Fletcher
Posts: 3386
Joined: 10/26/2006 From: Jerez, Spain, EU Status: offline
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FROM: VADM CHUICHI NAGUMO. 1ST AIR FLEET CINC. ABOARD HIJMS AKAGI. CARDIV1. SOUTH SEAS. TO: ADM. ISOROKU YAMAMOTO, COMBFLEET CINC. KURE. SUBJECT: SECRET ORDER #3 -COMBFLEET-. DATE: JUNE 4TH, 1942 1. GENERAL SITUATION OF THE ENEMY Because of develpments during the First Phase Operations, the enemy´s outpost which he had relied on to be his first line of defense, collapsed one after another until he began to feel direct threats even to such areas as Australia, India, Caledonian archipielago. The enemy was exerting every pressure to stem this tide by stepping up his submarine strength in the waters controlled by us and by increasing his air strengh in the Australia area. He employed these to carry on guerrilla type tactics. Task Forces thursts were also made in the Western and Southwestern Pacific. These seemed to indicate that the enemy was planning on more positive actions than heretofore. Subsequent to the beating he received in the Santa Cruz Island battle with the sinking of USS HORNET, the enemy was temporarily subdued, but by the middle of May -by the time the Fleet was about to sortie from Singapore- the enemy again began to show considerable life in all areas, parciularly in the Southern Seas (Santa Cruz) and Australia area. 2. SITUATION IN THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS Ndeni acts as a sentry for New Caledonian / Spiritu Santo Islands. The enemey was expediting the reinforcing of its defensive installations, its air base facilities and othern military installations as well as the personnel. Estimate of existing conditions there were as follows: - Air Strength: Fighters 3 Squadrons (P-39D, P-40E and P-40B) Army Bombers Unknown but our sub recon over Spiritu Santo/Efate reported about 50 Recco.Flying Boats Same as Army bombers with sub recon reporting about 60 The above estimated strenght could be doubled in an emergency, intel reported. b. Enemy can not maintained any CAP over Ndeni for days after his fighters squadrons could be under attrition by 25th AirFlotilla assets from Munda. c. Some surface vessels patrolled the area and some submarines were active to the North (Salomons and Bismarcks, with not less than 8 boats) d. Of the enemy´s carrier, HORNET was sunk in the Santa Cruz when the enemy landed at Ndeni-Vanikoro group island. Could get no reliable information as to the whereabouts of USS WASP. No carrier activities from the sinking of USS HORNET to now. e. About 4 - 5 fleet carriers must be active with CINCPAC. USS LEXINGTON was torpedoed two months ago and could be ready for service. She has not be sighted at any theatre. However, the enemy probably will not fight for a island into our LBA range. f. Shore Defense Installations on Ndeni: - A USMC Defense Battalion (2nd). - A USAAF Base Force (137th) - A Engineer Battallion (from USMC ?) - A Coastal AA Regiment (30th) Marines had also been landed and all in all, the island was very strongly defended (about 9.000 high quality ground forces). 3. MOBILE FORCE COMMANDER´S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION a. Althoug the enemy lacks the will to fight, it is likely that he will counter attack if we will try to launch a amphibious operations against them at Ndeni. b. The enemy conducts air reconnaissance mainly to Tulagi-Lunga Point. c. The enemy´s patrol radius is about 500 miles. d. The enemy is not aware of our plans (We were not discovered until today, June 4th, after our strikes push the enemy). No enemy submarine or recon naval search plane spotted us in our large transit from Singapore to Truk and in the sortie from Truk (under patrol from several USN boats)to our operational area. e. It is not believed that the enemy has any powerful unit, with carrier as its nucleus, in the vicinity. f. After attacking Ndeni by air and destroying the enemy´s shore based air strenght to facilitate our naval operations in the area, we would still be able to destroye any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack. g. The enemy´s attempt to counterattack with use of shore based aircraft could be neutralizer by our cover fighters and AA fire. FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION (inmediately prior to motivation of the operation) a. Organization of the Attack Units CARDIV1 around HIJMS KAGA, HIJMS AKAGI CARDIV2 around HIJMS HIRYU, HIJMS SORYU CARDIV3 around HIJMS SHOHO, HIJMS ZUIHO, HIJMS HOSHO CARDIV5 around HIJMS SHOKAKU, HIJMS ZUIKAKU BATRON1 around 4 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers CRUDIV6 around 4 Heavy Cruiser like Pickett surface force. DESFlotilla 1 like main escort force. SUBRON1 with more than 15 submarines around Santa Cruz - Espiritu Santo islands. HIGH COMMAND´S OPERATION ORDERS - Secret Combined Fleet OpOrd #3 Second Phase Operation Order. - Secret Combined Fleet OpOrd #4 Co-ordination of Movements of Various Forces involved in the SO (Sout Seas) and AL (Aleutians) Operations. PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION Upon their return to Singapore at early May after the raid over western Australian bases, the ships immediately underwent repair and maintenance operations. From the early May, carrier planes engaged in training at Singapore, take reemplacement aircrafts and receive new Reserve pilots from trained unit at Home. Float plane training was conducted at Georgetown (Pennang Naval submarine Base -SUBRON3). Although the flight training program was conducted without any major incident, since there had been a considerable turn-over in personnel, practically no one got beyond the point of based training. Inexperienced fliers barely got to the point where they could make daytime landings on carriers. It was found that even some of the seasoned fliers had lost some of their skill. No opportunity was available to carry out joint training. The likehoood of obtaining any satisfactory results from night attacks, therefore, was practically nil. DIRECTION OF OPERATION BY THE COMMANDER AND HIS MOVEMENTS. CarDiv 1 departed from Singapore 0600 May 14th. Maintaining strict anti-sub screen and a rigid radio silence, the force headed for Truk steaming at cruise and heading south-southwest to be refuelled at Balikpapan until reach Celebes and Eastern New Guinea. CarDiv 2 follow them May 15th, and CarDiv 5 departed from Singapore at May 16th with CarDiv3 coordinating his departure with Great SRA Convoy (2nd) to Home. Battleships steamed with CarDiv1 and CarDiv2 in their transit to Truk. All forces were assembled at Truk (4th Fleet district) at May 27th, 1942. HIJMS HIRYU needed some repairs and she was put under urgent repairs with AR tender in the Base. HIJMS SORYU take several reemplacement B5N2 lost in the Perth raid could not be taken at Singapore. CombFleet departed from Truk, at JUNE 1ST, 1942 like planned, with CarDiv1 leadering all forces, and my flag on HIJMS AKAGI. We steamed under heavy ASW meassures to avoid contact with enemy boats, reported in great numbers in the Salomons. DAY X (AIR STRIKE DAY 1) Vanikoro Striking Group take off from CARDIV5 carriers with 50 A6M2 escorting 60 B5N2 and 66 D3A1. 11 enemy P-40B were met on CAP. 3 A6M2 and 1 P-40B were downed in the dogfight. 11 casualties, 2 airbase, 7 airbase supply and 20 runway hits were reported in the first strike. CARDIV3 Striking Group take off from our carriers with 12 D3A1 and 12 B5N2 to attack two enemy destroyers spotted south Vanikoro. They were on ASW duties and were surprised by our strike. 2 bombs were reported on USS WHIPPLE. She was sighted on heavy fires. (2nd) Striking Group take off one hour later to strike aships off Vanikoro. 2 P-40B were met on CAP by our aircrafts (22 B5N2 escorted by 23 A6M2). 1 P-40B and 1 A6M2 were donwed. Our aircrafts reported: - AP GEORGE F. ELLIOT, 1 torpedo hit. (2 vehicles lost) (enemy ship was landing motor forces) - AVD BALLARD, 2 torpedo hits, SUNK. (3rd) Striking Group with 10 B5N2 escorted by 26 A6M2 attacked xAKL Kailua (landing supplies at Ndeni). 3 torpedo hits were reported and the ship sunk under heavy blows. 1 B5N2 was lost by Flak. CARDIV1 Strike Group with 22 D3A1 escorted by 41 a6M2 take off to strike naval forces south. One USN destroyed (identified like DD CUMMINGS) were reported hit two times by our bombs. AKAGI naval attack group take off to strike two enemy warships near Santa Maria (Espiritu Santo Islands). Two dutch destroyer were identified (PIET HEIN - BANCKET), but both of them get to avoid hits from our bombers. SORYU naval Atack Group (21 B5N2 escorted by 12 A6M2) take off to strike shippings off Vanikoro. A large AP (FULLER) was torpedoed (2 times) and sunk. One PB5Y was downed by our CAP (HIJMS ZUIHO fighter). Tomorrow we will be ready for any enemy counterstrike from LBA or Carrier based aircrafts. Long Live to the Emperor !! END//
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