wneumann
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The Big Picture #10a – The World as we know it six months (or so) after 12/08/41
Central Pacific:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – Hold Wake as long as possible. Hold Midway period. Otherwise, not much else to do for now.
July 1942 actual – Wake repelled several Japanese landings and managed to hold out until 1/42. I have no explanation to offer as to how it held out through multiple Japanese attacks before its fall, my original estimate being that it would fall almost immediately in 12/42. Nonetheless it was expected to fall and it did.
Midway is garrisoned and remains in US control. Pillager did not attempt an attack on Midway, this also being the case in our previous CHS game. Some construction activity is underway to gradually expand airfield and port facilities on Midway. For the moment, Midway is a relative backwater in the big picture as there is virtually no naval or air activity in the Central Pacific.
One activity that Pillager engaged in on several occasions during 1942 in our last CHS game was sending the KB on sorties into US-controlled areas of the Eastern Pacific, primarily in sea areas near the Line Islands, Johnston Is and south of Hawaii. The intent of these KB sorties appeared to have been mainly probing attacks with a secondary objective to destroy or disrupt US shipping movements between Hawaii and the South/SW Pacific theatres. The KB sorties in CHS had limited success and did not result in any significant naval actions. Up to this point, Pillager has not sortied KB into the Eastern Pacific in AE since the initial Pearl Harbor attack.
Until recently (6/42) the level of Japanese submarine activity in the Central Pacific in our AE game this time has been considerably less than in our previous CHS match. One possible theory as to why was the heavy toll taken during our CHS game by US surface ASW forces on Japanese subs Pillager sent into US controlled sea areas of the Eastern Pacific, this to the extent where Japanese subs detected in these sea areas had at or near 100% probability of attack if not destruction in the later stages of our CHS game (Pillager perhaps not having a short memory on this matter). In our current AE game, I’ve been largely content to note the presence of and otherwise ignore most Japanese subs as (1) Jap subs so far have minimal or no effect on my transport convoy system, (2) surface ASW warfare at least during the early war period is less effective in AE than in CHS, and (3) I’ve had several actions in AE between Japanese subs and US surface ASW where US ASW ships have been torpedoed and sunk.
My current general position on Allied surface ASW warfare in our AE game is to defer aggressively going after Jap submarines with surface ASW TF’s until later in the campaign when more effective Allied ASW weapons and systems become available, and I have larger numbers of Allied surface ASW ships that can be dedicated exclusively to “search and destroy” missions on Jap subs. Once those two conditions are true, plans are to become considerably more aggressive with employing Allied surface ASW. For now the benefits are limited and most Allied surface ASW activity is largely unnecessary (as Pillager’s subs have minimal impact or damage on my operations).
Up to this point in our AE game, both the Marshall and Gilbert island chains have been quiet with neither Pillager nor I putting a lot of emphasis on operations from these locations. That may change but attention on both sides has focused to the south.
South Pacific:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – Pillager got me here last time. A Japanese outer perimeter in the South Pacific area including Noumea, Suva, Samoa and Canton Is is very hard to crack. My early-game objective here is to prevent history from repeating itself.
There is very little question that Pillager will set up Japanese expansion in the Pacific to reach this outer perimeter line again, it proved to be very worthwhile in CHS and is equally so in AE. And every bit as hard for the Allied command to defend all these points in 1941 and early 42.
The opening Allied strategy in this theatre boils down to three questions… (1) How much time do the Allies have before the Japanese reach this line? (2) How many and what forces can the Allies bring into this area before the Japanese arrive? (3) How many and which of these bases can be effectively defended against a Japanese assault?
(A) In our last match in CHS, Canton Is fell to the Japanese on 1/5/42, Pago Pago was taken around 2/20/42. It would be a reasonable estimate to say events are likely to move at or close to the same pace this time as well.
(B) Even with Allied reinforcements immediately departing for the South Pacific, it’s going be a close race against Pillager.
The closest source for ground forces to reinforce South Pacific bases is New Zealand, however, NZ ground forces start the game in miserable condition with most New Zealand LCU’s having large numbers of disabled elements.
Australia is a possible source with several fully operational ground units that can be immediately dispatched (with PP expenditures) to the South Pacific area. One Australian infantry unit is now under orders for dispatch to the South Pacific and scheduled to depart in the next 1-2 days. Also, an attempt is being made to evacuate Lark Bn from Rabaul before the Japanese reach that location. A South Pacific base will very well be Lark Bn’s new home if I get it out of Rabaul.
Dispatching US forces from either Hawaii or the mainland US to the South Pacific will have to take into account the KB’s location and movement over the next few game turns. Until I can get a handle on the KB’s location and direction of movement, sending anything from here could run into a delay.
Somehow, from somewhere, we’re going to get something down there… How much and what we get down there determines the answer to question (3).
(C) It’s apparent that the Allies will not be able to defend everything, but may be able to defend at least one or possibly more of the major South Pacific bases.
The basis of my overall defensive plan in the South Pacific is to hold a sufficient portion of the Noumea-Suva-Pago Pago-Canton Is line so as to maintain a viable “bridgehead” in any Japanese outer perimeter line Pillager may attempt to form along this axis.
From an administrative standpoint, defense of the South Pacific theatre will be divided roughly into two areas: a Western Area (using mainly ANZAC forces) centered on Suva, and an Eastern Area (with mainly US forces) centered on Pago Pago. Thus, the planned “bridgehead” is projected to center on Suva and Pago Pago. After these two locations, Canton Is will be held so as to maintain an relatively unobstructed line of communications between the US and the South Pacific/New Zealand/Australia. Noumea is the most difficult of the four to defend and also the closest to major Japanese bases at Truk and Rabaul (once this is captured). Noumea will receive the lowest priority and estimates are that it is likely to fall into Japanese control.
Both the Lexington and Enterprise CV task forces are being dispatched into the South Pacific. Along with locally available Allied surface TF’s, these naval forces will be employed to disrupt Japanese invasion forces moving southward as much as possible at least until Pillager gets his ducks lined together and sends the KB south to end the party. Available PT boats at Pearl Harbor are being dispatched to (yet to be determined) bases in the South Pacific to assist in local defense against Japanese surface naval or invasion TF’s.
In short… we’re going to do what we can with what we can get down there without losing most or all of it (though expecting to lose some of it).
July 1942 actual – In the South Pacific, Pillager’s Japanese advance is running behind the schedule he followed in our last CHS game. In our current AE game to date, the Japanese have rather gradually taken Canton Is, the Solomons, Ndeni, Luganville and Noumea with no or token opposition. With KB hanging about nearby, there is so far little point to raising any effective Allied opposition. For the Japanese in this AE match, easy conquests in the South Pacific may be over.
Allied reinforcements from New Zealand and the mainland US have steadily accumulated in both Suva and Samoa with more on the way. The main island positions on Fiji and Pago Pago are already occupied in strength (one US division plus other LCU’s in each location), well supplied and with ample fortifications. Supporting positions on surrounding islands (Savaii, Tongatapu, Niue and others) are already in place or in the process of being set up. Another feature of the Samoa-Suva position is development of Auckland and Tahiti as rear-area support bases. Emphasis has also been placed on creating and maintaining a secure a line of communication from Auckland and Tahiti to the forward positions at Suva and Samoa.
30 US and Allied naval search planes (PBY’s and some Hudsons) are now based on Suva and flying almost continuous patrols covering the N, NW and W approaches to Suva and Samoa. About 40-50% of the total US submarine fleet (including all S-class boats) are now operating in the South Pacific, mainly in a continuous picket line surrounding Suva and Samoa to the N, NW and W as well as numerous patrols in the Coral Sea and its entry points from the north. US fleet subs operating from Pearl Harbor occupy a continuous north-south axis of patrol zones from the Japanese Home Islands, through the sea areas E of the Marianas and surrounding Truk on all sides, with the southern end of this axis extending to the northern sea approaches to Rabaul, the Solomons and Ndeni/Luganville. Pillager’s most recent sortie of the KB ran into three of the US fleet subs patrolling S of Truk and N of the Solomons, one of these subs having multiple contacts from the KB.
Auckland and Sydney currently provide full support and replenishment for Allied sub operations in the South/SW Pacific with Brisbane and Suva available as forward bases for refueling.
Allied LBA has not been employed in any combat role in the South or SW Pacific up to this time, though a network of bases are in place where US and Allied squadrons with mainly PBY and some Hudsons are flying more or less continuous naval search missions. Suva currently has the largest concentration of naval search planes followed by Australian east coast bases and Auckland.
In a manner of speaking, I’m concentrating most of my “eggs” in the South Pacific in one basket (Suva and Samoa) at the expense of others (Solomons, Efate, Luganville and Noumea), but my view has been that I was not going to adequately guard all the baskets anyway. Give unto Tojo what he is going to get anyway (Rabaul, Port Moresby, Solomons, Efate, Luganville and Noumea) and provide him with a wall (Suva and Samoa) to smack into later.
New Zealand:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – Auckland will be developed as quickly as possible into the primary forward operating base for Allied naval forces in the South Pacific.
July 1942 actual – This has largely been accomplished. Auckland is already functioning as the “U-boat pen” of the South Pacific. Auckland has large quantities of supply and fuel brought from the mainland US plus a considerable quantity of resource points picked up from production in Noumea and Suva. As stated earlier, Auckland will also be serving as the primary rear-area support base for forward positions on Suva and Samoa. Plans are to route most LCU’s, LBA, supply and fuel, etc arriving in the South Pacific theatre through Auckland. Auckland also being the primary destination port for the large transport convoys reaching the South Pacific theatre from Hawaii or the mainland US (exceptions of course will be made but Auckland being the general rule).
Rabaul:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – As stated above, plans are to evacuate Lark Bn from Rabaul and re-deploy this unit probably in the South Pacific area.
July 1942 actual – Lark Bn had been evacuated from Rabaul to Suva in 12/41. Lark Bn is also a sub-unit of 8th Australian Division and has since transferred from Suva to mainland Australia for building of this division from its existing sub-units (27 Australian Brigade plus three Bns).
Surviving elements of several other LCU including Rabaul Det Base Force and 2/1 Independent Coy were airlifted from open coastal hexes near Rabaul and Kavieng (after Japanese capture of these bases) to Australia by US and Australian PBY and Catalina squadrons. Both LCU have been rebuilt in Australia to full TOE strength.
Force N (ANZAC cruisers) intercepted the Japanese amphibious TF for Rabaul on 12/21/41 after the Jap transports already disembarked the invasion force. In this action 4 Jap PB plus a half-dozen Jap AK of various sizes were destroyed with no loss or damage to the Allies.
New Guinea and Port Moresby:
Dec 1941 estimate (quote from original post) – Defense of Port Moresby proper is receiving a lower priority relative to defensive operations in the South Pacific area. However, locally available Allied surface naval forces will be attempting to disrupt Japanese invasion operations as and where favorable conditions exist.
July 1942 actual – Port Moresby and all of eastern New Guinea fell to the Japanese during Feb-March 42. As in the case of Rabaul (above), US and Australian PBY and Catalina squadrons evacuated elements of or full-strength Allied LCU’s from base and open coastal hexes in eastern New Guinea to Australia. Evacuated LCU from New Guinea include Port Moresby Brigade, 15 RAAF Base Force, C and D Coys/NG Rifles – these LCU also being rebuilt to full TOE strength.
While small infantry LCU’s have limited usefulness in most situations, they could later serve a purpose when loaded aboard submarine transports and dropped off at unoccupied Japanese bases.
The Air War:
Overall plans have been to not employ Allied LBA in combat (unless absolutely necessary) until combat-worthy Allied planes are available and issued to squadrons on a sufficiently large scale and a sufficiently large “mass” of trained Allied combat LBA squadrons reach the forward theaters to begin combat operations with a reasonable degree of success.
Up to this point, with the exception of squadrons being used for naval search from forward bases, practically all Allied air units have been engaged in full-time training. My usual training pattern for individual squadrons has been to focus on specialties (air-to-air combat, naval bombing, land bombing, recon/naval search and ASW to a lesser extent). Squadrons operate continuously at a 100% training level until the squadron reaches a fatigue level of 30 or over, then the squadron is stood down until fatigue resets to zero and the process repeated. A considerable pool of pilots with 65-70 or over skill levels in various specialties is now in place. It should be noted here that pilots in many 2E bomber squadrons are in specialized training for low level naval bombing, this with the intent of extensively using 2E bombers on skip-bombing naval attacks (or whatever in AE passes for them).
Until very recently, nearly all US air squadrons starting the game or entering as reinforcements in the mainland US and Hawaii have remained there in training. This mainly for two reasons: (1) pilot training and (2) assigned priorities of PP expenditures and transport capacity for transfer and movement out of the mainland US and Hawaii to forward theatres.
Movement of US LBA squadrons from the mainland US and Hawaii has begun only within the last month or two (in game time). Air units bound for the SW Pacific and a few for US Tenth AF in Southeast Asia are being transported aboard the convoys leaving the Eastern US to Australia via Capetown – the first air units already reaching Australia. Air units for the South Pacific theatre are leaving in convoys from the US West Coast and Pearl Harbor. Current plans are to concentrate arrival of US LBA air forces in the South Pacific at Auckland and dispatch them to forward bases from there. CVE Long Island and possibly other CVE’s will be used to “shuttle” air units from Auckland and Australian bases into forward airfields when this capacity is needed due to flying range limitations and/or possibility of enemy action if squadrons are transported by sea using other means.
Movement of LBA squadrons into forward areas of the Pacific theatres is also being prioritized by aircraft types – fighters and patrol squadrons having first priority, followed by land-based dive and torpedo bomber squadrons. Transport planes will follow, with 4E and then 2E bombers coming last. This is the approximate order in which I expect to be using planes (by type) in forward theatres on a large scale, however, events may intervene and require unanticipated variations to this “script”.
Deployments from the mainland US:
Compared to our last game in CHS, US deployments from the mainland US to the South and SW Pacific theatres have greatly accelerated in AE, probably as much as 18 months or so ahead of the schedule from our last CHS game in many cases.
A number of US naval auxiliary ships (tenders, oilers, etc) from the mainland US and Hawaii are already operating in the South Pacific and from Australia, these ships being combined with many evacuees from the DEI and Philippines. I currently have no time frame in place for US surface combat and carrier naval forces entering the South Pacific, these forces for the moment remaining in the Eastern Pacific or on the US West Coast until I have a definite plan or operation to employ these forces in the South Pacific.
Four complete US divisions are already deployed in the South or SW Pacific – Americal and 32nd Infantry Divisions in Australia, 41st Division on Suva, 40th Division on Pago Pago. The remaining sub-units of US 3 Marine Division will arrive in Australia aboard the next off-map convoy from the Eastern US, once they arrive the full 3 Marine Division will be formed. Other US infantry LCU’s now in the South or SW Pacific theatres include two regiments of 2 Marine Division and several US RCT’s. US 27th Infantry Division is already transferred to the South Pacific command and remains in the mainland US for now while building to its full TOE strength from the replacement pools (now at about 80%) – this unit scheduled to ship out once it reaches full strength. The third regiment of US 2 Marine Division is also in the mainland US building to full TOE strength from replacements. Many US artillery, tank and combat engineer LCU’s have already reached Australia or the South Pacific.
US headquarter, construction and base force LCU’s are also now in the South and SW Pacific theatres with others in various stages of transit.
Many LBA squadrons have departed the mainland US, a few of these already arrived in forward theatres, most of them currently enroute aboard a transport convoy at some point in its transit.
The largest single route for deployments from the mainland US has been the off-map convoys from the Eastern US to Australia via Capetown (the “EX” convoys). Currently, about 200 large long-range US and other Allied transports are operating along this route at different points and stages of transit. Cargo carried across this route is mainly destined for the SW Pacific theatre with a smaller amount for the South Pacific.
Sea transport of most cargoes to the South Pacific is coming from the US West Coast, most of these convoys going directly to the South Pacific from the US West Coast (rather little of this transport traffic passing through or even near Pearl Harbor).
Sea transport convoys from the mainland US to forward areas have been highly organized, well secured and well concealed.
The general procedure I’ve employed for re-assignment and movement of US forces from the mainland US has developed as a sequence of steps outlined below.
(1) PP expenditure to transfer LCU’s and air units from restricted commands as necessary. This step I do first before any replacement elements or planes are added into the LCU or squadron to build it up to full strength. This accomplishes two things – First, the PP cost to transfer command of an under-strength LCU is lower than it is to transfer it after it’s brought up to full strength. Second, elements in the LCU replacement pools are targeted only at those LCU’s that are being prepared to “ship out”. Note that to do this, the replacement option must be turned off on all LCU’s and air units until you actually intend to start their build-up to full strength.
(2) Drawing elements or planes from replacement pools for all LCU’s and air units that are under full strength is done in the mainland US before the LCU or air units departs. The premise of this is that any supply points, etc used to draw replacements from the pools to get an air unit or LCU to full TOE strength is expended from stocks (at their source) in the mainland US rather than from supply points in theatre or at a forward base that had been shipped in from somewhere else and can be better used for other purposes. In those cases where the LCU or air unit must be transferred from a restricted command, step (1) is always completed before the unit draws any replacement pool elements or planes.
(3) Use of sea transport capacity for LCU and air unit departures from the mainland US is organized along the following priority system. LCU’s have highest priority -combat units (Infantry, Tank, Artillery) coming first, then engineer and HQ LCU’s. Departure of air units have had lower priority for the most part due to several factors including pilot training and availability of planes in the replacement pools. Priority of movement for different types of air units roughly follows the order described at the end of the section on “Air War”.
(4) LCU’s and air units ready for departure from the mainland US are moved to the port at which the transport convoy they will be loaded on is being formed. Unless circumstances require an exception, individual LCU’s being transported by sea will be loaded aboard two or more transport ships, this to prevent loss of the entire LCU if one of the ships is sunk. Vacant cargo space aboard transports carrying elements of an LCU is filled with either supply or fuel. In practice, transport ship(s) carrying LCU’s and air units will be placed in a transport convoy rather than these ship(s) moving at sea independently.
(5) All transport ships and auxliaries leaving the mainland US (regardless of destination) are loaded to their full cargo capacity before departure. No wasted space.
< Message edited by wneumann -- 9/11/2011 1:33:00 AM >
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