wneumann
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The Big Picture #10 – The World as we know it six months (or so) after 12/08/41
Overview: In this post and others that follow it in this series, a review of the points covered in my initial estimates of the overall early-war situation vs what actually occurred in the course of events.
This game’s version of “alternate history” in review”:
The Japanese conquest of Malaya in AE pretty much went on its predicted schedule, though Pillager’s capture of Singapore on 1/24 (in AE) was quicker than occurred in our previous CHS match (2/01). Pillager appeared to have placed considerably greater emphasis on a Japanese conquest of Malaya in AE in our previous match in CHS, and did so to the point of dispatching numerous Japanese LCU’s into Malaya that the AE scenario we’re playing (Scenario #6) initially allocated to other theatres and operations – particularly Jap LCU’s allocated in AE Scenario #6 for invasion of the Philippines. At the end of the day… the 8 days Pillager gained at Singapore was more than lost in delays that occurred in other theatres (DEI and Philippines).
My overall strategy in Burma for AE turned out to be much the same as what happened in CHS, this being a token resistance at Rangoon and in southern Burma with a delaying action in interior areas of central and northern Burma.
Pillager’s Japanese advance into southern Burma was somewhat faster in AE (Moulmein captured 1/11, Rangoon by direct assault on 1/25) compared to CHS (Moulmein captured 1/15, Rangoon on 2/24 after being bypassed in mid-Feb). Factoring in the rest of Burma… Pillager’s timetable was also somewhat faster - Myitkyina captured 4/29 in AE rather than considerably later in CHS. So far, the end result for Burma is not significantly different between AE and CHS.
The biggest Japanese cost in AE from Pillager’s emphasis on Malaya and Singapore occurred in the Philippines – notably resulting in the fall of Bataan 2 1/2 months later on AE (on 6/09) compared to our CHS match (3/24). Added to this in AE is that virtually all islands in the central Philippines plus parts of Mindanao remain in US control at the current time (6/25/42), still a considerable bit of mop-up activity remaining there.
Evacuation of US and Philippine merchant and naval ships from the Philippines was considerably less of an Allied success in AE compared to CHS. While US and Philippine ships departed the Philippines in CHS unopposed and virtually without loss, this process was a relative disaster in AE – the difference being a combination of a rather aggressive presence by Japanese surface naval units and parts of the Baby KB in the central Philippines/northern DEI helped by some difficulties I was having in ship movement at that point in the game. In our AE game, Pillager took out the US cruisers Houston and Boise plus a considerable number of transport and auxiliary ships.
For the most part, the DEI held out about as long in AE as in our previous CHS match. The Japanese capture of major bases on Borneo and Java occurred approximately at the same time in both games (i.e. Soerabaja captured on 3/14 in AE, 3/11 in CHS). Pillager’s Japanese conquest of the DEI in AE was somewhat more methodical, especially regarding the capture of Palembang. The fall of Palembang was one month later in AE (4/16 vs 3/20 in CHS) – this mainly due to Pillager (in AE) securing all the possible air bases surrounding Palembang before capturing Palembang itself. It possible the Japanese delay in capturing Palembang in AE may have been the result of an earlier Allied action that followed the Japanese capture of Tarakan and Balikpapan – heavy damage to captured oil facilities in these two bases from Dutch 2E bombers and US B-17’s employed on bombing strikes in AE after they fell into Japanese control. The bombing strikes turned out to be rather effective and at a rather low cost.
There are still Allied controlled bases in the eastern DEI as of 6/25/42 in AE, this was also true in our CHS game (no difference).
In the Pacific theatres, Pillager has made (to date) considerably less progress in AE compared to our last time around in CHS, particularly with regard to establishing the Japanese outer perimeter line in the South Pacific that he had in CHS (Noumea – Suva - Pago Pago – Canton Is). While Pillager’s Japanese advance in AE through Rabaul, New Guinea (Port Moresby), the Solomons and Gilbert Islands showed little difference with the pace he accomplished in CHS, Japanese advances farther southward in the Pacific have either been considerably delayed or not occurred at all. From my (Allied) perspective, it’s hard to assess the exact cause or causes Pillager’s delays in the South Pacific, my best theory being either or both the following. I have done very little if anything from the Allied side to cause the delays.
(1) Differences between the AE and WitP internal game mechanics “putting the brakes” on initial Japanese advances in the Pacific theatres.
(2) Japanese logisitical problems. Shortages of troops, suppply, fuel and/or the transport to move them.
What I thought particularly noteworthy was that Wake Is held off two Japanese attacks before it fell in Jan 42. I’d be quite curious to hear Pillager’s story of Wake Is after this game is over.
Whatever the cause(s)… Pillager’s Japanese delays in the South Pacific (in AE) have allowed the opportunity to create Allied defensive positions farther forward (to include Suva and Samoa) and do this much more quickly and (in addition) create supporting rear-area bases behind these forward positions. Things are far from over in the South Pacific theatre but this is the status quo for now. In AE, US and Allied forces in the South Pacific theatre by mid-1942 have passed the strength of forces that reached the South Pacific in CHS at the end of 1943.
No Japanese invasion of Australia… at least not yet. Pillager was landing in NW Australia by 4/42 in CHS. With 3-4 uncommitted Japanese divisions at-large following the fall of Bataan plus transfers from the Kwantung Army, a Japanese invasion of Australia is far from out of the question. It does not appear likely an Allied defense of NW Australia in AE would be any more successful than CHS. If Pillager does launch a Japanese invasion of NW Australia this time around in AE, one deterrent to a Japanese advance southward from Darwin is a potential repeat of “Stalingrad in the Outback” that occurred at Daly Waters in our last CHS match. Had that action gone to its logical conclusion, it would have ended with destruction of nearly the entire Japanese army in NW Australia (10+ LCU’s including 2nd and 5th Divisions). Then there’s what already arrived in Australia from the US (for SW Pacific theatre) aboard the “EX” convoys via Capetown with more on the way.
One theatre where Pillager has been moving ahead of schedule is in China, to the point where it could become of some concern if the Japanese rate of progress continues.
“Sir Robin” Strategy:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – In general, “Sir Robin” appears to continue applying for much of the Allied opening strategy this time around, though maybe or maybe not to the extent it was in our first match.
One thing I intend to look for in this match through the rest of 1941 and at least early 1942 are opportunities for quick, local offensive actions where significant worthwhile results can be obtained and where they can be done at a somewhat low or moderate risk to Allied forces. Hard to say if, when, or where these opportunities might occur but we’ll have to see. Last time I got too caught up in "getting out of Dodge".
June 1942 actual – “Sir Robin” strategy did for the most part apply as predicted in 12/41. As expected, my opportunities for Allied counterattacks in any form were very limited.
Sending Dutch and US bombers to launch bombing attacks on Japanese-held oil facilities in Tarakan and Balikpapan proved to be somewhat valuable. The attacks on Tarakan resulted in a complete demolition of oil facilities there, with a lesser level of damage in Balikpapan mainly due to the lack of operational bombers remaining after the strikes on Tarakan. It turned out to be the best possible action that could have been done with the Dutch 2E bombers before their inevitable elimination with the fall of the DEI. The small number of US B-17’s withdrawn from the Philippines added to these attacks with considerable effect.
The bombing attacks on Tarakan and Balikpapan possibly had an effect on Pillager’s Japanese strategy for the capture of Palembang and likely prolonged the time it remained in Allied control before its fall. It appears the results at Tarakan and Balikpapan could have led to Pillager’s moves to capture all the surrounding airbases within range of Palembang before moving to capture Palembang itself.
Another aspect of the "Sir Robin" strategy that can be employed in AE is the concentration of supply points into central locations by increasing the required supply point value for the base at the central location to its maximum, the central locations in question being the main Allied defensive strongpoints (i.e. Bataan on Luzon, Soerabaja on Java, Palembang on eastern Sumatra). This tactic was employed mainly in the DEI and Luzon and evolved into a de-facto "scorched earth" strategy where supply points stocks were emptied at nearly all bases in the Japanese path of advance; leaving little or no supply to Jap LCU's or aircraft occupying the base after its capture and no available supply to support a continued Japanese advance.
Wheras in CHS, Pillager could feed Japanese LCU's and aircraft "off the land" from supply taken in captured Allied bases, in AE, Pillager very likely in many instances had to transport in every supply point needed by front-line Jap LCU's and aircraft. This action appeared to be particularly effective on Luzon, and to a lesser extent the DEI (though it still required Pillager to transport most of the supply required by his front-line forces as they advanced).
The "scorched earth" strategem is less useful in situations where Allied forces are performing a gradual retreat (mainland of Malaya during the withdrawal into Singapore, also China) and in areas where no Allied defensive stronghold is planned (Burma).
Evacuations:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – With restricted commands being as they are in AE compared to CHS, there are fewer air units and LCU’s that can be evacuated from Malaya, the Philippines, DEI, and other areas. More of these units will stand and die in AE than they did in our first match in CHS. My thoughts on this is that the added restrictions in AE will likely be more help than handicap, this situation pushing me away from early-game evacuations and into other directions.
June 1942 actual – Restricted commands in AE plus fewer PP spent on re-assigning commands of Allied LCU’s and air units in Malaya, DEI and Philippines, the total number of evacuated LCU’s and air units dropped considerably in AE from last time around in CHS. LCU’s transferred using PP expenditures include seven Dutch LCU’s (2 flak, 3 small combat units and two Base Force units), 27 Australian Brigade from Singapore, nine understrength RAF & RN Base Force LCU’s from Burma, possibly several other small LCU in Burma – most of these transfers handled at minimum PP cost.
As stated in my 12/41 estimate, the added restrictions in AE were more help than handicap in pushing me away from early-game evacuations and into other directions.
Early game PP Expenditures:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – In our first match, I had placed a great deal of emphasis (and PP expenditures) on evacuating Allied air units and LCU’s from Malaya, the Philippines, DEI, and other locations to India and Australia.
Having done that… it is quite possible these evacuations were at the expense of using PP for other (more critical) Allied early-game actions elsewhere. I had used few or no PP early in our last game for moving U.S. forces off the U.S. west coast to garrison bases in the South Pacific theatre before Pillager moved into the area with Japanese forces to take Canton, Samoa, Suva and Noumea. It’s hard to say if it would have made a difference, but the possibility has to be explored.
June 1942 actual – This time around, I spent a considerably larger share of PP activating US and some ANZAC LCU’s for shipping out mainly into the South Pacific theatre. The more rapid build-up of Allied forces in the South and SW Pacific was greatly helped by this change in PP expenditures.
Deer in the Headlights:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – I was certainly guilty of this last time. Paralysis resulting from some of Pillager’s early actions last time around very likely had crucial consequences, especially in the Pacific theatres. Paralysis, along with over-estimation of Japanese capabilities, contributed to at least some of the Allied difficulties in our last match. Real life imitating history... This time I have the opportunity of 20-20 hindsight to reduce or eliminate the paralysis and mis-estimation of Japanese capabilities.
June 1942 actual – Except for the sea movement fiasco I had with ships trying to get out of the Philippines in 12/41 (this resulting in the sinking of many ships including Boise & Houston), things remained rather orderly. Though on further examination, at least some if not most of those ships would have been sunk anyway given Pillager's actions.
< Message edited by wneumann -- 8/27/2011 3:33:44 PM >
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