It could be argued (and will be) that it does. It also could be argued (and, no doubt, will be) that different tactics might have generated different results. I don't profess to be able to discriminate between the two...

I guess my bottom line is that the current system does generate results, which to my mind, are at least possible historically, if not probable. More than that, the game is a lot of fun to play.

_____________________________

Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"

- James Keelaghan

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 43
- 7/16/2002 1:56:36 AM   
byron13


Posts: 1589
Joined: 7/27/2001
Status: offline 		Good to hear from you, Iaian.

Seems the thread is starting to wander a bit, and I would like to try and refocus it. The issue was specifically, I believe, the effectiveness of B-17s at low altitude. I also believe that dgaad was continuing that discussion in the first post on this thread with his reference to "level bombers."

Those voicing concern over the effectiveness of the B-17 are concerned that it is either historically inaccurate to allow this and be as effective as it is or that there is some game imbalance (ineffective flak, etc.) that allows this to be more effective that it should be.

Mdiehl has argued that B-17s [I]were[/I] used as skip-bombers or low altitude bombers, and they were effective. The relative lack of cites to this tactic indicates that it was used infrequently. So the question related to historical accuracy in allowing B-17 skip/low altitude attacks would seem to be: If they were as effective as mdiehl claims, why weren't they used more often? American (and other) commanders did not lack ingenuity, and so I for one have to believe that, if it would have been effective, they would have used it more than they apparently did. This could be due to strategic or grand tactical decisions such as "I would rather use B-17s to bomb airfields," in which case a UV game player should be able to make a different decision and use B-17s as murderously effective skip bombers. And/or the infrequent use of B-17s for these types of attacks may have been due to some other historical restraining factor that simply isn't reflected in the various game algorithms, in which case some tweaking is in order. This could be, for example, that the B-17 just was not maneuverable enough to hit fast-moving war ships so that it was only effective against transports. It seems to me that more historical research is in order.

The other question is whether the historical countermeasures to a B-17 skip bombing attack and other factors are programmed properly. Most of the players questioning this tactic have focused on flak and CAP, with the emphasis on flak. The CAP issue has been partly addressed with respect to small Betty raids against PM with overwhelming CAP airborne. A large number of people are comfortable explaining it as being small raid/big sky. Personally, I have a problem with this explanation when it comes to huge (spottable from great distance), lumbering (lots of time to react), and green B-17s not being seen against a uniformly blue or gray sea, but . . . With respect to flak, the question is whether the game properly accounts for all factors, such as size of the target, in the equation and that maybe tweaking the game would make flak more effective specifically against B-17s, thus providing a (historically accurate?) disincentive from using B-17s in this role. Could Ploesti provide any guidance (acknowledging the vast differences)?

dgaad's theorem is a good one, but it should work with respect to all LBA and, for that matter, all aircraft. The problem believed to be present by at least some players is that, when the dgaad factors are not present, B-17s seem to get a much larger benefit than any other classes or types of aircraft. The other thread on B-17s showed AARs in which Dauntlesses, which were designed and the crews trained for the sole purpose of bombing ships, were relatively ineffective while B-17s, attacking the same target at the same time, wreaked havoc. These results may be anomolous, but they are the issue. It does not appear that dgaad's theorem supplies the complete answer to the riddle, since one would expect both Dauntlesses and B-17s to be either effective or ineffective depending on the dgaad factors present.

Have we expended all that we have on the issue?

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 44
Ammunition Expended on #3! - 7/16/2002 3:40:13 AM   
IChristie

 

Posts: 673
Joined: 3/26/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada
Status: offline 		Hmmm... I did some more reading and I would agree that a great deal of ammo has been expended. I suspect that the ammo lockers are pretty deep though...

Actually, if I take off my player hat and put on my physicist hat I would say that what we have here is a classic case of a discrepancy between the model and the experiment.

If I read Joel's posts correctly, Gary has created a very detailed model of air combat for WWII era technology which is based on a certain (probably large) number of variable parameters. Each base, ship, aircraft is created by assigning it values for the relevant parameters and then the model is run to determine an outcome. Problem is, when you set the parameters certain model configurations (Betty's vs. ships, B-17's vs. land installations, etc. you get good agreement with the experimental results (historical experience) However when you set the parameters for historical B-17's vs. ships and run the model you get results that "don't agree with experiment". So we then have the classic conundrum of trying to adjust a model which theory says is perfectly good to agree with a limited set of experimental data...

So, now everyone - RELOAD! - 1 round Fire For Effect!

_____________________________

Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"

- James Keelaghan

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 45
- 7/16/2002 3:51:02 AM   
Wilhammer

 

Posts: 449
Joined: 5/24/2002
From: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
Status: offline 		The air model sucks, because:

1. No Duck season. Really. Migratory birds must impede air operations at certain bases at some time in the year. In no way do I see UV modeling this.

2. No ability to launch medium bomber raids on one way trips from CVs. I mean, really. Doesn't anyone remember the Doolitle raid?

3. Lack of German ME-109s in the game. There are several cases when allied pilots reported ME-109s were engaged. I have yet to see any in the game.

4. I don't have a fourth item, so I am done, for now.

:)

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 46
- 7/16/2002 6:04:32 AM   
byron13


Posts: 1589
Joined: 7/27/2001
Status: offline 		Looks like the fix is in on the "How to Correct the Over Effectiveness of Low Level Bombing" thread, and it probably spells an end to this debate.

[QUOTE]are the three changes that I believe have been made to date in the next patch to be released.

1) Experience gain for pilots on transport missions has been greatly reduced.
2) Repair times for level bombers have been increased, especially for heavy bombers.
3) The Norden bombsight modifier for US aircraft has been limited below 6000 feet and totally taken away below 4000 feet (it had a minimum altitude that was not being accounted for which Mike just realized that Gary had not accounted for).

In addition, Gary is going to make a change that will reduce morale for level bomber units that have a large proportion of their planes damaged and are set for low level bombing (probably under 5000 feet). Along with the changes above, this should cut down on the ability to keep bombers flying low level missions day after day (as well as their effectiveness). xt patch to be released. [/QUOTE]

Of course, it still doesn't answer the question of how effective B-17s will should be on skip-bombing missions (or maybe it does, I don't know), but at least it probably fixes the problem players were having with the AI.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 47
- 7/16/2002 6:37:57 AM   
byron13


Posts: 1589
Joined: 7/27/2001
Status: offline 		. . . . And I agree with Wilhammer's post on the migrating flocks. In the Department of the Army's "Influence of Natural Occurrences on Military Operations" (from the famous Green Book collection), Robertson refers to several aerial attacks that were largely decimated by inadvertently colliding with migrating birds. One attack of 37 B-17s and 24 P-38s completely disappeared. The assumption was either that they got lost and crashed or that they were abducted by aliens ala Flight 19. Divers in Truk lagoon, however, found the flight at the bottom of the lagoon - almost still in formation - and have determined that massive bird strikes brought the entire flight down along with a number of interceptors.

Hillary, in his book "Destroyer Operations in the Pacific: January 1942- February 1942" recounts that the U.S.S. Smithsonjensen almost capsized when a flock of birds broadsided the ship in heavy fog.

Probably the funniest/saddest stories I can remember reading as a child was when a flight of B-24s released just over a heavy flock. The bombs detonated upon impacting the birds, which created a carpet of exploding bombs just below the bombers. Two of them sustained so much damage from the premature detonations that they crashed. Coincidentally, the two bombers were named Tweety-Bird and Bird Watcher (the latter being a double entendre with the nose art being a guy peering at a shapely lass through a spy glass).

Yes, fiction can be stranger than truth, and I think there should be some kind of random migratory bird flocks that move. I see it working kind of like the weather function.

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 48
- 7/17/2002 4:24:19 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by byron13
[B]. . . . And I agree with Wilhammer's post on the migrating flocks. In the Department of the Army's "Influence of Natural Occurrences on Military Operations" (from the famous Green Book collection), Robertson refers to several aerial attacks that were largely decimated by inadvertently colliding with migrating birds. One attack of 37 B-17s and 24 P-38s completely disappeared. The assumption was either that they got lost and crashed or that they were abducted by aliens ala Flight 19. Divers in Truk lagoon, however, found the flight at the bottom of the lagoon - almost still in formation - and have determined that massive bird strikes brought the entire flight down along with a number of interceptors.

Hillary, in his book "Destroyer Operations in the Pacific: January 1942- February 1942" recounts that the U.S.S. Smithsonjensen almost capsized when a flock of birds broadsided the ship in heavy fog.

Probably the funniest/saddest stories I can remember reading as a child was when a flight of B-24s released just over a heavy flock. The bombs detonated upon impacting the birds, which created a carpet of exploding bombs just below the bombers. Two of them sustained so much damage from the premature detonations that they crashed. Coincidentally, the two bombers were named Tweety-Bird and Bird Watcher (the latter being a double entendre with the nose art being a guy peering at a shapely lass through a spy glass).

Yes, fiction can be stranger than truth, and I think there should be some kind of random migratory bird flocks that move. I see it working kind of like the weather function. [/B][/QUOTE]

If you are serious, then you have my sympathy.

If you are not serious, then I laugh with you.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 49
- 7/17/2002 8:15:50 PM   
byron13


Posts: 1589
Joined: 7/27/2001
Status: offline 		We laugh together, then.

Satisfied with the B-17 fix?

(in reply to dgaad)
Post #: 50
Page:   <<   < prev  1 [2]
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Careless A 10s Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

6.578